R: 1890's Shift to Colonial Imperialism

Resolved: The 1890's saw a major shift in geopolitics in the normalization of colonial imperialism as a tool for powerful nations.

In the 1870's, the world had its share of powerful non-imperialist* countries -- the United States, which had recently made a major shift to modernity with the Civil War; Japan and Russia, which were doing the same with the Meiji Restoration and Tsar Alexander II, respectively; and recently formed nations, like Germany and Italy; as well as Austro-Hungary, which was landlocked. As such, anti-colonial activists and thinkers commonly embraced "modernity" as conceived in the West, as a way of beating their overseers, forming the "copy their ways to beat them" strategy; that "modern" ideas like democracy, industrial capitalism, and what have you, do not require the subjugation and exploitation of other peoples. Indeed, a number of non-western "modernizers" and reformers explicitly used countries like Germany and the United States as models for their own way forward (e.g. Meiji Constitution imitated Germany's, Sun Yat Sen's American influence, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani's philosophy of the "Fatherland", etc).

But then, in the 1890's, three strong nations that had been examples of non-imperial strength embraced colonial imperialism themselves -- first Germany, then Japan, and finally the United States.

First was Germany. Though the nation had gotten African colonies in the 1884 Berlin Conference, Bismarck had little planned for them, seeing the land claim as a way to help in relations with Europe; "my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia, and here... is France, and we're in the middle — that's my map of Africa." However, in 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm II fired Bismarck and shifter German policy from one of realpolitik to Weltpolitk, a policy of "World Power" or "Our Place in the Sun"; Germany would not only "develop" her own colonies (e.g.), but actively sought out new ones (as well as developing naval power to protect said empire).

Then, Japan's modern imperial era began in 1894, with the start of the Sino-Japanese War. Then the United States made its shift to true colonialist empire in 1898 with the annexation of Hawaii and the Spanish American War. The US, I would argue, had previously been expansionist (similar to Russia), which I would argue is different from colonial imperialism (which what this thread is talking about). Both these conflicts were motivated, in large measure, by seeking to open new foreign markets for the industrial powers, glossed over with rhetoric of liberation -- Korea, in the case of Japan, and the Spanish colonies, in the case of the US.

This normalization of colonial imperialism left an indelible mark on how the world thinks about modernity -- a connection between militarism and progress popularly conceived in powerful nations in the years leading up to the First World War; stronger strains of anti-liberal sentiment among anti-colonialsit (and some socialist) thinkers and activists in the years following the catastrophe; and to this day, said strains still influencing schools of various schools of thought skeptical or opposed to "progress" as commonly accepted by our world civilization.*

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OK, that turned out a little longer than I thought. So what do you guys think? Did the 1890's see a major shift toward normalizing colonial imperialism? If so, any thoughts my analysis of the effects?

*I had a couple examples, but thought they might hijack the thread and get it moved to chat, so I'm holding off for now.

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CONSOLIDATE: Also, important note: Following the Sino-Japanese War, China was divided into spheres on influence (with Russia among the dividers, who also gained influence in Korea, etc).

Also of note: Italy, who AIUI previously sought and gained colonies for purposes of national pride more than economic resources or markets, made a bid to conquer Ethiopia in 1895 (to fail, but still).
 
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Resolved: The 1890's saw a major shift in geopolitics in the normalization of colonial imperialism as a tool for powerful nations.

I'm not sure if this is meant to be an attempt at an alternate history, or an analysis of actual history. The nature of the forum would make the former more appropriate, but none of the actual events seem to have changed. As such, I'm going to assume it's the latter, otherwise many of my points won't make a great deal of sense.

This argument stands or falls on the assertion that the powers you highlight as being "non-imperialist" or "expansionist" changed their attitudes in the 1890s. However, the assertion is predicated on the powers you highlight being "non-imperialist", and there being a qualitative difference in "imperialism" and "expansionism". The problem is that your definition of "imperialism" seems to be "if you get on a boat to do it, it's imperialism; if you march or ride, it's expansionism".

The easiest way to see whether an artificial division is being made between expansionism and imperialism is via a thought experiment. If the British had sent an expeditionary force into Afghanistan, launched an night attack on the city of Kandahar led by a Church of England vicar, captured the city after two days of fighting killing several thousand of the defenders, and annexed the city as the new capital of British Afghanistan, this would be seen as a clear example of "imperialism". Therefore, the argument for classing it as "expansionism" just on the grounds it was the Russians who were doing it to Samarkand seems fairly weak. Similarly, if the discovery of gold in Zululand had led to an attempt by the British to buy the whole territory and relocate the natives to Swaziland, and the Zulu refusal resulted in the British declaring war, sending columns into the territory, cutting off food supplies, and forcing Cetshwayo to flee to the Transvaal, I have no doubt this would be cited as an example of "imperialism". Replace Britain with the US, and Zulu with Indian, and all of a sudden it becomes "expansionism".

This for me is the major problem with the thesis. However, I'm sure there are others. For instance, I'm not an expert on either Japan or Austria-Hungary, but I suspect the classification of these as "non-imperialist" may be debateable, particularly in the light of Austria-Hungary's extensive Balkan holdings. Nor is anti-colonial thought my area of expertise, but it strikes me that anti-colonial thinkers are prone to take what ideas they want from other societies without too much concern over ideological coherence: case in point, the number of them who idolise the imperialist, fascist states of Germany and Japan in the 1930s and 40s. As such, their looking to the US and Germany doesn't prove that these states were "non-imperialist". On the other hand, if we take the assumption as stated, we then face the question of why the vast number of Indian anti-colonial thinkers who were inspired by British political discourse on liberty don't also prove Britain to be a "non-imperialist" state.

So the question becomes- why might the powers you identified appear to have changed their minds about the role of overseas colonies. In the case of Germany, you present Bismarck's attitudes as completely representative of the state of mind in Germany at the time without questioning whether this is the case. Certainly, if Germany colonial policy rapidly changed following his sacking, it suggests that the shift is pre-1890s. You then cite the US, Japan and Italy moving into the colonial sphere as examples of a changing mentality. What you fail to acknowledge is that in the period before 1870 (or even later) these powers are expanding internally, recently united, hastily modernising, fighting civil wars, or a mixture of the above (as indeed is Germany). The idea that these countries suddenly decided it was fine to take overseas colonies is therefore less persuasive than the fact that overseas colonies were already a normalised part of the geopolitical sphere, but these powers either lacked the ability to take them or had more pertinent domestic priorities to divert their attention.
 
I'd agree with Rob, what the US and Russia did was complete imperialism.

To me an Empire is a state encompassing several ethnies on a largish area. See colonial Empires, Roman Empire, Chinese Empire, Monghol, Bizantine, etc...
 
I'd wondered if I was the distinction between expansionism and colonialism would need to be defended; now I know. Since it's getting late for me, I may have to come back to this later, but this is my attempt for now:

Both "colonial imperialism" (which is what I mean here by "imperialism") and "expansionism" involve "conquering" and subjugating a territory or other nation, it's true; but where the later is done with the goal of absorbing the new land being equally part of the conquering nation (eg new territory in the US being turned into new states), the former is done with the purpose of turning the conquered lands into colonies, whose economies are to be directed for the benefit of the mother country. So in America, for example, the growth of the country prior to 1898 was qualitatively different from lands taken that year (as well as military occupations in the following decades). Or, as a fictional example for Star Trek: the Dominion or the Cardassian Empires are a "colonial", while the Borg are more or less "expansionist".

This relates to the Original Point, because as I see it, in the 1890's, three nations shift toward (this definition of) Imperialism -- Germany, Japan, and the United States -- who, before said decade, managed to become among the most richest, powerful, and "modern" in the world without imitating the colonial model of Britain or France. So the question for the thread (after, I suppose, whether the distinct concept of colonial imperialism is valid) is whether these events -- the shift to Weltpolitik in Germany, the War with China in Japan, and 1898 in America -- were the points when said nations officially became committed colonial empires.
 
I'd wondered if I was the distinction between expansionism and colonialism would need to be defended; now I know.
Unfortunately, the definition does nothing to resolve the false dichotomy at the heart of the distinction. In fact, because it fails to recognise that the decision of whether to absorb the conquered territory or rule it separately depends as much on the technology available to the power as to that power's inclination, it more or less reproduces the assertion that "imperialism is something you do on a boat". It's also inconsistent: for instance, France- presumably included as an "imperialist" power- had treated areas in Algeria as parts of metropolitan France since 1848. When the Dutch send a governor on a boat to the East Indies, they're imperialist; the Austro-Hungarians send one by carriage to Bosnia-Herzegovenia, and that makes them non-imperialist and has the anti-colonial thinkers queuing up to take examples from.

Both the US in north America and the British in Australia sent settlers to a region semi-occupied by a nomadic or hunter-gatherer people, drove the original inhabitants out and took the land for themselves. Both the British in India and the Russians in central Asia defeated native kingdoms, installed a governor supported by troops, and traded and proselytised the natives. Yet the interpretation presented by "imperialism" versus "expansionism" is that the US and Russians are "expansionist", and the British are "imperialist". The main element connecting the US and Russia is that they shared a land border with the area they conquered: the two have little in common other than that.

This reduces the argument to a constitutional one, when all the significant insight that has come from studying the imperialism question recently has been from treating it as a question of mentalities, of intellectual history. Just because Russian maps painted their holdings in central Asia the same colour as their holdings in the Ukraine doesn't mean they thought of both (or, indeed, either) as integral parts of the Russian heartland; just because the US tolerated Indian settlements in formally unclaimed territories doesn't mean they didn't think of the whole of the north American continent as already rightfully theirs. If the Russians had any representative institutions, would they have included their new central Asian conquests in them? If Hawaii was three miles off the coast of America instead of three thousand, would we be arguing that the decision to organise it as a territory in 1900 clearly shows that the US remained an "expansionist" power?

whether these events -- the shift to Weltpolitik in Germany, the War with China in Japan, and 1898 in America -- were the points when said nations officially became committed colonial empires.
When Bismarck took those colonies in the 1880s, did he intend for them to be an equal part of the conquering nation? As you've said yourself, he didn't. So either the shift to Weltpolitik was irrelevant in making Germany a committed "colonial imperialist" power, as distinct from an "expansionist" one, or you need to create a third category for states which viewed colonies as diplomatic rather than economic assets. Let's call it "diplomatic imperialism", and leave aside the rather knotty question of whether we now have to class Britain as a "colonial imperialist" before and after the Napoleonic wars and a "diplomatic imperialist" during it.

We're now left with the problem that when the Prussians contemplated buying upper California in the 1840s, it was because it'd bring them economic strength. So now we have to work out how Prussia was a "colonial imperialist" in the 1840s, became a "non-imperialist" state by the 1860s (or perhaps an "expansionist" state, if we bother to remember that she annexed most of the rest of Northern Germany during this period), switched to being a "diplomatic imperialist" for a brief period in the 1880s, and finally realised she was a "colonial imperialist" again in the 1890s.

The other alternative is that these labels don't make a great deal of sense in the context of the events that we're looking at.
 
On my iPhone at the moment, but:

I should note the key distinction between colonial imperialism and other types of "imperialism" (diplomatic land claims, expanisionism, etc) is not a moral one. If that helps.

Rather, the key things that definine colonialism: constitutional distinction and subjugation for the purposes of economic control and exploitation. As you noted, the difference is largely constitutional, though at heart it's really economic.

Is this just another way of saying "imperialism with boats"? Well, geography does seem to play a large role in whether this particular form of subjugation is adopted. British Imperialism was often derided as an "island governing a continent"; for our purposes, the key point there is that said land masses were fundamentally distinct and unequal, and noteworthy that the smaller "governed" the larger, even though the distance between them was also an implicit or explicit factor in the criticisms. A land empire (/"empire") has the option of easy expansion (since, for example, movement between the conquering and conquered territories is so much easier), so they tend to go that route, but there's nothing in the definition of colonialism that says they couldn't.
 
I should note the key distinction between colonial imperialism and other types of "imperialism" (diplomatic land claims, expanisionism, etc) is not a moral one. If that helps.
Doesn't bother me in the slightest: it's whether it makes sense.

Rather, the key things that definine colonialism: constitutional distinction and subjugation for the purposes of economic control and exploitation. As you noted, the difference is largely constitutional, though at heart it's really economic.
So how does this fit with the fact that Canada levied a tariff on British manufactured imports in 1858? This doesn't look like "subjugation for the purposes of economic control and exploitation": does this make Canada no longer a colony, despite the fact they're politically subordinate to and constitutionally distinct from the UK?

If the purpose of "imperial colonialism" was "subjugation for the purposes of economic control and exploitation", why does the 1885 Berlin conference guarantee free trade throughout the Congo Basin and prohibit monopolies or grants of special concessions? Surely the high point of "imperial colonialism" should see each power closing off the trade markets of its new colonies from one another in order to exploit them better?

Furthermore, how does this definition fit with the fact that Britain abolished preferential tariffs in their imperially subjugated and exploited Indian colony in 1860, round about the same time that the US were imposing the massively protectionist Morrill tariff on their non-colonial, unexploited, "expanded" homeland territory? Tariffs on goods coming into India from 1894, in the time you suggest Britain were at the height of "subjugation for the purposes of economic control and exploitation," were 5% on general imports and a list of duty free exclusions- regardless where those goods came from. The revenue, incidentally, is used to fund Indian infrastructure; the British officials in the UK government wanted India to have free trade with everybody, but the British officials making up the Indian government insisted on a tariff.
 
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I will say rob, though I still think colonial imperialism is an important and descriptively useful concept, your arguments against such are well reasoned and thought provoking. At the very least, it's clear to me that such a distinction is not universally recognized in intelligent and informed discussion. My thanks for your responses.

So how does this fit with the fact that Canada levied a tariff on British manufactured imports in 1858? This doesn't look like "subjugation for the purposes of economic control and exploitation": does this make Canada no longer a colony, despite the fact they're politically subordinate to and constitutionally distinct from the UK?

I'd say yes.

If the purpose of "imperial colonialism" was "subjugation for the purposes of economic control and exploitation", why does the 1885 Berlin conference guarantee free trade throughout the Congo Basin and prohibit monopolies or grants of special concessions? Surely the high point of "imperial colonialism" should see each power closing off the trade markets of its new colonies from one another in order to exploit them better?

Furthermore, how does this definition fit with the fact that Britain abolished preferential tariffs in their imperially subjugated and exploited Indian colony in 1860, round about the same time that the US were imposing the massively protectionist Morrill tariff on their non-colonial, unexploited, "expanded" homeland territory? Tariffs on goods coming into India from 1894, in the time you suggest Britain were at the height of "subjugation for the purposes of economic control and exploitation," were 5% on general imports and a list of duty free exclusions- regardless where those goods came from. The revenue, incidentally, is used to fund Indian infrastructure; the British officials in the UK government wanted India to have free trade with everybody, but the British officials making up the Indian government insisted on a tariff.

Short answer: economic exploitation isn't the same thing as mercantilism (though the later was often a common incarnation of the latter). Holding a nation's market open against its will (especially when combined with social, economic, and political interventions meant to "guide" the local economy for the "common" benefit), can work just as well (and arguably better) as simply taxing the colonial population and forcing preferential treatment for imperial imports.

Longer answer: ... Actually not sure. Might need guidelines or just time to think on how to elaborate.
 
Robcraufurd said:
We're now left with the problem that when the Prussians contemplated buying upper California in the 1840s, it was because it'd bring them economic strength.

That sounds quite cool, would you have a source? Sounds like fun to read about




All these definitions about the way you want to rule your conquered territories kinda bother me. If the will for integration makes you expansionist rather than imperialist does that mean the Roman Empire was not imperialist? Does that mean the Napoleon Empire was not imperialist?

What about this, Imperialism is the will to conquer and assimilate foreign people and cultures in one nation. Which the Brits tried to do in India with schools (as seen in Kim for example), which Napoleon did with Republican ideals, which the French did with education ("nos ancetres les gaulois...").

Expansionism would be expanding on an area which is already under your sphere of influence (kinda like Germany conquering Silesia) while Imperialism is reaching out outside your sphere of influence.

Waddya all think?
 
Might need guidelines or just time to think on how to elaborate.
The problem is how to do so without keeping the broad interpretation and trying to minutely redefine the terms used in order to fit. I suppose it's possible that the US, Italy, Germany and Japan all had a similar change in mentalities within five to ten years of one another, but when I see that list there's a more obvious and pertinent connection. In the 1850s, the US was split by sectional tension; Japan was in isolation from the rest of the world; Germany and Italy were a patchwork of minor sovereignties, with Austria's fingers firmly wedged into their pie. The process of creating a single unified polity within their existing but theoretical borders, destroying any opposing sources of domestic power and fending off external rivals, was just as imperialist a project as Britain or France acquiring colonies overseas: more so, in fact, if we consider imperialism as a cultural project as well as a political one. The only difference in what they do in the 1890s (or earlier, in the case of Germany) is that they've all reached the stage of being able to project their power outwards, rather than having to concentrate inwardly.

That sounds quite cool, would you have a source? Sounds like fun to read about
John A. Hawgood, "A Projected Prussian Colonization of Upper California", Southern California Quarterly Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec. 1966), pp. 353-368.

Expansionism would be expanding on an area which is already under your sphere of influence (kinda like Germany conquering Silesia) while Imperialism is reaching out outside your sphere of influence.
Still has the problem of defining "sphere of influence". When the British conquer the Punjab, is that inside their sphere of influence because they already control India? Or outside it because it's on a different continent from the UK mainland?

Personally, when it comes to imperialism, I tend to agree with Porter:
"A stronger people overcomes a weaker neighbouring people, with varying degrees of force or consent, then dominates it, again in a variety of ways: enslavement, government, absorption. The tendency is as old as Adam. It is certainly not a peculiarity of modern imperialism."
 
I suppose it's possible that the US, Italy, Germany and Japan all had a similar change in mentalities within five to ten years of one another, but when I see that list there's a more obvious and pertinent connection. In the 1850s, the US was split by sectional tension; Japan was in isolation from the rest of the world; Germany and Italy were a patchwork of minor sovereignties, with Austria's fingers firmly wedged into their pie. The process of creating a single unified polity within their existing but theoretical borders, destroying any opposing sources of domestic power and fending off external rivals, was just as imperialist a project as Britain or France acquiring colonies overseas: more so, in fact, if we consider imperialism as a cultural project as well as a political one. The only difference in what they do in the 1890s (or earlier, in the case of Germany) is that they've all reached the stage of being able to project their power outwards, rather than having to concentrate inwardly.

Now we're talking! As it happens, I actually find this pretty compelling analysis -- the United States, Japan, Germany, and Italy, really were all more or less "founded" as modern nations around the same time, arriving to the world scene in the 1860's and early 70's. If colonialism can be thought of as the "natural" next step (though I'm somewhat hesitant to say it is), it would explain then why said nations made this change around the same time.
 
Still has the problem of defining "sphere of influence". When the British conquer the Punjab, is that inside their sphere of influence because they already control India? Or outside it because it's on a different continent from the UK mainland?

They control it, yes, but was it in their cultural sphere of influence? (I should have been more precise, sorry). Did they stay long enough to assimilate the locals?

The best example that comes to mind is the roman Empire. Gallic people were thoroughly Romanised after a few centuries. In your example, the Punjab people would not self-identify as British but the Gauls (at least in the south) would consider themselves Roman, like the people from Anatolia or Illyria, even though they were conquered at some point.


[quote[Personally, when it comes to imperialism, I tend to agree with Porter:
"A stronger people overcomes a weaker neighbouring people, with varying degrees of force or consent, then dominates it, again in a variety of ways: enslavement, government, absorption. The tendency is as old as Adam. It is certainly not a peculiarity of modern imperialism."[/quote]

I... actually agree with that definition. Then it all depends on how you define "people" ;)
 
Wouldn't it be better to classify expansionism as a subset of imperialism, with colonialism being another separate one?

FWIW, I think most of the issue here is defining Imperialism; whether it's based purely on 'Imperator' and any state which has an Emperor or if it's any multi-ethnic state. I suppose that begs the question; what distinguishes a multi-ethnic state (i.e. Yugoslavia or Burma) from an Empire (i.e. Russia or Austria-Hungary)?
 
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