Questions on the Marne

[Hörnla]

During the recent days, I concerned myself a lot with the offensives of 1914. I would like to put up a few of my thoughts for discussion.

These points are not necessarily alternate history, but the discussions will probably be.


1.
Some commentators act as if the moves by the 2nd, and then also the 1st German Army to move East of Paris instead of West of Paris was some sort of operational "original sin".

But wouldn't that have only worsened the problems encountered during the Battle on the Marne, and possibly spelt disaster?
How in the world should the 1st army have accomplished to encircle Paris?


2.
If I understand correctly, Lanrezac kept acting a lot more defensive and cautious than Joffre demanded when opposing the Germans in Belgium and near the frontier.

Attacking the German right wing relentlessly while being outnumbered sounds like a recipe for desaster to me, however. I could easily imagine a dis-integration of the French 5th Army as a result, and the consequences would come close to the French being doomed.


3. It is a wet dream of German alternate history NOT to have the two corps sent away to the Eastern Front, where H&L unexpectedly managed to halt the Russian advance.
What I couldn't find so far is where exactly these corps had been taken away from. I'd say we cannot assume that they accidentially had been exactly in the 20 mile gap between 1st and 2nd army in September...

 

[rast]

1. The 'hammer' was to be 2nd Army, 1st only to act as flank guard. Task: find the side - and if possible the rear - of the opposing French forces and roll them up.
2. He was very careful and saved his army at least twice by prudent retreat, which cost him his job.
3. The two corps had been the siege force at Namur. GdResK belonged to 2nd Army, XI. AK to 3rd Army. - In addition, V. AK had been earmarked for transfer to the east, but was quickly given back to 5th Army - after having marched to Metz...

 

[bm79]

Here's another question: has anyone created a credible AH.com TL where the Schlieffen plan worked as planned? It's the dream of a man who tried to create a Napoleonic era strategy that couldn't really account for modern defensive weaponry or the strength in numbers of conscripted armies on each side. Once the Germans decided not to violate Dutch neutrality, there's not enough real estate left to effectuate a sweep to the west of Paris outside of a complete French collapse. Without the motorized transport that would be available to later generations, it frankly smacks of a pipe dream.

1) Wholeheartedly agree. Had they tried an end-around, the most likely result would have been at least a division or two cut off and pocketed in the Allied counterattack.

2) Idem. Lanzerac was sacrificed on the alter of guerre à l'outrance, and France owes him an apology.

3) Rast's sources are of course without reproach

 

[Mikestone8]

By the Marne, it was already too late for a knockout. The lines of communication were too favourable to the French. At best, the Germans could have got a Western Front substantially further west, perhaps leading to a victory in 1915/16, but not in 1914.

Afaics, the ethnic minority in the woodpile seems to have been general Von Bulow. Had he not interfered with Kluck and Hausen, both Lanrezac and the BEF might have been outflanked and defeated in a western version of Tannenberg - which could indeed have led to a victory in 1914 - but once the BEF and V Army got the chance to retreat, the opportunity had been missed.

 

[rast]

Here's another question: has anyone created a credible AH.com TL where the Schlieffen plan worked as planned?

A Cannae-like victory à la Schlieffen's obsession, where the whole French Army is caught in one big cauldron - or forced into Swiss internment - was possibly never in the cards. And even Schlieffen himself knew this quite well, but that didn't keep him from dreaming.
However, even if the French managed to slip away, but the German right wing came down behind the French fortress line Verdun - Toul - Épinal, the initial objective would have been achieved. Together with the fortress line, the French would have lost the vast bulk of their heavy artillery, the old deBange etc. guns that IOTL kept them going for more than two years, until modern stuff in great numbers eventually became available in 1917.
The Germans would then have been able to send substantial forces (two or three armies) east, and the general plan for the two front war would have still been working. IOTL, it ended at the Marne and something new had to be devised. Trench warfare had never been part of Schieffen's inventory.

 

[Tallil2long]

The Schlieffen Plan was either a miscalculated plan to achieve what the Germans confidently expected to be a total victory, a plan born of near-desperation in the face of what the Germans regarded as an inevitable war against overwhelming odds, or something in between.

I suspect the last is closest to the truth. The Germans were confident (as am I) that, barring a complete abdication of all national interests by Germany, the French and Russians were determined to eventually bring them to war and crush them. And they believed that France and Russia were stronger than they eventually proved.

In such circumstances, the German had to concoct some plan that held out at least a hope of victory. Once such a plan was developed, that near-desperation would inevitably result in some Germans attaching a near-religious faith in the plan. After all, it seemed the only hope.

But in order to craft a plan that seemed plausible, they were forced to assume unrealistic abilities to march and sustain logistical support. In the end, those unrealistic assumptions doomed the plan -- barring seriously egregious blundering by the French and British.

So I think if you want the Plan to work, you have to have the Entente making mistakes which are well outside the (admittedly pretty broad) envelope of plausible military mistakes.

An absolute, utter failure by the French in coordinating their armies might do it, by allowing one or two Armies to be smashed in isolation. The BEF leadership committing to withdrawal from combat might do it. But both of these are just so unlikely as to border on ASB, IMHO.

Those of you who know more about the Plan and the Marne Campaign may prove my opinion to be nonsense, of course.

 

[Riain]

..........In such circumstances, the German had to concoct some plan that held out at least a hope of victory. Once such a plan was developed, that near-desperation would inevitably result in some Germans attaching a near-religious faith in the plan. After all, it seemed the only hope.

But in order to craft a plan that seemed plausible, they were forced to assume unrealistic abilities to march and sustain logistical support. In the end, those unrealistic assumptions doomed the plan -- barring seriously egregious blundering by the French and British.

.........

This pretty much accords with my thoughts on the subject. Even if the Germans managed to remove the 5th French army from the battle the logistics hurdles and marching distances are most likely too great.

That's not to say that they should have attacked in the east, the consolation prize of occupying northern France for 4 years gave the Germans the rare opportunity to fight the strongest form of warfare: strategic offensive/tactical defensive. This was the most important driver of the whole war.

 

[Hörnla]

Hello!
Thank you very much for the discussions and many ideas. Of course, I had read a lot about the Schlieffen plan, but I have never before so consciously followed the chain of events in detail as now during the centennial.

1. The 'hammer' was to be 2nd Army, 1st only to act as flank guard. Task: find the side - and if possible the rear - of the opposing French forces and roll them up.

That's an interesting point. When was this characterization envisaged? Because as the events unfolded, I think that switching the Commanders of 1st and 2nd Army (while keeping the superiority of 2nd army's command over 1st army) would rather have led to this development.

2. He was very careful and saved his army at least twice by prudent retreat, which cost him his job.

That's what I realized, too. And afterwards, the BEF would have had a very tough task.
I am not sure how Sir John French would have reacted if the next serious French troops would be 4th army in the Argonnes resp. the forming 6th army in Paris.

2) Idem. Lanzerac was sacrificed on the alter of guerre à l'outrance, and France owes him an apology.

As far as I know, France and Belgium bestowed their honours upon Lanrezac later on. Nevertheless, he demanded to be buried as a Civilian and without military pomp.
　

3. The two corps had been the siege force at Namur. GdResK belonged to 2nd Army, XI. K to 3rd Army. - In addition, V. ResK had been earmarked for transfer to the east, but was quickly given back to 5th Army - after having marched to Metz...

Thank you very much. Sherlock Holmes would have deducted that without sources. ;-)
So....more reserves for von Hausen, that's not spectacular; but an additional Corps for the 2nd Army, that could have made very much a difference during the Marne battle.
By "making a difference" I am not implying that the Germans crush France and envelop the majority of their forces, but that they can hold the ground up to the Marne or even beyond instead of retreating way, way back....and having the trenches of the war in the vincinity of Paris afterwards.

However, I find it hard to condemn Moltke for sending these corps away. Doing so is either Schlieffen-fandom or 20/20-hindsight. The Eastern Front was shaky enough even after Tannenberg, given the way the Austrians collapsed from the beginning of September onwards.

Here's another question: has anyone created a credible AH.com TL where the Schlieffen plan worked as planned? It's the dream of a man who tried to create a Napoleonic era strategy that couldn't really account for modern defensive weaponry or the strength in numbers of conscripted armies on each side. Once the Germans decided not to violate Dutch neutrality, there's not enough real estate left to effectuate a sweep to the west of Paris outside of a complete French collapse. Without the motorized transport that would be available to later generations, it frankly smacks of a pipe dream.

I think, the last sentence is the key, along with the issue of communications.
In reality, the German Armies were far closer to each other and to any place the OHL would pick for HQ than in the world of Schlieffen's "Denkschrift" (thought essay). If you look at the map and see how far the German soldier got on foot, and that this is about the limit of what you can ask.....how in the world should they continue all the rest of the way back to the Vosges and to Switzerland?
Or just have a look at the route most maps indicate as Schlieffen's task for 1st army. You just cannot do that un-motorized.
Concerning the sweep west of Paris, the issue is not (Nether)land, but the lack of manpower. 1st army was in the last days of the advance already obliged to juggle going after the French Vth & BEF with defending its flank against the new French VIth.
And here we have to excuse Schlieffen a bit. His order of battle envisaged a markedly mightier German Army. His essay didn't only entail the lesson "this is how we can beat France quickly" but also the demand "this is the number of divisions we need to do that". But the relation in strenght between France and Germany didn't develop that favourably for the Germans between 1905 and 1914.
　

By the Marne, it was already too late for a knockout.

I agree. Every possibility to markedly improve the German situation for Sep 5th would have had to happen beforehands. There would be still room for improvement which would have long-term consequences... But really knocking out France in two months, or even prior to Christmas? [Of course, we know 1940....but there is no 1940 without 14/18]

The lines of communication were too favourable to the French. At best, the Germans could have got a Western Front substantially further west, perhaps leading to a victory in 1915/16, but not in 1914.

I agree here, though I would imagine lines further South just as important. If a withdrawal only tot the Marne instead of the Aisne could be made possible, it would keep Verdun in a stranglehold, Paris almost a frontline city (and perhaps the French government permanently in Bordeaux), Reims, Soissons and Compiegne permanently in German control.
With this more difficult situation, the Entente might be unable to invest as much in the race to the sea and the frontline might end up further west here or there.
　

Afaics, the ethnic minority in the woodpile seems to have been general Von Bulow. Had he not interfered with Kluck and Hausen, both Lanrezac and the BEF might have been outflanked and defeated in a western version of Tannenberg - which could indeed have led to a victory in 1914 - but once the BEF and V Army got the chance to retreat, the opportunity had been missed.

You allude to Mons/Charleroi here?
As I said before, a more obedient and aggressive commander of the Vth would have done a Samsonow and done the Germans the favour.
Now if we assume that while still in Belgium BEF and the Vth get reduced to shadows of their former selves or even annihilated; I'd say that the results are felt in
a) the reaction of the Entente strategists AND politicians, as this would make Paris suddenly appear to be out in the open
b) the situation at the point of time WHEN the 1st and 2nd German army appear North/Northwest of Paris.
I don't think the Germans can march even faster, so it would still be early September.
　

That's not to say that they should have attacked in the east, the consolation prize of occupying northern France for 4 years gave the Germans the rare opportunity to fight the strongest form of warfare: strategic offensive/tactical defensive. This was the most important driver of the whole war.

A Cannae-like victory à la Schlieffen's obsession, where the whole French Army is caught in one big cauldron - or forced into Swiss internment - was possibly never in the cards. And even Schlieffen himself knew this quite well, but that didn't keep him from dreaming.

　
There has been some discussion in recent years in how far the German General Staff was aware of the dim chances, but nevertheless saw an operation à la Schlieffen as the best available option for the first months of the war in order to weaken France maximally.
(Of course, considering the existence of the British Empire, this is a naive calculation.)
The lightness with which the right wing was pulled back right now 100 years ago incicates to me, that this thought was at least existent. If it was a desparate gamble (imagine Hitler at the helm), the decision would have been sought right there at the Marne.

The Schlieffen Plan was either a miscalculated plan to achieve what the Germans confidently expected to be a total victory, a plan born of near-desperation in the face of what the Germans regarded as an inevitable war against overwhelming odds, or something in between.
I suspect the last is closest to the truth. The Germans were confident (as am I) that, barring a complete abdication of all national interests by Germany, the French and Russians were determined to eventually bring them to war and crush them. And they believed that France and Russia were stronger than they eventually proved.
In such circumstances, the German had to concoct some plan that held out at least a hope of victory. Once such a plan was developed, that near-desperation would inevitably result in some Germans attaching a near-religious faith in the plan. After all, it seemed the only hope.
But in order to craft a plan that seemed plausible, they were forced to assume unrealistic abilities to march and sustain logistical support. In the end, those unrealistic assumptions doomed the plan -- barring seriously egregious blundering by the French and British.
So I think if you want the Plan to work, you have to have the Entente making mistakes which are well outside the (admittedly pretty broad) envelope of plausible military mistakes.
An absolute, utter failure by the French in coordinating their armies might do it, by allowing one or two Armies to be smashed in isolation. The BEF leadership committing to withdrawal from combat might do it. But both of these are just so unlikely as to border on ASB, IMHO.
Those of you who know more about the Plan and the Marne Campaign may prove my opinion to be nonsense, of course.

I think you are not that wrong. And when we talk about Germany's mistakes in and prior to 1914, I'd agree that faulty geopolitical assessments and diplomatic priorities are as much to blame.
The military did indeed as much as could be asked; but it was the fault of the political leadership to abdicate its range of possibilities in order to follow a military concept.
Concerning the plan: I agree that a "Cannae" is not possible given that the French generals, with all the mistakes they already made in OTL, at least possess brains.
I also agree, to a certain degree, that a critical mass of French and Russian politicians desired to take Germany out in a two-front-war. But I am not convinced, that waiting would have been the inferior option. Actually provoking war without the other side playing along (as per OTL) is not as easy as it sounds, even in 1914.
Rapprochement with Britain was not impossible; Austria-Hungary was a horrible option for a strategic partner (as much as I love the k.k. monarchy for which my great-grandfather fought)....starting war in a situation with AH as aggressor allowing Italy to bail out was a miscalculation.
Every new invention in warfare gave industrialized and scientifically advanced Germany more of an edge over France and Russia, regardless of the latter's rapid economic progress. And then there is the question when and if Russia might erupt in unrest.

 

[fasquardon]

Reading this made me wonder: what if there had been an earlier invention of Pervitin (methamphetamine) and the Germans had used it on their soldiers for at least the invasion of France?

Would WW2 rates of marching save the Schlieffen plan?

fasquardon

 

[Johnny Canuck]

So....more reserves for von Hausen, that's not spectacular; but an additional Corps for the 2nd Army, that could have made very much a difference during the Marne battle.

I actually wonder if the reverse might be true. Even assuming Bulow deploys the additional corps on his right, once Kluck pulls III & IX Corps to the Ourcq, his right is still going to be outnumbered by the French forces opposite (I've read, though I can't remember where, that by the 9th his right was outnumbered 4:1, & I don't think one corps would be enough to redress this balance).

On the other hand, would an additional corps for Hausen on the 8th allow him to sustain the attack on the French 9th Army & prevent Foch from re-constituting his line?

 

[Mikestone8]

You allude to Mons/Charleroi here?

Yes -Sorry for not making that clearer.

As I said before, a more obedient and aggressive commander of the Vth would have done a Samsonow and done the Germans the favour.
Now if we assume that while still in Belgium BEF and the Vth get reduced to shadows of their former selves or even annihilated; I'd say that the results are felt in
a) the reaction of the Entente strategists AND politicians, as this would make Paris suddenly appear to be out in the open
b) the situation at the point of time WHEN the 1st and 2nd German army appear North/Northwest of Paris.
I don't think the Germans can march even faster, so it would still be early September.

Would they still be aiming at Paris?

As I understand things, their real target was the French armies - and with BEF and V Army smashed, presumably IV Army is now the French left flank. Wouldn't Kluck, Bulow and Hausen all be swinging south, trying to get at the rear of the remaining French forces? Obviously the French would be frantically trying to counter this, but it looks to me as if the decisive battles would be some ways east of Paris, which would only come within the battle zone if/when the decisive battle had already been fought.

 

[Hörnla]

Reading this made me wonder: what if there had been an earlier invention of Pervitin (methamphetamine) and the Germans had used it on their soldiers for at least the invasion of France?
Would WW2 rates of marching save the Schlieffen plan?

Good question. I recently watched a documentary on the issue. Of course that would have been a factor, but it is not the point. We also cannot ask for better means of communication or an armoured brigade...

I actually wonder if the reverse might be true. Even assuming Bulow deploys the additional corps on his right, once Kluck pulls III & IX Corps to the Ourcq, his right is still going to be outnumbered by the French forces opposite (I've read, though I can't remember where, that by the 9th his right was outnumbered 4:1, & I don't think one corps would be enough to redress this balance).
On the other hand, would an additional corps for Hausen on the 8th allow him to sustain the attack on the French 9th Army & prevent Foch from re-constituting his line?

The idea of Hausen bringing Foch's IXth into turmoil is interesting. Along with Klucks wild maneuvring and the forays of the BEF/Vth, this could turn the Battle on the Marne into a gigantique, chaotic Napoleonic battle.
Kluck's right being outnumbered 4:1 is really bad, but if that is down to 3:1 or 2.5:1, we have a situation where defense could be viable, provided the machine guns are well-used and their ammunition not depleted. Advance is still not possible in that situation, though.

Yes -Sorry for not making that clearer.

No problem, the question was due to my insecurity.

Would they still be aiming at Paris?
As I understand things, their real target was the French armies - and with BEF and V Army smashed, presumably IV Army is now the French left flank. Wouldn't Kluck, Bulow and Hausen all be swinging south, trying to get at the rear of the remaining French forces? Obviously the French would be frantically trying to counter this, but it looks to me as if the decisive battles would be some ways east of Paris, which would only come within the battle zone if/when the decisive battle had already been fought.

My mistake, I meant NORTHEAST of Pairs, not Northwest. I agree with you that IV Army would be the French western Flank, alongside the forming IXth. The German 2nd would go after these forces, supported by the 3rd and push them further and further Southeast.....this is what began to happen in OTL prior to the Entente move into the infamous 40-km-gap...
And if the IXth is pushed back, either to the Aube or eastwards along the front....how would Joffre react then?

I do not see (even Kluck) making it possible that the 1st continues to make the most mileage! Gallieni would still be in Paris and create the VIth, probably reinforced by the rest of the Vth and perhaps (if they don't head for the ports already) BEF. As in OTL, Kluck would have to go back to Paris to fight an equivalent to Battle on the Ourcq somewhere close to the French capital.
Afterwards it would be reasonable to have the 1st German army screen Paris, perhaps disrupt some of its links to the outside world, and organize the reinforcements coming through Belgium into an occupation of Northern France.
To put it short: whatever the French will be doing in Paris always has to distract the 1st.

 

[trajen777]

AN interesting point that could be considered is
1. The original plan called for 6 more corps being constructed, the % of German population could support this -- and Shleifen called for it
2. Keeping the right strong instead of dilution it to a double envelope by diverting forces to the left
3. Not sending troops to the East but keeping the forces in the West (Hoffman did not want or need these troops)
4. Would these forces have made a difference (i believe so) or would they have created more logistic bottlenecks ?)

Also

1. The SHleif plan was made "because the French will not accommodate us like in 1870 and attack headlong into the joint border".
2. That is exactly what the French did with something like 65% of their army
attacks across the border, So think if the Shleif plan had part A (what happened) and part B - if the French were stupid enough to repeat 1870, IN Part B the German armies fall back like they did on the left - those troops on the right instead of attacking in Belgium attack South and catch the French armies in flank (1870 again but more French troops captured however their are more French troops over all so does Paris fall or Not ? IN any matter France is massively weakened
3. Assuming plan B above does Britain enter fray with Belgium not invaded ?

 

[Mikestone8]

part B - if the French were stupid enough to repeat 1870, IN Part B the German armies fall back like they did on the left - those troops on the right instead of attacking in Belgium attack South and catch the French armies in flank (1870 again but more French troops captured however their are more French troops over all so does Paris fall or Not ? IN any matter France is massively weakened
3. Assuming plan B above does Britain enter fray with Belgium not invaded ?

Eventually maybe, but probably not right away. The Cabinet would take more persuading.

 

[NotYetRegistered]

I had a question on the Marne as well. At 9 September, the German 1st and 2nd Armies were in danger of being surrounded and destroyed. Moltke has a nervous breakdown but his subordinates ordered a retreat to the Aisne. What if the French and British had managed to destroy the German 1st and 2nd Armies?

By 9 September, the German 1st and 2nd armies were in danger of being encircled and destroyed. Moltke suffered a nervous breakdown upon hearing of the danger. His subordinates took over and ordered a general retreat to the Aisne, to regroup for another offensive

 

[Johnny Canuck]

I had a question on the Marne as well. At 9 September, the German 1st and 2nd Armies were in danger of being surrounded and destroyed. Moltke has a nervous breakdown but his subordinates ordered a retreat to the Aisne. What if the French and British had managed to destroy the German 1st and 2nd Armies?

I'm not sure if there is anything the British and French can do to destroy the German 1st and 2nd Armies by the 9th, which to me is the key date - even if Hentsch's car runs into a tree, it's pretty clear Bulow was going to order a retreat by the morning of the 9th. Plus, Bulow informed his neighbouring armies of his retreat, & I think the signal reached Kluck at noon (Hentsch had arrived 30 minutes earlier). Once Kluck knows that Bulow is actually retreating, he has no choice but to retreat himself. I'm not sure the BEF in particular could have advanced far enough to be in position to encircle 1st & 2nd armies by the morning of the 9th. Plus, if the British/French advance faster into the gap, I think it would be completely within his nature for Bulow to order an earlier retreat.

What a more rapid British/French advance might accomplish, however, is get them onto the heights north of the Aisne in strength before the Germans can entrench. The British/French were going to be stopped one way or the other (thanks to the arrival of the 'new' German 7th Army), but moving quicker prior to the retreat order might prevent the Germans from reconstituting their defence line on the Aisne. What would have been the next natural barrier north of the Aisne where the Germans could have made their stand?

 

[Riain]

I tend to believe that the Germans had reached their 'culminating point' by the Marne, and the BEF reached it by the Aisne.

That said the culminating point is not set in stone, if the British had sent the 6th division to France a few days earlier it would have had the fresh troops it needed to lead a faster advance into the German gap. Similarly if the Germans had sent the Corps from Namur to the front, or from the left to the right wing they could have defended themselves on the Marne.

 

[mudhead]

I don't think it's been mentioned yet, but Moltke had to control seven armies in the west, with no intermediate level of command.

It's not surprising that there was a lack of co-ordination between the various German formations. What they needed was an Army Group organisation - 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies under one command, 4th to 7th under another.

They might have done a bit better with better C3.

 

[rast]

I don't think it's been mentioned yet, but Moltke had to control seven armies in the west, with no intermediate level of command.

True, army group commands might have improved co-ordination. But... - Moltke never tried to impose his will on the armies of the envelloping wing - and the other armies too. Image he failed to provide guidance for the army group commands as well...

 

[Riain]

Moltke didn't impose his will on the enveloping armies, but he had 2 other campaigns to manage; the left wing and the eastern front. He sort of cheated by placing the 1st Army under the 2nd Army from time to time, so the need was foreseen to an extent.