The Neutrality Acts of the 1930s were proactive attempts to prevent the US from getting into situations similar to what was thought to have gotten into World War I.
More extreme proposals were on the table, including the Ludlow Amendment, intended to force a referendum on any congressional declaration of war. It was never enacted.
However, were there more extreme proposals than OTL's 1935 and 1937 neutrality acts to further forestall an American economic stake in foreign wars, like bans on raw materials sales or dual-use equipment and commodities like oil and steel?
The actual laws banned arms sales and travel to belligerents, with some exceptions being made for belligerents who could ship munitions themselves and pay without borrowing American funds.
The Roosevelt Administration applied the neutrality act to the Italo-Ethiopian war. Did it do so under its own volition as soon as the fight started, or was pressure first initiated in the legislative branch or media?
What if the decision went the other way? any practical effects?
Congress passed a resolution, and the Roosevelt administration accepted, legislation applying the practical measures of the neutrality acts to the Spanish Civil War, even though the act did not cover civil wars. Did it do so under its own volition as soon as the fight started, or was pressure first initiated in the legislative branch or media?
What if the decision went the other way? any practical effects?
The Roosevelt Administration chose *not* to invoke the Neutrality Acts in the Sino-Japanese war of 1937, historians say because he thought it would favor Japan to do so.
Was this a brave and politically risky stand for Roosevelt to take? Was it against the wishes of any significant legislators or media?
What if the decision went the other way? any practical effects?
In this last case, China and Japan cooperated by not formally declaring war? What if Japan had tried to force the American hand by declaring war rather than "incident" on China?
More extreme proposals were on the table, including the Ludlow Amendment, intended to force a referendum on any congressional declaration of war. It was never enacted.
However, were there more extreme proposals than OTL's 1935 and 1937 neutrality acts to further forestall an American economic stake in foreign wars, like bans on raw materials sales or dual-use equipment and commodities like oil and steel?
The actual laws banned arms sales and travel to belligerents, with some exceptions being made for belligerents who could ship munitions themselves and pay without borrowing American funds.
The Roosevelt Administration applied the neutrality act to the Italo-Ethiopian war. Did it do so under its own volition as soon as the fight started, or was pressure first initiated in the legislative branch or media?
What if the decision went the other way? any practical effects?
Congress passed a resolution, and the Roosevelt administration accepted, legislation applying the practical measures of the neutrality acts to the Spanish Civil War, even though the act did not cover civil wars. Did it do so under its own volition as soon as the fight started, or was pressure first initiated in the legislative branch or media?
What if the decision went the other way? any practical effects?
The Roosevelt Administration chose *not* to invoke the Neutrality Acts in the Sino-Japanese war of 1937, historians say because he thought it would favor Japan to do so.
Was this a brave and politically risky stand for Roosevelt to take? Was it against the wishes of any significant legislators or media?
What if the decision went the other way? any practical effects?
In this last case, China and Japan cooperated by not formally declaring war? What if Japan had tried to force the American hand by declaring war rather than "incident" on China?