Question on the Pacific War

Thanks for the info on the IJA reserves in Japan. It makes me wonder if the USN type 13 and 14 torpedoes had been fully efficient, how much more Japanese ships would have been sunk.
 
If Japan suffered more than a few setbacks, how likely could the hardliners be overthrown? Might Japan try to get an armitance or would they banzai their way for at least a year?

They would manage information and hide from the general public and even the emperor that anything untoward has happened. For example, see the handling of the Battle of Midway.
 
zert said:
It makes me wonder if the USN type 13 and 14 torpedoes had been fully efficient, how much more Japanese ships would have been sunk.
On the Mk13, I can't say. The Mk14, it's about 20% over OTL, judging by the per-patrol increase after 9/43.
 
On the Mk13, I can't say. The Mk14, it's about 20% over OTL, judging by the per-patrol increase after 9/43.

Well that could add to the losses in cargo ships as well as warships.

Now if any allied subs could line up shots on some of the IJN carriers, all the better. Any troop ships that can be sunk in open waters could reduce the IJA's strength and slow up operations.
 
There were three full-strength IJA divisions available in Japan in December, 1941, that could have been used elsewhere if need be: the 7th, which stayed in Japan throughout the war, other than the 28th Infantry Regiment (the Ichiki Detachment) which was destroyed on Guadalcanal; the 52nd, which didn't deploy until Nov '43 to the Carolines (and was bypassed at Truk, Yap, and other locales), and the 53rd, which didn't deploy until early '44 (to Burma).

52nd and 53rd were second rate, 7th was first rate. 2nd ID was in Japan (also first rate) assigned to 16th Army.
 
And 16th Army was the command that assaulted Java, so it's technically committed. If the IJA needs divisions in, say Malaya, they'll either have to send the 7th, bite the bullet and use either the 52nd or 53rd IDs, or do what they did with the 4th ID and the Bataan campaign: pull a division out of China and redeploy it elsewhere. They could get away with the 4th ID because the Shanghai area was relatively secure, and the division was not active in combat operations.
 
Counting 'divisions' can be misleading in any case, and more so with Japan. Its army was organized to depend on more local support than US, British, or many other armies. Impressed Chinese or Korean labor served in Asia where the US or Britain used uniformed men in military service units. That was not possible in the Pacifc. The Korean labor battalions sent across the Pacific were inadaquate for the task. Beyond that the cargo ship capacity prevented sending adaquate service units across the Pacific. There was both the problem of deck space to transport them but hold capacity to supply them. Thinking Japan had a useful reserve of unused infantry divisions in early 1942 is like thinking all sixty of the mobilized US Army divisions of that same date could be sent overseas.

This is one reason why the combat forces sent across the Pacific were so inadaquate in size. ie: In August 1942 the Japanese leaders used the lower estimate of 5,000 enemy on Gudalcanal & evaluated it as a raid. had they asked for the upper estimate (over 12,000 & there to stay) it would have meant a counter attack was impossible. With the transport available in August or September a ground force capable of dealing with 12,000+ enemy was impractical. The same thing can be seen in the second Milne Bay attack, elsewhere in New Guniea, or in Burma. They had to base their plans on the enemy being undersized, undertrained, and badly led. There was not the transport capacity to send significant additional forces.
 
Basically the Japanese strategy in WWII against the USA was not to beat them militarily. Overcoming colonial possessions of UK/France/Holland yes, taking some far away bits from the US, yes but not really "beating" them in some sort of curbstomp. The Japanese "plan" was to inflict early defeats and pain on the US, at which point it would roll over and play dead cowering in front of the Yamato spirit of Japan. There was no plan B - all throughout the war it was variations on the above. Even before they lost a single ship they did not have adequate transport to move the raw materials they started the war for and fight a war of any sort with the Americans. Even if they pulled half of their men out of China, they could only transport and support a small fraction of them anywhere against the USA directly.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Something worth keeping in mind:

I've been gathering up a lot of information about the Pacific War and most of the threads I've seen at some point mention how the Japanese were on a tight schedule and how Japanese needed everything to go just right. I'm wondering what was the Japanese contingency if their coup d'main turned sluggish. Like had the invasions of Malaya and Philippines bogged down quickly and the Japanese suffered high casualties, what was Japan's plan? Just send in more troops and if so where would these troops come from? Also how would the bogged down campaigns affect the other campaigns the Japanese were launching in early 1942, or this the "tight schedule" over exaggerated?

The initial Japanese offensives (Luzon, Philippines, Borneo, Malaysia, etc.) was so resource limited that even if every transport and landing force they used had been assembled into a single force, you're talking 12-14 brigade group/regimental combat team equivalents (in British or US terminology), so, realistically, maybe four reinforced infantry divisions and some corps and army troops - that's it.

And that's for the most important Japanese offensive of the conflict, and one they have - literally - months to years (?) to plan, refit, and train for...

Now, that's pretty impressive for 1941 - the Allies didn't mount anything comparable until TORCH in November, 1942 - but still; in terms of priorities, that was the Japanese equivalent of, say, OVERLORD, in terms of amphibious operations designed (ultimately) to win the war.

Also worth noting is that after the initial series of offensives in December, 1941, the Japanese never had that many divisions afloat and combat loaded simultaneously again for the entire war...

The US and UK were mounting equivalently-sized operations from 1942 and they only continued, and got larger in scale, to 1945...

Best,
 
So a thin line of trained troops available for possible redeployment. Add to it an underused and inadequate supply and transport fleet.

As many have said and written about, Japan rolled 7's all the way till May 1942. Just a few more setbacks, stalemates, and stalled invasions and IJN ships sunk and the Pacific War could have been a whole new ballgame.
 
Look at the largest Amphib operation of the war in the Pacific: Okinawa. Operation ICEBERG put four divisions ashore on day one, and the other two came ashore in the following days. Amphibious operations came a long way since Guadalcanal in 1942, and easily dwarfed anything the Japanese executed.
 
Look at the largest Amphib operation of the war in the Pacific: Okinawa. Operation ICEBERG put four divisions ashore on day one, and the other two came ashore in the following days. Amphibious operations came a long way since Guadalcanal in 1942, and easily dwarfed anything the Japanese executed.

True but that was 3 1/2 years in and after the US had built up its amphibious fleets. In 1942 the US was scrambling to get transports and tankers into the action.

Of course Japan had it bad and it only got worse as times eked on.
 
Easier to bypass than assault. Cut off Rabaul and Kaiveng from seaborne supply and they just whither on the vine.
 
zert said:
So a thin line of trained troops available for possible redeployment.
Overcommitted in China & sitting on their hands waiting to attack the Sovs in Manchuria.:rolleyes:
zert said:
underused and inadequate supply and transport fleet.
Nope, overcommitted again. The only reason Japan didn't hit a wall even sooner was the Sub Force couldn't inflict more losses. Why? Bad dispositions (scattered to hell & gone by Nimitz), inadequate intel (no maru code, thanks to a Customs nitwit:mad::mad: immediately prewar, & lack of manpower at ONI to crack it), & the notorious (& overblamed) Mark 14. Japan's losses were so in line with projections, they never even considered convoy.:rolleyes::eek:
zert said:
Japan rolled 7's all the way till May 1942. Just a few more setbacks, stalemates, and stalled invasions and IJN ships sunk and the Pacific War could have been a whole new ballgame.
Yep, sevens right up to Midway, then snakeyes.:eek: Even small delays or changes could crash the entire Japanese war plan (such as it was:rolleyes:).
 
Even with all the screwups that the Allies commited before and in the early days of the War, they overcame Japan. It is just a travesty that so many died until Japan surrendured.

If only a few psychics could have gotten their sights right and believed.
 
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