Question on Japanese Peace Initiatives during the Pacific War

[georgy176]

Despite the life and death struggle that the Japanese saw themselves engaging in, ultimately the war they embarked on against the United States was viewed as a limited war. After all no one of any consequence in the Japanese leadership thought their nation by itself could destroy and conquer such a vast area as the US and impose whatever settlement they wished. Instead they wanted the fighting to inflict such pain and destruction that the US would come to the conclusion that peace talks were the only practical alternative. And once the negotiations were completed and a treaty signed, normal relations and intercourse on diplomatic, economic and cultural matters would be restored.

This was the Japanese plan but the US of course would have none of it. They wanted revenge for Pearl Harbor and all the other humiliating defeats they suffered. And in the end they would settle for nothing less than unconditional surrender.

Now I have read much about the Japanese military strategy for the defensive phase of the Pacific War. The one that was supposed to inflict the levels of casualties that would force the US to the bargaining table. I have heard almost nothing though of the Japanese diplomatic strategy to convince the US to seek talks except that it would begin once the Americans initiated those discussions.

So I am wondering if anybody is aware of any initiatives (official ministry, unofficial ministry, private citizen, neutral third party etc…) during the period when the Japanese were in the ascendancy. And if so what was the position and the proposals the Japanese side had with respect to concluding a peace treaty. How did they envision the postwar war settlement of a victorious Japan to be like? Were there any Japanese foreign ministry studies or academic papers on that same subject. How about some biography or a memoir from an individual in a position to know?

On the US side were there any similar moves or considerations going on (yes I know the official position was NEVER, but with the US performance at this time not being at its best, there would certainly be at least a few low level planners being given the task of looking at the worst cases scenarios and coming up with options that would include talks)

And absent any of the above would anyone want to take a crack at drafting a peace proposal that Japan would likely have tried to present before the tide of battle made it quite obvious to all concerned that total defeat was just about upon them.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

There a few books on the subject. Costellos 'The Pacific War' includes a outline of this in the chapter on the Japanese governments actions summer 1945.

Butow 'Japans Decision to Surrender' has far more depth on the thought at the highest levels behind the Japanese endgame. I'd recommend it. there ar others, but I've not read them & don't know what to recommend.

The short version is in the spring of 1945 the Suzuki government put together a brief outline of a peace proposal. This was presented to a US diplomat in Switzerland via the Japanese embassy there. As the proposal recognized nothing of the Allied unconditional surrender policy it was ignored. What the Japanese proposed in very simple terms was:

*A cease fire

*The Japanese would withdraw from European colonies and US territory they had occupied from 1940 to 1945

*The Allies would withdraw from Japanese territories occupied since December 1941.

*The Japanese would negotiate a peace treaty with the Chinese government, & after withdraw from China.

*Territories held by Japan previous to 1937 were to remain Japanese territories. Formosa, Korea, & Manchuria were the principles here.

*Japan would not accept any restrictions on its future military.

*Japan would not expect the Allies to pay for damages to Japanese property & Japan would reciprocate and not make claims against the Allies.

As you can see, this is not a 'surrender'. It actually leaves Japan in a position to keep its empire if it can, and rebuild its military.

The lack of Allied response to the offer may have been a disappointment. After a couple months Japanese diplomats took a proposal to the Soviet Union. The USSR & Japan would renew their expiring non aggression treaty in a stronger version. A anti West alliance as it were. The USSR would assist Japan in obtaining a ceasefire and peace treaty with the US, China, and Europeans. When the Soviet Union failed to respond the pro war faction in the Japanese cabinet wrote it off as a extended negotiations tactic, claiming Moscow was just holding out for Japanese concessions in the proposed alliance. They were completely unaware Stalin had already agreed to no renew the previous Soviet/Japanese treaty and declare war on Japan in August 1945.

 

[CalBear]

There was no overture during the "ascendant" period of the Pacific War. This was due to two different, but related, issues.

The first issue was the Japanese utterly failed to achieve the planned for "flash knockdown" of the U.S. that was supposed to allow the IJN/IJA to create a defensive perimeter that would be too costly for the U.S., UK , or any combination of "Western" powers to assail. American carrier TF were striking Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands as early as February 1, 1942, with additional strikes in early March. That was followed by the (admittedly pure propaganda value) Doolittle strike against Tokyo. That was followed by a draw at Coral Sea that blunted the next effort to improve the defensive perimeter. This was followed by the gutting of the Kido Butai off Midway. Japan's effort to create the unbreakable perimeter in the war's opening months was then totally derailed in the Solomons followed immediately by New Guinea.

The second issue was that the Japanese didn't realize they had over-reached until it was too late to alter plans. By the time Tokyo realized that New Guinea was the Bridge too Far, and the dreams about isolating Australia were exactly that, wild dreams, the die had been cast. The idea that strong island bases could be invulnerable to attack and could prevent any enemy from advancing died on the very first major American attack at Tarawa. The Japanese had literally believed that the atoll was impregnable (Admiral Keiji Shibasaki famously stated that it would take "One Million Men 100 Years" to take the Atoll. It took the 2nd Marine Division 8 days, including mop up).

The Japanese plan was doomed from the onset. It relied on things happening that were, quite literally, impossible. One example is that the operational plan for the Pearl Harbor Raid expected to find "four or five" American carriers in port. The U.S. Pacific Fleet only had three carriers assigned, with one of those (Saratoga) being in Bremerton undergoing refit, something that any observer driving past the Navy Yard could see (33,000 ton carriers are hard to miss). There were also no fast battleships assigned in the Pacific, while the Japanese did succeed in sinking four USN battleships (two permanent loss) the U.S. commissioned four brand new fast BB of the South Dakota class between March and August of 1942. The U.S. had literally made good its losses before the Japanese had managed to complete the capture of the territory needed for the defensive perimeter.

This does not even begin to address the remarkable (and willful) misreading of American character by the Japanese.

 

[georgy176]

I have read that after the defeat at Midway Yamamoto himself began to urge his government to begin to consider a diplomatic approach to ending the war. Given his great prestige as the architect of Japan's victories, you would think that there would be at least one or two ministers who would at least give a brief consideration of the issue. And what about the officials in the Foreign Ministry and career diplomats? After all isn't it their job to plan and advise the government on how best to handle Japan's external relations? Would not there be some discussions taking place on the shape of the postwar world even if its at a lower technical level?

 

[Knightmare]

I have read that after the defeat at Midway Yamamoto himself began to urge his government to begin to consider a diplomatic approach to ending the war. Given his great prestige as the architect of Japan's victories, you would think that there would be at least one or two ministers who would at least give a brief consideration of the issue. And what about the officials in the Foreign Ministry and career diplomats? After all isn't it their job to plan and advise the government on how best to handle Japan's external relations? Would not there be some discussions taking place on the shape of the postwar world even if its at a lower technical level?

Not really. Even if there was any real plans, well....

Pearl Harbor kinda took any chance of a peace that wasn't unconditional out behind the woodshed. Add in previous Japanese "accidents" regarding US personnel and their actions up until then, there is literally no chance of any peace being even given more then a basic thought because the US demands are going to start with "Oh god why", and go up from there.

 

[CalBear]

I have read that after the defeat at Midway Yamamoto himself began to urge his government to begin to consider a diplomatic approach to ending the war. Given his great prestige as the architect of Japan's victories, you would think that there would be at least one or two ministers who would at least give a brief consideration of the issue. And what about the officials in the Foreign Ministry and career diplomats? After all isn't it their job to plan and advise the government on how best to handle Japan's external relations? Would not there be some discussions taking place on the shape of the postwar world even if its at a lower technical level?

Yamamoto argued against ever engaging the U.S., as did pretty much every officer who had ever served diplomatic duty in the U.S. Yamamoto was so loud about it the IJN made him CO of Combined Fleet so he wouldn't get assassinated sleeping in his bedroom ashore.

Reasonable people, both military and civilian, tended to wind up much worse for wear if they opposed the "Big Picture" that led to Japan in control of China and pretty much all of Asia after the inevitable Japanese victory. Some of those same IJA majors and colonels were the ones who tried to destroy Hirohito's recording announcing the surrender after Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Soviet entry into the war.

 

[georgy176]

OK so it looks like if there was any planning going on for negotiating a peace during the time that Japan was in the ascendancy it was either being kept as secret documents or personal rough notes or just verbally uttered speculation between individual for fear of being labelled unpatriotic and defeatist. Whatever it does not look like any of those plans survived.

So let's try another tact. I have read some of the Japanese prewar and wartime plans regarding the setting up of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This proposal would see the setting up of a self contained block of colonial and satellite states dominated by Japan that would provide it with all the economic elements it would need to to maintain itself as a great power. What would be its relations with nations and blocks (particularly the US and Britain) outside its own. Not in a perpetual state of war I don't think. At some point much more normalized relations including an exchange of diplomatic personnel and (within the limits of east asian autarchism) commercial intercourse would be sought. Would I be right in assuming that?

 

[Knightmare]

What would be its relations with nations and blocks (particularly the US and Britain) outside its own.

Poorly. if we assume per OTL....

England is not going to be happy, and the US is sure as fuck not going to be. And that's without factoring in 12/7. Shockingly, sneak attacks like that are frowned upon.

 

[georgy176]

Yes I would agree that whatever contact the parties agree to pursue would be rather awkward to say the very least. But then I don't think the purpose of such a proposed peace treaty would be to create a BFF relationship between the blocks. Instead what Japan would look for is the recognition and respect for its new position in the world. As well it would seek to define the rules and conventions for how those relations and interactions are to be managed on an ongoing basis.

I believe the term for such a situation as this is that diplomatic relations are "Correct".

So any idea how such a correct relationship would be worded. Would the US and Soviet Union or US and China relationship during the cold war provide a possible model?

 

[Knightmare]

So any idea how such a correct relationship would be worded. Would the US and Soviet Union or US and China relationship during the cold war provide a possible model?

Doubtful. At best, I'd guess..... You can sit down the diplomats in the same room and they'll have a polite conversation. That's about it.

 

[sloreck]

As I read it, Japan never had a negotiating position if they won - it was basically telling the Americans what they wanted in terms of keeping gains in Asia and the US not helping China in any way. Of course reopening markets and financial system to Japan. Even if Japan "won" I can't see the USA trusting them in any sense, and I can't see the USA doing anything but gearing up for round two in the future.

Until the atomic bomb Japan never gave up on the idea that if they just made the USA bleed enough (read "just a bit more") the USA would fold up and agree to Japanese terms, although what the Japanese would settle for got less and less as the war went on but basically their "best deal" was close to status quo ante bellum. AS Calbear pointed out, even after the bomb there was a coup attempt to seize the recording and spirit the emperor away to protective custody.

The Germans had a shot at the British accepting an armistice, or peace, after Dunkirk had a different PM been there. Not a huge shot, but a shot. Even if the sort of DoW in the 12/7 message had been decoded and presented as scheduled, the USA was not going to accede to Japanese terms, ever.

 

[georgy176]

OK then so not a formal peace or any hope of a normal relation. The best that could probably be obtained would be an armistice similar to the one that ended the Korean War. That is agreeing to disengage their forces from direct contact, establishing lines of demarcation and some sort of buffer (neutral) zone in which the entry of either side's forces would be considered grounds for a resumption of war. Periodic meeting between military officers of both sides would be held to oversee the technical aspects of the maintenance of the ceasefire and also investigate any incidents or violations the sides might accuse the other of perpetrating. Unofficial contact through individuals and neutral countries (not to mention indirect trade) would also in all likelihood occur, but no Nixon visits China moment for a very long time. Decades most likely and only if the ceasefire holds (which is a very big if)

 

[CalBear]

OK so it looks like if there was any planning going on for negotiating a peace during the time that Japan was in the ascendancy it was either being kept as secret documents or personal rough notes or just verbally uttered speculation between individual for fear of being labelled unpatriotic and defeatist. Whatever it does not look like any of those plans survived.

So let's try another tact. I have read some of the Japanese prewar and wartime plans regarding the setting up of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This proposal would see the setting up of a self contained block of colonial and satellite states dominated by Japan that would provide it with all the economic elements it would need to to maintain itself as a great power. What would be its relations with nations and blocks (particularly the US and Britain) outside its own. Not in a perpetual state of war I don't think. At some point much more normalized relations including an exchange of diplomatic personnel and (within the limits of east asian autarchism) commercial intercourse would be sought. Would I be right in assuming that?

The Japanese plan was to create their version of the British or French colonial Empires. Everyone would be part of one big family, with the Emperor of Japan being the God-ruler of Asia (literally, keep in mind that it was an accepted belief that the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, was a"small g" god on Earth) that Japan would suck dry. Since the Japanese needed to defeat the Dutch, French, British, and American colonies to achieve their Co-Prosperity Sphere it was doomed before it began.

When one reviews how the Japanese administered the regions that it did occupy in 1942-45 (and the part of China and Manchuria (Manchukuo) before that time it is fairly obvious that the Japanese idea of "Asian brotherhood" was... sub-optimal (the estimate is that 100,000+ civilians died every month in areas under Japanese occupation, with many more suffering remarkably poor treatment). What Japan would have had was an unending series of revolts across the "Sphere" until it either collapsed or something provoked a major power into war.

There is a counterpoint to the above, the occupation of Formosa (Taiwan). The Japanese Administration there was quite successful, to the point that just before the end of the War the Japanese Diet voted to allow Formosa actual seats in the Diet.

Overall, Japan's major problem was that they attempted to become a "conventional" colonial power based on the centuries old European model, but their effort ran into the end of the colonial era. The entire early war effort of the Japanese, right down to the way Tokyo believed they could end the conflict could easily be fit in the 18th Century wars between France and Great Britain over control of North America *see the settlement that ended the Seven Years War as an example). Unfortunately for the Japanese the days of wars that ended with the exchange of some colonies and some cash had ended (unfairly in Japan's opinion, since they saw themselves as being unfairly excluded from the Great Game).

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I have read that after the defeat at Midway Yamamoto himself began to urge his government to begin to consider a diplomatic approach to ending the war. Given his great prestige as the architect of Japan's victories,

He was still despised by the Army officers. A year earlier Yamamoto had to move abroad his flagship out of fear of a assassination attempt.

... you would think that there would be at least one or two ministers who would at least give a brief consideration of the issue.

The Cabinet was dominated by PM Tojo & Army officers

...
And what about the officials in the Foreign Ministry and career diplomats? After all isn't it their job to plan and advise the government on how best to handle Japan's external relations? Would not there be some discussions taking place on the shape of the postwar world even if its at a lower technical level?

That conversation was dominated by the Zaibatsu & their family members among the senior army officers. The administration of the occupied areas in China and the newly gained territories was handed over to the Army at least for the interim. What the long term concept was I can't recall.