Question on China during the Second Sino-Japanese War

If I may ask, what exactly were the reasons behind China's relatively poor performance in the SSJ War?
 
Both Chinese factions (the CCP and KMT) were more concerned about the other than about the Japanese. This prompted them to keep most of their troops in reserve for later use against each other, as opposed to sending them against the Japanese. Supply, morale, and command were also issues.
 
"China" was a massivly poor, underindustrialized band of warbands with little internal cohesion. Thats a no-no in warfare.
 
Most Chinese industry was in under Japanese occupation like Manchuria and the Northeast coastal region between Beijing and Shanghai. The unoccupied part of China didn't really have a unified military defending it: there were some troops loyal to the national government, but many were under the control of this or that provincial warlord. China's central government lost a lot of control over the provinces as a result of the Taiping rebellion, and the provinces weren't really brought in line under the capital's leadership until 1949.

Imagine how hamstrung the Red Army would be if the Central Asian SSRs were de-facto independent warlord fiefs who had to be coaxed and persuaded into an alliance with the central government every time an offensive was planned.

Most ports were under Japanese occupation, so any US aid from Lend-Lease had to be flown over the Himalayas, or sent through Burma in the later stages of the war. The USSR could still use its ports in the Far East to receive US aid.
 
Imagine how hamstrung the Red Army would be if the Central Asian SSRs were de-facto independent warlord fiefs who had to be coaxed and persuaded into an alliance with the central government every time an offensive was planned.
This is off-topic but didn't the USSR mobilize most of its manpower from its predominantly Slavic reservist base? Or are you referring to the relocation of so much of Soviet industry there?
 
This is off-topic but didn't the USSR mobilize most of its manpower from its predominantly Slavic reservist base? Or are you referring to the relocation of so much of Soviet industry there?
I think they were just saying how sluggish the war effort would be if massive parts of the country had to be wrangled and dealt with every time something major is even attempted, in a war.
 
Most Chinese industry was in under Japanese occupation like Manchuria and the Northeast coastal region between Beijing and Shanghai. The unoccupied part of China didn't really have a unified military defending it: there were some troops loyal to the national government, but many were under the control of this or that provincial warlord. China's central government lost a lot of control over the provinces as a result of the Taiping rebellion, and the provinces weren't really brought in line under the capital's leadership until 1949.

Imagine how hamstrung the Red Army would be if the Central Asian SSRs were de-facto independent warlord fiefs who had to be coaxed and persuaded into an alliance with the central government every time an offensive was planned.

Most ports were under Japanese occupation, so any US aid from Lend-Lease had to be flown over the Himalayas, or sent through Burma in the later stages of the war. The USSR could still use its ports in the Far East to receive US aid.

Also massive massive corruption meaning that most of the stuff that the US/Allies actually sent ended up diverted and sold rather then used to fight the Japanese.
 
This is off-topic but didn't the USSR mobilize most of its manpower from its predominantly Slavic reservist base? Or are you referring to the relocation of so much of Soviet industry there?
The comment wasn't about Central Asia specifically. I was using the region as an example of Moscow's ability to say "jump" and any given province responding with "how high?" vs. Chongqing saying "jump", and then needing to argue with some minor warlord about the benefits of jumping in general, and the need to jump now rather than later.
 
Imagine Chiang Kai-shek is Bashar al-Assad. China is Syria. Japan is Israel. Russia is America.

Imagine if Israel invaded Syria and the warring factions grudgingly agreed to a united front against Israel, but they rarely take orders from the government. Assad handles his own army with incompetence. The Russians advise him to reorganize his army. This would downsize many corrupt yet loyal commanders. Assad decides he risk losing power in the inevitable civil war to come if he alienates his supporters so he slow walks military reforms and becomes over dependent on Russian air support. Israel is losing to the Russians anyway and they can’t occupy Syria forever...
 
This is off-topic but didn't the USSR mobilize most of its manpower from its predominantly Slavic reservist base? Or are you referring to the relocation of so much of Soviet industry there?

It's more that in China, the central government couldn't reliably call upon or coordinate soldiers from across the entire country.

The country was very divided in the years leading up to the war, with small factions carving out their own spheres of governance and influence. Warlords and local cliques had their own little power bases spread around and oftentimes they had to be persuaded to assist the war effort of the central government. Some of these governments and warlords were at odds with each other and this made maintaining cohesion and cooperation difficult.
 
It's more that in China, the central government couldn't reliably call upon or coordinate soldiers from across the entire country.

The country was very divided in the years leading up to the war, with small factions carving out their own spheres of governance and influence. Warlords and local cliques had their own little power bases spread around and oftentimes they had to be persuaded to assist the war effort of the central government. Some of these governments and warlords were at odds with each other and this made maintaining cohesion and cooperation difficult.
How did the KMT government attempt to lessen this issue?
 
How did the KMT government attempt to lessen this issue?

Well Chiang and the KMT had nominally reunited China by the early 1930's but this was a mixture of direction occupation/conquest, coercion and vague promises.

To punish disloyalty or exert influence, the central government could cancel funding (not that there was a lot to go around), channel resources to more sympathetic warlord rivals, threaten military intervention, remove National Troops, or outright attack. The Japanese being generally awful also helped with unity as the war against Japan dragged on.
 
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