Question of France's "natural borders" and colonisation.

If somehow France was able to push its Borders to the Rhine and Alps by 1600 could it then afford to send people out to colonise the Americas in the same way the Brits, Spanish and Portuguese did.
 
If somehow France was able to push its Borders to the Rhine and Alps by 1600 could it then afford to send people out to colonise the Americas in the same way the Brits, Spanish and Portuguese did.

I think the impediments to French colonization are probably more structural than 'not being able to afford it'. The corporative nature of the French economy (i.e. individual town/guild/region laws + customs) meant that there were many obstacles in the way of constructing a trade system that could complement colonial settlement. In any case, the French imperial system largely depended on 'goodwill' from other maritime nations due to French naval inferiority, which meant that once war broke out the colonies were left to wither on the vine.

The appetite for colonization was also diminished by the relative lack of a maritime tradition in France (as opposed to Spain, Portugal and the UK) as well as the spectacular failure of the Mississippi Company scheme, which associated colonial efforts with fraud.

Differing attitudes to colonization also meant that in France, the urge to 'plant the flag' over parts of the world was much less powerful than for the other colonial states. France's colonial empire (in both India and America) was achieved with relatively minimal investment through developing links with native leaders, and in that sense was fundamentally different from the Spanish and especially British approaches.
 
Yeah, borders aren't what France needed to get the job done. See: Brazil.

The Spanish took over native states, British dominated the seas and moved lots of people, the Portuguese did a little of both and were fortunate to have little effective competition in their corner of the New World. All other states practiced something closer to the French route, and their colonies came to very little on a long scale.

What you want to do to achieve your aim would be something else, many of which are not things France itself could do, but questions of its neighbors.

England falling behind navally in the 17th or 18th century, for example. Or Oliver Cromwell is a little healthier and dies at 70 - the Protectorate then lasts substantially longer after his death (if not indefinitely); as a result colonization of New England, New York, and East Jersey is delayed dramatically. Or the Netherlands is much more successful, and keeps retaining New Netherlands at peace tables, breaking up the English/British NA block.

As for what France could actually do.... Win 17th and 18th century naval battles, particularly against England/Britain. Attempt to run Canada as an agricultural colony a generation earlier, so earlier arrival of filles du roi puts the French Canadian population explosion twenty years ahead of OTL. Run the filles du roi program continuously from 1663 to the 19th century, instead of only about a decade. Acquire bits of the Spanish empire through peace treaties following dynastic intermarriage, especially "less valuable" fringe areas of the empire, like La Plata, or Tejas, or the Californias.
 
My opinion is that a big problem of France is indeed its borders. Spain, Portugal and the UK had strong, easily defended borders (except between Spain and Portugal) so they could afford to send men away.

A big problem of France has always been they were primarily a land power with land borders to defend against the Spanish, the German, whoever owns the Ducth, the Italians AND they needed some sort of navy to defend against the British.

In the Napoleonic wars for example, they basically abandonned the colonies. Same in the 7YW. Even til the late XIX th century, emphasis is on the "ligne bleue des Vosges", the Eastern frontier
 

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My opinion is that a big problem of France is indeed its borders. Spain, Portugal and the UK had strong, easily defended borders (except between Spain and Portugal) so they could afford to send men away.

A big problem of France has always been they were primarily a land power with land borders to defend against the Spanish, the German, whoever owns the Ducth, the Italians AND they needed some sort of navy to defend against the British.

In the Napoleonic wars for example, they basically abandonned the colonies. Same in the 7YW. Even til the late XIX th century, emphasis is on the "ligne bleue des Vosges", the Eastern frontier

This - plus, Portugal and Spain as an exception worked because of the Treaty of Tordesillas and Zaragoza. That ensured that they didn't have colonial conflicts - and respecting each others shipping kept tensions to a minimum. Unlike France, or the UK, they had secure borders via diplomacy, more than anything else.
 
My opinion is that a big problem of France is indeed its borders. Spain, Portugal and the UK had strong, easily defended borders (except between Spain and Portugal) so they could afford to send men away.

That's quite an exception you've got there, lol. "The winners had this in common, except for one of the three, that didn't at all."

A big problem of France has always been they were primarily a land power with land borders to defend against the Spanish, the German, whoever owns the Ducth, the Italians AND they needed some sort of navy to defend against the British.

Very true.

In the Napoleonic wars for example, they basically abandonned the colonies. Same in the 7YW. Even til the late XIX th century, emphasis is on the "ligne bleue des Vosges", the Eastern frontier

This, though, is hugely contingent. They abandoned the seas because they were outmatched on the seas. Sure they were geographically more likely to end up in that position, and Britain geographically suited to naval strength, but there were a dozen ways chance, politics, or incompetence could have spoiled the trend. Napoleon certainly would have focused overseas had he not had a wreck of a navy to work with. Or even if Britain's had been drawn down or otherwise weakened relative to OTL. Likewise for the Seven Years' War - a couple royal fool's errands, a debt crisis, revenue collapse due to a bad war in India, some British admiral getting drunk and unlucky and losing a bunch of ships.... France's ship deficit relative to England/Britain was probable, but far from inevitable.

Eliminate it, and the French are likely to be as successful as any in 18th century colonialism.
 
A big problem of France has always been they were primarily a land power with land borders to defend against the Spanish, the German, whoever owns the Ducth, the Italians AND they needed some sort of navy to defend against the British.

While I think this was an issue, it was not the only one. What France needed in the New World, above all, was more settlers. With a larger population the colonies could defend themselves more easily without needing so much help from the mother country. This did not require a massive transfer of population; if done early enough, a relatively small settler population can grow quite large through natural increase. But recruitment of settlers was done halfheartedly, and almost completely stopped after the Dutch War broke out in 1672. (A large proportion of today's Québécois are descended from settlers who arrived before that year.)
 
That's quite an exception you've got there, lol. "The winners had this in common, except for one of the three, that didn't at all."
I shall admit this is a bit of a hole. I would think there was a reason (could Portugal even defend against Spain?) but I don't want to theorise too much on something I'm not knowledgeable enough :)

I'll point out that the Portuguese started their exploration/colonisation process in 1415 after they took Ceuta and effectively removed the Muslim threat. Same for the Spanish a bit later. I'm actually reading about that bit at the moment but you can really see that when the Spanish are resurgent, the Portuguese take a deep dive, but also because of the Dutch.


This, though, is hugely contingent. They abandoned the seas because they were outmatched on the seas. Sure they were geographically more likely to end up in that position, and Britain geographically suited to naval strength, but there were a dozen ways chance, politics, or incompetence could have spoiled the trend. Napoleon certainly would have focused overseas had he not had a wreck of a navy to work with. Or even if Britain's had been drawn down or otherwise weakened relative to OTL. Likewise for the Seven Years' War - a couple royal fool's errands, a debt crisis, revenue collapse due to a bad war in India, some British admiral getting drunk and unlucky and losing a bunch of ships.... France's ship deficit relative to England/Britain was probable, but far from inevitable.

Eliminate it, and the French are likely to be as successful as any in 18th century colonialism.

Agreed there, it's not absolutely inevitable but the UK is definitely in a better position. France needs a top of the art navy and a top of the art land force to be a colonial power without being curbstomped on the mainland. The UK needs a good navy for both role. With the same technology and training they can project strength as well as keep the Channel secure. As Napoleon said, take the RN out for three days and London burns.

It might actually happen, a diversion in the Irish sea, a bad storm wrecks a big part of the RN stationed there, the French invade. It's not THAT outlandish. Lucky, yes, but freak storms saving countries from the brink of collapse is hardly unheard of (Armada, Kamikaze, twice!...)

In the end, you can follow Ricardo advice and specialise. The French specialised in land forces which allowed them complete dominance in the places they managed to land at because it was the thing they were already better at. It was easier to establish full land dominance rather than trying to climb up to challenge the RN.
Interestingly enough, when they can no longer be THE land power of Europe due to demographic, they become the second top dog in colonial power.
 
Geography

Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain are very difficult to blockade due to geography. France, however, is positioned poorly; Britain can interdict the Atlantic quite nicely due to its position-and not needing a large army.
 
I don't think France's "natural borders" make much difference. Longer borders would actually take more men to fortify. And the problem wasn't just defensive, but the fact that France wanted to influence German politics, so it was always marching troops into the Holy Roman Empire.

Anyway, there are deeper issues here causing the trade-off. France had more than four times the population of the Brits for most of history. If it had a state and economic system of similar quality to the British, it could easily have matched the British at sea while still having armies on the continent. The problem was that it didn't get that until well into the 19th Century, by which time it was too late.
 
It is true the New World is up for question with whether the French can establish a viable settler presence there, but the "natural borders" of France will result in a France with significantly more wealth and people. True, the French financial system will still be less effective, but adding on the better part of 10m people from the parts of the Left Bank and the other territories the French had gradually expanded into throughout the 17th century, by 1600, is a major boost to the French. Even later, it is still a major benefit, and furthermore the defensive advantages are real; trying an opposed crossing of the Rhine with fortifications defending the line on the other side must certainly be more difficult than fighting through the plains of Northern France, even with the fortifications the French erected. Even if the French don't divert resources from their army to their navy, their navy is going to be significantly more capable, and resultantly it would be entirely possible that wars between them and the British would go the other way in some instances. All it takes after all, is the French attaining command of the channel once, at which case an invasion of Britain is certainly possible and the French have a decisively commanding position in negotiations following.

So while I would say it doesn't guarantee victory and isn't necessarily decisive in of itself (as compared to having it in the 1800s when control of such territory would do much to help result in a more industrialized France with control over the coal supplies in the region), in the 1600s-1700s such an addition to French strength can easily change the balance of power significantly into the French favor. It isn't like the French were abysmal at utilizing their strength, just that their financial and economic system had more trouble in the war that the English was fighting. There is a percentage cap on French military strength so far as I know, not an absolute cap, so therefor a larger, more populous, more economically powerful France will be able to achieve a higher military strength, without any alterations to their systems used to raise such a strength. Even if they don't send more settlers out, they can do better in the New World after all by crushing the English navy and preventing them from sending out troops and reinforcing their own colonies. Preventing losses like at Acadia improves their settler position as well.
 
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During the colonial period, France was the dominant power in Europe. It had the money and manpower to more or less do whatever it wanted. Whether Louis XIV attempts to seize the lands west of the Rhine and fails or succeeds is irrelevant to whether it "could afford to send people out".

As other posters have mentioned, the failure of the French colonial enterprise in North America had reasons utterly unrelated to its actions along the Rhine.
 
Not entirely.

The fact is that until the treaties of Westphalia and Pyrenees, France was surrounded by and offensive Habsburg coalition that was at barely 200 kilometers of Paris. So France had very serious reasons to feel threatened and that probably played a part in the fact french colonization of the Americas was slow and rather late.

Add the fact that France did not settle the most fertile lands in north America.

If France had settled Manhattan by the 1530 and then the neighbouring coast of what was going to be new Netherlands and part of New England, plus the Saint-Laurent bay as they did OTL, then all North America north of the Rio grande would speak french today.

The decisive issue is comparable to the network effet of the internet sites. The first who reaches the demographic critical treshold is unexpellable and is the winner who takes it all.
 
If one of the various French schemes to invade the UK were to be pulled off (and they did occasionally get close) the British would suddenly feel a lot more pressure to keep troops at home and be less adventurous sending troops everywhere.
 
I understand the French desire to break through the Hapsburg encirclement and give Paris more of a buffer; it's a logical enough goal. I just think they could have done this while also managing to send more colonists to North America. The population of French Canada grew by a factor of 20 between 1666 and 1750 (from 3,000 to 60,000) so those who did settle found the land sufficient to provide for large families. There just weren't enough of them.

One timeline idea I've had has Louis XIV not acting belligerently in 1700 and avoiding war over the Spanish succession. He then focuses on overseas expansion during his last 15 years and sends a few thousand more colonists than he did OTL. This means that Acadia is never lost, and the extra colonists pay dividends down the road as New France's 1750 population is around 100,000-120,000. They are still of course considerably outnumbered by the 13 colonies, and probably lose the Ohio valley anyway, but they now have the manpower to successfully defend Canada. So France maintains a presence in North America beyond 1763, leading to a lot of butterflies.
 
I rather agree with you.

You could even go much further on figures.

OTL France suffered a terrible starvation crisis in 1693-1694 (close to 1,3 million victims died from in France) and in 1709 (close to 0,6 million victims).

Have France organize mass migration to north America in order to save a part of these victims and you will dramatically change the course of world History. Just think of 200.000 people who manage to escape starving to death by successfully migrating to north America in these years of the late 17th and early 18th century (something like french government decide : "oh my God ! Let's avoid that any such drama ever happen again and send more poor people as settlers in America."). The Appalachians would remain an impassable frontier for the american colonies. One can even extrapolate that there will be less incentive for people migrating to a surrounded and blocked british north american atlantic coast and that the fr nch settlers will expand and grow faster than the british settlers and that the french will finish by conquering all of or at least the northern part of the american colonies.
 
I don't think France's "natural borders" make much difference. Longer borders would actually take more men to fortify. And the problem wasn't just defensive, but the fact that France wanted to influence German politics, so it was always marching troops into the Holy Roman Empire.

Anyway, there are deeper issues here causing the trade-off. France had more than four times the population of the Brits for most of history. If it had a state and economic system of similar quality to the British, it could easily have matched the British at sea while still having armies on the continent. The problem was that it didn't get that until well into the 19th Century, by which time it was too late.

Yeah. By 1660 the Dutch managed to have approximately 9,000 settlers in their colony of New Netherland. In the same decade the population of New France was a third of that.

The root of the problem of why New France was not more populous was not France's home population size, it was that countries like the Dutch Republic had a thriving, robust financial and mercantile system, despite its small size, and the French did not.
 
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