Question: how much territory can Germany lose and still be a great power?

With a surviving Second Reich these are somewhat skewed measurements though.

The U.S. economy and military is as large as it is IOTL because the USA is the leader of the freeworld.

A surviving Second Reich (+ Austria, Sudetenland etc.) would sooner or later control an economic powerblock on the continent. This and the vastly enhanced ability for global power projection would probably lead to an economy at least 1/2 as big as the USA. 1/3 seems to low imho.

The military side of things is hard to measure without an exact history of the TL

My gut says:

Germany would have a "first rate second rate Navy". There would be no way for them to beat the U.S. Navy . The rationale would probably something like a modified "Risikotheorie".

Enough to hurt the U.S. Navy enough that others (Japan?) could pose a threat to U.S. naval domination in the aftermath.

Without the standoff in Europe against the Soviets the U.S. army probably wouldn't have reached the size of OTL. It might be larger than the Reichsheer in peace time (in wartime the USA would pull decisively ahead). The German army would probably be more experienced and better lead though. They might also have some nicer toys simply because the United States would be a Naval Power first and foremost. ITTL and OTL you wouldn't want to mess with the U.S. Marines though.

Air forces would be interesting. I don't think either side have a decisive tech lead. The U.S. airforce might actually be dwarfed by the Navy aviation though.

Ultimately I think the U.S. would have a smaller military than IOTL simply because there are fewer places to actually use it. Pretty certain that the U.S. Navy would still be the mean 800 pound Gorilla though.

For me I hold to pre-1914 Imperial Germany and have left A-H either intact or some split but no gaining Austria for Germany. I have no scientific value to how the USA economy gains from being the single market it is, the culture, the people, and so much more, our per capita income is higher than a Germany or Japan, and has been, but if I skew he USA slightly less to perhaps account for the brain drain and the war damage and other less tangible things I feel I can guess at it. Backing the USA into a place more like pre-1914 than 2018 or 1945 certainly calls into question if it becomes so dominant. Using a real population calculator and trying some guesses at when German demographics shift to a lower birthrate gives me a Germany somewhere from 1/3 to 1/2 as populace, I skew it lower to reflect the smaller size and different cultural climate and get an economy defensible at 1/3 as wealthy. That is a big damn player.

And I think the world may not be quite as free market so the competing trade zones are more frictional, but you are correct, I guess at a European Customs Union led by Germany roughly covering much of modern Europe, not fully the EU, but not far from it. I have the USA closer to Germany and more at odds with the British, Japan for me looks more decaying like the old Soviet Union, France still fiercely independent but more like the UK hoping for a place in Europe yet not less than the (more than) equal she still wants to be, etc.

I think the global trading nations have arguments for strong naval power to safeguard trade, especially where the world is multi-lateral and no one power is trusted to be the policeman. Here I find the USA a peer but not having the same need to project power on every ocean or plan for wars in more than one region, so I roughly cut the USN in half to return to a USA who is no weakling but does not need to be equal to none. Germany is a similar boat but I allow for a lingering continental mission, maybe a reduced USSR or lingering antagonisms with France or Russia or whomever. Germany could be about 1/5th the strength of the modern USN here but it is a drain, manageable but under review endlessly, rather like the RN got whittled down. The British Empire looks a little stronger if all the Dominions can agree, etc., but the RN itself is more like OTL than it should be.

Without a WWII the USMC would be about two Brigades worth and without WWI they barely have the amphibious mission we know, instead I think they are more raiders like the RM. The USAF is more continental air defense and strategic bombing, the rest is an Army mission, so the US Army looks more like the modern USMC and likely has independent tactical air. This is a more modest and more expeditionary Army, the USA is not the global cop, if it needs more weight it must call out the NG. These are my guesses.

A lot is subject to changes and other influences in the century after 1918, without the same wars and the same bipolar alliance system, things get more and more guided by feel and less and less familiar. In fact I have scaled back to 50 years out because things get so hard to meaningfully guess.
 
Hard to see a need for a larger air force than IOTL given that it's mission would be national defense rather than that + power projection. Now the Coast Guard...

And now I am imagining a USCG carrier battle group bearding down on some poor rubber dinghy...

fasquardon
 
I have the USA closer to Germany and more at odds with the British

Why would the USA be closer to Germany? While the US would be trading heavily with both the British Empire and Germany, either the Royal Navy is more powerful than the Germany navy (and thus, more important for the US to keep friendly) or the RN is less powerful than the German navy and is therefore either part of the US sphere or the German sphere.

fasquardon
 
Why would the USA be closer to Germany? While the US would be trading heavily with both the British Empire and Germany, either the Royal Navy is more powerful than the Germany navy (and thus, more important for the US to keep friendly) or the RN is less powerful than the German navy and is therefore either part of the US sphere or the German sphere.

fasquardon

American anti-colonial sentiment, the clash over neutral's rights, clashes over China trade, as I retract Germany into Europe the USA has more open friction points with the British Empire, especially a healthier Britain. Leave the Japanese alliance in play, have Imperial Preference gain enough traction to facilitate a tariff war, and so on. With a stronger RN and a HSF more concentrated in Europe the USN stays focused on the British "threat". Again, in Asia it is more Anglo-Japanese "colonialism" versus USA "Open Door" and counter-Imperialism, something a Germany losing its hold in China aligns better with the American vision. As I see it you need weaker UK for the relationship to blossom, as the British fade they come under the American umbrella but a stronger Britain is not going so easily that path. In my sketch neutral Britain scenario I see the long term as a more two global blocs, USA "free market" versus Empire "cold shoulder", Germany and Japan are the secondary powers and "alliance" partners, Russia playing the other contender/disruptor. If you allow Russia to escape from the Soviet abyss then you could have a more Germano-Russian alignment that crafts a three way global spheres. As I keep the British Empire globally competitive it makes less friends.
 
American anti-colonial sentiment, the clash over neutral's rights, clashes over China trade, as I retract Germany into Europe the USA has more open friction points with the British Empire, especially a healthier Britain. Leave the Japanese alliance in play, have Imperial Preference gain enough traction to facilitate a tariff war, and so on. With a stronger RN and a HSF more concentrated in Europe the USN stays focused on the British "threat". Again, in Asia it is more Anglo-Japanese "colonialism" versus USA "Open Door" and counter-Imperialism, something a Germany losing its hold in China aligns better with the American vision. As I see it you need weaker UK for the relationship to blossom, as the British fade they come under the American umbrella but a stronger Britain is not going so easily that path. In my sketch neutral Britain scenario I see the long term as a more two global blocs, USA "free market" versus Empire "cold shoulder", Germany and Japan are the secondary powers and "alliance" partners, Russia playing the other contender/disruptor. If you allow Russia to escape from the Soviet abyss then you could have a more Germano-Russian alignment that crafts a three way global spheres. As I keep the British Empire globally competitive it makes less friends.

Australia and Canada stopped the Japanese alliance in OTL, I see no reason why those two dominions wouldn't push the UK out of than alliance in every situation except one where Japan and the US are friends, or something else is driving Anglo-American hostility.

As to US-UK friction, it's dwarfed by the reality that, if the US and UK fight, whoever wins they both lose.

I don't think that you need a weaker UK for the US-UK friendship to bloom - the friendship was mostly constructed between the two when the US was the rising great power and the UK was the currently dominant great power and from a policy point of view the motivating factor really boiled down to friendship being the cheapest way to deal with an extremely dangerous potential enemy for both powers.

I think to get a US-UK rivalry, you need to inflame one or the other with an ideology that warped its cost-benefit analysis.

Conversely, it's the very non-threateningness of Germany that makes it a bad friend for the US in a multipolar world. If Germany isn't a threat, than being Germany's friend only gains the US 1 friend, compared to Britain, whose friendship also means the US loses 1 potential enemy (Britain itself) and gains more secure access to the markets of the rest of the world. Now, if Germany were strong enough in this world that she was the 2nd greatest naval power after the US, then Germany is in a better position to offer the US the world and German friendship removes a potential enemy for the US. But Germany's geography makes it unlikely that they'd have such a powerful navy. Also, Germany is never going to have Canada, no matter how powerful it was.

fasquardon
 
Australia and Canada stopped the Japanese alliance in OTL, I see no reason why those two dominions wouldn't push the UK out of than alliance in every situation except one where Japan and the US are friends, or something else is driving Anglo-American hostility.

As to US-UK friction, it's dwarfed by the reality that, if the US and UK fight, whoever wins they both lose.

I don't think that you need a weaker UK for the US-UK friendship to bloom - the friendship was mostly constructed between the two when the US was the rising great power and the UK was the currently dominant great power and from a policy point of view the motivating factor really boiled down to friendship being the cheapest way to deal with an extremely dangerous potential enemy for both powers.

I think to get a US-UK rivalry, you need to inflame one or the other with an ideology that warped its cost-benefit analysis.

Conversely, it's the very non-threateningness of Germany that makes it a bad friend for the US in a multipolar world. If Germany isn't a threat, than being Germany's friend only gains the US 1 friend, compared to Britain, whose friendship also means the US loses 1 potential enemy (Britain itself) and gains more secure access to the markets of the rest of the world. Now, if Germany were strong enough in this world that she was the 2nd greatest naval power after the US, then Germany is in a better position to offer the US the world and German friendship removes a potential enemy for the US. But Germany's geography makes it unlikely that they'd have such a powerful navy. Also, Germany is never going to have Canada, no matter how powerful it was.

fasquardon

That reads too much like the Risk Theory. But post-war is more about trade than Risk, the power politics have failed in the Great War and now it is about economic recovery. A neutral British Empire is more the remaining super power here.

Nothing is certain but I would offer that the USA and Germany have mutually aligning goals in breaking up the British Empire, both based on economics, one more about geopolitics and the other ideology. Granted if Germany is a colonial power the relationship is less secure but then Germany is a minor one like the USA. Germany was never a threat to the USA and thus a better bet. I find plenty of anti-American sentiment in the British establishment to have a surviving and powerful Empire contemptuous of the USA. It is the global reach and naval might of the UK that puts her more at odds than Germany, sort of how the weaker China is a better ally for American moves against the Soviets. We cared not for China but she served the purpose. The real threat to the USA is blockade but here the USA might only theorize about it, so the balance is less overt hostility, more polite contempt. I let that stew over 20 or 30 years and find the USA and UK more not less alienated.

And here Japan is part of the British alliance and both Canada and Australia have not witnessed the war or paid its costs. They feared the aggressive Japan born s Britain turned its back and encouraged it to do some dirty business in Asia versus the enemy Germany. If it still occurs I see Japan acting only in China rather than into the Pacific, and the far east feels less insecure. And Japan on side with Britain should annoy the USA despite the Japanese having stronger trade links to the USA. In China it is Britain then Japan who irk the USA now that Russia is gone. And in the resurrecting China I see more room for British designs to alienate the USA as Japan threatens it all.

But that is just one of many possible paths.
 
A GP when? In 1914, Germany could lose as much territory as it did in 1945 and still be a Great Power. Today, even a Germany that never lost any territory would be barely holding on. None of the current European powers are Great Powers, and by 2050 they will be even weaker, in relative terms. Germany without the losses of WW1 would probably have 120 million people with an OTL standard of living, along with the culture required to actually express its potential, so it would certainly be a Great Power. The long-term 21st century requirements for Great Power status however would stretch those capabilities enormously. 120 million Germans vs 330 million Americans? 1.3 billion Chinese or Indians? It would be in a similar position to Japan, big and strong but not of the first rank, at least not for long.
 
A GP when? In 1914, Germany could lose as much territory as it did in 1945 and still be a Great Power. Today, even a Germany that never lost any territory would be barely holding on. None of the current European powers are Great Powers, and by 2050 they will be even weaker, in relative terms. Germany without the losses of WW1 would probably have 120 million people with an OTL standard of living, along with the culture required to actually express its potential, so it would certainly be a Great Power. The long-term 21st century requirements for Great Power status however would stretch those capabilities enormously. 120 million Germans vs 330 million Americans? 1.3 billion Chinese or Indians? It would be in a similar position to Japan, big and strong but not of the first rank, at least not for long.

This is the spongy zone. Here I think we craft the "great power" moniker for those powers who are not Super but more than merely regional, and it is relative. Brazil is certainly a regional power and in isolation likely a great power within South America, but globally as a big economy still not "great". India is certainly huge in population and has a big economy but barely attains regional power, its influence is really just in terms of its immediate neighbors. These are spongy labels. For our purposes I think we can keep a surviving Imperial Germany worthy of respect as one of the big players so long as it is unopposed by either a super power or an alliance of other peer/lesser powers. And even then we tend to parse over economic, military, cultural, diplomatic and other measures to yardstick. Thus in my ATL it is easy for me to see a USA as not a super power despite being a giant economy and having a respectable military, it simply has not enough power to unilaterally impose its will because it has less ambition to do so. It is not weakness but rather how one seeks to fit. An Imperial Germany has need to protect its merchant navy but still might not build a large amphibious force or aircraft carriers to project power, its Navy could be larger than the RN but designed for war versus the USSR not global hegemon. A multi-lateral world might let nations fill different places in the race as they cannot have everything they want. Today China is a near super power but it could not invade Switzerland. The metrics of power are not as easy to label. It is more which pond and what fish?
 
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