Query - British Empire and Germany - who could outproduce whom in WW2?

A simple explanation of why the Axis Powers lost the war is that by 1942 they were facing a Grand Alliance that massively outmatched them in raw materials, manpower and productive capacity.[1] Which between them outproduced the Axis in all types of war material - tanks, artillery pieces, infantry weapons, combat aircraft, warships etc. However, within that framework Britain (plus its Commonwealth and Empire) is sometimes seen as "the weakest link", unable to survive on its own post Fall of France due to its economic inferiority to Nazi Germany with access to European resources.[2] (This may have been discussed earlier, so please guide me to any such long-gone thread!)

(1) Is this perception of Britain true? And how can we decide which of the two powers could produce the most war material in circumstances different from OTL?

FWIW Harrington (Table 1.6, pp. 15-16) shows the UK (which I hope includes production in the Dominions and Colonies) as outstripping Germany in combat aircraft, machine pistols (a surprise?) guns and mortars, and major naval vessels [3]. Germany outproduced the UK in rifles, machine guns and tanks/SPGs. Adding Italy to the European Axis total would give them a slight superiority in combat aircraft too but nothing else

(2) Can we conclude from this that that the UK (and Empire?) by itself was a match for Germany and Italy in production terms?

Indeed, depending on how we weight the separate categories of armaments and differentiate further [4] we might conclude the UK etc. did indeed outproduce Germany and even Germany and Italy. (Is it worth me doing such an 'Index of War Production'? [5] ) It would probably need just a bit more granular data than Harrington's, some of which I can probably find. The techniques for aggregating output of different classes of goods are fairly standard and i can (re)learn them, with a PC it's much easier than it was 30-40 years ago!)

(3) IF confirmed, how does this affect how we view the UK's strategic position in July 1940?

The decision to fight on after the Fall of France (and before Lend-Lease) may have looked insane to outsiders or even with hindsight. However, according to Edgerton it was taken by a British establishment still confident about its economic potential. Possibly slightly too confident but this emanated I think not from its view of British war production versus Germany's (accurate enough). Instead it overrated Britain's forces ability to turn technology into war-winning operations and tactics. For instance, the UK over estimated ASDIC's effectiveness so losses to U-Boats were higher than anticipated. See also the ineffectual perfomance of Bomber Command in 1941-2 as against expectations of what damage it could do to Germany.

Sorry this is so long but it's basically three questions and background information. Happy to reformat it if requested.

[1] Harrington, Table 1.2, pp. 7-8 suggests the differential in GDP wasn't massive (1.3:1) but this was using 1938 figures for Axis conquests like France. Which were not perfectly integrated into the German productive system and in any event had suffered sharp declines in GDP since 1940.
[2] See my recent friendly discussions with Wiking on a few threads:)
[3] Harrington's definition includes submarines but excludes torpedo boats, landing craft and auxiliaries. I'm not sure whether the many small sloops and other escorts produced in the UK are included.
[4] Example: For combat aircraft should 1x4-engined plane = 2x2-engined planes and 4x single-engined planes? In terms of war fighting capability maybe not this exactly but in terms of production capability some degree of weighting like that is needed.
[5] Ideally, has some post-grad done it already?

Sources available to me ATM, plus OU material and other books on the war.
Edgerton (2012), Britain's War Machine, Penguin
Ellis, (1990) Brute Force, Penguin hardback
Harrington (1998) The Economics of World War II, Cambridge U iversity Press
Tooze, (2007) The Wages of Destruction, Penguin
 

Deleted member 1487

Are you talking about a Britain with access to Lend-Lease and a Germany subjected to blockade? If that is the case we get OTL's numbers were the British did outproduce Germany in a bunch of categories and the entire Empire had a higher GDP than Germany pre-war. Now if you eliminate LL and/or end the blockade on Germany things are different. IOTL post-FoF but before LL Britain still had hard currency to spend in the US, but their own had run out by the end of 1940 and they were spending loaned gold from Belgium and South Africa until LL kicked in. British production then was really in large part due to purchases from the US, especially of high capacity machine tools and raw materials that were unavailable in their Empire. Once money runs out and if there is no LL then British production effectively collapses even with the Empire due to the inability to actually source what they need close enough to home (across the Atlantic) to be able to effectively cope with the Uboat threat. So if you are postulating no LL then Britain loses the war due to the Home Isles being unable to sustain its war effort on what it can source through the Empire due to the distances involved (a trip to the US and back could be done 4 times a year by a merchant ship, while trip to the Iranian oil fields could only be done once a year due to the greater distance). However if what you're asking is can Britain with LL, but no US involvement survive and defend itself successfully, then of course, because they have access to $31.4 Billion in LL aid as per OTL. Adjusting for inflation that is more than Britain spent in WW1 in total. They probably couldn't successfully invade France, but they could probably invade Italy assuming Japan isn't in the war. But we addressed this around in our other discussion.
 
Britain was about 2/3 as strong as Germany from the economic point of view (excluding her external Empire) but at least had a stable economy. In terms of raw production it was more or less even, though the Germans had to deal with constant bombardment on a daily basis and devoted proportionately slightly more of their GDP to war spending. I would say if you looked at them in a vacuum the Germans would be industrially stronger than mainland Britain, but not decisively so.
 

Deleted member 1487

Britain was about 2/3 as strong as Germany from the economic point of view (excluding her external Empire) but at least had a stable economy. In terms of raw production it was more or less even, though the Germans had to deal with constant bombardment on a daily basis and devoted proportionately slightly more of their GDP to war spending. I would say if you looked at them in a vacuum the Germans would be industrially stronger than mainland Britain, but not decisively so.
British Isle yes, but OP said the empire, which had a pre-war GDP twice that of Germany. During the war that gap narrowed despite LL aid, but the British Empire as a whole had higher productive capacity than Germany, just spread out across the world. The British Isles had less capacity than Germany and totally depended on shipments of nearly everything from the US and the Empire to actually run its industry and feed and fuel itself. Germany subsisted mostly on what it was able to grab on the continent.
 
British Isle yes, but OP said the empire, which had a pre-war GDP twice that of Germany. During the war that gap narrowed despite LL aid, but the British Empire as a whole had higher productive capacity than Germany, just spread out across the world. The British Isles had less capacity than Germany and totally depended on shipments of nearly everything from the US and the Empire to actually run its industry and feed and fuel itself. Germany subsisted mostly on what it was able to grab on the continent.

Agreed.
 
The problem here is that people put far too much weight on the figures given by Paul Kennedy, even though this is a clear case of comparing apples with oranges: British figures for GNP are far more conservative than those for Germany or the US. As stated, according to Kennedy Germany had 50% more industry than Britain, and also had Czech and French industry (I know they didn't get that much out of France, but it was still a net gain), yet Britain outproduced Germany by a country mile - more tanks (slightly), more aircraft (by a large margin, made even larger because Britain produced many four-engined aircraft whereas most German aircraft were single-engined fighters), and more shipping (by a huge margin).

If you compare Britain to the US, you can see that Britain produced between 50% and 60% of what the US did:

Fast battleships: 6 British versus 10 American
Fleet carriers: 10 British versus 25 American
Light carriers: 25 British versus 11 American
Tanks and SPG's: 50,000 British versus 100,000 American
Aircraft: 177,000 British versus 324,000 American

This was despite Britain being bombed, blockaded and cut off from its markets in Europe. The US also benefited by British (and some French) investment that paid for the aircraft factories and shipyards that allowed the American economy to produce as it did.
 

Deleted member 1487

The problem here is that people put far too much weight on the figures given by Paul Kennedy, even though this is a clear case of comparing apples with oranges: British figures for GNP are far more conservative than those for Germany or the US. As stated, according to Kennedy Germany had 50% more industry than Britain, and also had Czech and French industry (I know they didn't get that much out of France, but it was still a net gain), yet Britain outproduced Germany by a country mile - more tanks (slightly), more aircraft (by a large margin, made even larger because Britain produced many four-engined aircraft whereas most German aircraft were single-engined fighters), and more shipping (by a huge margin).

If you compare Britain to the US, you can see that Britain produced between 50% and 60% of what the US did:

Fast battleships: 6 British versus 10 American
Fleet carriers: 10 British versus 25 American
Light carriers: 25 British versus 11 American
Tanks and SPG's: 50,000 British versus 100,000 American
Aircraft: 177,000 British versus 324,000 American

This was despite Britain being bombed, blockaded and cut off from its markets in Europe. The US also benefited by British (and some French) investment that paid for the aircraft factories and shipyards that allowed the American economy to produce as it did.
Speaking of comparing apples and oranges...
French industry isn't included in German figures. Britain was able to outproduce Germany because it was getting $31.4 Billion in LL and their production was the entire Empire, not just the British Isles. Strategic bombing of Britain was basically over by May 1941. Meanwhile Germany was investing far more of its production into air defense, as it was subjected to long and far heavier strategic bombardment from Britain and the US. German output was heavily reduced due to strategic bombing. And if you cherry pick categories you certainly could make British production seem higher than it was too. Germany for instance had over 300 divisions during WW2, Britain only about 50. The US about 100. The blockade of Britain was never really that effective, though it certainly sank of lot of production that gets counted as finished goods. Also don't forget that the US in its transmission of tens of billions of dollars of LL was actually providing the bulk of war time merchant shipping and tanks to Britain to get them the materials they needed to actually get the output they did.
 
Are you talking about a Britain with access to Lend-Lease and a Germany subjected to blockade? If that is the case we get OTL's numbers were the British did outproduce Germany in a bunch of categories and the entire Empire had a higher GDP than Germany pre-war.
Starting point is OTL - agreement on what happened OTL and why is key to estimating potential outcomes under other scenarios
However if what you're asking is can Britain with LL, but no US involvement survive and defend itself successfully, then of course, because they have access to $31.4 Billion in LL aid as per OTL. Adjusting for inflation that is more than Britain spent in WW1 in total. They probably couldn't successfully invade France, but they could probably invade Italy assuming Japan isn't in the war. But we addressed this around in our other discussion.
Yes, basically. Our differences on the potential outcome are minot and probably within margins of error and also different priorities for the UK. BTW Edgerton puts Lend-Lease supplies as equal to 20% of Uk armaments output, though like with the SU it was concentrated in a few fields. Which is substantial but manageable without - IF Britain could produce close to its OTL total.
Now if you eliminate LL and/or end the blockade on Germany things are different. IOTL post-FoF but before LL Britain still had hard currency to spend in the US, but their own had run out by the end of 1940 and they were spending loaned gold from Belgium and South Africa until LL kicked in. British production then was really in large part due to purchases from the US, especially of high capacity machine tools and raw materials that were unavailable in their Empire.
This is where we potentially start to differ and I'll have to number crunch. For one, the blockade continues through 1941 and beyond anyway. No change in UK naval power until much later, ships on order will be built in 1941 and probably 1942 too. Even if the LL deal falls through the US isn't going to side with Nazi Germany. UK production is going to take a hit with reduced imports as shipping-miles per import-ton will be more. But it's unlikely British purchases from the US will go from masses to zero on a given day. The UK can choose to prioritise what it buys and this would be machine tools, possibly for auxiliary factories in Canada. To which it can tempt US firms potentially hit by the shortfall in demand as direct sales to the UK. Without LL the UK has no need to join the US oil embargo and won't lose Malayan resources or divert troops to the Far East.
Once money runs out and if there is no LL then British production effectively collapses even with the Empire due to the inability to actually source what they need close enough to home (across the Atlantic) to be able to effectively cope with the Uboat threat. So if you are postulating no LL then Britain loses the war due to the Home Isles being unable to sustain its war effort on what it can source through the Empire due to the distances involved (a trip to the US and back could be done 4 times a year by a merchant ship, while trip to the Iranian oil fields could only be done once a year due to the greater distance).
Well, that's the key question isn't it. WILL UK and Empire production collapse to the extent you think or can Britain adjust its spending and import priorities in 1941 to cope with the U-boat threat while still being able to fight effectively in the Middle East? The British establishment in July 1940 thought so but could have been wrong. The US clearly thought the UK couldn't manage hence LL - were they right as you think? An interesting subsidiary question is whether a hard-headed British government could get a better LL deal - as far as the conditions on British post-war policy and the restriction on exports war-time are concerned - by rejecting the initial offer.

My guess (which I want to try to refine) is the truth is in the middle - UK output would fall from OTL totals but not collapse. What would have to be sacrificed is the Bomber Command build up which does help German war production from mid-1943 (possibly late 1942) but not really earlier. IF my reading of Tooze and German war production plans and outcomes is accurate. Germany still couldn't force Britain to surrender but Britain's war effort would be weakened to the extent that Germany could shift a higher proportion of its expanded production (and OTL manpower) to the Eastern Front from mid-1943. But that would be too late to bring about a German victory there, at best a stalemate on the Vistiula in 1944/5. And of course an unknown is whether with Bomber Command ineffective, Britain tries to build an A-bomb instead. And succeeds or launches Operation Vegetarian.
 

Deleted member 1487

BTW Edgerton puts Lend-Lease supplies as equal to 20% of Uk armaments output, though like with the SU it was concentrated in a few fields.
Only if you're looking at finished goods and leave out the critical stuff that enabled domestic UK production, like raw materials, food, high capacity machine tools, oil, merchant shipping, etc. You don't get OTL production without those things.


Which is substantial but manageable without - IF Britain could produce close to its OTL total.
But they couldn't without LL providing those inputs like raw materials and oil, especially high performance fuels for aircraft.

This is where we potentially start to differ and I'll have to number crunch. For one, the blockade continues through 1941 and beyond anyway. No change in UK naval power until much later, ships on order will be built in 1941 and probably 1942 too. Even if the LL deal falls through the US isn't going to side with Nazi Germany. UK production is going to take a hit with reduced imports as shipping-miles per import-ton will be more. But it's unlikely British purchases from the US will go from masses to zero on a given day. The UK can choose to prioritise what it buys and this would be machine tools, possibly for auxiliary factories in Canada. To which it can tempt US firms potentially hit by the shortfall in demand as direct sales to the UK. Without LL the UK has no need to join the US oil embargo and won't lose Malayan resources or divert troops to the Far East.
British ships will provided they could get the raw material inputs from the US. The issue of no LL is not that the US would side with Germany, its that the British wouldn't have the food, fuel, raw materials, finished goods like merchant ships/tankers and finished weapons that it depended on from 1941 on IOTL. They don't have the money to buy that stuff by 1942. So they pretty much have to negotiate and end to the war due to the materials crisis they would face given the continuing German Uboat efforts and lack of ability to actually win the war. Selling to Japan isn't really an option due to Japanese assets being frozen by the US financial system and the British gain nothing by providing tribute to Japan in terms of free raw materials and oil.
As to trying to appeal to US companies to violate cash and carry laws via Canada is just silly, Canada doesn't have the finances to pay in dollars either. If cash and carry remains in effect then Britain has no access to the US merchant shipping fleet and no credit to buy things from the US, and certainly no dollars left in the empire to do so. US business will be more than satiated by the US government spending on rearmament in the early 1940s.

Well, that's the key question isn't it. WILL UK and Empire production collapse to the extent you think or can Britain adjust its spending and import priorities in 1941 to cope with the U-boat threat while still being able to fight effectively in the Middle East? The British establishment in July 1940 thought so but could have been wrong. The US clearly thought the UK couldn't manage hence LL - were they right as you think? An interesting subsidiary question is whether a hard-headed British government could get a better LL deal - as far as the conditions on British post-war policy and the restriction on exports war-time are concerned - by rejecting the initial offer.

My guess (which I want to try to refine) is the truth is in the middle - UK output would fall from OTL totals but not collapse. What would have to be sacrificed is the Bomber Command build up which does help German war production from mid-1943 (possibly late 1942) but not really earlier. IF my reading of Tooze and German war production plans and outcomes is accurate. Germany still couldn't force Britain to surrender but Britain's war effort would be weakened to the extent that Germany could shift a higher proportion of its expanded production (and OTL manpower) to the Eastern Front from mid-1943. But that would be too late to bring about a German victory there, at best a stalemate on the Vistiula in 1944/5. And of course an unknown is whether with Bomber Command ineffective, Britain tries to build an A-bomb instead. And succeeds or launches Operation Vegetarian.
Britain was hand to mouth in terms of their spending Churchill went on a binge without concern for costs because he thought he'd be able to lure the US into the war eventually, then finances wouldn't matter. By the time Belgian and South African gold ran out in 1941 then Britain cannot purchase anything and they were already tamping down their purchasing as it was running dry. The fact is that money is running out and the Empire cannot make up the difference because of the distances involved and the limits to the British merchant shipping fleet. It could only make something like 1 million tons of merchant ships in the entire empire per year, which was well below the sinking rates of the Germans. But beyond that the problem of sourcing of resources is key; Canada only has some of what Britain needs, major things like oil have to come from the Middle East, but thanks to Italian entry tankers, which were scarce in 1941-42, would have to travel four times the distance to get to the Persian Gulf and get filled up. That distance effectively reduces the oil tanker fleet to 25% of its OTL capacity because it takes 4x a long to get to the oil fields. Couple that with the problem of not being able to convoy due to the distances involved and the German uboats have a field day hunting individual ships in the South Atlantic. Without oil Britain grinds to a halt, so they have to negotiate before their strategic stockpile runs out.

Britain would effectively be a non-factor in the war by early 1942 if there is no LL. If 1942 then starts with a hobbled UK due to no LL then the USSR is going to face over 2/3rds of the Luftwaffe and German army from then on out. When Britain cuts a deal and drops out then 90% of the German military will be in the East and production will be a lot higher and put toward different priorities when the blockade ends and Uboat construction does too. Then air defenses of Germany never become a major issue, so that rather than only 41% of the Luftwaffe being in the East in 1943 now 90% of it is; instead of 45% of the Panzers, now 90% of them are.
 
British ships will provided they could get the raw material inputs from the US. The issue of no LL is not that the US would side with Germany, its that the British wouldn't have the food, fuel, raw materials, finished goods like merchant ships/tankers and finished weapons that it depended on from 1941 on IOTL. They don't have the money to buy that stuff by 1942. So they pretty much have to negotiate and end to the war due to the materials crisis they would face given the continuing German Uboat efforts and lack of ability to actually win the war.
There are other sources of raw materials lying within the Empire and sterling zone.countries like Latin America or the Middle east. Effectively Britain could run up deficits with them by "printing money", pledges to pay post-war. The problem is rarely cash, it's the refusal of the US to allow Britain to fund purchases in sterling (reasonable as it might depreciate sterling or default on loans).
Selling to Japan isn't really an option due to Japanese assets being frozen by the US financial system and the British gain nothing by providing tribute to Japan in terms of free raw materials and oil.

It's quite easy, Britain provides Japan with a sterling loan, which Japan is as likely to repay post-war as Britain is to repay its sterling balances. Or views it as protection money, stopping Japan simply grabbing Malaya is worth a share of Malayan resources. Indeed I'm sure Japan can supply the Empire with something in return, shipped peacefully in Japanese hulls to India or Australia. Japanese friendship would be worth a lot to the UK in this no LL scenario.

As to trying to appeal to US companies to violate cash and carry laws via Canada is just silly, Canada doesn't have the finances to pay in dollars either. If cash and carry remains in effect then Britain has no access to the US merchant shipping fleet and no credit to buy things from the US, and certainly no dollars left in the empire to do so. US business will be more than satiated by the US government spending on rearmament in the early 1940s.
Does investment in arms production in a friendly country violate US law? Citation - i don't disbelieve you but given the creative way the FDR administration got round the sale of the 50 destroyers and some other supplies to the UK I'm sure good lawyers can find loopholes to wriggle through. Many large US companies had UK subsidiaries, perhaps favours for them could sweeten the deal. Being paid in sterling may not be as good as USD in 1941-5 but it's not worthless. Unless Britain loses the war of course.


Britain was hand to mouth in terms of their spending Churchill went on a binge without concern for costs because he thought he'd be able to lure the US into the war eventually, then finances wouldn't matter. By the time Belgian and South African gold ran out in 1941 then Britain cannot purchase anything and they were already tamping down their purchasing as it was running dry. The fact is that money is running out and the Empire cannot make up the difference because of the distances involved and the limits to the British merchant shipping fleet. It could only make something like 1 million tons of merchant ships in the entire empire per year, which was well below the sinking rates of the Germans. But beyond that the problem of sourcing of resources is key; Canada only has some of what Britain needs, major things like oil have to come from the Middle East, but thanks to Italian entry tankers, which were scarce in 1941-42, would have to travel four times the distance to get to the Persian Gulf and get filled up. That distance effectively reduces the oil tanker fleet to 25% of its OTL capacity because it takes 4x a long to get to the oil fields. Couple that with the problem of not being able to convoy due to the distances involved and the German uboats have a field day hunting individual ships in the South Atlantic. Without oil Britain grinds to a halt, so they have to negotiate before their strategic stockpile runs out. .
This is several points in one. Churchill's spending spree may have been designed to either get the US involved in the war or to force it to find other ways of helping the UK - possibly dollar loans (banned by the US constitution though?). Lend-lease was FDR's way round the problem but came with very tough conditions that may have crippled the British post-war economy. In fairness to FDR I don't think that was his intention though he did want to break Imperial Preference and open the UK and Imperial markets to US exports and investment. Reasonable goal for a US President but one that a less trusting and more Imperial minded UK government could have balked at. So it's worth examining whether the UK had in fact other options from late 1940 than running out of cash and throwing itself on the mercy of the US. Or blackmailing the US by threatening to make peace if not helped, which is just as reasonable an interpretation of Churchill's policy.

There's no doubt the extra shipping miles needed to source goods from Latin America and elsewhere would have hurt the volume of British imports as compared to OTL with LL and US built ships. But note the volume of British imports iOTL fell from 100 in 1937 to 90 in 1940 and then to only 67 in 1942 [1]. While British GNP and war production still rose. A faster fall in 1941 and 1942 would hurt output but the question is biy how much. 10%?, 20%, 30% or more. There;s no need to postulate a collapse in British GDP. There's scope to make cuts in food rations, these were still higher than in Europe. And cut the share of war output going to Bomber Command, it's only from 1943 that this would help Germany.

Britain would effectively be a non-factor in the war by early 1942 if there is no LL.
I think that is more than a a bit hyperbolic but it does depend on how much British and Imperial production drops. Which is established not by sweeping statements but number crunching. Still, while I think you're over-pessimistic re British stand-alone prospects and over-optimistic about what that means for Germany's ability to deploy additional forces on the Eastern Front, it's true it would be a different war. Better for Germany, worse for the USSR - but what about the US interest?

As a tangent, should Britain have been open to a generous peace settlement (as defined by Britain) in late 1940 rather than going on the USD spending spree? Or in early 1941, when it might have known about Barbarossa and seen it as a way to get two enemies (of the Empire) fighting each other.

[1] UN Statistical Yearbook 1951 - just don't ask why i have that one or indeed any in my book collection ;)
 

Deleted member 1487

There are other sources of raw materials lying within the Empire and sterling zone.countries like Latin America or the Middle east. Effectively Britain could run up deficits with them by "printing money", pledges to pay post-war. The problem is rarely cash, it's the refusal of the US to allow Britain to fund purchases in sterling (reasonable as it might depreciate sterling or default on loans).
The problem isn't financing things from within the empire, its the lack of shipping and tankers to actually get it to Britain where the production centers mostly were and the islands if they fell would mean the war was lost. Shipping for Britain was just like that of Japan: its center of gravity. Had they had to go around the world to the empire instead of across the Atlantic to the US they wouldn't have had enough shipping to be able to get the materials to the Home Isles. Source on that is:
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Civil-MerchantShipping/index.html


It's quite easy, Britain provides Japan with a sterling loan, which Japan is as likely to repay post-war as Britain is to repay its sterling balances. Or views it as protection money, stopping Japan simply grabbing Malaya is worth a share of Malayan resources. Indeed I'm sure Japan can supply the Empire with something in return, shipped peacefully in Japanese hulls to India or Australia. Japanese friendship would be worth a lot to the UK in this no LL scenario.
Why would they trust Japan to pay any of that back and what does giving them anything get Britain if it is on credit and pisses off the US? Japan barely had enough shipping to keep their own 1941 empire going, so don't really count on them to offer services in kind if they are already getting stuff for free or could intimidate the British into giving it.

Does investment in arms production in a friendly country violate US law? Citation - i don't disbelieve you but given the creative way the FDR administration got round the sale of the 50 destroyers and some other supplies to the UK I'm sure good lawyers can find loopholes to wriggle through. Many large US companies had UK subsidiaries, perhaps favours for them could sweeten the deal. Being paid in sterling may not be as good as USD in 1941-5 but it's not worthless. Unless Britain loses the war of course.
Investing in a losing war effort isn't exactly good business and if you cannot get the material inputs to make the weapons within the British empire and lack the shipping to source it from other CW nations then its a pointless move. Britain's real issue is fuel, food, aluminum, machine tools, etc. More factories in Canada are meaningless to that issue. Also US businesses are more interested in US government contracts and rearmament is starting.

This is several points in one. Churchill's spending spree may have been designed to either get the US involved in the war or to force it to find other ways of helping the UK - possibly dollar loans (banned by the US constitution though?). Lend-lease was FDR's way round the problem but came with very tough conditions that may have crippled the British post-war economy. In fairness to FDR I don't think that was his intention though he did want to break Imperial Preference and open the UK and Imperial markets to US exports and investment. Reasonable goal for a US President but one that a less trusting and more Imperial minded UK government could have balked at. So it's worth examining whether the UK had in fact other options from late 1940 than running out of cash and throwing itself on the mercy of the US. Or blackmailing the US by threatening to make peace if not helped, which is just as reasonable an interpretation of Churchill's policy.
The spending spree wasn't to get the US into the war, it was to rearm as fast as possible to make up for the losses in France in 1940 and head off a potential Nazi invasion. The Neutrality Acts banned dollar loans to any belligerent, Cash and Carry was loophole legislation there; if you have shipping and cash you could buy what you wanted. Otherwise you're pretty much right about the impact of LL, which IMHO was the effort by the US to become the global hegemon by defeating the Axis and financially entrapping the Brits. No one would be left to stand in the way of the US reordering the world to their benefit and heading off future conflicts between major powers. I'm not saying that it was something done out of malice, rather out of a desire to make sure that future wars would be impossible because there was finally one global power that set the rules that benefited everyone that was willing to play along (if you were a major power that is, sorry 3rd world). Churchill was willing to sell out to the US because he thought it was in British interests to do so. I don't think he was in a position to blackmail really.

There's no doubt the extra shipping miles needed to source goods from Latin America and elsewhere would have hurt the volume of British imports as compared to OTL with LL and US built ships. But note the volume of British imports iOTL fell from 100 in 1937 to 90 in 1940 and then to only 67 in 1942 [1]. While British GNP and war production still rose. A faster fall in 1941 and 1942 would hurt output but the question is biy how much. 10%?, 20%, 30% or more. There;s no need to postulate a collapse in British GDP. There's scope to make cuts in food rations, these were still higher than in Europe. And cut the share of war output going to Bomber Command, it's only from 1943 that this would help Germany.
Latin America was still accepting Sterling? The US was monopolizing Latin American trade to cut out the Europeans.
The reason British GDP was able to rise was LL allowed the Brits to import expensive finished goods instead of raw materials. So steel pre-fabbed based on spec, finished wood products instead of raw lumber, refined fuels instead of crude oil, etc. It was very expensive, but saved weight for the final product. That is not a viable option without the US picking up the tab. Printing Sterling to pay inflates the currency and runs into the problem Germany had with inflation in and after WW1. Cutting BC helps German in 1942:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Cologne_in_World_War_II

Again having to travel 2-4x as far to get what they need is bad enough, not being able to afford more than raw materials then further hampers shipping efficiency, as it means wasted space for unrefined raw materials. Then add in the increased sinkings from not being able to convoy over 2-4x as far ports means the tonnage war is lost.

I think that is more than a a bit hyperbolic but it does depend on how much British and Imperial production drops. Which is established not by sweeping statements but number crunching. Still, while I think you're over-pessimistic re British stand-alone prospects and over-optimistic about what that means for Germany's ability to deploy additional forces on the Eastern Front, it's true it would be a different war. Better for Germany, worse for the USSR - but what about the US interest?
Again just in terms of fuel having 25% as much tankers effectively due to having to travel 4x as far to get at Middle East oil is fatal, especially as you cannot convoy over that distance and German raiders can have a field day. Add in that you cannot have the US making you more tankers and its death. The war machine grinds to a halt.

The real issue is getting the US to do that. Frankly IOTL its hard to see in the long run LL not happening given the politicians in charge in the US. We are just arguing a thought exercise really. The only way LL isn't happening is if Britain drops out after France in 1940.

As a tangent, should Britain have been open to a generous peace settlement (as defined by Britain) in late 1940 rather than going on the USD spending spree? Or in early 1941, when it might have known about Barbarossa and seen it as a way to get two enemies (of the Empire) fighting each other.
IMHO once Britain drops out the situation is such that they cannot come back in even if Germany invades the USSR. For one thing the Axis Pact would be signed, which means Britain would be willingly starting a war with Italy and Japan in addition to Germany if they reentered the war, while India will not come back in; the outcry after the colonial administration forced India to declare war in 1939 meant that India was going to be independent the minute the war ended and would not reenter a war if Britain started it. So Britain would be fighting without the critical part of it's empire. In that situation given the finances of Britain they won't be coming back in. So Britain not being open to negotiate in 1940 meant that the conditions for a long war were at least present (though Hitler could have played his post-defeat of France hand MUCH better and forced the Brits out in 1941) and kept Hitler from being able to consolidate his gains in peace and invade the USSR for continental hegemony.
 
If you are wanting more analysis & then data I recommend looking at Ellis 600+ page summary ' Brute Force for a start. Then have go at the sources for that books data. Ellis looks at all the major combatants, but his comparisons are divided up so that large chunks of the seperate efforts are displayed.
 

Daniels

Banned
Well OTL British production was massivly boosted by LL deliveries - without them Britain will do a lot worse. I have numbers for machine tool production and imports which in the years 1940-1944 amounted to
362 000 produced by the British and 117 000 imported by Britain. Based on these numbers alone British production would have been around 20-25% lower without LL deliveries.

As for Germany: Bombing reduced German aircraft production by 18 500 aircraft in the 43/44 period - around 20-25% for this time period.

Also the British reached their maximum tank production in 1942 with 8600 machines which continuously declined to 7500 in 1943 and 5000 in 1944 because the British had not enough industrial capacity to build tanks and aircraft ect. Meanwhile German tank production increased from 6200 in 1942 to 19 000 in 1944 - while everything else increased as well.
 

Deleted member 1487

Well OTL British production was massivly boosted by LL deliveries - without them Britain will do a lot worse. I have numbers for machine tool production and imports which in the years 1940-1944 amounted to
362 000 produced by the British and 117 000 imported by Britain. Based on these numbers alone British production would have been around 20-25% lower without LL deliveries.

As for Germany: Bombing reduced German aircraft production by 18 500 aircraft in the 43/44 period - around 20-25% for this time period.

Also the British reached their maximum tank production in 1942 with 8600 machines which continuously declined to 7500 in 1943 and 5000 in 1944 because the British had not enough industrial capacity to build tanks and aircraft ect. Meanwhile German tank production increased from 6200 in 1942 to 19 000 in 1944 - while everything else increased as well.
Also take into consideration that Britain sourced the high capacity machine tools they couldn't make at home from the US, so their effect was larger than just raw numbers would indicate, as the US made machine tools enabled much more labor and raw materials savings than the machines made in Britain. It was a similar dynamic with Soviet LL that needed technically complex machine tools that they could not domestically manufacture. So losing those tools is far more damaging than just not having 25% of historical numbers.

For Germany they were constantly hampered by their lack of machine tool production and the constant lack of all the necessary steel and coal; IIRC the Germans were 2-3 years behind on filling machine tool construction orders, which was made worse by screw ups in projects like the cancelling of the Ju288 after enormous machine tool investments that had to be scrapped, same with the Me210, again with the flawed Ta-154, and the near useless He177 (prior to late 1943). Add the bombing on top of that and it is surprising the Germans got anything done.
 
If you compare Britain to the US, you can see that Britain produced between 50% and 60% of what the US did:
Is this supposed to be "wartime production", i.e. 1939-1945?

Because some of the figures are very questionable. Looking at ships built by each country and commissioned during the war:

Fast battleships: 6 British versus 10 American

Britain only built 5 during the war: Vanguard was commissioned in 1946.
The U.S. also built two Alaska-class "large cruisers", which were battleship sized and armed.

Fleet carriers: 10 British versus 25 American

Britain commissioned 4 Illustrious-class and 2 Implacable-class during the war, which is only 6.

The U.S. commissioned Hornet, Wasp, and 17 Essex-class during the war, which is only 19.

Light carriers: 25 British versus 11 American

Britain commissioned no light carriers during the war.

The U.S. commissioned only 9 Independence-class during the war; Saipan and Wright were completed after the war.

If one considers escort carriers as "light" carriers:

Britain built and commissioned Audacity, Activity, Pretoria Castle, and 3 Nairana-class during the war, which is only 6. I don't think one can count the 19 "merchant aircraft carriers" as real carriers or new construction: they were all cargo ships with a tacked-on flight deck to operate no more than 4 aircraft.

The U.S. built 2 Long Island-class, 3 Avenger-class, 45 Bogue-class, 4 Sangamon-class, 4 Sangamon-class, 50 Casablanca-class, and 10 Commencement Bay-class, for 108 total.

As to other warship classes...

Heavy cruisers: Britain built none. The U.S built 11 Baltimore-class.

Light cruisers: Britain built 11 Dido-class, 11 "Colony"-class. The U.S built 43 Cleveland-class, 8 Atlanta-class.

Destroyers: Britain built 137; the U.S. built 316.

So while Britain approached a third to a half of U.S. production in battleships, fleet carriers, light cruisers, and destroyers, Britain did not build any light carriers or heavy cruisers.
 
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What were the 6 Colossus class carriers commissioned in 1944/1945 then? And HMS Unicorn.

That is 7 light carriers.

No idea where the number of 25 comes from though.
 
What were the 6 Colossus class carriers commissioned in 1944/1945 then?

I thought I checked those, and found they were all commissioned after the war. None of them saw action.

And HMS Unicorn.

For some reason I read Unicorn as being commissioned in mid 1939.

That is 7 light carriers.

Correct.

No idea where the number of 25 comes from though.

Nor I.

Even after the above corrections, Britain's warship production looks like 30%-50% of US production, and in some areas much less. Not 50%-60%.

Unicorn was commissioned in
 
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