Quality of the Japanese Army in WWII

No it's not ASB, you just need to have Imperial Japan 'reform' without getting involved in WWII.

Since nobody is going to fight Imperial Japan over what she already holds, then there is a strong precident for a long term Japanese control over Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan.

I'd guess Korea or Taiwan to turn into Japanese Algeria eventually. More likely it would be Korea. Island possessions would probably well integrated into Japan and increasingly Japanized, while Taiwan could probably be made into autonomous or semi independent nation.
 

CalBear

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So, the political statement of the need of using nuclear bombs was just an exaggeration, seeing the vast inferiority of the Japanese forces in the late WWII?

You do not need superior tactics or weapons to be a hedgehog.

You need exceptionally brave, even suicidal troops, defensible terrain, and a willingness to absorb horrific losses.

The best example of what the IJA could do on defense when presented with good defensible terrain and a commander who realized that charging machine guns and artillery firing canister with bayonets is Okinawa, with Peleliu running a close 2nd (with Iwo Jima being something of an aberration due to the unique terrain, but again a perfect example of a good commander who spent all his men, but got full value for them).

For that matter the Soviets lost 10% of their forces KIA in Afghanistan fighting the tribal militias and they were damn near untrained and woefully equipped, even after the U.S. intervened with Stingers (which only took helos out of the equation).

At Okinawa the Japanese inflicted 51,000 combat casualties on a Allied force of 183,000, including 12K+ KIA, with 120,000 defending troops and around 1,000 kamikazes (they also suffered 105,000 KIA plus 100,000 or more civilian deaths for total loss of 200,000+ dead and God alone knows how many civilian permanent incapacitates). Add a zero to all those figures and you have a reasonable estimate of what Kyushu would have cost. Simply put, the American planners underestimated total losses when they talked of a million dead. overall the figure would have been closer to 4 million.
 
You do not need superior tactics or weapons to be a hedgehog.

You need exceptionally brave, even suicidal troops, defensible terrain, and a willingness to absorb horrific losses.

The best example of what the IJA could do on defense when presented with good defensible terrain and a commander who realized that charging machine guns and artillery firing canister with bayonets is Okinawa, with Peleliu running a close 2nd (with Iwo Jima being something of an aberration due to the unique terrain, but again a perfect example of a good commander who spent all his men, but got full value for them).

For that matter the Soviets lost 10% of their forces KIA in Afghanistan fighting the tribal militias and they were damn near untrained and woefully equipped, even after the U.S. intervened with Stingers (which only took helos out of the equation).


At Okinawa the Japanese inflicted 51,000 combat casualties on a Allied force of 183,000, including 12K+ KIA, with 120,000 defending troops and around 1,000 kamikazes (they also suffered 105,000 KIA plus 100,000 or more civilian deaths for total loss of 200,000+ dead and God alone knows how many civilian permanent incapacitates). Add a zero to all those figures and you have a reasonable estimate of what Kyushu would have cost. Simply put, the American planners underestimated total losses when they talked of a million dead. overall the figure would have been closer to 4 million.

Of the 525.500 soviet soldiers that served in Afghanistan there were 13.833 Killed and 311 MIA. That's way bellow 10%. You only get over 10% if you count the 49.985 wounded (all causes). Bear in mind that the red army had an horrible accident record. Soviet sources put the non combat deaths at 17.7%
 
I'd guess Korea or Taiwan to turn into Japanese Algeria eventually. More likely it would be Korea. Island possessions would probably well integrated into Japan and increasingly Japanized, while Taiwan could probably be made into autonomous or semi independent nation.

Possibly...

But it is a relative unknown. Critically when the Japanese took control of Korea and Manchuria, they moved Japanese civilians, industry and companies in as well. The Japanese took the view that it was the 'land of asia' and the 'consumer natives' that were important in their colonial ambitions.

This is why particularly in China, they wanted to emulate the British success of maintaining economic advantage to sell to the lucrative Chinese market. In maintaining an export based economy they tap the wealth of the nation, that wealth being used to support effectively the large military and 'buy off' the decision process.


What we must realise that not until circa 1930 was Imperial Japan effectively a military junta. In the 1920s there had been a significant mellowing towards the armed forces, and the diet was looking towards more peaceful status quo due to the industrialists and merchants gaining favour at the expense of the military. Partly this was because industrialisation initiatives were beginning to pay off, and fall out from the '21 Demands'. Yet the IJA still maintained defacto total control and power in Manchuria.



However, the American depression is to blame for Imperial Japan’s change of leadership in exactly the same way the American depression is heavily to blame for the rise of Nazism.

The world markets slumped and trade tariff barriers led to widespread unemployment and poverty in Japan, thus putting the Merchants in a poor light, and undermining Count Hamaguchi's 'friendship policy' with China because China wasn't buying Japanese good...hence how can they be considered friends?

Thus the nationalist societies of the day gained favour, and ultimately led to Hamaguchi's assassination, and was one of the first deaths in a string of assassinations designed by military leaders in Manchuria and at home to create a climate favourable to war.

The rest we can say is history.



My original point is that the Japanese moved into these regions with their own peoples and business. In so doing they controlled the markets to a fair degree, as well as the 'modern' manufactured goods industries. With emigrated 'pro-japanese' Japanese in Korea and later Manchuria, and them dominating the economic outlook it would be very difficult for the local Chinese or Koreans to be able to make a good case for independence.

Admittedly yes, this is much the same as the French-Algerian case, however the end level of discrimination would be unknown. If the military junta doesn't arise in Imperial Japan and it survives WWII.


Furthermore in the Cold War Japan would still be seen as a world power aligned against the Soviets, and hence receive excellent relations with America and Britain. This form of support would make Japans patronage of Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria highly desirable to prevent a Soviet Invasion.

Hence allowing the Japanese military to serve its 'high esteem position' of being the defensive force keeping the Soviets at bay, without having to antagonise China. A China that is likely still nationalist without a Japanese invasion.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union...then it is more likely we would be seeing Manchurian or Korean nationalist movements, assuming that the world still follows the tenant of international terrorism, then we might expect in such a timeline these Japanese aligned states to take that line. However given the length of period dominated, and social integration these regions may identify themselves more with Japanese culture (with local aspects of course) rather than Chinese or native Korean.
 
The Japanese tanks of the 1930s were equal to the tank designs coming out of Europe at the time. Let's take three examples the;

Type 95 Ha-Go tank (designed 1930-34);
Weight: 7,400kg
Crew: 3
Main Gun: 37mm
Secodary Gun: 2x 7.7mm machingun


British Cruiser Mk I (designed 1936-41)
Weight: ~12,000kg
Crew: 6
Main Gun 40mm
Secondary guns: 3x0.303 (7.7mm) Vickers Machinguns


Panzer II (designed 1934)
Weight: ~8,900kg
Crew: 3
Main Gun: 2 cm KwK 30
Secindary gun: 1x7.92mm machigun

The things this chart doesn't show is that:

1) The HA-GO only had a one-man turret, severly reducing its usefulness.
2) Japanese tanks used riveted armor, which was weaker than welded armor.

I do agree with two of your three themes however:

1) The tankette was useful against enemies with no armor, so it continued to be produced long after it should have been abandoned (the fact it was cheap also contributed to this).

2) The IJN got the bulk of steel supplies, I just can't see the Army successfully getting more than what they were getting.

3) Japanese armor wasn't "good enough", Khalkan Gol should have proved this. And as mentioned earlier, Russia's production was vastly greater than that of Japan. So even if Soviet tanks were total crap (which they weren't) they could easily outproduce Japan and absorb heavy losses. Even with better tanks there was no way Japan could win over such lopsided odds.
 
I'm not a WWII expert, so this is purely for information's sake: How much did the Allies use tanks against the Japanese?

The largest use in any single occasion was the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation were the Soviets used over 5000 tanks against the Kwantung Army, outnumbering them in armour almost 5 to 1.
 
The largest use in any single occasion was the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation were the Soviets used over 5000 tanks against the Kwantung Army, outnumbering them in armour almost 5 to 1.

And, needless to say, the Kwantung Army was utterly steamrolled. It wasn't even a contest.
 
The things this chart doesn't show is that:

1) The HA-GO only had a one-man turret, severely reducing its usefulness.
2) Japanese tanks used riveted armour, which was weaker than welded armour.

Indeed it doesn't show many things...like French tanks deemed to be 'the best in the world' even though they mostly had only one man turrets.

Hindsight and retrospect are great, but they give us a skewed perception of things, since the people at the time didn't have any real idea how much or how little factors such of these would ultimately be worth. At the time (1930-1942) the Japanese Armoured forces were pretty much 'up to the job' particularly in China.

The high mobility, naval logistics needed to mount the multiple and rapid invasions of the Pacific could not have easily incorporated any more than the few armoured units shipped overseas and even then would have been a logistical issue for the Japanese above and beyond what they already had as problems.

In that sense their was no more room in the Japanese Order of Battle, or any practical gains from the IJA to have pursued any more comprehensive tank development.



What is often forgotten with the Pacific theatre is that the Japanese were "not stupid", for all their fanaticism, dogma and problems with military discipline, their commanders and chiefs of staff were excellent at getting as much mileage out of their inadequate forces as possible. It's not that the Japanese could have done better...it's more, that was (generally) the best they could do under the circumstances!

In the grand scheme of things, they were a modern nation of the last 60 years, compared to the US which was a modern continental sized nation of the last 300! Meaning they never really had a chance.

It is frankly quite amazing that they gave as good account of themselves as they did and pretty much all on their own.



In my opinion what serious sunk Imperial Japan wasn't the war in China, but the Japanese Navy unilaterally beginning and forcing through their 'advance south policy' which through a number of events and decisions led to Pearl Harbour.

Without the navy getting involved in the IJA's war in China it is likely that the war would have stalemated somewhere in North China and eventually lead to some kind of pro-Japanese armistice. If the IJN had 'stuck to their ports' the IJAs eventual failure to beat the Chinese would have given them the prestige they desired, while at the same time not leading Japan to total war and a full defeat.
 
Hindsight and retrospect are great, but they give us a skewed perception of things, since the people at the time didn't have any real idea how much or how little factors such of these would ultimately be worth. At the time (1930-1942) the Japanese Armoured forces were pretty much 'up to the job' particularly in China.
Ummm... 1930? maybe. 1942? only in a backwater (militarily) place like China. The entire rest of the world was moving forward on bigger tanks with bigger guns. No, it doesn't require any kind of 'hindsight'. Possibly spies. The difference in 'adequate' tanks moved hugely from 1930 to 1939 and then again as far from 1939 to 1942-3.
The high mobility, naval logistics needed to mount the multiple and rapid invasions of the Pacific could not have easily incorporated any more than the few armoured units shipped overseas and even then would have been a logistical issue for the Japanese above and beyond what they already had as problems.
Yet another reason why Japanese strategic planning sucked. The Brits, at least, had OK tanks (as opposed to the Japanese tankettes), and wouldn't drop out of the fight fast, even if the US did (which latter they assumed).
In that sense their was no more room in the Japanese Order of Battle, or any practical gains from the IJA to have pursued any more comprehensive tank development.
Unless, of course, they actually wanted to win a war....

What is often forgotten with the Pacific theatre is that the Japanese were "not stupid", for all their fanaticism, dogma and problems with military discipline, their commanders and chiefs of staff were excellent at getting as much mileage out of their inadequate forces as possible.
Really? 1) when e.g. Army and Navy ships traveled empty on legs of trips where the other services' ships were fully loaded? Certain routes they could have doubled their effective shipping capacity, but didn't because of interservice rivalry.
2) explain to me Midway, again, please. Massively overly complicated plan, division of forces (can we say Alaska), not enough troops to take the island even if they had defeated the US Navy, ....

It's not that the Japanese could have done better...it's more, that was (generally) the best they could do under the circumstances!

In the grand scheme of things, they were a modern nation of the last 60 years, compared to the US which was a modern continental sized nation of the last 300! Meaning they never really had a chance.
Except they CHOSE to go to war against that disparity of force. Explain again the "not stupid" bit.
It is frankly quite amazing that they gave as good account of themselves as they did and pretty much all on their own.
Agreed. And given that they were totally outclassed and steamrollered - and that ample sufficiencies of data were available before, going to war hardly counts as "not stupid".
In my opinion what serious sunk Imperial Japan wasn't the war in China, but the Japanese Navy unilaterally beginning and forcing through their 'advance south policy' which through a number of events and decisions led to Pearl Harbour.

Without the navy getting involved in the IJA's war in China it is likely that the war would have stalemated somewhere in North China and eventually lead to some kind of pro-Japanese armistice. If the IJN had 'stuck to their ports' the IJAs eventual failure to beat the Chinese would have given them the prestige they desired, while at the same time not leading Japan to total war and a full defeat.
Aha! So the Japanese should have stayed away from the DEI and run out of oil in 2 years - and then done what?
 
The point is, Japanese operated under the set of assumptions that made their choices seem rational. They fully expected that US would, after initial disasters settle for peace. Even if they didn't, Japanese believed Americans would be compelled to offer a decisive battle with remnants of their fleet. And that Japanese fleet would win this battle, after which there would be peace. Even after that failed, they still held the belief that American initial contact with Japanese defensive perimeter would inflict such high losses on Americans that they would settle for peace.

After that point, the sheer stubbornness took hold and they were unable to admit to themselves they lost the war.

At all points, Japanese recognized massive industrial potential of the US. They just didn't recognize that the Americans would have the willpower and determination to use it in a total war. In the warped world the Japanese militarists created for themselves, Americans cared more for their lives than for some godforsaken rocks in the Pacific and had no sense of national pride.
 
Simply put, the American planners underestimated total losses when they talked of a million dead. overall the figure would have been closer to 4 million.
Are you saying 4 million of both sides or American losses of both Army and Navy?
 

sharlin

Banned
The IJA in regards to leadership also had problems as a lot of officers at lower ranks would carry out their own plans/ideas and force their superiors to change what ever plans they had to try and adjust for the 'bottom up' planning that the IJA whilst not favouring, never showed its displeasure about either.
 
Congratulations Dathi, take statements out of context of the post and it actually appears like you have some constructive points to add... /sarcasm.







My point on Japanese Armour of the early war period, is that what the Japanese had, was pretty much 'up to the job' of what they asked of it. Let's consider this Dathi; the Japanese develop a home grown copy of the German Tiger Tank in 1941. Right now how are they going to;

A) Build this heavy tank, when the IJN and JAAF has the priority for strategic resources of steel, rubber and metal alloys.

B) Run this incredibly large oil hog of a war machine when the Japanese reserves are already allocated to the navy and airforce.

C) Ship these heavy tanks overseas when Japanese logistics vessels typically were designed for supply loads as opposed to single heavy objects.

D) Get these heavy tanks out from Hanghung, Pusan etc. into northern China via an equally 'light weight' rail network.

E) Once these tanks are somewhere near the front around Qingdao, Xi'an Jingang etc. get from the stations to the actual front, given that the terrain is mostly rough and rural, roads are little more than dirt paths and mechanic shops and resupply bases are few and far between.

F) So we get one of these tanks to the front, we think right this tanks massive, gun, hugely thick armour will 'change the course of history'. Wherever they deploy the tank the Chinese run away. Thus the tank hardly ever gets into a combat situation where it can use that big gun, or rely on its strong armour.

G) The commanders in the field quickly point out to the new 'Japo-tiger crews' when they complain about Chinese cowardice, that the Chinese also run away from the light tanks developed back in the 1930s that don't have half of the troubles listed above.


Thus how is a *cough* adequate *cough* tank going to help the Japanese in China?

The Chinese and Manchurian theatre was completely different in terms of tactical and strategic needs compared to Europe or North Africa, therefore their was no precedent to adopt the changes in tank design that the Europeans did. If the Japanese had developed heavier tanks in the early war period they would have stressed their military industrial complex beyond what it could have been reasonably been able to produce for no tactical advantage.

If we look at the use of Armoured units on the pacific islands, again from a tactical view on the defensive armoured units are fairly useless when your opponents have superior fire-power from air power and ship bombardment, your generally not assaulting hardened positions on the defensive and your 'war of mobility' can be dictated via ships acting as your mechanised/motorised deployment assets.

While there was room for some better tanks designs in various campaigns in the pacific their wasn't the logistical backup to have been able to lend effectiveness to a larger or heavier Japanese armoured force. Hence suggesting that the Japanese 'just failed to advance their armoured forces' completely ignores the Japanese strategic position...a position that the IJA fully understood and realised, and hence why they realised wasting limited assets simply for the sake of doing so wasn't productive....and indeed if they had pursued developing a better/larger armoured force it would have likely been far more counter-productive to the overall war effort.

If you have some miracle knowledge of the pacific/Chinese theatre that shows how had the Japanese only developed better armoured forces they would have won the war I suggest you share it with us.




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I presume Dathi that you consider yourself "Not Stupid"; You have 5 boats, your colleague over their has another 5 boats. You really have to get your equipment and goods transported to location X. You ask your colleague for his 5 boats to help you. He says no, they are being used for his more important campaign. What do you do? You can't exactly order him to give over his assets. You can try going up the chain of command, but in doing so you might find that your 5 boats get requisitioned to help your colleague over their instead leaving your campaign dead in the water.

On the grounds your are better off with what you have, rather than nothing at all, you opt to use what resources you do have.

Sure if you look at it as a whole it sounds stupid not to cooperate and hence do poorly as opposed to if their had been cooperation, but that's the beauty of hindsight and retrospect speaking; it didn't work out in the end...ergo it was stupid behaviour.

If we look at the context of 1890 - 1935 the fact that the services had been separate had not prevented Imperial Japan from annexing Korea, occupying and creating a puppet state out of Manchuria and repeatedly beating the Chinese and Russians in set battles. Thus in the context of the times, to the Japanese having inter-service rivalry had not prevented them victories in the past. Sure its arrogance, but you'll also note that I recognised such shortcomings didn't I?;
...fanaticism, dogma and problems with military discipline...
And in the context of the post was talking about the practicalities of individual officers commands, not of the armed forces as a whole.
...their commanders and chiefs of staff were excellent at getting as much mileage out of their inadequate forces as possible...
That's what I mean by "Not Stupid", individually commanders and officers tended to act along the lines they believed the best...even when freelancing and against orders from higher up. While hardly useful for the armed forces as a whole this style of operation (which ultimately undermined their doomed campaigns even further), you cannot deride all the Imperial Japanese officers for being poor commanders in the field.



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Except they CHOSE to go to war against that disparity of force.
Really is that what you believe? Let me ask you a question, how much control did the diet have over the IJA in Manchuria....the IJA that defacto owned and controlled all economic activity, people and trade in Manchuria? Did the homeland Japanese people support the Mukden Incident or the Marco Polo bridge incident?

Did not the government in Tokyo send General Tatekawa to advise 'prudence and patience' from the Kwantung Army? Was not, the Mukden incident started by conspirators and plotters under Col. Itagaki? What about the 2-2-6 incident, a coup in Tokyos capital, during which a number of government ministers were murdered?

Was not the omens in Europe pointing towards a major war between the major powers, Stalin having being in the middle of rebuilding the Soviet armed forces and killing off many officers in the purges while the US preached neutrality? Thus everything looking in favour towards a once ever opportunity to a totally free hand in China for military actions? Were not these ideas of General Tojo rejected by the civilian government, but taken up and acted on in the Marco Polo bridge incident?

Did not the IJN feel incredibly threatened by the IJAs warmongering in Asia that would be bound to lead to war with the soviets, and hence all they could seriously do would be to start their own war actions in the 'southern advance' policy. Note: This plan was proposed well before Japan had any strategic oil problems.

Did not in 1938 the War minister General Sugiyama resign and force the Japanese cabinate to reform in a manner 'more fitted to deal with the national emergency' and replace nearly the entire civilian government will military generals? Did not the IJN admerials then engineer an incident to take Hanan island from the Chinese?

Did not in 1939 a reshuffle of positions in the Japanese 'junta' government lead to Matsuoka becoming Foreign ministers, who pushed to occupy French Indochina which culminated in the embargos from the United States, Holland and other nations.

Only then did the Navy and airforce have a problem because without American Oil they [the IJN] couldn't stick to a unilaterally chosen 'advance south policy'. Since the Americans could not be delt with diplomatically (and the embargo being a slur on Japans honour as well), that left the Japanese Armed forces to agree to defacto hostilities with the Americans and the Allies to use force to occupy the DEI and other strategic locations in the pacific.

The rest we can say is history.




So who chose eh Dathi? You make it sound like the Japanese followed their Emperor, or that their government represented the Japanese people. The historical record clearly points to multiple parties being to blame for the hostilities in Asia. Including the Americans for almost 'bringing war upon themselves'. I'm no apologist for the Imperial Japanese regime. But nobody can seriously claim the Japanese chose war with the Americans, in any more the Japanese people chose their government of the time or Britian 'chose' to wage war with Nazi Germany. We have to remeber that it was effectively an out of control military junta that ruled Japan of the era.
 
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