So here's an issue for our board Russian Revolution experts -- a fair number of us (myself included) know about the basic factions that were vying for power in 1917 between the February and October Revolutions, but our knowledge of their political ideologies is fairly vague and mostly seem to hinge on two issues: (1) "should the Soviets take full power?" and (2) the war. This is a bit limiting when it comes to AH speculation, trying to imagine results of one faction doing better or worse than OTL, and how that would affect the new Russian government.

The basic factions I'm talking about:
  • Bolsheviks
  • Right (or "defensist") SRs
  • Left SRs
  • Mensheviks (left and right)
  • Kadets
My question for our experts -- aside from their stances on the war (and on the question of the PG itself), how did these factions differ in their proposed domestic policies and governing philosophies? For example, were their serious differences in their approach to land reform, industry nationalization, or general economic policy? And putting plausibility of said regimes aside entirely, how would a government dominated by Right SRs differ from the Bolshevik regime's policies of OTL? Same for a coalition government of Kadets and Right Mensheviks. And same for other potential regimes we might think of.
 
Obviously, "War Communism" differed drastically from what any non-Bolshevik party wanted to implement. The main question (oversimplified of course) is whether it was inherent in Bolshevik ideology or was really a series of improvisations to cope with conditions of civil war. See Orlando Figes' discussion of this at http://www.rulit.me/books/a-people-s-tragedy-the-russian-revolution-1891-1924-read-232715-226.html and http://www.rulit.me/books/a-people-s-tragedy-the-russian-revolution-1891-1924-read-232715-227.html
 
Obviously, "War Communism" differed drastically from what any non-Bolshevik party wanted to implement. The main question (oversimplified of course) is whether it was inherent in Bolshevik ideology or was really a series of improvisations to cope with conditions of civil war. See Orlando Figes' discussion of this...
Good point. Maybe we should figure how Bolshevik economic thinking differed from War Communism to start then.

Here's another way of looking at it -- did Lenin institute the NEP because War Communism wasn't working, or because the war was (mostly) over? If the Bolsheviks still took complete power, but didn't need to fight a RCW to get said power, would their economic policies more resemble War Communism or the NEP?

FWIG, the NEP was super unpopular among the Bolshevik leadership (Lenin excluded), so I'm guessing, if they had their way, they would still implement policies closer to War Socialism or Stalinism. But that's my (very amateur) impression.
 

Deleted member 94680

War Communism was a 'short term' solution to the problems of the Russian Civil War. Banning strikes and requisition of anything above a bare minimum of agricultural surpluses are never going to be a long-term solution to a government presenting themselves as an alternative to Tsarist autocratism. By virtue of presenting it as short-term, it allowed it to run as long as it did - an emergency measure that would be ended as soon as the war was won.

The NEP wasn't much better, but it was an attempt by people who spent their lives in opposition to mould economic policy. It was needed to restart the Russian economy after the ravages of the RCW, there is debate as to whether it was a long-term programme (some say if Lenin had lived, it would have persisted past 1929) but it probably would've been more benificial to Russia as a whole to keep it running. Saying that, as it had elements of Capitalism, it was unpopular with many on the Left.

It was better than the disaster that was Collectivisation! It obviously failed, it was probably doomed from inception, but the security of the Bolsheviks once in power allowed it to drag on as long as it did.
 
A related question -- first, do you guys think this analysis by historian Orlando Figes is a fair assessment of the cultural political context at the time?
Orlando Figes said:
But if the monarchy was dead politically, it was still alive in the broader sense. The mass of the peasants thought in monarchical terms. They conceived of the state as embodied in the monarch, and projected their ideals of the revolution on to a “peasant king”, or some other authoritarian liberator come to deliver their cherished land and freedom. Here were the roots of the cults of Kerensky, Kornilov, and Lenin, all of which were attempts o fill the missing space of the deposed Tsar, or perhaps rather the vacuum left by the myth of the Tsar Deliverer. George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, noted this monarchial mentality during the first days of the revolution, when one soldier said to him: “Yes we need a republic, but at its head should be a good Tsar.” Frank Golder similarly noted such misunderstandings in his diary on March 7: “Stories are being told of soldiers who say they wish a republic like England, or a republic with a Tsar. One soldier said he wanted to elect a President and when asked ‘Whom would you elect?’ he replied ‘The Tsar’.” Soldiers’ letters voiced the same confusion: “We want a democratic republic and a Tsar-Batiushka for three years”; “It would be good if we had a republic with a sensible Tsar”. It seems that the peasants found it difficult to distinguish between the person of the monarch (gosudar) and the abstract institutions of the state (gosudarstvo). Their conception of the democratic order was similarly couched in personalized terms. Sometime during March a Menshevik deputy of the Moscow Soviet went to agitate at a regimental meeting near Valdimir. He spoke of the need for peace, of the need for all the land to be given to the peasants, and of the advantages of a republic over a monarchy. The soldiers cheered loudly in agreement, and one of them yelled out “We want you as Tsar”, whereupon the other soldiers burst into applause. “I refused the Romanov crown” recalled the Menshevik, “and went away with a heavy feeling of how easy it would be for any adventurer or demagogue to become the master of this simple and naive people.
If so -- supposing neither Lenin nor Kerensky (nor Kornilov) are in a position to come to power in Russia. Then depending on the political factions that coalesce into a government, is there any individual person who could find himself in a position of commanding widespread support across the country with a personality (pseudo)-cult?
 

Deleted member 94680

...supposing neither Lenin nor Kerensky (nor Kornilov) are in a position to come to power in Russia. Then depending on the political factions that coalesce into a government, is there any individual person who could find himself in a position of commanding widespread support across the country with a personality (pseudo)-cult?

Trotsky. He had the ability to command a crowd and I'm not unconvinced that he'd turn down the opportunity to become a tsar-like figure... in the people's interest of course.
 
Trotsky. He had the ability to command a crowd and I'm not unconvinced that he'd turn down the opportunity to become a tsar-like figure... in the people's interest of course.
He came to my mind as well, but there's one big thing holding him back (at least in 1917) from becoming the head of the Bolsheviks (should Lenin become indisposed) and Tsar-President of Russia -- his Jewish heritage.

So here's a particular scenario:
After the Kornilov Affair, the Bolsheviks still distrust the Kerensky government enough that they still intend to overthrow it and deliver "all power to the Soviets". Only TTL, they decide to wait for said Soviet to actually convene, then vote with the Left SRs to do just that. Because this is not given to them as a fair accompli, the Right SRs and Mensheviks don't walk out. When the Constituent Assembly convenes, the Soviet does not abolish them, but since the former is still getting their bearings governance largely resumes under the Soviet (at least at first). Helping things further, in the Soviet and Consituent Assembly alike, Bolsheviks and SRs have to form coalitions with each other.

Meanwhile, the Soviet has initiated armistice negotiations with the CP (roughly as OTL). When the Kaiser pushes the negotiators to issue the ultimatum, Russia responds one of two ways: (1) the CA and Soviet alike resume hostilities; (2) Trotsky convinces the Soviet to adopt a position of "neither war nor peace" (as OTL). If the latter happens, the Germans advance as OTL, only this TL the Soviet (and CA) continue to refuse German conditions. As the Germans approach Petrograd, the various socialist parties and institutions rally together to call on Russian to defend itself; the biggest divider between Left and Right SRs, and between Left (Bukharin) and Right Bolsheviks, dries up in this context.

The war ends sooner than OTL, with German defeat, and representatives of Russia's socialist state will be at the peace negotiations. With the various socialist parties and factions more or less working together, the Russian Civil War is far shorter and less destructive. Things are looking up in the Motherland.
Now I can imagine somebody getting appointed as President in this scenario -- if the CA and the Soviets even try to work together, the idea of having an executive they both agree upon will be low hanging fruit -- but I wonder if this person would find himself "confused" for a Tsar by the Russian populace at large, or if he needs a certain charisma to pull this off? If it's the former, than all TTL needs is somebody who has the respect, and can get the tolerated support, of the Bolsheviks, Left SRs, and Right SRs alike; so I'd guess Victor Chernoff, as unlikely as that sounds.

Thoughts?
 

Deleted member 94680

He came to my mind as well, but there's one big thing holding him back (at least in 1917) from becoming the head of the Bolsheviks (should Lenin become indisposed) and Tsar-President of Russia -- his Jewish heritage.

Plenty of leading Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were Jews, it didn't seem to hold them back OTL when the time came to take power?


So here's a particular scenario:

Now I can imagine somebody getting appointed as President in this scenario -- if the CA and the Soviets even try to work together, the idea of having an executive they both agree upon will be low hanging fruit -- but I wonder if this person would find himself "confused" for a Tsar by the Russian populace at large, or if he needs a certain charisma to pull this off? If it's the former, than all TTL needs is somebody who has the respect, and can get the tolerated support, of the Bolsheviks, Left SRs, and Right SRs alike; so I'd guess Victor Chernoff, as unlikely as that sounds.

Thoughts?

I'm not sure Chernov has the charisma to become the tsar-president. He would probably serve in the position if elected by a majority, but acceding to office of President when voted in doesn't fit the idea of "a personality cult". Would a "democratised" Grand Duke Michael fit the bill? Elected "to serve" but slowly over time becomes viewed as a Tsar in his own right and disposes of the Duma?


What scenario accounts for Lenin, Kerensky and Kornilov being absent?
 
Plenty of leading Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were Jews, it didn't seem to hold them back OTL when the time came to take power?
Well, it didn't hold them back from getting leadership positions within the Bolshevik party, no; that said, any government is going to want the mass of the Russian population to accept them, and that can be difficult if their Head of State is "sufficiently Russian". Certainly nothing is stopping Trotsky from becoming very influential in the party and in the government, short of this position.
What scenario accounts for Lenin, Kerensky and Kornilov being absent?
PoD in the above scenario is that Lenin is killed during his period of hiding following the July Days; then the Kornilov Affair happens as OTL, effectively destroying Kerensky's career once the Soviets take power.
 
Pretty much every party made some references to land reform, increase in democratic representation and the like. Although these are for the 1905 revolution, here are the political programmes for the Kadets and the SRs which might give you some insight into their background positions. The difference in the Left SRs and the Right was perhaps in the approach they would have taken to land reform and the land owners and also the obvious factors of the war, the provisional government and the soviets.
 
Since I got to thinking about this:
Pretty much every party made some references to land reform, increase in democratic representation and the like. Although these are for the 1905 revolution, here are the political programmes for the Kadets and the SRs which might give you some insight into their background positions.
Oh yeah, there does appear to be a lot of overlap between the Kadets, SR's, and Social Democrats (Mensheviks and Bolsheviks). I can certainly see a scenario where the Kadets work with the more left wing parties to essentially implement their program, since it pretty much consists entirely of things they all agree on.

On top of that, the SR governing philosophy looked a lot like Marxism to me, though their policy proposals had key differences with the Bolsheviks, particularly in the area of land policy and industry nationalization. A coalition between the three factions, as described in my scenario above, would still be very much marxist, even as it was very different from what happened OTL.
 
Since I got to thinking about this:

Oh yeah, there does appear to be a lot of overlap between the Kadets, SR's, and Social Democrats (Mensheviks and Bolsheviks). I can certainly see a scenario where the Kadets work with the more left wing parties to essentially implement their program, since it pretty much consists entirely of things they all agree on.
It's easy to look at some of these organisations' policies and think that they have a lot in common but I don't really think the Kadets and the others can reconcile their differences. Looking at the record of the Kadets in power makes them seem entirely cynical and only ever pushing for token reforms in order to prevent the Tsarists from getting too afraid and cracking down on trade unionists, peasant uprisings and socialists with an iron fist. They took up land reform because it was so popular amongst the peasant masses during 1905, who might as well have been serfs even if serfdom had been abolished, but as a party in government they never attempted to push for any change worth a damn and the moment they did, the most watered down land reform they could think up, they backed down at the first sign of dissent from the landowners and it fell through along with their position of relative power.

Not only was there this practical difference, a difference in dedication to the principles of democracy and reform, but the Kadets suffered under decades of assassinations and bombings led by the terrorist wings of the SRs. The SRs basically thought their only recourse after being declared illegal was to engage in terrorism and they weren't picky about their targets, aristocrat or Kadet politician. This animosity never really went away.

On top of that, the SR governing philosophy looked a lot like Marxism to me, though their policy proposals had key differences with the Bolsheviks, particularly in the area of land policy and industry nationalization. A coalition between the three factions, as described in my scenario above, would still be very much marxist, even as it was very different from what happened OTL.
The SRs and the Social Democrats have a lot more in common with each other than they do with the Kadets. If the situation in the Ukraine had been different, the Russian army's presence on the front with Germany stronger and, consequently, if Brest-Litovsk had been different leading to the soviet alliance between the Left-SRs and the Bolsheviks remaining strong, then I could easily see a multi-party democracy based on the soviets being democratic organs of the government. If that alliance had stuck or been deeper with more moderate SRs and the Mensheviks also abandoning the Provisional Government for the soviets a lot of trouble could have been avoided, such as the peasant uprising at Tambov and the SR government in Samara. The Civil War would have been over much quicker, I feel.
 
The SRs and the Social Democrats have a lot more in common with each other than they do with the Kadets. If... the alliance between the Left-SRs and the Bolsheviks remain[ed] strong, then I could easily see a multi-party democracy based on the soviets being democratic organs of the government. If that alliance had stuck or been deeper with more moderate SRs and the Mensheviks also abandoning the Provisional Government for the soviets a lot of trouble could have been avoided... The Civil War would have been over much quicker, I feel.
In my "Lenin dies earlier" TL concept, I picture a situation where the Soviets and CA form two "houses" of a "legislature", each propped up initially by a coalition between the Bolsheviks and one of the SR factions, topped off by Chernoff and Trotsky as a dominant political partnership.
 
In my "Lenin dies earlier" TL concept, I picture a situation where the Soviets and CA form two "houses" of a "legislature", each propped up initially by a coalition between the Bolsheviks and one of the SR factions, topped off by Chernoff and Trotsky as a dominant political partnership.
The problem in my mind is that the majority of those invested in the Provisional Government were vehemently opposed to the very existence of the soviets and even before the Bolsheviks started winning control many of the soviets were opposed to the Provisional Government as well. It's particularly evident in the soldiers soviets, Kronstadt for example had denounced the Provisional Government as early as May, since the soldiers wanted the war to end whilst the Provisional Government wanted to continue the war. There were other, more self-serving, reasons why those invested in the soviets opposed the Provisional Government and visa versa. The gerrymandering of the Constituent Assembly meant the bolsheviks and the Left SRs and the other anti-war radicals would be under-represented and in the reverse the soviets had been organised in such a way that was an anathema to the traditional routes to power the Kadets and Right SR's would have understood.

So the soviets and the Provisional Government were organised differently, served different constituencies and effectively competed with each other to organise the daily structures of life. October didn't spring from nowhere. The Provisional Government was doing everything it could to suppress the influence and power of the soviets and across Russia the soviets were increasingly butting heads with the state. After the July Days, prominent Bolsheviks were arrested or were forced into hiding. For many, it was the Tsarist repression come again and the Provisional Government did nothing to assuage those fears. The soviet in Tashkent rejected the authority of the Provisional Government in September and on the 20th troops were ordered in to suppress them, similarly artillery was used to fire upon the soviet in Kaluga, peasant soviets began armed insurrections against the failure of the government to implement their promised land reforms in Tula, Tambov and Ryazan. In Kazan, the soviet had seized power a few days before Petrograd.

I struggle to conceive of a way they can be reconciled because they were heading down a conflict regardless.
 
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