I had already created a question thread about this already. But I'am curious to see if there are even more ideas about possible PODs for the Burma Campaign. In my TL, the POD (a Chinese failure in the Second Expedition) hasn't been told yet. So.. I would like to get other people's ideas and suggestions for this particular theatre of the Pacific War. Thanks!
Q: Any WW2 Burma Campaign PoD Ideas?
- Thread starter Walker2006
- Start date
During the initial Japanese invasion, the Japanese were opposed by 17th Indian Division in the area east of the Sittang River. 18th Indian was driven back, and began to retreat across the Sittang. On 22 February, the only bridge across the Sittang was destroyed by British engineers prematurely, while 17th Indian was still fighting to the east. Some men escaped by swimming the river, but many were trapped, and nearly all heavy equipment (vehicles, artillery, mortars, machine guns) was abandoned. The swimmers left behind their rifles, helmets, and boots.
The near-destruction of 17h Indian left almost nothing to stop the Japanese advance to Rangoon. Had 17th Indian completed its withdrawal over the Sittang, that line might have been held, at least for a while.
OTOH, the Japanese defeated 17th Indian decisively east of the Sittang, before the bridge was blown. That suggests 17th Indian could not hold the Japanese, even along the river.
The near-destruction of 17h Indian left almost nothing to stop the Japanese advance to Rangoon. Had 17th Indian completed its withdrawal over the Sittang, that line might have been held, at least for a while.
OTOH, the Japanese defeated 17th Indian decisively east of the Sittang, before the bridge was blown. That suggests 17th Indian could not hold the Japanese, even along the river.
I think that the Japanese could not have advanced into Burma if their Malayan/Singapore campaign had faltered. The formations the IJA used in Burma would have been redirected to Malaya. If Singapore does fall a few months later that would have bought some time for the British and Commonwealth forces to improve the Burma defenses. Maybe.
Or if you're looking at how the Allied operations should have been conducted after the fall of Burma then this depends on how much resources can be devoted to the CBI in general and specifically to the difficult requirements and limitations of the Burmese geography. I may post some ideas about this a little later.
Or if you're looking at how the Allied operations should have been conducted after the fall of Burma then this depends on how much resources can be devoted to the CBI in general and specifically to the difficult requirements and limitations of the Burmese geography. I may post some ideas about this a little later.
Best thing that could happen in Burma is a competent General. Anybody not as uncomprimisingly incompetent and full of himself as Stilwell would be a great PoD.
Means less wasted forces in Burma and more importantly, the new General would probably not force China to hand over their best troops and literally hoard all the equipment meant for them, like Stilwell did. If you read or listen to non american works about him for more then five minutes you will notice what an utter clusterfuck of a failure he was and why him not beeing there would maybe even change the destiny of all of Asia (looks at China)
Means less wasted forces in Burma and more importantly, the new General would probably not force China to hand over their best troops and literally hoard all the equipment meant for them, like Stilwell did. If you read or listen to non american works about him for more then five minutes you will notice what an utter clusterfuck of a failure he was and why him not beeing there would maybe even change the destiny of all of Asia (looks at China)
Stillwell was not in command of the British and Indian troops in Burma and he didn't even arrive in India until 25 February 1942 by which time the disaster was well underway. He also he nothing to do with the disastrous attempt to hold Rangoon or its eventual evacuation.
I see four very basic PODs:
- Slim is charge of British and Commonwealth troops from the start.
- Token resistance in southern Burma, fall back in good order to northern Burma to more defensible positions and shorter supply lines.
- Send the two brigades (or heck even just one) from the 6th Australian Division that went to Ceylon to Burma instead. This one may be hard to get Canberra to agree to.
- Slim is charge of British and Commonwealth troops from the start (that one really does need to be listed twice).
All of the above but I'd have Slim in charge from the start!
The British cull the East African campaign (as by this stage the result isn't really in doubt) for troops and equipment to send to Burma. Also scrape together whatever is available to buy time for a couple of divisions sent from Britain and India to deploy.
Send as much air power as can be deployed even if it means scaling back British fighter defences ( the Germans are fully committed in Russia so won't be trying a BoB 2.0 in 1942) and the bomber offensive. This makes sense as the only real strategy to defeat Germany is to look busy while waiting for the Americans to deploy in strength.
Scale back British Lend Lease to Russia and try to talk the Americans to do the same (unlikely without foresight) this gives more of everything to fight the Japanese and speeds up the war in North Africa. It also allows more atms to be sent to the Chinese Nationalists. Having made in Britain stamped onto the material their getting might reduce the influence Stilwell commanded over the Chinese forces in Burma. Also slows down the eventual Russian advance later in the war so less of central Europe remains under the Iron Curtain post war.
Scale up the RIAF and give them some combat aircraft to convert onto as soon as the brown stuff hits the fan.
To retake Burma any possible Allied operations will be dictated by the geography and climate and by what resources can be spared for this lower priority theatre. The Burma campaign in WW2 is all about the Irrawaddy river valley and its tributaries. This is where the plains, cities and transportation routes are. If more powerful infantry and mechanized forces were made available to the Allies to liberate Burma their operational use will be constrained by this reality.
If enough naval and amphibious forces are made available to defeat the Japanese in an ATL Arakan operation then punching through over the coastal mountains into the Irawaddy valley N.E. of the Arakan peninsula should be done to bisect the LoCs of Japanese occupied Burma. But a decent road would need to be built to support the Allied armies in their advance Eastward to Rangoon. I think it could be done but would require a huge amount of supplies and copious air support.
A less Naval and air force extensive and cheaper option utilizing the abundant construction labour available. Extent the Assam railway N.E. as far into the Himalayan foothills as practicable. Then extend a mountain road from the railhead past Fort Hertz which then turns Southward until it reaches the foothills at the Northern most reach of the Irrawaddy river valley about 100 miles North of Myitkyina. If a reliable supply route can be built looping through the Himalayan foothills from Assam into the hinterlands of the Irrawaddy then a powerful mechanized Commonwealth army with sufficient artillery and tanks can be supplied to push Southward into the Irrawaddy valley first taking Myitkyina and then moving on to Mandalay. The ultimate destination of course being the city and port of Rangoon. This campaign would require a well equipped fighter contingent to protect the road building in the mountains North of Myitkyina.
If enough naval and amphibious forces are made available to defeat the Japanese in an ATL Arakan operation then punching through over the coastal mountains into the Irawaddy valley N.E. of the Arakan peninsula should be done to bisect the LoCs of Japanese occupied Burma. But a decent road would need to be built to support the Allied armies in their advance Eastward to Rangoon. I think it could be done but would require a huge amount of supplies and copious air support.
A less Naval and air force extensive and cheaper option utilizing the abundant construction labour available. Extent the Assam railway N.E. as far into the Himalayan foothills as practicable. Then extend a mountain road from the railhead past Fort Hertz which then turns Southward until it reaches the foothills at the Northern most reach of the Irrawaddy river valley about 100 miles North of Myitkyina. If a reliable supply route can be built looping through the Himalayan foothills from Assam into the hinterlands of the Irrawaddy then a powerful mechanized Commonwealth army with sufficient artillery and tanks can be supplied to push Southward into the Irrawaddy valley first taking Myitkyina and then moving on to Mandalay. The ultimate destination of course being the city and port of Rangoon. This campaign would require a well equipped fighter contingent to protect the road building in the mountains North of Myitkyina.
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Most of what's mentioned above are good things for the British / Allies. Here's a suggestion for the opposite side:
The Battle of the Admin Box is a possible PoD during the re-taking of Burma - it presaged the Battles of Kohima and Imphal, which were decisive turning points in the campaign. A PoD could be for that instead to be a Japanese victory, or at least not such a clear defeat - perhaps bad weather prevents the air re-supply of the Admin Box defenders, or something like that. The knock-on effects, to the afore-mentioned Battles of Imphal and Kohima, for example, would certainly cause a delay in the Allied campaign - though they wouldn't stop eventual Allied victory, the manner in which it is achieved, and what events go down in history, would be different.
The Battle of the Admin Box is a possible PoD during the re-taking of Burma - it presaged the Battles of Kohima and Imphal, which were decisive turning points in the campaign. A PoD could be for that instead to be a Japanese victory, or at least not such a clear defeat - perhaps bad weather prevents the air re-supply of the Admin Box defenders, or something like that. The knock-on effects, to the afore-mentioned Battles of Imphal and Kohima, for example, would certainly cause a delay in the Allied campaign - though they wouldn't stop eventual Allied victory, the manner in which it is achieved, and what events go down in history, would be different.
Fearless Leader
Donor
It's also worth noting that the initial Japanese goal was only to take Rangoon and Southern Burma. Only when this was achieved ahead of schedule (along with objectives elsewhere) were reinforcements sent and the British driven out of Northern Burma.
That's not quite the argument IIRC. Writing after the war, the 17th division's commander "Jackie" Smyth argued that had the bridge not been blown prematurely, the 17th would have been able to establish a line immediately and be reinforced by forces in Rangoon, including an Australian Armoured brigade. According to him, these forces combined, coupled with the favourable terrain would have eliminated Japanese advantages. Exactly how accurate Smyth's assessment was is open for debate. IMHO, I think it's definitely plausible that the 17th in conjunction with reinforcements from Rangoon could have held the Japanese back for a time. Exactly how long depends on the battle in the air, one area not touched on by Smyth.
That's not quite the argument IIRC. Writing after the war, the 17th division's commander "Jackie" Smyth argued that had the bridge not been blown prematurely, the 17th would have been able to establish a line immediately and be reinforced by forces in Rangoon, including an Australian Armoured brigade. According to him, these forces combined, coupled with the favourable terrain would have eliminated Japanese advantages. Exactly how accurate Smyth's assessment was is open for debate. IMHO, I think it's definitely plausible that the 17th in conjunction with reinforcements from Rangoon could have held the Japanese back for a time. Exactly how long depends on the battle in the air, one area not touched on by Smyth.
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Brigadier Smyth VC OC of the 17th Indian Army Division sends Brigadier Cowen to Rangoon and he manages to convince his superior Gen Hutton that the Bilin 'River' is actually not a river but a muddy ditch and does not offer any real geographical defensive feature that Hutton's maps might otherwise suggest.
(OTL Hutton would not be budged and ordered the Green Division to hold the Bilin 'line' - where it effectively shot its bolt over several days - instead he is convinced )
Having convinced his boss he is allowed to instead collapse back to the Sitting River Bridge on the 17th Feb with the majority of the Division and its heavy equipment and MT crossing in good order before the IJA 55th Division and reinforcing IJA forces can pin it in place (and bring aircraft operating from captured airfields to interdict road travel) and using their superior numbers and experienced troops outflank the 17th Division.
The decision proves to be a sensible one as the rear guard units come under increasing air attack from the IJA bombers and fighters
It is here a far superior defensive feature that the 17th Division Makes its stand on the Eastern side of the Bridge with its supporting arms and motor transport safely on the Western side.
The Leading Japanese Regiments - 214th and 215th of the 33rd IJA Division - were forced to instead make repeated costly assaults on the Eastern End of the Bridge while the dug in Indian Army units were supported by an 18 pounder Artillery regiment and despite being WW1 vintage they were more than capable of making the difference.
After 3 days of fighting Smyth withdraws his battered 16th and 46th Brigades overnight on the 21st Feb replacing them with the fresh 1/4th Gurkha and Duke of Wellington Regiment as well as several companies from the 2nd Burma Brigade making a scratch Infantry Brigade under the command of Brigadier Punch Cowen.
This unit holds for another 2 days before the Japanese Artillery park catches up with its Division and company sized infiltration's having crossed the River North and South of the Bridge are detected after a series of skirmishes with patrols
With his troops exhausted and fearing being encircled, Smyth withdraws his scratch Brigade during the night to the Western end (undercover of a hurricane bombardment from the Divisions Artillery which fired off its reserve ammo) with Brig Cowen being the last man across before the main spans of the Bridge are dropped in a series of explosions.
The 17th Despite being battered retires in good order before dawn towards Rangoon where it comes under the somewhat improved protection of the Tomahawks of the AVG and RAF Buffaloes allowing for much greater (and safer) day light mobility by MT.
The Japanese themselves exhausted by the 5 day battle and having expended much of their ammunition spent several days reorganising before pursuing with a single Regiment supported by 2 company's of Type 95 Tanks that had been ferried across the river by the 3rd March.
The Vanguard reached Payagyi on the morning of the 4th March and in light mist the Vanguard of 4 tanks and a company of Infantry ran into an ambush by elements of the 17th Division in Brigade Strength (4 Battalions) and lose all 4 tanks and heavy losses among the infantry company
Initially thinking the opposition light the IJA Regiment made a full bloodied push later on that day only to discover that the British had rather rudely brought their own tanks - in this case 2 Squadrons of M3 Stuarts from the 7th Queens own Hussars who along with the rest of the veteren 7th Armour Brigade had arrived to reinforce the British 'Corps' in Burma.
The 1st Battle of Payagyi 4th-5th March 1942 - was possibly the first major IJA defeat at the hands of the Allies on land and the leading IJA Regiment was obliged to fall back after 2 fruitless days having suffered 1000+ Casualties and leaving behind 15 tanks and await the balance of its parent Division.
The 2nd Battle of Payagyi 10th-13th March 1942 was a much more determined affair with the Japanese using a combination of air support, artillery, tank supported infantry assaults and infiltrating light forces.
It was the latter tactic that ultimately forced the Commonwealth Brigade to retreat from its position when several light infantry columns manged to create roadblocks behind the Payagyi position effectively cutting it off
These roadblocks were felled trees roped together into a 'Giant Abatis' that was impassable to motor transport including the ubiquitous tracked universal carrier and then covered by type 96 LMGs and Knee mortars making any infantry assault attempting to clear it costly.
This had been a successful tactic previously used in Malaya and elsewhere and often forced the now cutoff unit to abandon its position as well as its heavy equipment and MT and try to 'escape on foot' with only what it could carry (Small arms and LMGs) - effectively destroying said unit as a fighting unit and often obliged to leave its wounded behind which apart from everything else was very demoralising to the unit in question.
The M3 Stuarts however were not stopped by these roadblocks and the infiltrating Japanese 'roadblock units' did not possess any weapon that could realistically engage the tanks* and both enemy roadblocks where driven off by units of the 7th Armoured Brigades and supporting infantry.
Despite the 2nd Battle being a failure as far as the IJA were concerned the subsequent decision by General Hutton the British Corps commanding officer had already made the entire result irrelevant.
With his replacement (Gen. Slim) having already told by Whitehall not to hold Rangoon and indeed to have withdrawn before the Monsoon season in April made mass movement impossible.
Hutton (who Slim did not want to replace half way through a battle) despite knowing that Rangoon was to be abandoned had been ordered to still give the appearance of holding it, which the 1st and 2nd battles of Payagyi successfully achieved.
So not wanting to lose the Brigade and in the opinion of some 'bottling it' he ordered the unit to fall back and abandon the position on the evening of the 13th March.
Much has been made of the decision - particularly on forums such as 'Alternative History dot com' where 'Rangoon is ultimately held' or 'Alexandra takes over earlier etc' and the Burma campaign is far more successful than it was - however understanding the wider picture of what was occurring elsewhere in Burma makes the decision much easier to understand.
The Japanese thrust into Burma was not just aimed at the Sitting river Bridge and then Rangoon but also further north towards China where several Chinese units (9 'Divisions') where also operating in Burma - the main strategic intention of the Japanese was to cut off the 'Burma Road' one of the major supply routes of allied materials into China - and additional Japanese forces were pushing them north and threatening to kick them out of Burma.
The more than expected resistance by the Commonwealth forces and the heavy losses suffered by the 33rd IJA Division including the majority of its armour obliged the Japanese leadership to send heavy reinforcements that had originally been intended to attack (and indeed had been) the Chinese 6th Army to join the assault on Rangoon.
So in this the British Burma Corps had achieved an important aim as it would ultimately allow the 3 Chinese army's (9 Divisions) to take up positions astride the Burma road (Mandalay to Wantang) in an orderly fashion with the British commonwealth forces ultimately holding a stable front astride the Irrawaddy river south of Yenangyoung after further hard fought battles during 1942.
Meanwhile before all of this happens the Burma Corps continued to conduct a fighting retreat with another major fight taking place at Hlegu for 3 days before the British Commonwealth forces melted away on the evening of the 19th March.
The 33rd Divisions shattered Regiments enters a 'deserted Rangoon' on the 20th and General Sakurai Commanding officer of the 33rd Division which had conducted most of the fighting and suffered very heavy losses in the campaign to take the city wrote:
'The British have gone and with them the Golden opportunity we had of decisively defeating them has gone with them, and our prize (Rangoon) that we fought so hard for is ablaze and deserted, the port facilities destroyed and anything of use to our continued advance rendered useless'
The Burma Corps now under command of Bill Slim and comprised of the now battered but 'Veteran' 17th Indian Army Division and the reinforced Burma Division along with the 100 or so M3 tanks of the 7th Armoured Brigade defended Prome with the 200th Division (one of the better units of the NRA and including many veterans of the Battle of Kunlan pass) defending Tooungoo supported by the 55th Division NRA.
Against this position the Japanese having reinforced the 33rd and 55th division with the 18th and 56th (minus 1 regiment) Divisions along with the 213th Regiment (a detached unit of the 33rd and used to bring it up to strength - the other 2 Infantry Regiments having suffered heavy losses having formed a composite Regiment) along with 2 Tank regiments.
Initially it had been intended for the 56th Division to join the 55th in attacking the Chinese at Tooungoo during March but instead all but 1 Regiment of the 55th had been sent to reinforce the 33rd in order to ensure that Rangoon fell after the reverses the 33rd experienced and subsequently had taken over the 'chase' of teh Burma Corps while the 33rd was left to recover in Rangoon.
So the 18th joined the 55th in attacking the Burma Corps at Prome and the 56th with the 55th's 144th Inf. Rgt along with 1 of the 'new' Tank Regiments moved up towards Tooungoo where it spent several weeks trying to evict the 200th and 55th Chinese divisions during April.
OOC: Basically by being allowed to abandon the Biling 'River' line that battle is not fought and the division is able to fall back in an orderly fashion to the Sitting Bridge and dig in - OTL most of the unit had to fight its way back having 'shot their bolt' at the hard fought Billing River battle with Japanese forces blocking 2 of the Brigades while IJA aircraft strafed and bombed anything that moved and with the Bridge nearly falling on several occasions Smyth reluctantly ordered it to be blown up with the result that much of the Divisions MT and heavy equipment was lost - with 2 of its Brigades losing nearly all of its kit when it had to swim the river - the Division effectively shattered as a fighting unit with only a few of its sub units retaining their equipment and cohesion and capable of further fighting with the 'Burma Division' at the time being little better than a Militia pretending to be a division.
The IJA 55th OTL defeats the 200th NRA Division at Toungoo and then this allows the IJA to encircle and destroys the 55th NRA Division at Loikaw unhinging the entire defensive line - ITTL the 55th is obliged to reinforce the 33rd - thinking that 'The British' are going to robustly defend Rangoon and as such the 200th NRA Gets more time to prepare and is reinforced by elements of the 55th NRA when the '56th IJA Division eventually attacks in April. Again delay and heavier losses to the IJA impose significant changes to the subsequent campaign.
The delay (and losses) that the 17th instead inflicts on the IJA by instead making its stand at the Sitting Bridge and subsequently able to withdraw pretty much intact as a fighting division to inflict further defeats on the 33rd as it tries to capture Rangoon enables Slim to inherit an intact Burma Corps when he arrives in March and all of this despite Rangoon still falling creates a different situation with regards to the subsequent campaign in the rest of Burma into Late April/May when the Monsoon arrives and beyond with the campaign being conducted further East than it was OTL
Here is a map of the 'OTL campaign' Feb-April 1942 to give you an idea of what happened and where the 'places are'
(OTL Hutton would not be budged and ordered the Green Division to hold the Bilin 'line' - where it effectively shot its bolt over several days - instead he is convinced )
Having convinced his boss he is allowed to instead collapse back to the Sitting River Bridge on the 17th Feb with the majority of the Division and its heavy equipment and MT crossing in good order before the IJA 55th Division and reinforcing IJA forces can pin it in place (and bring aircraft operating from captured airfields to interdict road travel) and using their superior numbers and experienced troops outflank the 17th Division.
The decision proves to be a sensible one as the rear guard units come under increasing air attack from the IJA bombers and fighters
It is here a far superior defensive feature that the 17th Division Makes its stand on the Eastern side of the Bridge with its supporting arms and motor transport safely on the Western side.
The Leading Japanese Regiments - 214th and 215th of the 33rd IJA Division - were forced to instead make repeated costly assaults on the Eastern End of the Bridge while the dug in Indian Army units were supported by an 18 pounder Artillery regiment and despite being WW1 vintage they were more than capable of making the difference.
After 3 days of fighting Smyth withdraws his battered 16th and 46th Brigades overnight on the 21st Feb replacing them with the fresh 1/4th Gurkha and Duke of Wellington Regiment as well as several companies from the 2nd Burma Brigade making a scratch Infantry Brigade under the command of Brigadier Punch Cowen.
This unit holds for another 2 days before the Japanese Artillery park catches up with its Division and company sized infiltration's having crossed the River North and South of the Bridge are detected after a series of skirmishes with patrols
With his troops exhausted and fearing being encircled, Smyth withdraws his scratch Brigade during the night to the Western end (undercover of a hurricane bombardment from the Divisions Artillery which fired off its reserve ammo) with Brig Cowen being the last man across before the main spans of the Bridge are dropped in a series of explosions.
The 17th Despite being battered retires in good order before dawn towards Rangoon where it comes under the somewhat improved protection of the Tomahawks of the AVG and RAF Buffaloes allowing for much greater (and safer) day light mobility by MT.
The Japanese themselves exhausted by the 5 day battle and having expended much of their ammunition spent several days reorganising before pursuing with a single Regiment supported by 2 company's of Type 95 Tanks that had been ferried across the river by the 3rd March.
The Vanguard reached Payagyi on the morning of the 4th March and in light mist the Vanguard of 4 tanks and a company of Infantry ran into an ambush by elements of the 17th Division in Brigade Strength (4 Battalions) and lose all 4 tanks and heavy losses among the infantry company
Initially thinking the opposition light the IJA Regiment made a full bloodied push later on that day only to discover that the British had rather rudely brought their own tanks - in this case 2 Squadrons of M3 Stuarts from the 7th Queens own Hussars who along with the rest of the veteren 7th Armour Brigade had arrived to reinforce the British 'Corps' in Burma.
The 1st Battle of Payagyi 4th-5th March 1942 - was possibly the first major IJA defeat at the hands of the Allies on land and the leading IJA Regiment was obliged to fall back after 2 fruitless days having suffered 1000+ Casualties and leaving behind 15 tanks and await the balance of its parent Division.
The 2nd Battle of Payagyi 10th-13th March 1942 was a much more determined affair with the Japanese using a combination of air support, artillery, tank supported infantry assaults and infiltrating light forces.
It was the latter tactic that ultimately forced the Commonwealth Brigade to retreat from its position when several light infantry columns manged to create roadblocks behind the Payagyi position effectively cutting it off
These roadblocks were felled trees roped together into a 'Giant Abatis' that was impassable to motor transport including the ubiquitous tracked universal carrier and then covered by type 96 LMGs and Knee mortars making any infantry assault attempting to clear it costly.
This had been a successful tactic previously used in Malaya and elsewhere and often forced the now cutoff unit to abandon its position as well as its heavy equipment and MT and try to 'escape on foot' with only what it could carry (Small arms and LMGs) - effectively destroying said unit as a fighting unit and often obliged to leave its wounded behind which apart from everything else was very demoralising to the unit in question.
The M3 Stuarts however were not stopped by these roadblocks and the infiltrating Japanese 'roadblock units' did not possess any weapon that could realistically engage the tanks* and both enemy roadblocks where driven off by units of the 7th Armoured Brigades and supporting infantry.
Despite the 2nd Battle being a failure as far as the IJA were concerned the subsequent decision by General Hutton the British Corps commanding officer had already made the entire result irrelevant.
With his replacement (Gen. Slim) having already told by Whitehall not to hold Rangoon and indeed to have withdrawn before the Monsoon season in April made mass movement impossible.
Hutton (who Slim did not want to replace half way through a battle) despite knowing that Rangoon was to be abandoned had been ordered to still give the appearance of holding it, which the 1st and 2nd battles of Payagyi successfully achieved.
So not wanting to lose the Brigade and in the opinion of some 'bottling it' he ordered the unit to fall back and abandon the position on the evening of the 13th March.
Much has been made of the decision - particularly on forums such as 'Alternative History dot com' where 'Rangoon is ultimately held' or 'Alexandra takes over earlier etc' and the Burma campaign is far more successful than it was - however understanding the wider picture of what was occurring elsewhere in Burma makes the decision much easier to understand.
The Japanese thrust into Burma was not just aimed at the Sitting river Bridge and then Rangoon but also further north towards China where several Chinese units (9 'Divisions') where also operating in Burma - the main strategic intention of the Japanese was to cut off the 'Burma Road' one of the major supply routes of allied materials into China - and additional Japanese forces were pushing them north and threatening to kick them out of Burma.
The more than expected resistance by the Commonwealth forces and the heavy losses suffered by the 33rd IJA Division including the majority of its armour obliged the Japanese leadership to send heavy reinforcements that had originally been intended to attack (and indeed had been) the Chinese 6th Army to join the assault on Rangoon.
So in this the British Burma Corps had achieved an important aim as it would ultimately allow the 3 Chinese army's (9 Divisions) to take up positions astride the Burma road (Mandalay to Wantang) in an orderly fashion with the British commonwealth forces ultimately holding a stable front astride the Irrawaddy river south of Yenangyoung after further hard fought battles during 1942.
Meanwhile before all of this happens the Burma Corps continued to conduct a fighting retreat with another major fight taking place at Hlegu for 3 days before the British Commonwealth forces melted away on the evening of the 19th March.
The 33rd Divisions shattered Regiments enters a 'deserted Rangoon' on the 20th and General Sakurai Commanding officer of the 33rd Division which had conducted most of the fighting and suffered very heavy losses in the campaign to take the city wrote:
'The British have gone and with them the Golden opportunity we had of decisively defeating them has gone with them, and our prize (Rangoon) that we fought so hard for is ablaze and deserted, the port facilities destroyed and anything of use to our continued advance rendered useless'
The Burma Corps now under command of Bill Slim and comprised of the now battered but 'Veteran' 17th Indian Army Division and the reinforced Burma Division along with the 100 or so M3 tanks of the 7th Armoured Brigade defended Prome with the 200th Division (one of the better units of the NRA and including many veterans of the Battle of Kunlan pass) defending Tooungoo supported by the 55th Division NRA.
Against this position the Japanese having reinforced the 33rd and 55th division with the 18th and 56th (minus 1 regiment) Divisions along with the 213th Regiment (a detached unit of the 33rd and used to bring it up to strength - the other 2 Infantry Regiments having suffered heavy losses having formed a composite Regiment) along with 2 Tank regiments.
Initially it had been intended for the 56th Division to join the 55th in attacking the Chinese at Tooungoo during March but instead all but 1 Regiment of the 55th had been sent to reinforce the 33rd in order to ensure that Rangoon fell after the reverses the 33rd experienced and subsequently had taken over the 'chase' of teh Burma Corps while the 33rd was left to recover in Rangoon.
So the 18th joined the 55th in attacking the Burma Corps at Prome and the 56th with the 55th's 144th Inf. Rgt along with 1 of the 'new' Tank Regiments moved up towards Tooungoo where it spent several weeks trying to evict the 200th and 55th Chinese divisions during April.
OOC: Basically by being allowed to abandon the Biling 'River' line that battle is not fought and the division is able to fall back in an orderly fashion to the Sitting Bridge and dig in - OTL most of the unit had to fight its way back having 'shot their bolt' at the hard fought Billing River battle with Japanese forces blocking 2 of the Brigades while IJA aircraft strafed and bombed anything that moved and with the Bridge nearly falling on several occasions Smyth reluctantly ordered it to be blown up with the result that much of the Divisions MT and heavy equipment was lost - with 2 of its Brigades losing nearly all of its kit when it had to swim the river - the Division effectively shattered as a fighting unit with only a few of its sub units retaining their equipment and cohesion and capable of further fighting with the 'Burma Division' at the time being little better than a Militia pretending to be a division.
The IJA 55th OTL defeats the 200th NRA Division at Toungoo and then this allows the IJA to encircle and destroys the 55th NRA Division at Loikaw unhinging the entire defensive line - ITTL the 55th is obliged to reinforce the 33rd - thinking that 'The British' are going to robustly defend Rangoon and as such the 200th NRA Gets more time to prepare and is reinforced by elements of the 55th NRA when the '56th IJA Division eventually attacks in April. Again delay and heavier losses to the IJA impose significant changes to the subsequent campaign.
The delay (and losses) that the 17th instead inflicts on the IJA by instead making its stand at the Sitting Bridge and subsequently able to withdraw pretty much intact as a fighting division to inflict further defeats on the 33rd as it tries to capture Rangoon enables Slim to inherit an intact Burma Corps when he arrives in March and all of this despite Rangoon still falling creates a different situation with regards to the subsequent campaign in the rest of Burma into Late April/May when the Monsoon arrives and beyond with the campaign being conducted further East than it was OTL
Here is a map of the 'OTL campaign' Feb-April 1942 to give you an idea of what happened and where the 'places are'
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BlackDragon98
Banned
Any way to boost the Chinese Expeditionary Forces?
OTL they suffered hell from disease and lack of supplies because of KMT corruption and general state of China at the time.
OTL they suffered hell from disease and lack of supplies because of KMT corruption and general state of China at the time.
It was mentioned sending a Brigade of the Australian 6th Division to Burma. This would have been pointless. The ships returning the AIF from the Middle East to Australia were not "tactically loaded". The hurry to return the forces was so great that they were simply loaded willy-nilly onboard the ships. This was one of the prime arguments used by the Australian Government against the high-handed efforts by the British Government to turn the ships around and send them to Burma rather than allowing them to return to Australia from Ceylon. Without tactical loading, all the would have arrived at Rangoon was a hodge-podge of forces which would have simply ended up going nearly straight into the bag. The Australian Government was correct to insist on their return to Australia. It allowed the Australians to build up a core defensive position from which they could strike back at the stretched Japanese in New Guinea.
@Cryhavoc101 That was quite an excellent account of how things could have gone better at the beginning of the Burma campaign. Very well written.
Looking at your ATL in May 1942 I would imagine the arrival of the Monsoon would have prevented any further major actions by the Allies and the Japanese for the next 4 or 5 months. Sadly, with the loss of Rangoon the Japanese would have succeeded in one of their objectives which was halting supplies reaching the Chinese via the Burma Road. Everything arrived in country through Rangoon.
Which raises the question of how the Allies will be able to keep their formations holding defensive positions in the Central Irrawaddy valley supplied. As far as I can see supplies would have to be brought in through Cox's Bazaar or Akyab and humped over the coastal mountains. Or by taking a longer route from Assam over the mountains East of Imphal. Perhaps new roads could be built from those locations through the mountain ranges. It would be a very difficult undertaking especially during the Monsoon. But essential. Some amount ofsupplies could also be flown in weather and soggy airfields permitting as there likely would not be as big a "Hump airlift" as in OTL thereby freeing up a few dozen C-47s.
Meanwhile the Japanese are repairing the port facilities in Rangoon so as to expedite their preparations for their resumption of operations when the Monsoon ends in October or November. It''s going to be a hot Autumn in 1942.
Looking at your ATL in May 1942 I would imagine the arrival of the Monsoon would have prevented any further major actions by the Allies and the Japanese for the next 4 or 5 months. Sadly, with the loss of Rangoon the Japanese would have succeeded in one of their objectives which was halting supplies reaching the Chinese via the Burma Road. Everything arrived in country through Rangoon.
Which raises the question of how the Allies will be able to keep their formations holding defensive positions in the Central Irrawaddy valley supplied. As far as I can see supplies would have to be brought in through Cox's Bazaar or Akyab and humped over the coastal mountains. Or by taking a longer route from Assam over the mountains East of Imphal. Perhaps new roads could be built from those locations through the mountain ranges. It would be a very difficult undertaking especially during the Monsoon. But essential. Some amount ofsupplies could also be flown in weather and soggy airfields permitting as there likely would not be as big a "Hump airlift" as in OTL thereby freeing up a few dozen C-47s.
Meanwhile the Japanese are repairing the port facilities in Rangoon so as to expedite their preparations for their resumption of operations when the Monsoon ends in October or November. It''s going to be a hot Autumn in 1942.
Thank you all for your suggestions. Very appreciated!
But what I'm looking for specifically is stuff good for the Japanese forces, not exactly the Allies. (Not to be demanding here, just saying) I was maybe planning to do a bit of Japanese Invasion of India style stuff.
Again, thanks for your suggestions guys!
edit. I'm also looking for possible PoDs for the Second Expedition to Burma. I was planning to make it fail this time.
But what I'm looking for specifically is stuff good for the Japanese forces, not exactly the Allies. (Not to be demanding here, just saying) I was maybe planning to do a bit of Japanese Invasion of India style stuff.
Again, thanks for your suggestions guys!
edit. I'm also looking for possible PoDs for the Second Expedition to Burma. I was planning to make it fail this time.
That I didn't know, thanks. I knew Canberra had excellent reasons for not wanting those troops to go to Burma but the specifics on the ships and how they were loaded was known to me.
Actually the monsoon season in 42 didn't end until early December, it was extra long that year. That's why the Allies' push down the coast to Akyab was late getting started. You're right the logistics of keeping the troops supplied will be difficult but IMWO not insurmountable and once the campaigning season starts in December the Japanese will be facing Allied troops who are better trained, better equipped, better led, and a lot more confident than they were OTL. That last part cannot be understated because if the Allies can manage to hold a large chunk of Burma then the troops will know they can take the measure of the Japanese and the whole myth that they are some sort of super jungle warriors never takes hold. The Allies will also now have fighter airfields within range of Rangoon when the flying weather gets better in late 1942, again that is huge.
Oh and let's not leave out the most important - this probably butterflies away some of the worst aspects of the Bengal famine.