Putin goes for all of Novorossiya in 2014

CaliGuy

Banned
What if, in early 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin would have outright sent the Russian Army to capture all of Novorossiya (as opposed to merely trying to spark a separatist rebellion there)?
 
Militarily, the Russians would easily sweep aside Ukraine's military. The problem is twofold:

1. The locals will be pissed. Even as it is, it's unclear if the OTL separatists actually have majority popular support in the areas they control. An overt Russian invasion is liable to kill what sympathy there is and the odds of an insurgency is pretty high.
2. Western reaction will be even more harsh. It's unlikely to be overt military intervention, even OTL the West made it pretty clear they didn't regard Ukraine as being worth potential war with Russia. But forget sanctions, we're liable to be looking at outright embargo's. And arms and training support for any insurgency.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Militarily, the Russians would easily sweep aside Ukraine's military. The problem is twofold:

1. The locals will be pissed. Even as it is, it's unclear if the OTL separatists actually have majority popular support in the areas they control. An overt Russian invasion is liable to kill what sympathy there is and the odds of an insurgency is pretty high.
2. Western reaction will be even more harsh. It's unlikely to be overt military intervention, even OTL the West made it pretty clear they didn't regard Ukraine as being worth potential war with Russia. But forget sanctions, we're liable to be looking at outright embargo's. And arms and training support for any insurgency.
Agreed with all of this. However, how exactly do you see this playing out in the long(er)-run?
 
2. Western reaction will be even more harsh. It's unlikely to be overt military intervention, even OTL the West made it pretty clear they didn't regard Ukraine as being worth potential war with Russia. But forget sanctions, we're liable to be looking at outright embargo's. And arms and training support for any insurgency.

There won't be any embargoes, because such would mean Europe freezes come Winter.
 
Agreed with all of this. However, how exactly do you see this playing out in the long(er)-run?

Unsure, but probably more poorly then Putin's OTL moves. Poorly enough to bring him down? Who knows?

Qatari, Turkmen, and Kazakh natural gas can't compensate for Russian natural gas?

Qatari could. Turkmen and Kazakh natural gas couldn't, since they have to move through Russian pipelines to reach Europe. There are also other potential options: Venezuala, the US, Indonesia or Malaysia... the point is, the Europeans do have alternative options so long as they have the political will to suck up the extra costs.
 
The net result of a Russian attempt at broad conquests in Ukraine, not limited to substantially Russian areas like the Donbas or predominantly Russian ones like Crimea, would trigger a far more severe breakdown in Western-Russian relations. (I ignore for the moment the possibility of a nasty extended war in Ukraine, with potential implications for NATO and its eastern member-states.)

A far more visibly aggressive Russia would have significant knock-on consequences in Western domestic politics. It might well avert the election of Russophile Trump, for instance, or even see another Republican candidate selected.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Unsure, but probably more poorly then Putin's OTL moves. Poorly enough to bring him down? Who knows?



Qatari could. Turkmen and Kazakh natural gas couldn't, since they have to move through Russian pipelines to reach Europe. There are also other potential options: Venezuala, the US, Indonesia or Malaysia... the point is, the Europeans do have alternative options so long as they have the political will to suck up the extra costs.
Can't Turkmen and Kazakh natural gas move through Azerbaijan or Iran instead of Russia?

The net result of a Russian attempt at broad conquests in Ukraine, not limited to substantially Russian areas like the Donbas or predominantly Russian ones like Crimea, would trigger a far more severe breakdown in Western-Russian relations. (I ignore for the moment the possibility of a nasty extended war in Ukraine, with potential implications for NATO and its eastern member-states.)

How severe do you expect this breakdown to be? Enough for the West to cut off diplomatic relations with Russia and impose an embargo on Russia? Also, would other countries--such as China--be more tempted to join a Western embargo of Russia in such a scenario?

A far more visibly aggressive Russia would have significant knock-on consequences in Western domestic politics. It might well avert the election of Russophile Trump, for instance, or even see another Republican candidate selected.

Couldn't Trump simply run as a Russophobe in this TL, though?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I find Trump to be far too ill-informed about Russian culture or history to really be described as "Russophile". That bit of terminological pedantry aside, I'd say your spot on.
Frankly, I suspect that Trump will simply run as a Russophobe in this TL.

Also, as for your point here, I think that Trump is primarily concerned about one thing--money, and whoever is willing to give him the most of it.
 
I find Trump to be far too ill-informed about Russian culture or history to really be described as "Russophile".

He may be an ignorant Russophile, but he is still a Russophile. In the 1980s, for instance, Donald Trump desperately wanted to be made an American envoy to the Soviet Union and to be given the authority to negotiate a nuclear disarmament deal. In a 1987 interview with Ron Rosenbaum, meanwhile, Trump argued that the world would be best run as a Soviet-American condominium, one capable of threatening and dominating such countries (and nominal American allies) as France.

Caliguy said:
How severe do you expect this breakdown to be? Enough for the West to cut off diplomatic relations with Russia and impose an embargo on Russia? Also, would other countries--such as China--be more tempted to join a Western embargo of Russia in such a scenario?

It really depends. I certainly do not think China would be particularly happy with Russia starting a significant war in eastern Europe. I'm not sure if China would favour sanctions--it might, instead, favour a Russia weakened by sanctions as more likely to follow China.

Couldn't Trump simply run as a Russophobe in this TL, though?

I think that Donald Trump, God help us all, is entirely sincere in his liking for Russia and his willingness to let Russia do what its wist.
 
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There won't be any embargoes, because such would mean Europe freezes come Winter.

Not really, this is not the 73; the EU not only have reserve for at least 90 days of normal use but it's not overall dependent on Russia gas and there is the possibility to get the gas from other sources even if more time consuming and costly (and IRC the worst of the winter was already over at the time of the crisis)...the question is another: Can Russia stop sell commerce to his biggest clients for long time?
 
The net result of a Russian attempt at broad conquests in Ukraine, not limited to substantially Russian areas like the Donbas or predominantly Russian ones like Crimea, would trigger a far more severe breakdown in Western-Russian relations. (I ignore for the moment the possibility of a nasty extended war in Ukraine, with potential implications for NATO and its eastern member-states.)

A far more visibly aggressive Russia would have significant knock-on consequences in Western domestic politics. It might well avert the election of Russophile Trump, for instance, or even see another Republican candidate selected.

The shit will certainly hit the fan in the West. It would really put the EU in a bind, given their reliance on Russian natural gas, but a Russian invasion of the Ukraine would trigger something close to a full on a panic in Poland and the Baltics; there'd be enormous pressure, both internal (from the aforementioned Eastern European countries) and external (from the US) for the gloves to come off. I'd expect re-armament programs to step up, at the very least.

In the US, Mitt Romney's anti-Russian rhetoric is going to get a lot more traction (and you can bet John McCain is going to be screaming about this at the top of his lungs), but it comes down to Obama's response. He always favored soft power over hard, so I'd imagine he'd lean on Merkel to marshall the EU to act. Certainly, you'd probably see some kind of diet-REFORGER and deployments of NATO units to Poland and the Baltics as a show of force.

Frankly, I suspect that Trump will simply run as a Russophobe in this TL.

Also, as for your point here, I think that Trump is primarily concerned about one thing--money, and whoever is willing to give him the most of it.

Trump's Russophilia is a combination of him being a moron who likes Putin's strongman posturing/flattery, and the fact that he's been deep in Russian money for close to a decade. OTL Russia is deeply unpopular in the US, and the GOP has barely gotten on board due to the fact that Trump is President. In a world where Russia is straight up invading its neighbors, any sort of Russophilia is going to be DOA.
 
In the longer run, a breakdown in Western-Russian relations over a broader Russian war in Ukraine could trigger a startlingly rapid shift away from Russian sources. There would be significant long-term consequences, but they would be most severe for a Russia that depends critically on fuel exports.
 
The shit will certainly hit the fan in the West. It would really put the EU in a bind, given their reliance on Russian natural gas, but a Russian invasion of the Ukraine would trigger something close to a full on a panic in Poland and the Baltics; there'd be enormous pressure, both internal (from the aforementioned Eastern European countries) and external (from the US) for the gloves to come off. I'd expect re-armament programs to step up, at the very least.

This certainly would happen. Blatant Russian aggression in Ukraine will make the Russian sanctions policy promoted by, among others, Merkel appear more necessary. Obama would not need to lean on Merkel at all, I think.

Trump's Russophilia is a combination of him being a moron who likes Putin's strongman posturing/flattery, and the fact that he's been deep in Russian money for close to a decade.

Even before that, though, he was strongly Russophile. As I noted above, he apparently sees Russia in the same way he saw the Soviet Union in the 1980s, as a necessary partner and only peer of the United States.

I would not be so quick to suggest Trump's Russophilia might not be an obvious problem for him as a politician. I hope I am avoiding the BOP, but the reluctance of many Republicans to engage in significant criticism of Russia's role in the elections, along with the way Russia has been positioned by many in the West as a righteous conservative challenger to the mores supported by a degenerate West, suggests that there is a strong support for this Russophilia. There might even be this support in the context of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.
 
Qatari, Turkmen, and Kazakh natural gas can't compensate for Russian natural gas?

The Russians can apply particular pressure on the Turkmen and Kazakhs, and that's ignoring the fact that there is no infrastructure in place that the Russians don't partly own. As for the Qataris, Europe has just lost 34% of its natural gas imports, which I doubt Qatar or the US will be able to effectively meet in the mere months before winter hits Europe. There's also the simple fact that the majority of the EU's "frontline" states are, according to 2007 figures, 100% dependent on the Russians; getting new sources in place and the associated deliver delays may very well break them.

Not really, this is not the 73; the EU not only have reserve for at least 90 days of normal use but it's not overall dependent on Russia gas and there is the possibility to get the gas from other sources even if more time consuming and costly (and IRC the worst of the winter was already over at the time of the crisis)...the question is another: Can Russia stop sell commerce to his biggest clients for long time?

The EU is now more dependent on Russian natural gas, and the US and Qatar both have failed to break this dependency. This is why the EU has been reluctant to get firmer with Russia, because Putin can very easily break them with this weapon. As for the timing, the Crisis did first flare up around February and gradually increased to a height towards the end of Summer, come Winter of 2014-2015, that's when the bite will hit hard.
 
The EU is now more dependent on Russian natural gas, and the US and Qatar both have failed to break this dependency. This is why the EU has been reluctant to get firmer with Russia, because Putin can very easily break them with this weapon. As for the timing, the Crisis did first flare up around February and gradually increased to a height towards the end of Summer, come Winter of 2014-2015, that's when the bite will hit hard.

Putin can't break the EU with the menace of stopping send gas, because otherwise he will see the collapse of the Russian economy as selling gas is basically the only thing that keep the nation afloat. On the other hand in the EU the only real phisically dependent by gas importation are the Czech, the Slovack, the Baltic and the Hungarians (and a little less Poland), sure there will be serious problem and incovencience but nothing that pulling together the EU resources and reserves will not solve, at least for the initial period...and in this game Russia can't afford to wait too much as for now she is basically a one trick pony economy.
Europe has been reluctant with Russia, sure for the gas, as the fact that can hold against the cut doesn't mean that people want do it but also for fear of an escalation of the armed conflict and because many country had heavily invested in Russia.
Just the sanctions and the downturn in the oil price had sent Russia in a recession that only now (thanks also to the oil price going up again) seem slightly reversed...image the effect of a full embargo
 
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Putin can't break the EU with the menace of stopping send gas, because otherwise he will see the collapse of the Russian economy as selling gas is basically the only thing that keep the nation afloat.

Natural Gas is only 10% of Russia's exports, while the imports of such make up 35% of Europe's natural gas consumption. In 2009, when the Russo-Ukraine dispute led to disruptions in supplies, costs in Britain shot up by almost a third despite Britain being one of the least dependent nations in Europe. Now imagine what a complete embargo by Russia would do to those more dependent.

On the other hand in the EU the only real phisically dependent by gas importation are the Czech, the Slovack, the Baltic and the Hungarians (and a little less Poland),

Here's the actual numbers from 2009, which shows places such as Germany imported nearly 40% of their supply from Russia. This dependency has grown since then, mind you. Now imagine what a sudden cut off in natural gas means for the European economy at time when it was already struggling with the threat of Grexit; almost the entire EU frontier economies would collapse without a doubt for example.

sure there will be serious problem and incovencience but nothing that pulling together the EU resources and reserves will not solve, at least for the initial period...and in this game Russia can't afford to wait too much as for now she is basically a one trick pony economy.

Despite having said for years they intend to wean themselves off Russian imports, they've actually grown more dependent on them. Yet, somehow we believe they can make up for over a one third reduction in their energy markets in mere months? According to that Bloomberg article I linked, there aren't yet any suppliers to take the Russian's place and such exports only make up 10% of their economy. Simply put, Europe is screwed if they go along with tougher actions on Russia.
 
Natural Gas is only 10% of Russia's exports, while the imports of such make up 35% of Europe's natural gas consumption. In 2009, when the Russo-Ukraine dispute led to disruptions in supplies, costs in Britain shot up by almost a third despite Britain being one of the least dependent nations in Europe. Now imagine what a complete embargo by Russia would do to those more dependent.

Here's the actual numbers from 2009, which shows places such as Germany imported nearly 40% of their supply from Russia. This dependency has grown since then, mind you. Now imagine what a sudden cut off in natural gas means for the European economy at time when it was already struggling with the threat of Grexit; almost the entire EU frontier economies would collapse without a doubt for example.

Despite having said for years they intend to wean themselves off Russian imports, they've actually grown more dependent on them. Yet, somehow we believe they can make up for over a one third reduction in their energy markets in mere months? According to that Bloomberg article I linked, there aren't yet any suppliers to take the Russian's place and such exports only make up 10% of their economy. Simply put, Europe is screwed if they go along with tougher actions on Russia.

http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_vulnerability_on_russian_gas

And this is a more recent article with a more detailed analysis of the situation and while Moscow hold a lot of good cards they have no overall dominion on the continent or the mean to cripple the economy immediately (the various strategic reserve are for this) and even the OTL sanctions (that had hit various sectors of the Russian economy not only the natural gas production) had done enough numbers on the russian economy to make it enter in recession...so getting a full embargo from some of their biggest economic patner will also crash their economy
And btw oil and energy related export represented in 2013 at least the 70% of the export value
 
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