Agreed with all of this. However, how exactly do you see this playing out in the long(er)-run?Militarily, the Russians would easily sweep aside Ukraine's military. The problem is twofold:
1. The locals will be pissed. Even as it is, it's unclear if the OTL separatists actually have majority popular support in the areas they control. An overt Russian invasion is liable to kill what sympathy there is and the odds of an insurgency is pretty high.
2. Western reaction will be even more harsh. It's unlikely to be overt military intervention, even OTL the West made it pretty clear they didn't regard Ukraine as being worth potential war with Russia. But forget sanctions, we're liable to be looking at outright embargo's. And arms and training support for any insurgency.
2. Western reaction will be even more harsh. It's unlikely to be overt military intervention, even OTL the West made it pretty clear they didn't regard Ukraine as being worth potential war with Russia. But forget sanctions, we're liable to be looking at outright embargo's. And arms and training support for any insurgency.
Qatari, Turkmen, and Kazakh natural gas can't compensate for Russian natural gas?There won't be any embargoes, because such would mean Europe freezes come Winter.
Agreed with all of this. However, how exactly do you see this playing out in the long(er)-run?
Qatari, Turkmen, and Kazakh natural gas can't compensate for Russian natural gas?
the election of Russophile Trump
Can't Turkmen and Kazakh natural gas move through Azerbaijan or Iran instead of Russia?Unsure, but probably more poorly then Putin's OTL moves. Poorly enough to bring him down? Who knows?
Qatari could. Turkmen and Kazakh natural gas couldn't, since they have to move through Russian pipelines to reach Europe. There are also other potential options: Venezuala, the US, Indonesia or Malaysia... the point is, the Europeans do have alternative options so long as they have the political will to suck up the extra costs.
The net result of a Russian attempt at broad conquests in Ukraine, not limited to substantially Russian areas like the Donbas or predominantly Russian ones like Crimea, would trigger a far more severe breakdown in Western-Russian relations. (I ignore for the moment the possibility of a nasty extended war in Ukraine, with potential implications for NATO and its eastern member-states.)
A far more visibly aggressive Russia would have significant knock-on consequences in Western domestic politics. It might well avert the election of Russophile Trump, for instance, or even see another Republican candidate selected.
Frankly, I suspect that Trump will simply run as a Russophobe in this TL.I find Trump to be far too ill-informed about Russian culture or history to really be described as "Russophile". That bit of terminological pedantry aside, I'd say your spot on.
I find Trump to be far too ill-informed about Russian culture or history to really be described as "Russophile".
Caliguy said:How severe do you expect this breakdown to be? Enough for the West to cut off diplomatic relations with Russia and impose an embargo on Russia? Also, would other countries--such as China--be more tempted to join a Western embargo of Russia in such a scenario?
Couldn't Trump simply run as a Russophobe in this TL, though?
There won't be any embargoes, because such would mean Europe freezes come Winter.
The net result of a Russian attempt at broad conquests in Ukraine, not limited to substantially Russian areas like the Donbas or predominantly Russian ones like Crimea, would trigger a far more severe breakdown in Western-Russian relations. (I ignore for the moment the possibility of a nasty extended war in Ukraine, with potential implications for NATO and its eastern member-states.)
A far more visibly aggressive Russia would have significant knock-on consequences in Western domestic politics. It might well avert the election of Russophile Trump, for instance, or even see another Republican candidate selected.
Frankly, I suspect that Trump will simply run as a Russophobe in this TL.
Also, as for your point here, I think that Trump is primarily concerned about one thing--money, and whoever is willing to give him the most of it.
The shit will certainly hit the fan in the West. It would really put the EU in a bind, given their reliance on Russian natural gas, but a Russian invasion of the Ukraine would trigger something close to a full on a panic in Poland and the Baltics; there'd be enormous pressure, both internal (from the aforementioned Eastern European countries) and external (from the US) for the gloves to come off. I'd expect re-armament programs to step up, at the very least.
Trump's Russophilia is a combination of him being a moron who likes Putin's strongman posturing/flattery, and the fact that he's been deep in Russian money for close to a decade.
Qatari, Turkmen, and Kazakh natural gas can't compensate for Russian natural gas?
Not really, this is not the 73; the EU not only have reserve for at least 90 days of normal use but it's not overall dependent on Russia gas and there is the possibility to get the gas from other sources even if more time consuming and costly (and IRC the worst of the winter was already over at the time of the crisis)...the question is another: Can Russia stop sell commerce to his biggest clients for long time?
The EU is now more dependent on Russian natural gas, and the US and Qatar both have failed to break this dependency. This is why the EU has been reluctant to get firmer with Russia, because Putin can very easily break them with this weapon. As for the timing, the Crisis did first flare up around February and gradually increased to a height towards the end of Summer, come Winter of 2014-2015, that's when the bite will hit hard.
Frankly, I suspect that Trump will simply run as a Russophobe in this TL.
Putin can't break the EU with the menace of stopping send gas, because otherwise he will see the collapse of the Russian economy as selling gas is basically the only thing that keep the nation afloat.
On the other hand in the EU the only real phisically dependent by gas importation are the Czech, the Slovack, the Baltic and the Hungarians (and a little less Poland),
sure there will be serious problem and incovencience but nothing that pulling together the EU resources and reserves will not solve, at least for the initial period...and in this game Russia can't afford to wait too much as for now she is basically a one trick pony economy.
Natural Gas is only 10% of Russia's exports, while the imports of such make up 35% of Europe's natural gas consumption. In 2009, when the Russo-Ukraine dispute led to disruptions in supplies, costs in Britain shot up by almost a third despite Britain being one of the least dependent nations in Europe. Now imagine what a complete embargo by Russia would do to those more dependent.
Here's the actual numbers from 2009, which shows places such as Germany imported nearly 40% of their supply from Russia. This dependency has grown since then, mind you. Now imagine what a sudden cut off in natural gas means for the European economy at time when it was already struggling with the threat of Grexit; almost the entire EU frontier economies would collapse without a doubt for example.
Despite having said for years they intend to wean themselves off Russian imports, they've actually grown more dependent on them. Yet, somehow we believe they can make up for over a one third reduction in their energy markets in mere months? According to that Bloomberg article I linked, there aren't yet any suppliers to take the Russian's place and such exports only make up 10% of their economy. Simply put, Europe is screwed if they go along with tougher actions on Russia.