Prussian US alliance a bond through the ages

Sorry, but trench warfare was already praticed during the ACW.

Sure.

Likewise trench warfare was already used by the Ottoman Empire when they besieged Vienna in the 17th century. :)

But it seems to have been a local and temporary affair?
Once armies moved they gave up their trenches hoping for a more advantageous position to strike at their enemies?

The siege of Port Arthur and the Battle of Mukden on the other hand saw extensive use of trench warfare for more than a few days or weeks? Machine guns supported by artillery?
We´re talking here about attacks involving a 50+ miles front line (Mukden) involving roughly 600,000 soldiers (both sides combined)?
Where in the ACW did you get 600,000 soldiers concentrated on a 50+ miles front?
 
I don’t think you can write the Prussian opinion off as simply as that. It’s hard to see why they would be impressed by an army in which some units don’t have target practice until 1864, when each Prussian soldier keeps a log-book in which he records the result of every practice shot he takes, or by lumbering frontal assaults when small Prussian units are always mobile, always taking the initiative, and always feeling out the enemy’s flanks.

And meanwhile, this is worse than Austria or Russia?

I'm not saying the USA or CSA armies are models of the best of the day, but there's a difference between ordinary incompetence and stupid civilians.

BlondieBC said:
What unique lessons do you think the Prussians GHQ could have learned from ACW that could not have been learned from either the Crimean War, Franco-Prussian War (1870), Austro-Prussian War (1866), or Second Boer War?

I don't think it's a matter of unique lessons, I'd say its a matter of showing the same lessons as those last three wars. Responding to just this part to keep the thread from bogging down in detailed argument on ACW armies.
 
Those observers had to have come away with something. The normal tactics in Europe emphasized shock-assault with columns and minimal use of musket-fire. The last demonstration of this for the Prussians was the Austro-Piedmont War in 1859. The ACW stands out because of the slaughter worked by musket fire when trading volleys but especially when the defenders had anything like a trench or wall. The Prussians experimented with fire-intensive tactics in 1864 during the Second Schleswig War. It was in 1866 that columnar tactics were officially discarded.
 
And meanwhile, this is worse than Austria or Russia?
They may not be any worse, but then the Prussians weren't learning lessons from the Austrians or Russians either. And it's not exactly a fair comparison when you factor in the polyglot nature of the Austrian army and the poorly educated raw material the Russian one has to work with. In fact, the Prussian observer with the Confederate army- Captain Julius Schiebert- looked back over the battles of 1870 and concluded that the Prussian army performed better than the Confederate one under the same conditions of battlefield chaos and dispersed force because of their more experienced junior leaders and rank-and-file.

Those observers had to have come away with something. The normal tactics in Europe emphasized shock-assault with columns and minimal use of musket-fire. The last demonstration of this for the Prussians was the Austro-Piedmont War in 1859. The ACW stands out because of the slaughter worked by musket fire when trading volleys but especially when the defenders had anything like a trench or wall. The Prussians experimented with fire-intensive tactics in 1864 during the Second Schleswig War. It was in 1866 that columnar tactics were officially discarded.
Actually, the Prussian regulations of 1861 are the ones which both abandon the batallion column in favour of the company column for battlefield maneouvering- which I assume you're referring to- and introduce the swarm tactic. This changes the practice of skirmishing from a single line led by officers to a number of small groups led by NCOs which are linked to the company. Although they were issued during the war, the first Prussian observer didn't go until 1863 and the process of drafting the new regulations must have meant that they were issued before most of the firing started.

Incidentally, the Austrian tactics in 1859 were focused on musketry, not shock: the tactics used in 1864 are revised following the 1859 defeat.
 
They may not be any worse, but then the Prussians weren't learning lessons from the Austrians or Russians either. And it's not exactly a fair comparison when you factor in the polyglot nature of the Austrian army and the poorly educated raw material the Russian one has to work with. In fact, the Prussian observer with the Confederate army- Captain Julius Schiebert- looked back over the battles of 1870 and concluded that the Prussian army performed better than the Confederate one under the same conditions of battlefield chaos and dispersed force because of their more experienced junior leaders and rank-and-file.

Well, they have to be learning lessons from someone, if only in the sense of seeing what isn't working.

Given that both of those are probably counted as "professional armies" (as distinct from civilian soldiers/armed mobs), I don't think it's unfair to use them as examples here, if we're going to dismiss ACW (either side) regiments as ineffectual amateurs unlike Professional Soldiers. Being no worse than two of Prussia's rivals/peers (Austria and Russia both being "Great Powers") is hardly a sign of being especially terrible.

I'd like to know how Schiebert saw that as tactically making the Prussian army superior- meaning, what exactly this advantage translated into in terms of what Prussian battalions (regiments? Not sure which is the right term for the Prussian army) did on the field.

Not arguing, but it would be interesting to see here.
 
Well, they have to be learning lessons from someone, if only in the sense of seeing what isn't working.
A lot of what Prussia gets right is from deduction rather than observation. For instance, introducing the breech-loader naturally leads to the conclusion that it’s better to abandon columns for a formation which allows the troops to bring their weapons to bear, that they need to be able to shoot accurately at a variety of ranges, and that NCOs need to be able to take command of small units.

Given that both of those are probably counted as "professional armies" (as distinct from civilian soldiers/armed mobs), I don't think it's unfair to use them as examples here, if we're going to dismiss ACW (either side) regiments as ineffectual amateurs unlike Professional Soldiers.
I think the difference in raw material is too great to fairly compare, particularly in the case of the Austrian army. The Union and Confederate armies speak the same language- it’s a lot more difficult manoeuvring troops under fire when not all of them understand the word “stop” (Solferino) or when officers have to pantomime orders (Podol). Education counts too, particularly when it comes to understanding what a ladder sight is and how it works.

I'd like to know how Schiebert saw that as tactically making the Prussian army superior- meaning, what exactly this advantage translated into
The phrase is Aufstragstaktik, although it’s not used at this point in time. Basically, the battlefield of the 1860s is a lot larger and a lot more confusing: senior officers lose control of the battle and responsibility devolves to junior officers and NCOs who are out of contact of their superiors (Wawro cites a good example in Oskar Becher at Sedan). Taking on that sort of responsibility comes much easier to an individual who’s had training, than one trying to learn on the job whose only reference source is a copy of Hardee or Casey. Reading the descriptions of Prussian encounter battles in which small advance guards probe into Austrian or French positions, engage them, and slowly reinforce themselves, makes it clear what this advantage looks like.

in terms of what Prussian battalions (regiments? Not sure which is the right term for the Prussian army) did on the field.
Prussian structures at this point are one corps of two divisions of two brigades of two regiments of three battalions of four companies of 250 men each. The idea behind it being that nobody has to worry about what more than two units are doing until the battalion stage, when the colonel should (in theory) be able to see all his units.

We are a little off the topic here, but hopefully it’s helping to emphasise that Prussian instructors in Union units are not the miracle fix that might be hoped.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Well, they have to be learning lessons from someone, if only in the sense of seeing what isn't working.

My Impressions is the most important war used that Prussia did not fight in was the Crimean War. So if I had to rank where the Prussian learned lessons form in 1900, I would say in order.


1) Napoleonic War
2) Franco Prussian War.
3) Austrian Prussian War
4) Crimean War
5) Second Boer War
6) ACW
 
A lot of what Prussia gets right is from deduction rather than observation. For instance, introducing the breech-loader naturally leads to the conclusion that it’s better to abandon columns for a formation which allows the troops to bring their weapons to bear, that they need to be able to shoot accurately at a variety of ranges, and that NCOs need to be able to take command of small units.

This is true.

I think the difference in raw material is too great to fairly compare, particularly in the case of the Austrian army. The Union and Confederate armies speak the same language- it’s a lot more difficult manoeuvring troops under fire when not all of them understand the word “stop” (Solferino) or when officers have to pantomime orders (Podol). Education counts too, particularly when it comes to understanding what a ladder sight is and how it works.

Which neatly emphasizes that being a professional army doesn't mean a better army, does it not?

The phrase is Aufstragstaktik, although it’s not used at this point in time. Basically, the battlefield of the 1860s is a lot larger and a lot more confusing: senior officers lose control of the battle and responsibility devolves to junior officers and NCOs who are out of contact of their superiors (Wawro cites a good example in Oskar Becher at Sedan). Taking on that sort of responsibility comes much easier to an individual who’s had training, than one trying to learn on the job whose only reference source is a copy of Hardee or Casey. Reading the descriptions of Prussian encounter battles in which small advance guards probe into Austrian or French positions, engage them, and slowly reinforce themselves, makes it clear what this advantage looks like.

I'm not entirely sure that's necessarily the case, or rather I'm not sure it necessarily is the case that an 1863 ACW army is less able to do this than a normal European army.

Prussian structures at this point are one corps of two divisions of two brigades of two regiments of three battalions of four companies of 250 men each. The idea behind it being that nobody has to worry about what more than two units are doing until the battalion stage, when the colonel should (in theory) be able to see all his units.

We are a little off the topic here, but hopefully it’s helping to emphasise that Prussian instructors in Union units are not the miracle fix that might be hoped.

That part I do agree with. Not without some sizable US organizational tweaks compared to the OTL structure (neither the new regular regiments or the old ten company regiments look anything like this, let alone the brigades and divisions formed from there)

BlondieBC: So, you're saying that armies in the days before (or without them being relevant) railroads, before mass use of rifles, before the telegraph, before those things rank above the ACW?

That's a bit much. In fact, that's a lot much.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
As Howard (of whom Wawro is a pale, thesis driven, Prussophilic shadow) points out, the Prussians mounted major frontal assaults in 6 out of the 7 major battles of the Franco-Prussian war and broke through.

In 1870 they were still operating in battalion columns. Breaking down to company columns came in after the initial battles. By the siege of Paris they started using skirmish lines and the like. Most of this was not forgotten but was doctrinally rejected after the Franco-Prussian War. Command and control was all important (rightly so) and so loosening of formations was rejected and the German Army of 1914 made attacks in a looser order battalion column, but still a column.

Rob is correct in pointing out just how pushed down command authority was. A Prussian captain, commanding a body of men that at full strength looks a lot like an ACW regiment has a great deal more latitude to act than a Union colonel. The orders process means that the Captain knows the 2 up (regimental) objectives and schemes of maneuver and so can continue to act in accordance with the main effort even after communication with battalion and regiment are lost.

OTOH a Zug leader is a mere cypher responsible for fire control orders (see Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and "Old Prussian Drill" in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 68, No. 1. (Jan., 2004), pp. 73-104 ). Nothing smaller than the company maneuvers on the field.

What Prussia had over France in 1870 was a far superior artillery branch. This comes partially from observations of the ACW (where they concluded the artillery was the decisive arm on the battlefield) and their war against Austria where their artillery got the crap kicked out of it by the Austrian artillery on a regular basis. This, and their superior staff processes, compensated for the general crapness of the Prussian infantry.

In 1861 none of this is really true. The Prussians of 1861 only have 36 infantry regiments (exc/ landwehr) and these are very weak. In a typical battalion of 1,000 about 300 are new recruits, 300 are trained, 300 have been released to civilian life and about 100 have deserted (round figures). Roons reforms vastly increased both the scope of conscription (in 1861, after exemptions, less than 80,000 men were liable for conscription) and the length (in 1861 a typical Prussian soldier served two years with the colours and then went home as a "war reserve", under Roon it became five with the colours).

The Prussia of 1861 is unlikely to want to place itself in a position where it may be fighting France, Britain and many of the German states.
 
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