Prussia annexes Danish West India in 1864

And as for the second part the US had no problem with one colonial power buying or exchanging territory so long as they did not try to take any more territory from an independent nation .


Not true. Read John A. Logan, Jr.'s invaluable *No Transfer: An American Security Principle* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). I haven't read it for some time but summarized some of its points years ago in soc.history.what-if (the immediate topic of discussion was whether, if Alaska remained Russian, the US would object to the UK getting it in 1917):

***


(1) It long preceded the Monroe Doctrine. (One could even trace it to George
Washington's reluctance to embark on a joint expedition with the French to
conquer Canada, partly on the ground that with five thousand troops there,
France might trump up any excuse to retain its former colony.) In fact,
some historians have talked about the "Madison Doctrine" of 1811 when
Congress passed a joint resolution stating that the US could not view with
indifference the transfer of Florida to any foreign power--and authorizing
the President to occupy Florida ("temporarily" and "subject to further
negotiation") in the event of any such transfer.

(2) However, in those years, the no-transfer idea was still limited to
contiguous continental territory. Spain's cession of Santo Domingo to France
and Britain's occupation of Trinidad during this period were not considered
threats to US safety, and passed unprotested. Americans still defined the
geographical extent of their vital interests narrowly. The first extension of
the principle beyond the North American continent was to Cuba, which John
Quincy Adams thought would eventually become a part of the United States
through the "laws of political gravitation" and whose rumored transfer from a
weak Spain to a strong Britain was an on-and-off source of fear and anger in
the US for decades.

(3) It was President Grant and his Secretary of State Hamilton Fish who first
explicitly linked the no-transfer principle with the Monroe Doctrine. By the
beginning of the twentieth century, most Americans probably took for granted
that no-transfer had always been part of the Doctrine--though it had not in
fact been mentioned in Monroe's famous message of December 2, 1823.

(4) There was one actual violation of the no-transfer policy in its long
history--the retrocession of St. Barthlomew island by Sweden to France in
1877. (Napoleon never actually took possession of Louisiana before it was
sold to the US, and the seizure of St. Pierre and Miquelon by the Free French
on Christmas Day 1941 did not involve a technical change of sovereignty.)
The US did not protest, and with good reasons (even apart from the fact that
the newly installed Hayes administration had some thorny problems at home...)
As Logan writes, "...this minuscule dot of land was hardly worth a quarrel
wih Sweden. Sweden wanted to unload a financial burden, and France was
probably in the last analysis the most acceptable European buyer as far as
the United States was concerned. It had been the orignal owner, so that
Washington could and did treat this incident as a reversion rather than as a
transfer of sovereignty. This acquisition would add nothing to the strength
of the nation that already controlled Maritinique and Guadalupe, while if
Italy had purchased the island [which had been discussed for a while], a new
naval power would have established itself in the Western Hemisphere." (p.
255)

(5) But finally, let's go back to Alaska in 1917 and whether the US would
have objected to even as friendly a power as the UK gaining control. One
reason I am convinced the US would have objected is an incident a
few years later involving Greenland.

In 1920 the Danish government asked the UK to recognize its right to extend
its political and economic interest in the whole of Greenland--a claim to
sovereignty already acknowledged by the US as a condition of the cession of
the Danish West Indies four years earlier. The British goverernment replied
that it would agree to this proposition only if granted the right of pre-
emptive purchase in case Denmark should consider disposing of Greenland.
When word of the British demand reached Washington, Secretary of State Colby
strongly objected, and in deference to the US objection, the UK softened its
conditions. Even in 1940, when one might think after Hitler's occupation of Denmark, the
US might welcome a British or Canadian occupation of Greenland, instead the
US was anxious to prevent precisely this event, while not yet ready to
dispatch troops itself. (Eventually it did, of course, but only after
keeping the question in suspense for a year.) This was partly out of a
desire to deny Japan an excuse for a "protective" occupation of the Dutch
East Indies should Hitler make his expected assault on Holland. But it was
also a product of the US belief that Greenland was part of the Western
Hemisphere, and that the Monroe Doctrine (including the no-transfer policy)
applied. Hull specifically reminded Lord Lothian of Colby's 1920 note, which
Hull called an "express application of the Monroe Doctrine by the United
States."

If the US applied the Monroe Doctrine and no-transfer policy even to
Greenland, it is hard to see it not applying them to Alaska. To any claim by
the British that they were simply protecting Canada from Bolshevism, the US
would reply that Bolshevism on the North American continent was a menace to
the US as well as Canada and that the US would meet the menace itself. Given
that US annexation of Alaska would be just as effective a check on Bolshevism
in North America as British annexation, and given the UK's general desire not
to offend US sensibilities on the Monroe Doctrine during that era (as shown
not only by its concessions on Greenland but by its enthusiastic support for
Wilson's proposal to include a reaffirmation of the Doctrine in the League
Covenant) I would expect the US to get its way.

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/-ZEiZ3ZLWL8/PYTAsp-4Bn4J

***

Anyway, to get back to the Danish West Indies:

In the 1860's the no-transfer principle had not yet been *officially* linked to the Monroe Doctrine, but I do think Americans would view with some alarm the introduction of a new power, far stronger than Denmark, into the Caribbean. And this is particularly true of islands that the US was interested in acquiring--or at least Secretary of State Seward was, even if the Senate was not. See Halvdan Koht, "The Origin of Seward's Plan to Purchase the Danish West Indies," The American Historical Review
Vol. 50, No. 4 (Jul., 1945), pp. 762-767. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1842701?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents In fact, Seward's desire to purchase the Danish West Indies originated with a concern that the Prussians would offer them to Austria in return for their recognizing sole Prussian occupation of North Schleswig...
 
Not true. Read John A. Logan, Jr.'s invaluable *No Transfer: An American Security Principle* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). I haven't read it for some time but summarized some of its points years ago in soc.history.what-if (the immediate topic of discussion was whether, if Alaska remained Russian, the US would object to the UK getting it in 1917):

***


(1) It long preceded the Monroe Doctrine. (One could even trace it to George
Washington's reluctance to embark on a joint expedition with the French to
conquer Canada, partly on the ground that with five thousand troops there,
France might trump up any excuse to retain its former colony.) In fact,
some historians have talked about the "Madison Doctrine" of 1811 when
Congress passed a joint resolution stating that the US could not view with
indifference the transfer of Florida to any foreign power--and authorizing
the President to occupy Florida ("temporarily" and "subject to further
negotiation") in the event of any such transfer.

(2) However, in those years, the no-transfer idea was still limited to
contiguous continental territory. Spain's cession of Santo Domingo to France
and Britain's occupation of Trinidad during this period were not considered
threats to US safety, and passed unprotested. Americans still defined the
geographical extent of their vital interests narrowly. The first extension of
the principle beyond the North American continent was to Cuba, which John
Quincy Adams thought would eventually become a part of the United States
through the "laws of political gravitation" and whose rumored transfer from a
weak Spain to a strong Britain was an on-and-off source of fear and anger in
the US for decades.

(3) It was President Grant and his Secretary of State Hamilton Fish who first
explicitly linked the no-transfer principle with the Monroe Doctrine. By the
beginning of the twentieth century, most Americans probably took for granted
that no-transfer had always been part of the Doctrine--though it had not in
fact been mentioned in Monroe's famous message of December 2, 1823.

(4) There was one actual violation of the no-transfer policy in its long
history--the retrocession of St. Barthlomew island by Sweden to France in
1877. (Napoleon never actually took possession of Louisiana before it was
sold to the US, and the seizure of St. Pierre and Miquelon by the Free French
on Christmas Day 1941 did not involve a technical change of sovereignty.)
The US did not protest, and with good reasons (even apart from the fact that
the newly installed Hayes administration had some thorny problems at home...)
As Logan writes, "...this minuscule dot of land was hardly worth a quarrel
wih Sweden. Sweden wanted to unload a financial burden, and France was
probably in the last analysis the most acceptable European buyer as far as
the United States was concerned. It had been the orignal owner, so that
Washington could and did treat this incident as a reversion rather than as a
transfer of sovereignty. This acquisition would add nothing to the strength
of the nation that already controlled Maritinique and Guadalupe, while if
Italy had purchased the island [which had been discussed for a while], a new
naval power would have established itself in the Western Hemisphere." (p.
255)

(5) But finally, let's go back to Alaska in 1917 and whether the US would
have objected to even as friendly a power as the UK gaining control. One
reason I am convinced the US would have objected is an incident a
few years later involving Greenland.

In 1920 the Danish government asked the UK to recognize its right to extend
its political and economic interest in the whole of Greenland--a claim to
sovereignty already acknowledged by the US as a condition of the cession of
the Danish West Indies four years earlier. The British goverernment replied
that it would agree to this proposition only if granted the right of pre-
emptive purchase in case Denmark should consider disposing of Greenland.
When word of the British demand reached Washington, Secretary of State Colby
strongly objected, and in deference to the US objection, the UK softened its
conditions. Even in 1940, when one might think after Hitler's occupation of Denmark, the
US might welcome a British or Canadian occupation of Greenland, instead the
US was anxious to prevent precisely this event, while not yet ready to
dispatch troops itself. (Eventually it did, of course, but only after
keeping the question in suspense for a year.) This was partly out of a
desire to deny Japan an excuse for a "protective" occupation of the Dutch
East Indies should Hitler make his expected assault on Holland. But it was
also a product of the US belief that Greenland was part of the Western
Hemisphere, and that the Monroe Doctrine (including the no-transfer policy)
applied. Hull specifically reminded Lord Lothian of Colby's 1920 note, which
Hull called an "express application of the Monroe Doctrine by the United
States."

If the US applied the Monroe Doctrine and no-transfer policy even to
Greenland, it is hard to see it not applying them to Alaska. To any claim by
the British that they were simply protecting Canada from Bolshevism, the US
would reply that Bolshevism on the North American continent was a menace to
the US as well as Canada and that the US would meet the menace itself. Given
that US annexation of Alaska would be just as effective a check on Bolshevism
in North America as British annexation, and given the UK's general desire not
to offend US sensibilities on the Monroe Doctrine during that era (as shown
not only by its concessions on Greenland but by its enthusiastic support for
Wilson's proposal to include a reaffirmation of the Doctrine in the League
Covenant) I would expect the US to get its way.

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/-ZEiZ3ZLWL8/PYTAsp-4Bn4J

***

Anyway, to get back to the Danish West Indies:

In the 1860's the no-transfer principle had not yet been *officially* linked to the Monroe Doctrine, but I do think Americans would view with some alarm the introduction of a new power, far stronger than Denmark, into the Caribbean. And this is particularly true of islands that the US was interested in acquiring--or at least Secretary of State Seward was, even if the Senate was not. See Halvdan Koht, "The Origin of Seward's Plan to Purchase the Danish West Indies," The American Historical Review
Vol. 50, No. 4 (Jul., 1945), pp. 762-767. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1842701?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents In fact, Seward's desire to purchase the Danish West Indies originated with a concern that the Prussians would offer them to Austria in return for their recognizing sole Prussian occupation of North Schleswig...

A lot of what you said makes sense however you seem to be confusing Alaska and Greenland. The US has had Alaska since the 1867, long before Bolshevism.
 
A lot of what you said makes sense however you seem to be confusing Alaska and Greenland. The US has had Alaska since the 1867, long before Bolshevism.

The what-if to which I was responding in that post was a question of "what if the US had never bought Alaska--would it in 1917 object to the British acquiring it after the Bolshevik Revolution?"
 
In the 1860's the no-transfer principle had not yet been *officially* linked to the Monroe Doctrine, but I do think Americans would view with some alarm the introduction of a new power, far stronger than Denmark, into the Caribbean. ...

Yet would Prussian possession of half of the VIs be seen as any more of a danger than British possession of the other half - esp as the Prussia of 1864, in naval terms, was weaker even than Denmark, never mind Britain?
 
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