Protestant Wank

Well, you need a clear definition of "victory" because victory could be long- and short-term.
It also involves clear objectives, which Protestants didn't really have then, except arguably having the king restauring the Edict of Beaulieu. The point however, is that Protestants were entierly dependent of royal edicts for their political survival and the Edict of Nantes wasn't the first edict to enact measures (the aformentioned Edict of Beaulieu, for exemple) and the succession of not too disfavourable terms with condemning edicts really did a number on their cohesion.
While we certainly can't say that the Edict of Nantes was a defeat of French Protestants, of course, calling it a victory simply ignores that Protestants at this point had no proper objective to win over.

Edict of Nantes was a reasonably long "short-term" victory: they lost their territorial, political and military rights, but retained the religious ones in 1629, 31 year later, and everything in 1685, 87 years later.
You ignore that most of Edict's measures were essentially a royal peace favourable more to Catholicism than to Protestantism, even if it was leagues better than what Protestants could have hoped for with a Ligue's victory.
Without considering the variability in its application (some regions more or less ignored it at first, and even before Alès, some beneficied from the regency to do as they pleased them), it legalized Protestantism at the condition making it restricted : its practice was authorized only where it was present in 1597 (and even there, Catholics often did their best, successful, to deny there was Protestant communities there and there), and while Protestant could count on less partiality in justice, it was still there and alive.
Protestants kept places de sureté, not because it was a royal gift, but because the Edict was in fact a political-military agreement. And Protestants didn't get the upper hand on negotiation, to the point some of their leaders preffered to go in exile.

This is not a political or strategical victory, giving it does not lead to the imposition (at least partial) of their conceptions in France : this is an uneasy peace that was still better than the alternative.

But if short-term victory (as peace arrangement) does not count, then none of the peace treaties made by Napoleon was a "victory" either: everything was negated by a final defeat within a much shorter time span. And Germany lost Alsace-Lorraine in just 47 years so here goes Franco-Prussian War. ;)
Easy with the straw man argument, sonny. You're leaving entire fields running out of scarecrows with this sentence alone.
See above for the necessity of at least more or less clearly defined objectives vs. taking what you can without being the active part in the decision.

For the Huguenots it was a victory because they got pretty much all that they wanted
Nope. Not even close : from the admission of their own leaders what they wanted was the same thing than Catholics : dominate French politics and having only one religion in the kingdom. They got neither.
Anything about individual freedom of worship is anachronistic.
 
I can imagine a Bulgaria which is almost 50/50 Orthodox vs Protestant in a TL in which the French revolution goes awry (compared to our TL).

EDIT: then again, OTL is weird enough, so why not.
 
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It also involves clear objectives, which Protestants didn't really have then, except arguably having the king restauring the Edict of Beaulieu. The point however, is that Protestants were entierly dependent of royal edicts for their political survival and the Edict of Nantes wasn't the first edict to enact measures (the aformentioned Edict of Beaulieu, for exemple) and the succession of not too disfavourable terms with condemning edicts really did a number on their cohesion.
While we certainly can't say that the Edict of Nantes was a defeat of French Protestants, of course, calling it a victory simply ignores that Protestants at this point had no proper objective to win over.

Well, as I said, all depends on what constitutes a "victory". From Huguenots' perspective, Edict of Nantes was a victory because it gave them pretty much everything they could spell out. Of course, they did not have an explicit political program but it was not exactly the XX century Russia and they were not the Bolsheviks. They did want a freedom of religion, they got it. They wanted fortresses of their own, they got it. It was XVI century and the notions were quite different from the modern ones so an absolute freedom of religion was neither expected nor granted. Having their own fortified places meant security. There was no need to explicitly spell out that they have rights to raise troops because it was assumed within framework of the existing military system. So they did have an objective and they achieved it.

Of course, they did depend upon the royal edicts being a minority hated/disliked by a majority of population but this is a completely different story because under no realistic circumstances could they achieve a complete independence within France or carve a part of France as their own state. You got what you wanted, you won.


You ignore that most of Edict's measures were essentially a royal peace favourable more to Catholicism than to Protestantism, even if it was leagues better than what Protestants could have hoped for with a Ligue's victory.

The peace was favoring BOTH sides and it did not really matter if the Catholics won as well as long as the Protestants got what they wanted.

Without considering the variability in its application (some regions more or less ignored it at first, and even before Alès, some beneficied from the regency to do as they pleased them), it legalized Protestantism at the condition making it restricted : its practice was authorized only where it was present in 1597 (and even there, Catholics often did their best, successful, to deny there was Protestant communities there and there), and while Protestant could count on less partiality in justice, it was still there and alive.
Protestants kept places de sureté, not because it was a royal gift, but because the Edict was in fact a political-military agreement. And Protestants didn't get the upper hand on negotiation, to the point some of their leaders preffered to go in exile.

I know these facts but I disagree with your conclusions. Of course, Protestantism was authorized only in the limited number of areas but these were areas where majority of the Protestants used to live and the high-ranking nobility got the right to conduct services in their households even outside these areas, which was one of the contention issues at the very beginning of the conflict. In the XVI century the ideas of a complete religious tolerance were not there, yet, so what one could expect? BTW, picture of the Catholics as the only bad guys before or after the Wars is a little bit too one-sided: both sides had been quite "good" in oppressing others given an opportunity and establishing Catholic services in the Protestant areas was not simple or safe.

Anyway, "a political-military agreement" by which you are getting most of what you want, is a victory for you. It may also be a victory for other side if it got most of what it wanted as well. But the "other side" not being the stubborn ultra-Catholics (Duke of Mayen took care of their leaders and demonstrated political flexibility), these gains were not completely mutually exclusive.


This is not a political or strategical victory, giving it does not lead to the imposition (at least partial) of their conceptions in France : this is an uneasy peace that was still better than the alternative.

Did you pay any attention to what I wrote? I was quite clear about this being a short-term victory. However, this peace lasted for longer than many celebrated peace treaties so, being a short-term victory, it is still a victory. BTW, following your logic, Edict of Fontainebleau was not a long-term victory of Catholicism either: it was in force only for a century and abolished by Edict of Versailles in 1787.


Easy with the straw man argument, sonny. You're leaving entire fields running out of scarecrows with this sentence alone.

Let's put couple things straight. I'm too old to be your son and I do not like the condescending tone. You may disagree with what I said but who said that you are always right? Anyway, with you not producing a clear definition of what in your opinion constitutes a victory, your own points about the long-term, etc. is the only criteria available to go by. :winkytongue:


See above for the necessity of at least more or less clearly defined objectives vs. taking what you can without being the active part in the decision.

This would make sense only if you can prove that the Huguenots had been absolutely passive party at the time when Edict of Nantes (or the earlier edicts) was written and had no clue what is that they want. I find this quite unlikely.

Anyway, neither French revolutionaries nor the Bolsheviks in Russia had clearly defined objectives (besides general idea of getting to power) when they started their circuses, the English Parliament was not quite clear about its objectives during most of the English CW, etc.


Nope. Not even close : from the admission of their own leaders what they wanted was the same thing than Catholics : dominate French politics and having only one religion in the kingdom. They got neither.

Which "leaders"? By that time their only meaningful leader was Henry of Navarre and idea of the Protestant France was a pipe dream (if anybody seriously considered it in the past). Dominating French politics was an objective of the earlier period when Prince Conde, Coligni and other aristocratic clowns had been around. They had been long gone and so did most of those with a rank high enough to be close to the throne. Anyway, with the head of the party becoming King of France the issue of domination ceased to be critical: it was assumed that he would not oppress his "brethren".
 
From Huguenots' perspective, Edict of Nantes was a victory because it gave them pretty much everything they could spell out.
Which again, is false. What Protestants wanted as their main objective, as political and religious dominance, they didn't get.

Of course, they did not have an explicit political program but it was not exactly the XX century Russia and they were not the Bolsheviks.
That's a pity because both Ligue and Henri IV had precise objectives. I never would have guessed that Lenin time-travelled as a Bourbon.

They did want a freedom of religion, they got it
Nope : they wanted freedom of Protestant religion. Which is a bit different, because it kinda implied the absence of Catholic dominance at least over their lands, which they didn't get.

They wanted fortresses of their own, they got it.
Nope, they were authorized to keep the fortified places they already got.

So they did have an objective and they achieved it.
The small issue there was that it wasn't their objective : it was what they already got and get to keep for a while but this time under royal supervision.

I know these facts but I disagree with your conclusions. Of course, Protestantism was authorized only in the limited number of areas but these were areas where majority of the Protestants used to live
That's not entirely true : places with a significant Protestant population but that was under Ligue's control for a while weren't as represented. For example Normandy or Dauphiné. These areas were essentially in regions held by Protestants before the edict, stressing that it was not as much an edict of religious freedom than a military treaty.
Furthermore, what was allowed (and which did represented an hindrance for the Protestant cause was the ability of Catholics (and royal authority of course) to enter these territories they couldn't before which effectively limited the Protestants' ability to grow out of their positions (at such point they didn't from this point onward).

In the XVI century the ideas of a complete religious tolerance were not there, yet, so what one could expect?
Well, Protestants did expected to have the upper hand religiously-wise.

BTW, picture of the Catholics as the only bad guys before or after the Wars is a little bit too one-sided
Who even claimed this on this thread? it's not a question of "oppressing", it's a question of power (political or religious) projection in areas held by Protestants, while Protestants couldn't do the same : this is a simple, factual situation.

Anyway, "a political-military agreement" by which you are getting most of what you want, is a victory for you.
Then again, they didn't get most of what they wanted, they won an acknowledgement of a de facto situation instead of being targeted by the royal power. Which they got before, for example at Beaulieu, but so far it was constantly repealed in the royal balance play : the difference with Nantes was that the royal power was established enough to enforce this decision.

Did you pay any attention to what I wrote?
No, I'm utterly illiterate and I type at random on my keyboard.

Let's put couple things straight. I'm too old to be your son and I do not like the condescending tone.
Then cut the wild exaggerations and comparison, to bold and underline each word you want to hammer and I'll consider your post in a better light. You know straw in the eye and all this, or the kind of sentences as above.

Anyway, with you not producing a clear definition of what in your opinion constitutes a victory, your own points about the long-term, etc. is the only criteria available to go by.
Because the focus on short-term and long-term is your own perspective of the event, one I don't share. I prefer to point the continuity on political and military grounds and compare it to the stated ambitions of the sides in presence.
In fact, I think the main issue there is that you tend to see the Edict as it's either all or nothing, and you assume (or at the very least seems to assume) that others are arguing so, when I'm plainly saying that while by no means a defeat, calling it a victory, regardless "short-term" or "long-term" is abusive to carachterize what is essentially an acknowledgement of royal authority (which they didn't so far) and a stabilization of their political control in exchange of the limitation of said control.
From a roughly independent but unstable situation, Protestants got a relatively more stable but much more dependent from royal will hold. And that royal power was able to really get the better of them and relatively easily so (in comparison of the previous wars) does points that the exchange while certainly necessary at this point, was not a political victory from itself. It was, at its very core, a ceasefire that favored first most the king. : not every campaign have to end with a victory or a defeat.

This would make sense only if you can prove that the Huguenots had been absolutely passive party
Again, you're mostly seeing this trough an "all or nothing" perspective. Not talking an active part is not the same than being "absolutely passive". Really, you should try to not exxagerate so much, because it really makes discussing with you....Well, impossible.
As for how Protestants didn't took the active part on the elaboration of the Peace : when the Parliaments requested a re-writing of the clauses of the edict, they obtained it without deliberation with Protestants. The direct political concession, not to a faction, but to leaders such as Lorraine were essentially made to Catholics. And as for the main protestant negotiator and writer of the edict was Daniel Chamier, who was rather following the cause of royal authority (in spite of his violent attack on Rome) than siding with Protestants on political matters.

and had no clue what is that they want. I find this quite unlikely.
You know what? Me too, I'd find this unlikely, because their stated goals were relatively clear : it's just that in their position they couldn't realistically reach it and they elected to preserve their agreement with Henri IV (who can't be considered the chief of the Protestants since he became the only royal candidate) rather than to push for expansion of Protestantism, political autonomy and continuation of the war with Spain with England and Netherlands.
It's just that you seem to consider that regardless of their unability to reach these, they were victorious and the main beneficers of the Edict. And, let's be clear, I couldn't disagree more.

Which "leaders"?
Claude de la Trémoille, Théodore d'Aubigné and Henri I de la Tour d'Auvergne come to mind.

By that time their only meaningful leader was Henry of Navarre
Not at this point, not anymore : as long Henri IV was just a possible candidate (basically until the death of d'Alençon) his interests were importantly distinct from royal interests. But when he became king de facto (especially as no other credible candidate could be found by the Ligue) and that he was joined by the whole of forces supporting royal authority againsr both ultra-Catholics and protestants, his political interests changed. Not that he was an unique case, political revolving door was a common sight for french nobles.
Note that it did weakened Protestant leadership, something that might have played a role in their relative lack of initiative.

and idea of the Protestant France was a pipe dream (if anybody seriously considered it in the past).
Claude de la Trémouille certainly considered it even after the Edict. And while it was certainly a pipe dream, it's pretty much common sense that ideologies and political objectives aren't always driven by a realistic perception of the situation. Especially in religion. (Or, as you seems to enjoy such comparisons, it's not because world Caliphate was a pipe dream that it wasn't at the core of Daesh' objectives).
 

kernals12

Banned
From my reading of the period, I honestly think the only regions that couldn't have fallen to protestantism were in Italy and Iberia. The Spanish already went through what amounted to a reformation of their church structures during the 1400s, with massive anti-corruption campaigns and the much closer linkage of the church and state - coupled with a very militant and missionary version of Catholicism. Portugal had a far more corrupt church system, but was so cut off from the rest of Europe and influenced so heavily by Spain that they would be more likely to follow Spanish example than that set elsewhere. In Italy they were under heavy pressure from the closeness of the church - their form of Catholicism might take on a more liberal bent but it would remain Catholic. I would strongly recommend Diarmaid MacCullough's book The Reformation: Europe's House Divided if you want to learn more about all of this.

France could have fallen to the Huguenots at some point during the Wars of Religion, there are multiple possible PoDs to accomplish that. Germany and Austria nearly fell in their entirety to Protestantism in early 1600 while Poland, Transylvania and Royal Hungary all had very strong protestant powers. I think that about covers the areas that didn't go protestant IOTL.

If the Huguenots had been able to hold onto their supporters in Normandy, particularly in the first couple of wars, then they should be set to eventually dominate France. Though that opens up the question and threat of Habsburg or Papal interference in France earlier on.
If everyone else goes Protestant, they could just invade Iberia and Italy and convert them to Protestantism by force.
 

kernals12

Banned
Those are pretty big places to convert by force. Realistically, they would need domestic Protestant movements.
Italy and Spain were the most repressive countries when it came to Protestants so presumably there's a sizable number of people who would've converted if they were free to do so or if they had a little nudging.
 
Italy and Spain were the most repressive countries when it came to Protestants so presumably there's a sizable number of people who would've converted if they were free to do so or if they had a little nudging.

If there were lots of crypto-Protestants we would know about them. We do know that Spain had crypto-Muslims and Jews.

It's much more likely that this invasion would lead to a massive uprising against the "heretic" invader.
 

kernals12

Banned
If there were lots of crypto-Protestants we would know about them. We do know that Spain had crypto-Muslims and Jews.

It's much more likely that this invasion would lead to a massive uprising against the "heretic" invader.
Crypto-Protestants are people who had been protestant who pretended to switch to Catholicism. I'm talking about people who didn't switch at all.
 
Crypto-Protestants are people who had been protestant who pretended to switch to Catholicism. I'm talking about people who didn't switch at all.

The closest you get to something like protestantism (and it is very far from that) are the mystical movements led by St John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila as well as the Jesuits. The thing is, support for Protestantism was tied very closely to corruption within the church and dissatisfaction with church officials trampling local interests and rights. That was no longer really a thing in Spain by 1500. During Queen Isabella's reign, and a bit on either side of it, Spanish Catholicism had gone through an extensive period of change and development that resolved most of those problems. Corruption was cut out harshly while almost all church posts in the region were held by native bishops. Furthermore, the Spanish were a dominant faction within the Papacy and as such were able to exert considerable influence and power on it in their favor. The Spanish have coversos and mudejars to deal with, but their paranoia about protestants rarely had any basis in fact. There is also a quite significant cultural element, with the protestant movements viewed quite broadly as some barbaric heretical idea held by crazy northern Europeans - quite simply, they were too prejudiced to invite such an idea from the outside when they didn't have many of the problems that provoked the reformation in Germany.
 

kernals12

Banned
The closest you get to something like protestantism (and it is very far from that) are the mystical movements led by St John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila as well as the Jesuits. The thing is, support for Protestantism was tied very closely to corruption within the church and dissatisfaction with church officials trampling local interests and rights. That was no longer really a thing in Spain by 1500. During Queen Isabella's reign, and a bit on either side of it, Spanish Catholicism had gone through an extensive period of change and development that resolved most of those problems. Corruption was cut out harshly while almost all church posts in the region were held by native bishops. Furthermore, the Spanish were a dominant faction within the Papacy and as such were able to exert considerable influence and power on it in their favor. The Spanish have coversos and mudejars to deal with, but their paranoia about protestants rarely had any basis in fact. There is also a quite significant cultural element, with the protestant movements viewed quite broadly as some barbaric heretical idea held by crazy northern Europeans - quite simply, they were too prejudiced to invite such an idea from the outside when they didn't have many of the problems that provoked the reformation in Germany.
So what if the Church didn't go through such anti-corruption reform?
 
So what if the Church didn't go through such anti-corruption reform?

The anti-corruption reforms were tied closely to the Reconquista and played a key role in ensuring that Iberian Christianity was united in its struggle with Muslim Iberia. Furthermore, the reforms were a key part of trying to unite the Spanish kingdoms and their incredibly disparate peoples - the Church was the only common institution beyond sharing monarchs for the kingdoms. Getting Catalans, Basques, Castilians, Galicians, Aragonese, Andalusians and more to all move in the same direction was incredibly important.

As a result, if the Iberian Church doesn't go through with anti-corruption reforms then I have a hard time imagining the Reconquista turning out victorious. You would need to work with a PoD as early as the 1200s and have pretty major divergences. It was a slow, incremental shift that culminated in Isabella's reign with countless reforms all packed closely together. You might be able to provoke some changes with a different monarch than Isabella, but it would be more a matter of how precisely the reforms play out rather than preventing any reforms from occuring - if that makes sense.
 
Which again, is false. What Protestants wanted as their main objective, as political and religious dominance, they didn't get.

Which is what you keep saying without producing any proof that it was at any point formulated by any of their leaders. It is quite clear that such an objective was not realistic from the very beginning and it hardly was even worthy of considering by 1589: out of 40,000 of Henry's army the Huguenots amounted to approximately 5,000.

Nope : they wanted freedom of Protestant religion. Which is a bit different, because it kinda implied the absence of Catholic dominance at least over their lands, which they didn't get.

Again, "implication" is your interpretation but not a solid fact. They had infrastructure established during the assembly at Sainte Foy in June of 1594 which guaranteed Protestant control over their localities (and the measures to be taken in the case government would try to install a Catholic in charge instead of a Calvinist), in the case the king "ceased to pay the sums necessary to keep up the garrisons in the towns left to the Reformers, the governors were to seize the tallies in the hands of the king's receivers , and apply the money to the payment of the garrisons... The Calvinist party had thus a territorial area, an administration, finances, a legislative power and executive power independent of those of the country; or, in other words, the means of taking resolutions contrary to those of the mass of the nation, and of upholding them by revolt." In other words, the realistic goals had been set and mostly achieved well before the Edict of Nantes.

After being finally recognized as the King of France, Henry IV extended the areas in which the Reformer services had been permitted: 3 months after his entry to Paris he allowed reformer service in the Faubourg St. Germain (even if Paris area was explicitly excluded by the existing agreements) and authorized the use of the reformer services at court. By edict of St. Germain (1597) the Protestants had been allowed to fill "all the offices and dignities of the kingdom". What's probably more important, he forced Parliament of Paris and provincial parliaments to register these edicts, making them permanent.

Now, about the personalities and influence. The most influential person during Henry's reign was Maximilien de Béthune, future Duke of Sully, one of Henry's Protestant followers. 3 Protestants, Hurault Dufay, Du Plessis-Mornay and Rosny, became members of the council of state (in 1594 Rosny became also a member of the council of finance). "Soffray dw Colignon, La Force, Lesdiguieres, and Sancy were summoned to the most important functions; Turenne, in 1594, was raised to the dignity of marshal of France; and in 1595 La Tremoille was made a duke and peer."

Of course, not everybody got everything he wanted with the resulting grumbling in the provinces (even La Tremoille marched with his troops to Poitou) so Edict of Nantes dealt with these Protestant malcontents. Besides confirming the old laws "Henry IV added a great deal to the rights of the Protestants and to the duties of the state toward them. Their worship was authorized not only in the castles of the lords high-justiciary, who numbered thirty-five hundred, but also in the castles of simple noblemen ... provided that the number of those present did not exceed thirty. Two towns or two boroughs, instead on one, had the same religious rights in each bailiwick or seneschalty of the kingdom. The state was charged with a duty of providing the salaries of the Protestant ministers and rectors of their colleges or schools... The children of the Protestants were admitted into the universities, colleges, schools and hospitals, without distinction between them and Catholics." Special judicial chamber, the edict-chamber, had been created for trials in which Protestants had been interested. Catholic judges could not sit in this chamber unless they were presented by the Protestants. The towns in Protestant possession (up to 2 hundred) had been retained by them for 8 years (then for 5 more) with king paying for their garrisons and maintenance of the fortifications. Judging by the fact that now protests had been coming from the Catholics, Protestants had been satisfied.

Of course, you can not make everybody happy forever. For example, Turenne (by that time Duke of Bouillon ) being compromised in the conspiracy of Biron in 1602, he fled to Geneva the following year and had to accept a French protectorate over his duchy of Bouillon in 1606. After Henry's death he entered the Council of Regency during the minority of Louis XIII, and intrigued against Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully and Concini. La Tremoille, after being unhappy for a while, became a good boy again and did not participate in Biron's conspiracy.
 
Conflict between the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and an Alt-Napoleonic France. It's a wide shot, but possible. barely. There is also a much earlier possible POD, probably just after the Reformation, when there were still sympathies in early Protestant movements towards Orthodoxy. Also, butterflies. I think that about covers it.
 
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