From Huguenots' perspective, Edict of Nantes was a victory because it gave them pretty much everything they could spell out.
Which again, is false. What Protestants wanted as their main objective, as political and religious dominance, they didn't get.
Of course, they did not have an explicit political program but it was not exactly the XX century Russia and they were not the Bolsheviks.
That's a pity because both Ligue and Henri IV had precise objectives. I never would have guessed that Lenin time-travelled as a Bourbon.
They did want a freedom of religion, they got it
Nope : they wanted freedom of Protestant religion. Which is a bit different, because it kinda implied the absence of Catholic dominance at least over their lands, which they didn't get.
They wanted fortresses of their own, they got it.
Nope, they were authorized to keep the fortified places they already got.
So they did have an objective and they achieved it.
The small issue there was that it wasn't their objective : it was what they already got and get to keep for a while but this time under royal supervision.
I know these facts but I disagree with your conclusions. Of course, Protestantism was authorized only in the limited number of areas but these were areas where majority of the Protestants used to live
That's not entirely true : places with a significant Protestant population but that was under Ligue's control for a while weren't as represented. For example Normandy or Dauphiné. These areas were essentially in regions held by Protestants before the edict, stressing that it was not as much an edict of religious freedom than a military treaty.
Furthermore, what was allowed (and which did represented an hindrance for the Protestant cause was the ability of Catholics (and royal authority of course) to enter these territories they couldn't before which effectively limited the Protestants' ability to grow out of their positions (at such point they didn't from this point onward).
In the XVI century the ideas of a complete religious tolerance were not there, yet, so what one could expect?
Well, Protestants did expected to have the upper hand religiously-wise.
BTW, picture of the Catholics as the only bad guys before or after the Wars is a little bit too one-sided
Who even claimed this on this thread? it's not a question of "oppressing", it's a question of power (political or religious) projection in areas held by Protestants, while Protestants couldn't do the same : this is a simple, factual situation.
Anyway, "a political-military agreement" by which you are getting most of what you want, is a victory for you.
Then again, they didn't get most of what they wanted, they won an acknowledgement of a de facto situation instead of being targeted by the royal power. Which they got before, for example at Beaulieu, but so far it was constantly repealed in the royal balance play : the difference with Nantes was that the royal power was established enough to enforce this decision.
Did you pay any attention to what I wrote?
No, I'm utterly illiterate and I type at random on my keyboard.
Let's put couple things straight. I'm too old to be your son and I do not like the condescending tone.
Then cut the wild exaggerations and comparison, to bold and underline each word you want to hammer and I'll consider your post in a better light. You know straw in the eye and all this, or the kind of sentences as above.
Anyway, with you not producing a clear definition of what in your opinion constitutes a victory, your own points about the long-term, etc. is the only criteria available to go by.
Because the focus on short-term and long-term is your own perspective of the event, one I don't share. I prefer to point the continuity on political and military grounds and compare it to the stated ambitions of the sides in presence.
In fact, I think the main issue there is that you tend to see the Edict as it's either all or nothing, and you assume (or at the very least seems to assume) that others are arguing so, when I'm plainly saying that while by no means a defeat, calling it a victory, regardless "short-term" or "long-term" is abusive to carachterize what is essentially an acknowledgement of royal authority (which they didn't so far) and a stabilization of their political control in exchange of the limitation of said control.
From a roughly independent but unstable situation, Protestants got a relatively more stable but much more dependent from royal will hold. And that royal power was able to really get the better of them and relatively easily so (in comparison of the previous wars) does points that the exchange while certainly necessary at this point, was not a political victory from itself. It was, at its very core, a ceasefire that favored first most the king. : not every campaign have to end with a victory or a defeat.
This would make sense only if you can prove that the Huguenots had been absolutely passive party
Again, you're mostly seeing this trough an "all or nothing" perspective. Not talking an active part is not the same than being "absolutely passive". Really, you should try to not exxagerate so much, because it really makes discussing with you....Well, impossible.
As for how Protestants didn't took the active part on the elaboration of the Peace : when the Parliaments requested a re-writing of the clauses of the edict, they obtained it without deliberation with Protestants. The direct political concession, not to a faction, but to leaders such as Lorraine were essentially made to Catholics. And as for the main protestant negotiator and writer of the edict was Daniel Chamier, who was rather following the cause of royal authority (in spite of his violent attack on Rome) than siding with Protestants on political matters.
and had no clue what is that they want. I find this quite unlikely.
You know what? Me too, I'd find this unlikely, because their stated goals were relatively clear : it's just that in their position they couldn't realistically reach it and they elected to preserve their agreement with Henri IV (who can't be considered the chief of the Protestants since he became the only royal candidate) rather than to push for expansion of Protestantism, political autonomy and continuation of the war with Spain with England and Netherlands.
It's just that you seem to consider that regardless of their unability to reach these, they were victorious and the main beneficers of the Edict. And, let's be clear, I couldn't disagree more.
Claude de la Trémoille, Théodore d'Aubigné and Henri I de la Tour d'Auvergne come to mind.
By that time their only meaningful leader was Henry of Navarre
Not at this point, not anymore : as long Henri IV was just a possible candidate (basically until the death of d'Alençon) his interests were importantly distinct from royal interests. But when he became king de facto (especially as no other credible candidate could be found by the Ligue) and that he was joined by the whole of forces supporting royal authority againsr both ultra-Catholics and protestants, his political interests changed. Not that he was an unique case, political revolving door was a common sight for french nobles.
Note that it did weakened Protestant leadership, something that might have played a role in their relative lack of initiative.
and idea of the Protestant France was a pipe dream (if anybody seriously considered it in the past).
Claude de la Trémouille certainly considered it even after the Edict. And while it was certainly a pipe dream, it's pretty much common sense that ideologies and political objectives aren't always driven by a realistic perception of the situation. Especially in religion. (Or, as you seems to enjoy such comparisons, it's not because world Caliphate was a pipe dream that it wasn't at the core of Daesh' objectives).