Protestant Wank

kernals12

Banned
So I've got plausible PODs for Protestant domination in France and Austria. So now let's move on to, what impact does this have on wars, politics, and society?
 
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kernals12

Banned
From my reading of the period, I honestly think the only regions that couldn't have fallen to protestantism were in Italy and Iberia. The Spanish already went through what amounted to a reformation of their church structures during the 1400s, with massive anti-corruption campaigns and the much closer linkage of the church and state - coupled with a very militant and missionary version of Catholicism. Portugal had a far more corrupt church system, but was so cut off from the rest of Europe and influenced so heavily by Spain that they would be more likely to follow Spanish example than that set elsewhere. In Italy they were under heavy pressure from the closeness of the church - their form of Catholicism might take on a more liberal bent but it would remain Catholic. I would strongly recommend Diarmaid MacCullough's book The Reformation: Europe's House Divided if you want to learn more about all of this.

France could have fallen to the Huguenots at some point during the Wars of Religion, there are multiple possible PoDs to accomplish that. Germany and Austria nearly fell in their entirety to Protestantism in early 1600 while Poland, Transylvania and Royal Hungary all had very strong protestant powers. I think that about covers the areas that didn't go protestant IOTL.

If the Huguenots had been able to hold onto their supporters in Normandy, particularly in the first couple of wars, then they should be set to eventually dominate France. Though that opens up the question and threat of Habsburg or Papal interference in France earlier on.
Well, there's the places that were Eastern Orthodox but that's a whole other can of worms.
 
Citation please
Maybe he meant one sixt? At the peak of Reformation in Poland (second half of 16th century) up to 20% of nobles (and over 1/3 magnates) converted, mostly to Calvinism, but there was no 'cuius regio, eius religio' rule in Poland, nobles were not interested in converting their peasants, and when counter-reformation started, number of Protestant nobles fell quickly, out of circa 800 Calvinist congregations (?, how is Calvinist analogue of parish called?) only one survived untill 20th century and majority of modern Polish Calvinists are descendants of Czech and German immigrants.
 
Is there any way the Hugoenots could win the Wars of Religion?
Not really, in no small part because Protestants were the relatively less powerful side of the Wars.

Eventually, they were as much religious than political, and the Protestant side really flourished in France where it could be protected by but an handful of French nobility (arguably a powerful handful). The more active sides were either ultra-catholics of the Ligue led by Guise which were opposed by Catholics as the Montmorency (and generally the malcontents) and to say nothing of the Valois that played a constant game of balance between noble houses to assert their powers, sometimes going all absolutist on what they considered lese-majesty, and temporizing for the same problems instead according their interest.
And while the royal power in France could certainly be weakened, it wouldn't be at the benefit of Protestant, but to the one of the Catholic princes.

A Protestant France would require to break not only Catholic nobles, not only Valois but as well the capacity of projection of Habsburgs in France. It is not literally impossible, but at the very least requires an earlier PoD where France is particularly divided politically (maybe due to much worse Italian Wars?), meaning the nobiliar capacity to harbor and promote Protestantism is demultiplied. You'd note that it doesn't, at all, resolve the problem of foreign influence.

There is a third way for a semi-Protestant France, tough, trough the advancement of the Gallican Church in the XVIth century, evolving on similar lines than Anglicanism in England (while being probably much more "high church" style in France) that would integrate humanist and reformation beliefs while not cutting radically ties from Rome.
 

kernals12

Banned
The Concordat of Bologne seems to be a very good POD. Francis I was somewhat supportive of the reformation, because it was turning German princes against his main rival, Charles V, at least until the Placard Affair. So he seems like a good candidate to pull a Henry VIII.
 
The Concordat of Bologne seems to be a very good POD. Francis I was somewhat supportive of the reformation, because it was turning German princes against his main rival, Charles V, at least until the Placard Affair. So he seems like a good candidate to pull a Henry VIII.
Francis I remained a firm catholic, in spite of his beef with Rome. His relative tolerance of Protestantism was, outside a personal interest on intellectual Protestantism that was close to humanism, essentially geopolitical. The Concordate of Bologna could be, however, a good starting point : admitting that Henri II does hold his ground ITTL rather than witnessing Habsburg's dominance (meaning longer Italian Wars) you could see edicts towards a more independent French church turning more and more as a Gallican church while Protestant nobility remains close to power.
 

kernals12

Banned
An old German encyclopedia from the late 19th century we had at home. Was fun to read.
I can't find anything mentioning a large protestant polish population. Maybe that data was found to be dubious or they were referring to the part of Poland that was later annexed by Prussia.
 
Is there any way the Hugoenots could win the Wars of Religion?

The question implies that they lost, which was hardly the case. By the Edict of Nantes they got pretty much everything they realistically expected. Creation of the Protestant France was not their goal so conversation of victory as "Protestant France" is irrelevant.

They got:

1. Freedom of religion with a guaranteed protection for those travelling abroad. While formally, a complete equality was guaranteed, at least one position, Connetable of France, was reserved to the Catholics. Lesdiguières had to convert and Turenne ended up with being just Marshal General of France (;)). Of course, their freedom of worship had been limited to specified geographic areas (those officially established in 1597) but these areas had been covering (AFAIK) most of the Protestant regions and the nobles holding the right of high justice could "exercise the said religion in their houses"

2. Their own strongholds (places de sûreté) maintained, at least partially, at state expense and a further 150 emergency forts (places de refuge), to be maintained at the Huguenots' own expense.

How exactly this amounts to not winning?

As for the relative military strengths, while the Huguenots had been a minority, popularity of Calvinism among the nobility (cadres of the heavy cavalry, still the main offensive weapon in the battles of that time) partially compensated for this. Then, it is necessary to keep in mind that practically from the very beginning the Huguenots felt themselves quite free to invite the German Protestants as the mercenaries and/or allies (popularity of Henry de Guise grew considerably after he got a credit for repulsing one such invasion during the reign of Henry III). Of course, the royal side kept hiring the Swiss but they cost money while the Protestant German allies would be satisfied with looting.

At the Battle of Dreux the German reiters had been forming a part of the 1st line in Protestant's battle order and Landsknechts - part of the 2nd line. At Moncontour, again - the royal troops had been fighting the Huguenots and their German (and Dutch?) Protestant allies led by Count Vollrad of Mansfeld and Count Louis of Nassau. As a result, in the major battles the Protestant forces had been more than once more numerous than their opponents. Of course, having the greater numbers never prevented Coligny from losing a battle but this is neither here nor there. :winkytongue:

Hapsburg direct interference was quite limited (at least where it mattered): in 1590 Parma marched to France to break blockade of Paris by Henry of Navarre and in 1592 he did the same at Rouen but, after escaping from being trapped by the greatly superior French Royal forces at Caudebec, left for the Flanders.
 

kernals12

Banned
So back to my earlier question, what changes with a protestant France and Austria? Do we see an end to absolutism in France earlier along the lines of Britain's Glorious Revolution?
 

kernals12

Banned
The question implies that they lost, which was hardly the case. By the Edict of Nantes they got pretty much everything they realistically expected. Creation of the Protestant France was not their goal so conversation of victory as "Protestant France" is irrelevant.

They got:

1. Freedom of religion with a guaranteed protection for those travelling abroad. While formally, a complete equality was guaranteed, at least one position, Connetable of France, was reserved to the Catholics. Lesdiguières had to convert and Turenne ended up with being just Marshal General of France (;)). Of course, their freedom of worship had been limited to specified geographic areas (those officially established in 1597) but these areas had been covering (AFAIK) most of the Protestant regions and the nobles holding the right of high justice could "exercise the said religion in their houses"

2. Their own strongholds (places de sûreté) maintained, at least partially, at state expense and a further 150 emergency forts (places de refuge), to be maintained at the Huguenots' own expense.

How exactly this amounts to not winning?

As for the relative military strengths, while the Huguenots had been a minority, popularity of Calvinism among the nobility (cadres of the heavy cavalry, still the main offensive weapon in the battles of that time) partially compensated for this. Then, it is necessary to keep in mind that practically from the very beginning the Huguenots felt themselves quite free to invite the German Protestants as the mercenaries and/or allies (popularity of Henry de Guise grew considerably after he got a credit for repulsing one such invasion during the reign of Henry III). Of course, the royal side kept hiring the Swiss but they cost money while the Protestant German allies would be satisfied with looting.

At the Battle of Dreux the German reiters had been forming a part of the 1st line in Protestant's battle order and Landsknechts - part of the 2nd line. At Moncontour, again - the royal troops had been fighting the Huguenots and their German (and Dutch?) Protestant allies led by Count Vollrad of Mansfeld and Count Louis of Nassau. As a result, in the major battles the Protestant forces had been more than once more numerous than their opponents. Of course, having the greater numbers never prevented Coligny from losing a battle but this is neither here nor there. :winkytongue:

Hapsburg direct interference was quite limited (at least where it mattered): in 1590 Parma marched to France to break blockade of Paris by Henry of Navarre and in 1592 he did the same at Rouen but, after escaping from being trapped by the greatly superior French Royal forces at Caudebec, left for the Flanders.
A century later, the Edict of Nantes was repealed and the Huguenots were forced out and France's Christian population today is virtually all Catholic.
 
A century later, the Edict of Nantes was repealed and the Huguenots were forced out and France's Christian population today is virtually all Catholic.
The point of the Edict was that Protestants were able to practice their religion where they already could, but were forbidden to do so elsewhere. Oh, and Catholics could practice and convert even in places de sureté (which were repealed by the Edict of Alès, so well before Fontaineblau).
Henri IV knew what he owed to the Protestant side, but couldn't do much more than Henri III that already assessed the situation (and, in fact, would have Henri III lived, I suspect the situation for Protestant would be similar). It's worth noting that from the beginning, the Edict of Nantes was thought as a transitional compromise, not setting up a modern idea of religious coexistence.
So I entirely agree with you it can't be seriously considered as a Protestant victory.

Now, the very low percentage of Protestants in today's France is to be relativised : with similar criteria applied to the Catholic (as in regular practice, etc.), these represents approximately 7% of the total population. Protestantism in the XIXth may have been practiced by 4 or 5% of the population, which is significantly lower than the high point but not virtually disappeared at this point, especially not in traditionally Protestant areas.
 
I think Protestantism has potential in the non-Greek Orthodox parts of the Ottoman Empire. Historically Catholicism made some inroads in Bulgaria as resistance to increasing Greek dominance of the Orthodox Millet including burning of Bulgarian books.
 
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Tell me about the Unitarian Reformation
I mean, ultimately, not counting the medieval proto-reformations, there have been four reformations: Magisterial, Radical, Unitarian, and Pentecostal. The Unitarian Reformation, rejecting the Trinity and any strong kind of church organization, began to take roots in Hungary and Severtus was actually leaning in that direction, but John Calvin's burning of Severtus crippled the movement, and the counter reformation meant that it never gained traction. Bungle the Counter-Reformation and have Severtus make it back to Spain and win the support of some claimants to the throne and etc, and you could get a Unitarian Spain, which leads to Mothra-sized butterflies.
 
A century later, the Edict of Nantes was repealed and the Huguenots were forced out and France's Christian population today is virtually all Catholic.

Yes, of course. As so-called Chinese Course saying, "Let's your dreams come true!". ;)

What the Huguenots wanted made realization of their dream doomed: strengthening absolutist France could not tolerate "state within state" forever. If Edict of Nantes was just guaranteeing a religious freedom, it would be one thing but having their own strongholds was a completely different issue. They lost these places of refuge under Richelieu on account of insubordination but they were still in a position to oppress the Catholics in the areas of their settlement (and vice vesrsa) so it is open to guessing if they'd gain in a long run by gaining less by the Edict of Nantes and not being excessively "visible".

OTOH, it should not be forgotten that this edict did not eliminate strong religious animosity: Catholic majority did not like the Huguenots and for quite a while there was a much greater tolerance on the top than among the lower classes. For example, Jean Guiton, mayor of La Rochelle during the rebellion, was (after capitulation) put by Richelieu at the head of the French Navy . Abraham Duquesne, marquis du Bouchet, got his title for the Battle of Palermo even though he was a Protestant (and he already was Vice Admiral by that time). Turenne was a Protestant.

Of course, Louis XIV was, rather typically, hamfisted in his Edict of Fontainebleau and the measures he used to force Huguenots into conversion resulted in a mass emigration but the revocation of the Edict of Nantes brought France into line with virtually every other European country of the period (with the brief exception of England, Scotland and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), where only the majority state religion was legally tolerated.

However, quite a few Huguenots did convert and not all of them had been complete nincompoops. For example, family of a Huiguenot watchmaker Caron converted and its most famous member, Pierre-Augustin, was born a Catholic and benefited the humankind by inventing escapement for watches that allowed them to be made substantially more accurate and compact paving the way to his greatest accomplishment, a watch mounted on a ring for his mistress Madame de Pompadour. Well, he was also doing some other things like writing few plays, mostly forgotten, and getting involved in some obscure colonial disturbances but it is neither here nor there. :winkytongue:
 
Henri IV knew what he owed to the Protestant side, but couldn't do much more than Henri III that already assessed the situation (and, in fact, would have Henri III lived, I suspect the situation for Protestant would be similar). ...
So I entirely agree with you it can't be seriously considered as a Protestant victory.

Well, you need a clear definition of "victory" because victory could be long- and short-term. Edict of Nantes was a reasonably long "short-term" victory: they lost their territorial, political and military rights, but retained the religious ones in 1629, 31 year later, and everything in 1685, 87 years later. But if short-term victory (as peace arrangement) does not count, then none of the peace treaties made by Napoleon was a "victory" either: everything was negated by a final defeat within a much shorter time span. And Germany lost Alsace-Lorraine in just 47 years so here goes Franco-Prussian War. ;)

For the Huguenots it was a victory because they got pretty much all that they wanted and the modern ideas of the religious coexistence were not quite there, yet, and as such not applicable. They wanted religious freedom for themselves and they got it in the areas where they lived. They wanted military guarantees, and they got them. What else could they realistically want or expect?
 
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