Chapter 61
Fort Myers, Florida
March 21, 1984
1500 hours
Major Ewing was as good as his word. He got together as many bandages, medications, and food that he felt he could spare without putting his area at risk. That’s not to say there wasn’t opposition, though. There was definitely a fuss thrown up by the mayors of the three towns and some of the supply bureaucrats, not to mention most of the doctors at the hospitals, but Ewing had ultimate authority under the Emergency Powers Act, and he did his best to reason with them. What broke the stalemate was when one of the doctors from Cape Coral Hospital agreed with the major, and volunteered to go with the convoy. He then proceeded to shame his colleagues by reminding them how fortunate they all were: they had electricity, clean water, and food, and maybe things would start getting tight in another month or two, but there were fellow humans not that far north who were dying, starving, and suffering. They took an oath, and to him, that oath meant something.
The speech broke the spell. Altogether, a dozen doctors volunteered to go with the convoy. A squad of soldiers, with a lieutenant in charge, would escort them and move the supplies. After much discussion of what route to take and how to ensure the safety of the convoy, one of the volunteer doctors offered his yacht. He was a successful heart surgeon who’d made a pile of money in Miami and decided to wind down in his early fifties, moving to Fort Myers and living on the yacht during the summer. The yacht was a 1979 Burger, 86’ long, with more than enough room to house the supplies and everyone coming along. They could stay there at night, and a pair of soldiers could keep watch over it during the day.
With transport settled, a route had to be planned. For all anyone knew, war was still going on, and there could be Soviet ships off the coast. Maps were laid out, depths were checked, and a route was measured that would, at least, strongly reduce the threat from any submarines that might be out there. If a destroyer or cruiser were out there raiding, it would likely be game over—the yacht had a max speed of a mere 20 knots, and its crusing speed was 16 knots. The positive aspect was the trip would take five hours, the yacht had a modern radar, and they would leave at dawn to ensure the best visibility. The brothers leading the Sarasota group weren’t thrilled by it, but they were getting what they needed, and arguing wouldn’t help. After the trouble they’d dodged in making it to Fort Myers, they understood this was the best way, despite their desperation. The men would come back for the vehicles after they got things stabilized.
If this mission had any success, and the yacht successfully made it to Sarasota, Ewing planned to redouble his efforts to reach Gainesville. The radio connections had been, even a month later, far too sporadic. The only reason they’d been getting FPR broadcasts was because the sheer power output from Gainesville had been tripled upon the Kassel detonation. The WUFT transmitter was pumping out 300,000 watts, using brute force to push through the interference. WSFP in Fort Myers had 100,000 watts, yet it barely reached Naples, and there just wasn’t enough desire amongst the leadership to beef up the output to utilize as a way to reach Gainesville.
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Gainesville, FL
2010 hours
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FROM: INTEL GROUP GAINESVILLE
TO: CINC-FNG
UPDATED STRIKE LIST—FLORIDA, GEORGIA, ALABAMA, LOUISIANA (PARTIAL)
INFORMATION GATHERED FROM SURVEILLANCE FLIGHTS, COMMUNICATIONS WITH GEORGIA GOVERNMENT AT VALDOSTA. ALABAMA GOVERNMENT UNREACHABLE. PENSACOLA REACHED VIA MORSE CODE. PENSACOLA SURVIVED, BUT IS ISOLATED. SUPPLIES ARE LOW. THEY HAVE COMMUNICATED WITH GULF STATES COMMAND VIA RADIO. NEW ORLEANS LARGELY SURVIVED, ONLY FAR EASTERN HALF STRUCK. DOTHAN, ALABAMA MASSIVELY HIT, NO FURTHER DETAILS. MOBILE STRUCK AS WELL, DETAILS SKETCHY. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION IS AS FOLLOWS:
MIAMI—MASSIVE (3-5MT) AIRBURST OVER DOWNTOWN; MIAMI AIRPORT (MINIMUM 500KT GROUNDBURST, EVALUATION DIFFICULT)
HOMESTEAD AFB (GROUNDBURST, 1MT)
JACKSONVILLE—NAS CECIL FIELD (GROUNDBURST, 350KT ESTIMATE); NAVAL STATION MAYPORT (500KT AIRBURST); NAS JACKSONVILLE (500 KT GROUNDBURST); JACKSONVILLE AIRPORT/FANG BASE (GROUNDBURST, ESTIMATE 350-450KT)
TAMPA/ST. PETERSBURG—ST. PETE AIRPORT (GROUNDBURST, 500KT); FORT MACDILL (AIRBURST, ESTIMATE 2-3MT, WITH BELIEVED FOLLOW-ON 1MT GROUNDBURST ON RUNWAY); TAMPA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (GROUNDBURST, 500KT)
ORLANDO—DOWNTOWN (AIRBURST, 1MT); ORLANDO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (GROUNDBURST, 500KT); ORLANDO-SANFORD AIR BASE (GROUNDBURST, 350KT); LEESBURG GUARD DEPOT (100KT GROUNDBURST--ERROR?)
WEST PALM BEACH—AIRPORT (GROUNDBURST, 200KT); DOWNTOWN (AIRBURST, 200KT)
PANAMA CITY—TYNDALL AFB (GROUNDBURST AND AIRBURST, APPROXIMATELY 200KT EACH)
EGLIN AFB/HURLBURT FIELD (LOW ALTITUDE AIRBURST (500 FEET?), ESTIMATE 3-5MT)
NAS KEY WEST (GROUNDBURST, 350KT)
CAPE CANAVERAL—(MULTIPLE AIRBURSTS, 150KT EACH, WITH A 500KT GROUNDBURST ON NORTH END OF RUNWAY)
PATRICK AFB—(GROUNDBURST, 350KT)
ATLANTA—CITY CENTER (AIRBURST, MASSIVE 10MT+); HARTSFIELD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (GROUNDBURST, 1MT)
SAVANNAH—HUNTER ARMY AIRFIELD (GROUNDBURST, 500KT); SAVANNAH HILTON HEAD AIRPORT (GROUNDBURST, 500KT)
KINGS BAY SUBMARINE BASE (MULTIPLE AIRBURSTS, BELIEVED 1MT EACH)
ATHENS (AIRBURST, 200KT)
MACON (AIRBURST, 200KT)
AUGUSTA (AIRBURST, 350KT)
FORT BENNING (GROUNDBURST, LAWSON ARMY AIRFIELD, 2MT; AIRBURST, 2MT, OVER EXERCISE AREA)—MOST OF COLUMBUS SURVIVED UNTOUCHED.
FORT STEWART (AIRBURST, 1MT)
ROBINS AFB (GROUNDBURST, 350KT)
MOBILE (GROUNDBURST OF INDETERMINATE SIZE)
DOTHAN (MULTIPLE STRIKES, SIZE UNKNOWN)
GEORGIA HAS LOST AN ESTIMATED 850,000 PEOPLE TO IMMEDIATE DEATHS, AND SUFFERED AN ESTIMATED TWO MILLION FURTHER CASUALTIES, MANY OF WHOM PROBABLY DIED DUE TO COMPLETE COLLAPSE OF HEALTHCARE INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AREAS THAT WERE HIT. GEORGIA EXISTS IN THREE SEGMENTS RIGHT NOW—THE NORTHERNMOST AREA, CENTERED AROUND ROME, WHERE SECTREAS IS RUMORED TO HAVE LANDED; CENTRAL GEORGIA (A FAIRLY THIN STRIP RUNNING ALONG A LINE INCLUDING LAGRANGE, FORSYTH, GRIFFIN, MILLIDGEVILLE, LOUISVILLE, AND WAYNESBORO), AND THE SOUTH OF THE STATE, WITH VALDOSTA MAINTAINING A TENUOUS HOLD ON IT. SURVEILLANCE FLIGHTS OUT OF BRUNSWICK AIRPORT HAVE VALIDATED MUCH OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION FROM GEORGIA.
OUR EVALUATION IS AS FOLLOWS: GEORGIA’S DIVIDED SITUATION IS FAR WORSE THAN OURS. SO MUCH OF THEIR TRANSPORTATION WAS CENTERED IN ATLANTA, AND THAT ENTIRE METROPOLITAN AREA IS FLATTENED. THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE AID TO THEIR NORTHERN SECTOR, IN FACT, THEY ARE UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH ROME—IT IS GOING THROUGH RELAYS IN FORSYTH, WHICH IS OVERWHELMED AND NEAR COLLAPSE, WITH REFUGEES COMING FROM BOTH DIRECTIONS. SOUTH GEORGIA IS RELATIVELY UNTOUCHED, SAVE FOR KINGS BAY. IF THEY CAN CLEAR FALLOUT FROM FARM AREAS, WE MAY BE ABLE TO PURCHASE FOOD IN RETURN FOR OTHER ITEMS OF INTEREST. OUR GROWING PROGRAM HAS BEEN MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL, BUT WILL NOT BE ENOUGH TO FEED OUR SURVIVING POPULATION. THEY ARE DESPERATELY LACKING IN HEALTHCARE RESOURCES, WHICH WE HAVE FORTUNATELY MANAGED TO MAINTAIN BETWEEN GAINESVILLE, OCALA AND TALLAHASSEE. TALLAHASSEE HAS SEEN A NUMBER OF REFUGEES FROM THE PANAMA CITY AREA. MOST HAVE DIED, OTHERS ARE QUITE ILL, HOWEVER, WE MAY BE ABLE TO SPARE SOME CAPACITY FROM FSU AND STATE OFFICE RESOURCES TO ASSIST IN RETURN FOR FOOD. TALKS WILL NEED TO HAPPEN TO ESTABLISH WHAT WE CAN GIVE VERSUS WHAT THEY NEED.
WE WILL NEED TO MAKE DECISIONS SOON AS TO WHETHER WE PROTECT OUR OWN POPULACE IN THE SHORT TERM AT THE POTENTIAL EXPENSE OF OUR LONG-TERM FOOD SAFETY. WE RECOMMEND A FULL LOGISTICAL STUDY BE PERFORMED TO WEIGH THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AIDING GEORGIA.
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