Professional Carthaginian Army

Well, the Carthaginians would presumably have to conquer their empire themselves in order to conscript others into their armies. And even once they had, having to keep a large portion of their manpower at home to keep the serfs in line would limit their strategic possibilities (and, arguably, defeat the main point of having a professional citizen army in the first place -- why bother when you can't ever use it?). Not to mention, it would make them more vulnerable to invasion of their homeland. The comparison between Rome and Sparta is instructive here: even during the darkest day of the Hannibalic War, Rome's allies largely remained loyal to them; on the other hand, when Epaminondas invaded Laconia after the Battle of Leuctra, the helots all deserted to him and Sparta never really recovered.

The Spartan model isn't necessarily a standing army, rather it's a large cadre of leaders for armies fleshed out by allies and mercenaries; they wanted to expose their citizen class to as little direct danger as possible, so often the only Spartiates in an army were the commander and about thirty officers. This was enough to greatly improve the fighting power of the rank and file who lacked Sparta's lifelong training regimen. Being able to successfully integrate Gauls, Iberians, Italians, Greeks, and Africans into a cohesive, disciplined army under a caste of Punic professionals could be a major advantage, given the less-professional Italians they fought against.

From what I can tell, most ancient empires had to deal with servile revolts, so it's hardly a unique disadvantage to a class of landed officers. It's also largely unrelated to the fastness of allies; all Mediterranean empires had large classes of brutally mistreated slaves, and for what it's worth, most of Italy outside Latinum did defect to Hannibal; Samnium, Apuila, Magna Graecia, Cisalpine Gaul. Capua, second only to Rome itself, joined his camp.
 
The Spartan model isn't necessarily a standing army, rather it's a large cadre of leaders for armies fleshed out by allies and mercenaries; they wanted to expose their citizen class to as little direct danger as possible, so often the only Spartiates in an army were the commander and about thirty officers. This was enough to greatly improve the fighting power of the rank and file who lacked Sparta's lifelong training regimen. Being able to successfully integrate Gauls, Iberians, Italians, Greeks, and Africans into a cohesive, disciplined army under a caste of Punic professionals could be a major advantage, given the less-professional Italians they fought against.

Well if that's all you're suggesting, the Carthaginians more or less had that anyway -- their army commanders were all Carthaginian citizens.

From what I can tell, most ancient empires had to deal with servile revolts, so it's hardly a unique disadvantage to a class of landed officers.

Yes, but the proportion of Helots:Spartiates was higher than the usual proportion of slaves:free men, so Sparta was more vulnerable to this sort of thing than most states.

most of Italy outside Latinum did defect to Hannibal; Samnium, Apuila, Magna Graecia, Cisalpine Gaul. Capua, second only to Rome itself, joined his camp.

As far as I can tell, the historical consensus is the complete opposite: Rome's allies generally remained loyal, and this was a key factor in her ultimate victory.
 
You'd want to integrate Carthaginians lower down the chain of command than just the army/wing commanders; Hannibal's army at Cannae would have 320 commanders of a hundred among the line infantry, for example, or 3,200 men if you wanted Carthaginians at the head of each file. More advanced integration of professional Carthaginian officers into their armies might allow them to put up a better fight in Spain, with more reliable troops available as the result of better training.

Polybius and Livy are both pretty clear that defection of Italian allies outside of Latinum was disastrous for the Romans, even if they eventually pulled through and reestablished control.

Polybius said:
[Cannae]had the consequences which both sides expected. For the Carthaginians by their victory were thenceforth masters of nearly the whole of the Italian coast which is called Magna Graecia. Thus the Tarentines immediately submitted; and the Arpani and some of the Campanian states invited Hannibal to come to them; and the rest were with one consent turning their eyes to the Carthaginians: who, accordingly, began now to have high hopes of being able to carry even Rome itself by assault.

On their side the Romans, after this disaster, despaired of retaining their supremacy over the Italians, and were in the greatest alarm, believing their own lives and the existence of their city to be in danger, and every moment expecting that Hannibal would be upon them.

Livy said:
Never when the city was in safety was there so great a panic and confusion within the walls of Rome. I shall therefore shrink from the task, and not attempt to relate what in describing I must make less than the reality. The consul and his army having been lost at the Trasimenus the year before, it was not one wound upon another which was announced, but a multiplied disaster, the loss of two consular armies, together with the two consuls: and that now there was neither any Roman camp, nor general nor soldiery: that Apulia and Samnium, and now almost the whole of Italy, were in the possession of Hannibal. No other nation surely would not have been overwhelmed by such an accumulation of misfortune.



 
You'd want to integrate Carthaginians lower down the chain of command than just the army/wing commanders; Hannibal's army at Cannae would have 320 commanders of a hundred among the line infantry, for example, or 3,200 men if you wanted Carthaginians at the head of each file. More advanced integration of professional Carthaginian officers into their armies might allow them to put up a better fight in Spain, with more reliable troops available as the result of better training.

Having more Carthaginians in the army would make it more effective, but this is where the need to keep most of your manpower at home to deal with helot rebellions becomes a problem, as you'd be limited in how many men you could send abroad whilst still keeping control at home.

Polybius and Livy are both pretty clear that defection of Italian allies outside of Latinum was disastrous for the Romans, even if they eventually pulled through and reestablished control.

Those passages are both highly rhetorical descriptions of Rome's reactions to the news of Hannibal's victories, and hence ought to be taken with a pinch of salt. If you look at the situation in more detail, things are more hopeful for the Romans: the defections were almost all in southern Italy, and even here not every city went over; meanwhile the strategically vital central part of the peninsula remained solidly Roman.
 
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