Prince Henry of Prussia: Rise of the U-boat, Redux

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The Germans ran two supply ships to East Africa OTL so some resupply is plausible. In this TL this scenario I bet German agents would be prepped to buy some stuff from neutrals like diesel fuel (Kamerun you have Spanish territory adjacent so perhaps even easier to smuggle stuff).

By 1914 you are just starting to get air conditioning and decent drugs to deal with tropical diseases, by the 20s those colonies might have started to have decent European settlement, however Doulea wont be a popular station for a battalion of white German marines in 1910 (at least in Tsingtao the climate is better).

It does seem like the Allies would rely on block ships and mining and just attrition to reduce the effectiveness of these places. I can't imagine the German starting a war that they thought would last more than 6 months so aybe they just don't care.
 

hipper

Banned
  1. Convoys are a partial solution. The biggest issue with convoys is that you immediately lose about 1/3 of freight capacity. Every strategy has a countermeasure. Every counter measure has its own counter measure.[/QUOTE]

There is a loss of shipping efficency with convoy compared to normal peacetime operations. However in war significant delays occurred to independent sailings as they reacted to news of shipping losses. I doubt that the loss in efficency between wartime independent salling and convoy was as great as one third.

Also the reduction in loss rates for convoy quickly makes loss of efficency moot.
Once a ship is lost it does not transport anything. When a ship is not lost it continues to operate

10 ships making 10 independent voyages a year with 1000 tonnes of cargo one ship is lost after 1/2 a year

Tonnage shipped per year

1st year. 95000 tonnes
2nd year 75000 tonnes
3rd year. 55000 tonnes
4th year. 35000 tonnes
5th year. 15000 tonnes
6th year. O tonnes
Total carried 275000 tonnes

10 ships making 7 convoy journeys a year with 1000 tonnes of cargo one ship is lost after one year

1st year 70000 tonnes
2nd year. 63000 tonnes
3rd year. 56000 tonnes
4th year. 49000 tonnes
5th year. 42000 tonnes
6th year. 35000 tonnes

Total carried 325000 tonnes

Note the assumption is made that shipping in convoy is twice as safe as an independent sailing. in reality independent sailings were more likely to be sunk by a factor of 10 compared to ships in convoy.

So the convoy should actually carry a minimum of 378000 tonnes in 6 years compared to the 275000 tonnes carried by the independents

Convoy is 1/3 more efficent once you take losses into account.

So the challenge for your Naval officers is to figure this out and try to change those numbers

Cheers Hipper

Actually the loss rate for Convoys in ww1 is O.6%
While the loss rate for independents in the same time period is 5.93%

This table is interesting http://www.gwpda.org/naval/stats006.htm
 
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Well, if subs and raiders force a switch to convoying, and convoying renders shipping losses minimal, even if it's as you say and that cancels out the inefficiencies of the system, that's still just saying that the use of raiders would force the British war effort to adjust itself to a significantly lower supply level. That seems like it'd still be worth the effort.
 
The Germans ran two supply ships to East Africa OTL so some resupply is plausible.

Oh, it's *plausible.* It's just not something the Germans can count on.

Anything they can sneak in on furtive merchant ships, long range subs, or even zeppelins has to be counted as a pure bonus. Any realistic German planning has to work based on using only resources in place at the outset of hostilities.
 
I am looking forwards to reading this a LOT! If they're doing war games, and think that convoys will reduce enemy losses, the next step is to work out a plan to countr the convoys. Also, convoyed ships are NOT protected by the cruiser rules...
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Well, if subs and raiders force a switch to convoying, and convoying renders shipping losses minimal, even if it's as you say and that cancels out the inefficiencies of the system, that's still just saying that the use of raiders would force the British war effort to adjust itself to a significantly lower supply level. That seems like it'd still be worth the effort.

That's the whole point. It will be a few months at least before I get back to the model, but the idea is that if the UK has 20% less stuff in France (ammo and the like), then the Germans take a lesser amount of KIA/MIA, say 10%. The UK still takes about the same losses. So over the months, you see "surplus" regiments appear on the organization chart of the Germans. And these units eventually show up in Corps that make extra attacks compared to OTL. So just to give a potential example, the Germans don't effectively use these regiments until Spring 1915 since they are focused on training Green units in the winter. In May 1915, instead of attacking from one direction into Poland, they have an extra 1-2 Corps that do a diversionary attack from East Prussia towards the rail lines in Northern Poland. Either it works, or it does not work, but it makes the Russian life harder. Or maybe these attacks are near Ypres. Perhaps they work, but even if they don't, say the Germans lose about a corp, and UK loses a corp. The UK is down one corp compared to OTL, and the Germans are up 0-1 corp.

Since I am minimizing some butterflies such as Italy will join the war, this can easily be a much bloodier war. I have no set end date for the war. Maybe the Germans win faster. Maybe it carries on into 1919, and somehow the USA enters the war a bit late.
 

hipper

Banned
This is incredibly deceptive when you do it by year instead of month and total it up over six years. No one is thinking that long term in 1914 or 1915. The loss rate due to convoying being introduced is instantaneous. The loss rate due to ships being sunk happens over time. And no one expects the war to last two years, let alone six(and considering the actual war only lasted 4, using 6 years to try to prove your point is dishonest).

That combined with the fact that the rate at which the UK was building ships was actually greater than the losses do to combat for 1914, and break even for 1915, and it becomes obvious why convoying was not introduced until April 1917.

Consider that Britain has 18.6 million GRT in 1914. A 30% reduction in capacity would be equal to the UBoats sinking 5.6 million tons. Effectively more than the Germans actually sank in the entire war.

Break out the numbers by month and it become very obvious that the break event point for convoying vs attrition isn't till well passed the 2nd year. That sort of thinking then leads to the sunk cost fallacy, which is why the Admirals stuck with not convoying for so long.

The Admiral has a choice to make, does he want England to receive 95,000 tons of supplies in the next 12 months, or 70,000. He's going to pic 95,000 EVERY TIME. Because he cares about not losing the war this year, not possibly winning it in five years. And he will make the same decision next year.
He's probably not even thinking about the next year, he's probably thinking about the next month, maybe two(or whatever the equivalent of a single cargo ship's round trip time is).

It is only at the end of 1916 when the losses began to massively climb that anyone was willing to take that immediate 30% hit in return for a lessor loss over time.

I pointed out at the start of my post that there is in fact not a 30 % loss in shipping capacity on the introduction of convoy, as independent ships delayed sailing when they heard of losses In the vicinity. Who wants to be the next target of a lurking u boat!

convoys with regular sailing maintain a regular shipping Schedule.

My figures above are purely illustrative with an artificially low loss rate to point up the difference between convoy and Independent sailing.
That's the only deception.

The figures above assume a loss rate of 2% for independents and 1% for convoyed ships in the first year.

The actual figures are 5.93 % and 0.3 %

see below for a consideration of the actual loss rate

the actual loss rate of 5.93 % is a per voyage figure and implies that the 10 ships will loose half their number in the first year.

While in convoy 10 ships will loose one every 5 years

That approximates to 75000 tonnes transported in the first year by Independents (assuming no delays in sailing)

Compared to 70000 tonnes in the first year for Convoy.

You have to think about shipping in terms of tonne miles,
each ship lost represents a loss of capacity for the whole war,
which dwarfs any savings in efficiency due to convoy.

Cheers Hipper.
 
I pointed out at the start of my post that there is in fact not a 30 % loss in shipping capacity on the introduction of convoy, as independent ships delayed sailing when they heard of losses In the vicinity. Who wants to be the next target of a lurking u boat!

convoys with regular sailing maintain a regular shipping Schedule.
Hi Hipper!

If I have indeed understood the posts here in this tread on the topic of lost shipping capacity, then it seems your argument is likely true, but only in the context of greater than 33% reduction of shipping capacity due to independent shipping staying in port/out of war entirely? If that is the case, then what is this % loss, such that a 33% reduction over peace time shipping, is the lesser of two evils? I ask because I don't know, as no one is coming out with hard numbers, and there seems to be confusion about the 33% less effectiveness of convoyed shipping vs peacetime shipping, and the "No shipping % loss compared to wartime, independants stay in port situation".

Basically, the 33% is accurate with regard to the peacetime norm, but not measured against the wartime norm of non convoyed? If this is the case, then what was the worse % loss of wartime non convoyed merchant shipping?
 
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Regardless of the actual numbers (a discussion I lack the resources to make informed comments about) the U-boat arm has to consider them as a factor. It's obvious that making the enemy form convoys will be a bottleneck, though how much, they might not be able to tell, and certainly won't be able to tell what level of losses it will take to make convoys happen.

So, they need to play with their toy boats some more, and figure out how to attack convoys So many targets in once place--so few torpedoes on one sub.
 
So, they need to play with their toy boats some more, and figure out how to attack convoys So many targets in once place--so few torpedoes on one sub.
Simple. Hang out off the shores of Ireland or so. Realistically, they know the destination of the convoys, just hang out near there.
 

hipper

Banned
I should have thought the title of the Table is quite clear

"Comparison Between Numbers of Ships Convoyed, Losses in Convoy, and Indedpendent Losses Through U-Boat Attack In the Atlantic and Home Waters from the Introduction of Convoy Feb. 1917 to Oct. 1918"

For a series of 3 month periods the numbers of ships convoyed and the number of losses are enumerated so the loss rate in convoy is clearly per voyage.

The number of losses for independently sailed ships is also given for each three month period. And a % loss rate is given. I think Erik Grove is clearly stating that the loss rate is indeed per voyage.

Regards

Hipper



 
Simple. Hang out off the shores of Ireland or so. Realistically, they know the destination of the convoys, just hang out near there.

Finding convoys in some areas isn't especially hard--but attacking them effectively IS. In choke points, there will be a profusion of escorts...

They need to start thinking about possible ASW techniques, and then how to counter them.
 
In a topic unrelated with the convoy discussion, I remember that in the first version the Germans in Kamerun resupplied their forces mainly buying from South American countries, either directly from them or using them to buy indirectly from the US. In that case, british diplomatic pressure hindered the purchase of some critical items, such as large caliber coastal guns. After some reading on Brazil in World War I, I believe this diplomatic pressure would be uneffective or even counterproductive.
Brazil choosed to embrace strict neutrality at the beginning of the war, and there was much discussion in the press (mostly philosophical in it's nature) about which side was right. There was a strong and organized pro-Entente group, the Brazilian League for the Allies, but German-Brazilian relations were also strong, with several military missions to Germany in recent years, and the foreign minister was himself an ethnic German (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lauro_Müller).
Economically, however, British actions were crippling for an economy then based almost solely on exporting coffee. Coffee was put on the contraband list and in 1917 the UK banned imports of coffee, considering it to be a suprefluous item. Rubber, the other main export by then, was needed by both sides, but if the UK is importing less, and the Germans more, it could make a difference. Furthermore, the German Empire had surpassed the UK by then as the primary commercial partner of Brazil. With profits being made trading with German Africa, and German propaganda not absent with the loss of the colonies' radio transmitters, it is likely that Brazil would gradually gravitate to a more pro-CP neutrality. It would be hard to convice the Brazilian government to actually enter the war on the CP side, barring some british ship sinking a brazilian merchant ship type of incident. However, IMO it would be easy for German Africa to import anything it could pay for through Brazil, regardless of British diplomatic pressure.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Shadow Master Begins Email

I just started a thread about {Alternate ship designs; Rescue for hire ships}, and would like your thoughts.

The reasons for this should be obvious, as in your ATL, there are going to be many folks taken off their ships in out of the way places, and if a neutral nation organization could exist, preferably S American, that operates {Rescue for hire} ships, this might have interesting impacts on the capabilities of subs and raiders to sink ships over a greater area, while providing safety for passengers and crew in accordance with Cruiser Rules, and also allow for them to be taken off Germany's hands in mid ocean/secluded anchorages, so that the German raiders can keep on raiding, and no masses of folks need to be brought back to base, and perhaps get an up close look at things you would rather they didn't.

What are your thoughts for expenditures on colonial defenses once they realize the war fighting potential of commerce warfare units stationed abroad. Will they wait till the war actually starts before they realize the long term potential these forces represent?

What are your thoughts in regards to specialized cargo submarines, designed for bringing large objects to faraway places, in secrecy? I am already seeing folks posting the pat, "You cannot resupply, so your colonies cannot last" kind of objections.

German WA could be resupplies from S American nations, especially if you do some work establishing specialized industrial production of things needed in your colonies, like Germans standard arms and ammunition, and artillery production lines in Argentina and/or Brazil for AMC would be a huge help, and good luck to the British trying to block this traffic, especially if custom designed U boats are the vehicles of choice.

I am still plugging away at the old ATL, and trying to keep up with the new one, but wanted to get my input in before it's too late.

Thoughts?

End of Shadow Master email, begin of reply

You don't have to worry about it being too late. I am a half page into the old ATL, and the old ATL is 59 pages, so this rewrite will be a multi-year process. I am basically writing a book, and I did not work Monday and Tuesday.

As to merchant submarines, they are really likely to be built after the start of a war. At the start of WW1, only about 1/3 of merchant ships had radios, and it would be even lower in 1902. To stop shipping going to Cameroon, a royal navy cruiser will need to find the ship at sea by visually spotting it. And if you keep the enemy navy more than a 100 miles or so from Cameroon, there are not obvious bottlenecks. Also, they are planning for a neutral UK. So they can land supplies at Calabar in Nigeria. Cameroon is selected because it messes with the French. And the Germans plan to win in 6 months on land, so it is probably easier to stockpile many supplies. For example, if you keep a year worth of coal on hand for peace time, and you likely have plenty of coal. Same for torpedoes or shore battery ammo.

As to the smaller items, people are making it too complicated in the discussion. In a pinch, I can run men, parts and torpedoes to Africa in a regular submarine. This can be increased even more if I use a limited crew to conserve food. There will be a lot of stuff about Kamerun, but most of it has to do with me wanting to have a mini ATL where a colonial power seriously tries to develop a so, so colony for 10 years or more, and this is the only scenario that I have been able to develop.

And cruiser rules, at least effective cruiser rules, are more lax than people seem to realize. For example,

  • Germans U-boats would just tow the passengers in life boats with about a 100 foot rope. When they saw a ship on the horizon, often a UK warship, they simply let go of the rope and submerge. I have found no complaints of this type of action ITOL.
  • You just have to get the people to a port, not a good port. Some remote port where a ship stops by every 4 months still counts. You are not responsible for feeding the people once they are there, or supply cash to buy supplies. So take operations near China, if the U-boat takes the passengers to near a minor chinese port (large fishing village), and drops them off, then there is no further responsibility of the Germans.
  • Part of the reason for the rewrite is things I covered to briefly. Most of the time in the South Atlantic, the U-boats operate with a AMC. It is an AMC and 4-6 U-boats operating as a team. The AMC picks up survivors, and in many cases puts a crew on the captured ship to sail to Kamerun. There is a large POW camp on the interior of Kamerun, I just did not cover it much. And if you are a neutral, you can take stay the war at the expense of the German government, try to leave overland, or take one of the supply ships to South America.

As to the reaction, it took the UK several years to react IOTL to developments, so most things I do will have no prewar impact on the British actions. If the Germans were not writing press releases as they go along bragging, the British probably would not even know what the Germans were doing.

So what really happens elsewhere? You get a brief burst of activity near China. People will travel from Chinese ports to Shanghai, and then go back to their home country. Probably the USA as the most powerful neutral will organize the effort, to the extent it is organized.

If you are in the Indian Ocean basin, you will spend the war in the highlands of East Africa.

If you are in the South Atlantic, you have options.

If you are near the UK home waters, you end up on a UK warship or the coastline of a neutral country.

I did not cover it, but the biggest single loss of life will be when UK warships attack German AMC's since most of these ships will have prisoners below decks. If the German crew dies, the POW also die. It was not covered in the first ATL in any detail.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
In a topic unrelated with the convoy discussion, I remember that in the first version the Germans in Kamerun resupplied their forces mainly buying from South American countries, either directly from them or using them to buy indirectly from the US. In that case, british diplomatic pressure hindered the purchase of some critical items, such as large caliber coastal guns. After some reading on Brazil in World War I, I believe this diplomatic pressure would be uneffective or even counterproductive.
Brazil choosed to embrace strict neutrality at the beginning of the war, and there was much discussion in the press (mostly philosophical in it's nature) about which side was right. There was a strong and organized pro-Entente group, the Brazilian League for the Allies, but German-Brazilian relations were also strong, with several military missions to Germany in recent years, and the foreign minister was himself an ethnic German (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lauro_Müller).
Economically, however, British actions were crippling for an economy then based almost solely on exporting coffee. Coffee was put on the contraband list and in 1917 the UK banned imports of coffee, considering it to be a suprefluous item. Rubber, the other main export by then, was needed by both sides, but if the UK is importing less, and the Germans more, it could make a difference. Furthermore, the German Empire had surpassed the UK by then as the primary commercial partner of Brazil. With profits being made trading with German Africa, and German propaganda not absent with the loss of the colonies' radio transmitters, it is likely that Brazil would gradually gravitate to a more pro-CP neutrality. It would be hard to convice the Brazilian government to actually enter the war on the CP side, barring some british ship sinking a brazilian merchant ship type of incident. However, IMO it would be easy for German Africa to import anything it could pay for through Brazil, regardless of British diplomatic pressure.


Yes, for most of the war, the Germans had a larger naval presence in the South Atlantic than the British, so the supplies were simply brought in by freighter from Latin America. I have not gotten that far ITTL, but the UK will do a stronger response.

As to the Brazilians entering the war, by the time they could have been easily persuaded, there was no real need to try. The Brazilians were more useful as a friendly trading partner.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Approval of Training Schedule
Mid-April, 1902
On a quite Sunday morning, Hans Speer sits behind his large desk in an empty room. He is reading some technical materials on the Holland boats. He walks over and quietly stirs the fire. “At least the warmth of summer will be here soon,” gesturing to a crowd that does not exist.

A sound draws his attention to the door, and he hears a key in the lock. He only takes a few steps before the door swings open, and Prince Henry accompanied by two aids stride through.

“Sir, what an unexpected pleasure”

The Prince replies “I am moving the review of the training plan today”, as he points to the desk covered in books. Hans quickly clears the desks as one of the Prince’s aids moves over some chairs. As the group settles down around the desk, “What should I focus on first in your reports?”

“It will take 18 months to finish the full process of the initial training - crew training, basic port defense drills, and the like. Before this is finished, we should reserve judgement on most matters. As soon as this is finished, we should hold exhaustive table exercises in the winter of 1904, followed by a summer drill on the defense of Danzig.

“Isn’t 18 months a bit generous for initial training window?”

Hans briefly pauses, “The crews will be well trained by the end of the year in the operation of the ships, the bigger challenge is figuring out how to effectively use these ships. Our internal exercises indicate the Hollands are best used as port defense ships to supplement the minefields and coastal guns. Once we have the next class of ships with much longer ranges, we can test the other ideas. And then the Hollands become more training ships that can also be used as reserve ships in a war.”

“I will have my staff review the training schedule, make the needed changes, and have approval to you by the end of the month.” The Prince looks around, “Do you have any coffee? And how good is the bakery?”

As Hans heads towards the coffee pot near the fire, the Prince looks at one of his aids and gestures towards the door. After eating a quick meal, Hans resumes “I recommend we bring on the crews for the second generation of U-boats about 6 months before delivery. This time will allow us to train the crews on the Hollands, so we can transfer the more experience crew to shakeout the new class of ships. The substantially increased range on these ships will allow for a lot more options.”

“Agreed. What do you think of the other range extending techniques?”

“The U-boat carrier idea would require a custom built warship that probably cost a lot more than a cruiser, maybe as much as a battleship. We would have to build a prototype first, then design the real class of ships. Building expensive ships to support U-boats defeats the strategic idea behind our current strategy. The idea of refueling U-boats with freighters has more potential and testing is built into the 18 month training plan. We have confidence the idea will work in a quiet anchorage, and may well be practical in the open ocean. It will take testing to know for sure. If you look at the testing schedule” …

About an hour later, “Kapitän you have a good point. Perhaps the larger coastal guns add to the port defense than the smaller guns that worked better in our table guns, but perhaps not and they cost a lot more to install and man. Has the German Navy ever conducted coordinated coastal batter fire against target moving at the speed and distance we expect in a port attack? And then again under bad weather condition?” Hans continued.

Kapitän, “No”.

Hans, “So in reality we don’t know because we don’t have the data,” a brief pause, “In 18 months, we will have reliable operating data on the U-boats. We will then have the options of running table games with either set of tables. We can give a surface commander a few weeks to throw together attack plans against our major ports, and we can test them. Come better weather in the summer, we can even conducted limited tests at sea”

The Prince interrupts with a wave of his hand “We can revisit these issues in future months. Now why do you favor Danzig for the home base?”

“To provide protect for the Baltic coast while the main fleet can defend the North Sea Coast from the French. Our current doctrine will have the bulk of the U-boats at weaker home ports and colonial ports, also, Danzig is the location of our main supplier.”

After a half hour more of theoretical fleet deployments, “Once we have a larger U-boat fleet, it is likely our main offensive opponents will be the French, and major surface actions will be rare for reasons we already discussed.” Hans speaks quieter. “Portions of the French Admiralty has openly discussed ignore the customs of naval warfare, and sinking ships with mercy or warning. The German counter measures are important, but have been consider because they probably are mostly of a diplomatic nature.”

The Prince nods sadly, then stands up. “Time for my next meeting. I will send you my modifications to your orders within a few weeks.” The Admiral and his two aids leave.
 
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BlondieBC

Banned
Prince Henry of Prussia: The Rise of U-Boat.
Dawning of a New Age of Naval Warfare
Copyright 2016


Initial African Base:


While the modern German Naval structures and customs seems natural to us today, it varies greatly from the either the Royal Navy’s or the US Navy’s history. We accept without thinking each current or former U-boat captain having a leopard skin hide in his office. Most people would have trouble explaining why a U-boat squadron commander is known as the ‘hyena’ in naval slang. We view the quicker integration of the German Navy compared to all other colonial powers as a sign of superior German culture. To a young cadet of 1901, the German Navy of 1950 would seem bizarre, mostly because the cultural traditions of the German U-boats is more African than German. When Hans Speer departed Germany on November 5th, 1902; the cultural identity of the modern force began to emerge. The seed that was planted in Danzig began to rapidly grow in Douala.

The following chapters are dedicated to the numerous Germans who died of malaria and other tropical illnesses building Douala and Cameroon. …

Hans Speer was an odd quirk of human traits, and he was exactly the man the German Navy needed. He was both idealistic and practical. He took the lofty, often unworkable ideals of naval philosopher and found a way to make them work. While in Germany, he blended in with other officers, but once in Africa, he quickly went native. A blind eye was turned to racial intermarriage and polygamy. He bragged in his diary about how it was “main recruiting tool”. He tolerated mavericks, misfits, adventures, and criminals; as long as they bought into this vision of future. When illness continued to decimate white officers, sailors, and civilian technical forces, he embraced any loyal local who could do the job.
 

hipper

Banned
And I'm saying the percentages on this chart are crap, because they don't add up. And no where on the chart is he stating they are per voyage. And in fact, I will demonstrate that they cannot be per voyage, unless there is something really bizarre with British shipping patterns.

Britain begins Feb 1917 with 18,295,000 tons of shipping
From Feb to April, she loses 1,189,659 tons of shipping

That's 6.5% of her total tonnage over the whole period. But the chart says she lost over 10% of her voyages for the period, and 20% in April.

The only way that works is if the average tonnage of shipping in the period only makes .65 voyages from Feb 1 to April 30th.

That implies that the average tonnage of shipping only make 2.6 voyages per year

But lets assume this chart is accurate, the loss rate is actually per sailing. Then your hypothetical scenario where ships sail 10 times per year is crap. The average merchant tonnage sailed less than 11 times in the entire war.

Further, lets use Britain's numbers in 1914 of 18,892,000, and assume all ships do their first voyage Aug 1914, and lets assume the 5.93% per voyage loss rate from the start of the war for non-convoyed.
The second voyage will be Dec 1914
The third will be in May 1915
The fourth will be in Sept 1915, etc

The first voyage, the convoyed ships were effectively 13,145,000 tons due to losses and inefficiency. The non convoyed were 17,771800 tons

The second voyage, the convoyed ships were 13,066,183 tons. The non convoyed were 16,717.842. Total tonnages shipped are 26,211,236 and 34,489,546.
W
The third voyage, the convoyed ships were 12,987,786. The non convoyed were 15,726,473. Total tonnages are now 39,199,023, and 50,216,021.

Etc etc. In fact, the convoy system won't beat the non convoyed system until the 7th sailing, in Nqov 1916, when the convoyed ships will move 12,678,873 and the non-convoyed will move 12,315,043. In that 2+ year period, the non-convoyed ships will have moved 104,332,923 tons. The Convoyed ships will have moved only 90,375,562. That is effectively an entire cycle of shipments difference at that point. As a point, extrapolated out to the war end, even with losses, the non-convoyed ships move MORE tons of goods.

Which is why the admiralty didn't move to convoys Feb until 1917(or later). Despite losing over 2 million tons in 1915 and 1916.

Convoys are not a magic bullet. And are in fact a major decision, with serious downsides.

You seem to be very Upset with the data about shipping losses in WW1 as presented by Eric Grove. You are also presenting tonnage based loss figures. Since Tonnage is not mentioned in the table I presented what is the source of the tonnage figures you are using?

to be clear the total number of vessels convoyed in a three month period is counted. The number of ships lost is also enumerated and a loss rate is calculated. Thus the loss figure in percent is per voyage in convoy m not sure how you can avoid that conclusion.

Thirdly the same calculation is performed on Loss Rate in UK Overseas trade sailed independently, the number of ships that sailed is not included in the table only number of ships lost.we are given a percentage loss figure which varies in precision from estimates 0f not greater than 10% to numbers to two significant figures . This suggests that the numbers of ships sailing as independents becomes available in greater precision

the table is from the book the defeat of the enemy attack on shipping which was a rearrangemnet of the Naval staff history By Eric Grove who is a professionalHistorian and quite well regarded

However I hate arguments from Authority

But I'm not sure what your argument is apart from you dislike the data and you dispute the fact that the percentage loss rates are per voyage and instead seem to think they are a percentage loss of all ships that sailed independently in a three month period.

It does not matter.

the numbers of ships that were lost in convoy and outside convoy are enumerated, 257 were lost in convoy 1500 were lost outside convoy.

the effect of convoy was clear and in terms of the U boat war in WW1 a magic bullet.

Convoys mean fewer attacks by UBoats on ships in convoy (convoys are harder to find than a stream of single ships)
Convoys mean more u boat casualties. ( UBoats are forced to operate near escorts rather than avoiding them)

Regards

Hipper
 

hipper

Banned
http://www.gwpda.org/naval/stats002.htm , who is in turn pulling it from Salter, J. A. Allied Shipping Control, pages 355-359.
Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1921.


And this is the part that is suspect. He is somehow able to make claims about the loss rate on a per sailing basis, without being able to say the number of sailing that took place. Where is he getting this figures from? It is all well and good to say 10%, but where is his source from the number of sailing that took place in a period? He isn't even saying how many took place, just that this many sunk and that represents 10%.

This implies that only 4100 ships sailed independently in the three month from Feb to April. Which represents well under half of the total number of ships in the British merchant fleet, assuming each sailing was a unique ship. And this doesn't address the problem that if he is using the definition of a sailing to mean a one way trip, that is even a fewer number of actual cargos moved.

Do you think the general point about convoys being a vastly safer form of shipping compared to independent sailings is valid?
Do you think the loss rate in convoy is accurately portrayed ?

Re the source of his data shipping was only brought under Goverment control in 1917 so the data may be lacking which is why figures like not less than 10% are used

However you are trying to relate losses of British shipping worldwide with losses to independently sailed ships in British waters

The two data sets are not comparable - American ships for example will not be included in your figures.

Regards Hipper.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Supply is the major issue I see - not just of torps and fuel, but also spare parts (I can easily see most of these u-boats laid up for lack of parts by Christmas.) Of course, it depends on just how much in the way of stores the KM can sock away in each of these ports before war's outbreak. Whatever they have on Day One is all they can count on having. They run wild for a few months or so and then, well....hope the war is over.

I do think that the original timeline understated what the Allies could (and would) bring to bear in the African theaters, and overstated what the Germans could do by way of offensive action. But as for defense . . . I do not think it is all that difficult to generate a credible German defense of Duala, for example - Allied forces seized it by the end of September, but there was almost no German naval resistance to speak of, nor much of anything in the way of coastal artillery. They relied almost entirely on blockships and naval mines. Contrast with how long it took the Allies to secure the littoral of German East Africa - all because the KM happened to have a light cruiser (!) there. It took the British until July 1915 - nearly a full year! - to finally subdue her. Imagine what a squadron of submarines could do in both places.

In the end, of course, I do think the Allies would divert what was necessary to neutralize these forces and their ports, probably by sometime in late 1915. They were far too sensitive to their supply lines. But that is the point: Anything diverted from Europe or the Med helps Germany (and indeed Turkey) in the main theater.

Germany can't defend all of her colonies, of course. Togoland, the Marianas, Samoa and German New Guinea will be very hard to defend, or at least not likely worth the resources to make them defensible. But East Africa, Southwest Africa, and Kamerun certainly can. Tsingtao is a more marginal case, but worth exploring; German investment in development of the port makes it worth some effort at defense, and it's too tempting as a base for commerce raiding on Allied shipping in the Far East to resist.


In case you are reading this TL and have not read the last one.

If you or others want to propose specific Entente counter attacks in Africa, send me a private email. I will look over it. What I really need is specific unit names to use, i.e ships and divisions/regiments. I will have all major Entente units in roughly OTL locations by mid 1914.

This TL and the previous is not about holding the British back, but it is about making sure we don't cancel something more critical when dealing with Africa. Also, please remember that I intentionally write in mistakes. For example, the rather dumb annexations of parts of Poland by the Kaiser via Prussia. Designed to cause post war headaches for decades.

The imports are coming in from Brazil. As long as every 2nd or 3rd freighter makes it to Africa, the port remains open until shut down by land action. And it is not just stopping the freighter, if needed, the freighters are escorted by a U-boat or two. You will find that when far away from British ports such as in true in the South Atlantic, the English have a problem. The smaller ships (DD and the like) don't have the legs to operate down there. The ships with longer legs that can be used (cruisers and predreads) can't handle U-boats due to lack of anti-submarine weapons. Imagine this scenario, you have a 5000 ton freighter sailing with a U-boat on the surface. It is flying a non German flag and is disguised to look like a non-German merchant ship. A British Cruiser sees the ship, and begins to intercept. Traveling to the freighter provides a straight easy to predict path. The U-boat submerges, and sinks the cruiser. If you have an easy counter measure that does not involve lots of long-legged DD, please reply, but hide in a spoiler tag. Thanks.

As to the units available, it is not the RN ships. The RN is so big, you just can't sink enough surface ships to win. The missing item is the lack of trained land units. This is why for example, the UK let Japan take Tsingtao instead of sending up a corp to do the job themselves. The divisions don't exist, at least of any quality in 1914 outside the BEF. Sending a Division or two of the BEF to Africa in 1914 is a sure way to lose the war, fast. Calais must be held. It is so, so much more important than other parts of the Globe.

As to the other colonies defense, it is not so much a can't, as a don't want to spend the money. The Germans could easily have afford to put Tsingtao like defenses at each colony minus the warships. The Germans could have put a full corp of troops in Tsingtao as recommended by the German Army. There are plenty of people in Germany and plenty of Marks that can be taxed. It is just that the colonies were important, until you had to spend large amounts of money, then the Germans quickly economized.

Also, as a side note, by the time the war starts, the Germans will have over 5 years experience operating half squadrons of U-boats with a controlling surface ship. It just is what has to happen when you have so few ships, and so much area to cover. Many of the problems seen by others relate to Germany not having a developed doctrine. ITTL, there will be a plan, probably flawed, to deal with most issues.
 
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