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To Caesar what's Caesar's
And to @LordKalvan what is LordKalvan's, whose countless and precious contributions (ideas, pieces of information, explanations, corrections, feedback, honest and constructive criticism) to this TL are so many that I consider him a coauthor. Since there is no official way to acknowledge coauthorship, I found it appropriate to have a post highlighting and declaring this fact and to give my honest, wholehearted thanks for all this invaluable help.
 
Did Ferdinand just contribute to an earlier invention of the sniper rifle? :p But yeah, technological innovation might be the only way a confederal Italy could ever hope to survive in the short run, due to its small population (when compared to its neighbours), lack of resources, endemic poverty, and so on. It'd basically be something not that dissimilar from 1990s Ireland, 2000s Estonia, or even a 20th century Asian Tiger.

inb4 we end up with an opera based on the Tale of Genji and ukiyo-e views of life in Turin. :p
 
Did Ferdinand just contribute to an earlier invention of the sniper rifle? :p But yeah, technological innovation might be the only way a confederal Italy could ever hope to survive in the short run, due to its small population (when compared to its neighbours), lack of resources, endemic poverty, and so on. It'd basically be something not that dissimilar from 1990s Ireland, 2000s Estonia, or even a 20th century Asian Tiger.

inb4 we end up with an opera based on the Tale of Genji and ukiyo-e views of life in Turin. :p
Is the legend of Toni true or just a myth, born out a series of good shots with a gun equipped with a Verdi bullet? Were there Sardinian (or better said Ferdinandean) agents in disguise? We will probably never know.
I admit my first plans for the war were more "basically OTL with fewer mistakes (swifter advance through Lombardy, send a small force to block the Brenner pass and effectively isolate the Quadrilatero from Vienna instead of trying to take all the fortresses, follow the Po until Venice, defeat Nugent, showdown with Radetzki nearby Verona) but it was effectively wasting all the build-up done with Ferdinand and his innovations. With the two-line formations, now the Sardinians are on par with the Austrians on the side of doctrine, have better artillery than OTL, and topographic charts of L-V (which they did not OTL). The Verdi bullet and early needle-gun usage by the Bersaglieri, combined with their skills and good leadership, make the latter a force the Austrians are not prepared to deal with.
Now, the interesting thing is that the war could have been won even OTL. A different leadership would have been sufficient IMHO. Probably with limited gains, Lombardy and the Emilian Duchies (if the peace treaty does not force to hand them back to their former rulers), but then you have a stronger base for a Second War relying less upon foreign intervention (a KoS with Cavour's leadership on steroids, basically). But that is another (alternate) story...

I must confess I do not know the Tale of Genji, I will look into that!
 
The Verdi bullet and early needle-gun usage by the Bersaglieri, combined with their skills and good leadership, make the latter a force the Austrians are not prepared to deal with.
Now, the interesting thing is that the war could have been won even OTL. A different leadership would have been sufficient IMHO. Probably with limited gains, Lombardy and the Emilian Duchies (if the peace treaty does not force to hand them back to their former rulers), but then you have a stronger base for a Second War relying less upon foreign intervention (a KoS with Cavour's leadership on steroids, basically). But that is another (alternate) story..
The more so because the Austrian army has spent the last 30 years acting basically as military police, repressing insurrections and propping reactionary regimes. Their doctrine is still mostly Napoleonic (with a few frills added, like the above mentioned two-lines tactic), and they use smoothbore muskets, with a rate of fire and an effective range much worse than the needle guns, in particular needle guns firing hollow-based bullets.

IOTL, a clear strategy was missing on the Sardinian side: the primary objective was clearly Lombardy, but the insurrections in Veneto and the support pledged by the other Italian states (not to mention the public opinion) made it almost impossible to stop at the Mincio (and anyway, the bridges were successfully forced by the Piedmontese). What followed clearly shows that CA had no clear plan in mind, either on the political or on the military side. Mind, the British and French diplomacies were working hard to convince the Austrians to accept a reasonable compromise (which was Lombardy to Sardinia, without Mantua and Peschiera, plus at least Piacenza if not the whole duchy of Parma), and the deal was almost done before CA allowed his army to be defeated in detail at Custoza. After Custoza, there was no way to mend the situation.
 
The more so because the Austrian army has spent the last 30 years acting basically as military police, repressing insurrections and propping reactionary regimes. Their doctrine is still mostly Napoleonic (with a few frills added, like the above mentioned two-lines tactic), and they use smoothbore muskets, with a rate of fire and an effective range much worse than the needle guns, in particular needle guns firing hollow-based bullets.

IOTL, a clear strategy was missing on the Sardinian side: the primary objective was clearly Lombardy, but the insurrections in Veneto and the support pledged by the other Italian states (not to mention the public opinion) made it almost impossible to stop at the Mincio (and anyway, the bridges were successfully forced by the Piedmontese). What followed clearly shows that CA had no clear plan in mind, either on the political or on the military side. Mind, the British and French diplomacies were working hard to convince the Austrians to accept a reasonable compromise (which was Lombardy to Sardinia, without Mantua and Peschiera, plus at least Piacenza if not the whole duchy of Parma), and the deal was almost done before CA allowed his army to be defeated in detail at Custoza. After Custoza, there was no way to mend the situation.
This brings two questions. First, how can one avoid Custoza? From what I gather, until the Second Battle of Governolo (a Sardinian victory) the situation, while not optimal, was still favorable to CA. The second one is trickier: say that you avoid Custoza and the Austrians settle for the deal you mention. Does the Italian public opinion see CA as a traitor?
 
This brings two questions. First, how can one avoid Custoza? From what I gather, until the Second Battle of Governolo (a Sardinian victory) the situation, while not optimal, was still favorable to CA. The second one is trickier: say that you avoid Custoza and the Austrians settle for the deal you mention. Does the Italian public opinion see CA as a traitor?
The answer to the first question must be re-worded: how can one be forced to fight at Custoza in such a bad tactical disposition? Even after making a few strategic blunders (the march of the Sardinian army across a Lombardy empty of Austrian troops was too slow allowing Radetzky to reinforce the bridges on the Mincio and on the Adige, the battle of Santa Lucia was a stupid decision made by CA himself, the bridges on the Adige were only probed while it was quite obvious that the failure of reinforcing Vicenza was the key to everything, since Nugent would not have been able to join his forces to the ones already in Verona), the Piedmontese had somehow recovered: the battle of Goito had avoided the flanking maneuver initiated by Radetzki, and the fortress at Peschiera had surrendered (great result this one: a couple of thousand of fortress troops surrendered, and a crumpling obsolete fortress was taken). Now came the fateful decision to blockade the fortress of Mantua (why?), but to compound his folly CA decided to probe the Austrian positions at Rivoli: not only this attack lengthened the Sardinian front up to almost 70 km, drained forces from the Sardinian center when the Austrians counter-attacked and effectively opened the door to Radetzki's decisive attack against the same center. It is unnecessary to go into the gory details: once the battle became a battle of movement, the Piedmontese never recovered, there was a number of wrong tactical decision, in particular by De Sonnaz, and the bridges on the Mincio were lost.
However, the problem is not so much in the battle itself, but rather from CA's failure to understand that the war in the second half of July was not the war in the first half of April: on the military side, not only all of Veneto (excepting only Venice) has been lost to Nugent, but now R. had gained 15,000 more field soldiers which allowed him to plan a battle of movement in the open field; on the political side, the wind had changed too: since Ferdinand of Two Sicilies and Pius IX had abandoned the war, and the Veneto had been lost thanks to the Piedmontese slowness and lack of focus, but also thanks to the incapacity of the insurrectionists in Veneto and Venice to organize a credible resistance, the option of making peace with Austria had become much more palatable, effectively the only possibility to gain Lombardy. So back to square one: why the probes at Rivoli? why the blockade of Mantua? The only sensible strategy was to keep the Sardinian army in a defensive position, protected by field works and covering the approaches to the bridges on the Mincio, leaving time to the diplomats in London to complete their negotiations (as they did, but when the news of the agreement reached Linz, they had been preceded by the news of Custoza).

I think this should answer the second question too: Radetzki has been reinforced, the Veneto is lost, Ferdinand II and Pius IX has stabbed the Italian cause in the back, the Sardinian finances are in bad shape and the logistics were frayed. Except some ultra-nationalist, no one might have accused CA of being a traitor because he accepted to make peace with Austria in these conditions.
 
The answer to the first question must be re-worded: how can one be forced to fight at Custoza in such a bad tactical disposition? Even after making a few strategic blunders (the march of the Sardinian army across a Lombardy empty of Austrian troops was too slow allowing Radetzky to reinforce the bridges on the Mincio and on the Adige, the battle of Santa Lucia was a stupid decision made by CA himself, the bridges on the Adige were only probed while it was quite obvious that the failure of reinforcing Vicenza was the key to everything, since Nugent would not have been able to join his forces to the ones already in Verona), the Piedmontese had somehow recovered: the battle of Goito had avoided the flanking maneuver initiated by Radetzki, and the fortress at Peschiera had surrendered (great result this one: a couple of thousand of fortress troops surrendered, and a crumpling obsolete fortress was taken). Now came the fateful decision to blockade the fortress of Mantua (why?), but to compound his folly CA decided to probe the Austrian positions at Rivoli: not only this attack lengthened the Sardinian front up to almost 70 km, drained forces from the Sardinian center when the Austrians counter-attacked and effectively opened the door to Radetzki's decisive attack against the same center. It is unnecessary to go into the gory details: once the battle became a battle of movement, the Piedmontese never recovered, there was a number of wrong tactical decision, in particular by De Sonnaz, and the bridges on the Mincio were lost.
However, the problem is not so much in the battle itself, but rather from CA's failure to understand that the war in the second half of July was not the war in the first half of April: on the military side, not only all of Veneto (excepting only Venice) has been lost to Nugent, but now R. had gained 15,000 more field soldiers which allowed him to plan a battle of movement in the open field; on the political side, the wind had changed too: since Ferdinand of Two Sicilies and Pius IX had abandoned the war, and the Veneto had been lost thanks to the Piedmontese slowness and lack of focus, but also thanks to the incapacity of the insurrectionists in Veneto and Venice to organize a credible resistance, the option of making peace with Austria had become much more palatable, effectively the only possibility to gain Lombardy. So back to square one: why the probes at Rivoli? why the blockade of Mantua? The only sensible strategy was to keep the Sardinian army in a defensive position, protected by field works and covering the approaches to the bridges on the Mincio, leaving time to the diplomats in London to complete their negotiations (as they did, but when the news of the agreement reached Linz, they had been preceded by the news of Custoza).

I think this should answer the second question too: Radetzki has been reinforced, the Veneto is lost, Ferdinand II and Pius IX has stabbed the Italian cause in the back, the Sardinian finances are in bad shape and the logistics were frayed. Except some ultra-nationalist, no one might have accused CA of being a traitor because he accepted to make peace with Austria in these conditions.
I see. One of the cases where "less is more". CA had all the cards in hand and lost to himself. I wonder how an enlarged KoS would develop; probably faster than OTL if Cavour still comes to power (as I bet he would). What worries me is if the Army would then be as keen to reform as it was OTL (but some reform had to be implemented anyhow) having "won" the war.
 
It's a time of technological improvements in firearms, so I suppose there would be an incentive to reform the weapons, maybe there wouldn't be the same attitude toward tactics (but then in the war of 1859, neither the French nor the Sardinian were innovative: shoot a volley, and charge with bayonets)
 
#7: The Battle of Goito
The Battle of Goito

“Of all the birds that roam the blue sky, only one dares to fly higher than the eagle: the crow. Clad in his shiny yet humble black feathers, high up between the clouds he goes, challenging the dominion of the noblest among the birds of prey. The crow even dares to attack the eagle, pecking at her neck, trying to make her bleed. Contemptuous, the eagle barely responds: she simply flies higher, towards Heaven, trying to take the crow’s breath away. Over and over again, barely scathed, the eagle would win, but not on this fateful day of March the 24th, 1848 came. Today, the Italian crow has pecked the Austrian eagle so hard, made her bleed so hard, that she will never again try to cast her tyrannical shadow on our sacred land.”

Over the past 170 years, million of words have been used to describe the Battle of Goito, the first and the most decisive battle of the Italian War of Liberation. However, none of those are as famous as the few lines quoted above. Ironically, they were written by the only journalist present on the battlefield which was not meant to be there (1), Guglielmo Stefani. An ardent Italian patriot, Stefani had been arrested after the riots at the famous “Caffè Pedrocchi” (2) in Padova and taken to Venice. He then managed to escape jail along with Manin and Tommaseo and decided to head back to Padova. Upon hearing of Radetzki’s retreat from Milan, and delighted by the rumors of a swift Sardinian advance into Lombardy, he decided to ride into the lion’s mouth. Guided by his instinct and educated guess, he went to Goito and arrived just in time to see the epic charge of Lamarmora’s Bersaglieri on the eastern bank of the Mincio. Seeing the eagles on the Austrian banner and the shiny black feathers on the Bersaglieri’s helmets (although they were, in truth, black capon feathers), he had “the clear vision of the crow and the eagle, but this time, I was sure the crow would gain the upper hand”. And right he was.

The Battle of Goito was a resounding victory for the Sardinian forces, one that would leave Europe shocked and silent - at least for a couple of days, it was 1848 after all. Many detailed accounts of the Battle written by eyewitnesses on either side and by future historians (we recommend Prince Ferdinand’s own account, which can be found in his diaries (3), which is by far the sharpest and most devoid of rhetoric, as well as von Moltke's "The Campaign of 1848 in Northern Italy (4)), so here we will limit ourselves to a brief account of the battle.

The whole Austrian Army under Radetzki was crossing the Mincio at Goito. The river was in flood and the fords nearby were useless, so the crossing had to be made across the only bridge available. There were plans to blow up the bridge after the crossing, but the Austrian sappers had not yet placed the charges: having 20 thousand men, hundreds of civilians and horses and their baggage cross the river with just a single bridge available was a time consuming and frustrating process, and by the time Ferdinand’s forces arrived, only a third of the Austrian Army had made it to the other side. The first critical mistake made by Radetzki was to assume that he was confronting the Piedmontese vanguard formed by Lamarmora’s Bersaglieri. This meant two things. First (and in this he was correct, though he had had no word of Treviglio), his rearguard had been annihilated and was not crossing at that God-forsaken bridge some ten km to the north he had ordered them to. Second, the Sardinians were foolish enough to engage a full army (tired from days of vicious street fighting and somewhat short of officers, yes, but a full-strength army nevertheless) with a mere vanguard of “feathered buffoons”, as he said to his aide. The FieldMarshal could take the opportunity to teach them a sharp lesson (5). Morale was as important as tactics or strategy, even more so if the damned Corsican could be trusted, and with every single rebellion in Lombardy-Venetia being successful to this day, it was important to cut these… Italians down as fast as possible. He had a numerical advantage, and even if he was light on the artillery side, the attackers had little or none; most importantly his back was protected by the river, the only bridge firmly in his hands. Why not? He took the command of the rear and ordered the crossing to continue, but not to start the march toward Verona, just in case.
When he realized that he was confronting the Sardinian second wave, 15000 strong, it was too late: the Sardinians were quick to seize the lightly guarded town, and the superior Verdi bullet in the hands of Sardinian sharpshooters quickly started to break havoc, targeting Austrian officers. An Austrian counterattack was repulsed, but it effectively prevented the Sardinians from fully encroaching the Austrians. At this point, Radetzki could still have made an attempt to disengage, leaving a sacrificial rearguard to hold the enemy; however, the pennants clearly indicated that that commanding his enemies was no one other than the Crown Prince himself. Seeing an opportunity to end this madness for good, he called for reinforcements from the other side of the river andordered an all-out attack against the apparent location of the Sardinian command, with the full support of his few artillery pieces. The prince was ready for this, though, and immediately ordered the three squadrons of light cavalry he had available (Carabinieri dragoons under Major Alessandro Negri di Sanfront, effectively Ferdinand’s Lifeguards) to counter-charge, breaking the Austrian line. The whole Sardinian command joined: the sight of the beloved Crown Prince and the gallant Prince Henri on the first line, personally risking their lives, gave new momentum to the whole Sardinian Army. Prince Ferdinand then ordered an all-out attack, leaving the cavalry charge under Henri’s command. When seeing the eager look on his aide's face (who was Augusto Cavour, the twenty-year-old nephew of his friend Camillo Benso), the Prince let him join.
Another officer of the Prince retinue later recounted in his diary the following monologue (the Prince was known for talking to himself) :
“I would never make my sister a widow, nor have my friend mourn his beloved nephew, but there are moments when it is foolish to hesitate”. (6)
He then took out his pocket watch.
“Ten minutes ahead of schedule. I need to figure out a counter-move should we need one”.
The officer had to bit his tongue not to ask… Ten minutes ahead of what, exactly?
And then, all of a sudden, the distant echo of trumpet and the battle cries of what sounded like one hundred thousand men filled the air. The Austrian line started to break. Curiously enough, part of it running from the Sardinians… and some towards them.
“Oh, my bad: I should always have full confidence in Alessandro (7): he is my rock. Well, I guess it won’t hurt to have a hero of a brother-in-law, and Camillo will be bursting proud of his nephew as well: he’s earned himself a medal today”.
The battle cries and the sound of trumpets heralded the Bersaglieri’s charge on the other side of the Mincio. This had been Ferdinand’s gambit-and genius move: after Treviglio, he had ordered Lamarmora to advance, cross the river at that very “God-forsaken bridge some ten kilometers to the north” (8) and surprise the Austrians on the wrong side of the river. Lamarmora’s steadiness and the bravery of his men did the rest. The battle was over well before noon, when a still incredulous and shocked Field Marshal Radeztki surrendered to Ferdinand. Upon yielding his saber to the Prince, said “I fought many times against Napoleon, I served the emperor of Austria on the field for 40 years. Until today, I thought I had seen everything on a battlefield. (9)
Smiling, Ferdinand replied: “I know. That is why I took inspiration from Murat, and why I had so much confidence in my Bersaglieri ”.
Footnotes:
(1) There were two other Italian journalists at Goito: Giovanni Bottero, born in Nizza, who became MD, but had always a keen interest in journalism. When he moved to Turin, he started writing articles for "L'Opinione", a newspaper to the left of center. When he got wind of La Marmora was assembling his troops to cross the Ticino and be the vanguard of the Sardinian army, he was able to wrangle a place on his staff (an MD is always useful) and followed him to Treviglio and Goito and beyond, always reporting back to his newspaper by telegraph; the other one is Pier Carlo Boggio, born in Turin and a close friend of Augusto Cavour, with whom he studied in Geneva. Augusto was introduced to Camillo Benso by Augusto, and worked for The Risorgimento, Cavour's newspaper. When Augusto enrolled for the war, Pier Carlo followed him and was embedded in Ferdinand's corps from the beginning to the end. At Goito there was quite a rivalry between the three journalists, and there is even a legend that they almost came to blows at the telegraph office of Goito on a matter of precedence. This may be true or not, but the three young men became fast friends and after the war founded AGI, Agenzia Giornalistica Italiana: something like a Italian Associated Press. Their articles fired up hearts and minds not just in Italy, but all over Europe, in particular in Paris and London. Ferdinando is reported to have said (half in jest) that the three journalists were worth to him as an extra battalion of Bersaglieri.
(2) The "Caffe' Pedrocchi" was first opened in 1772 in Padova; in 1831 the son of the founder, Antonio Pedrocchi, greatly expanded the facilities and Caffe' Pedrocchi became a byword in Padova. Padova has been for many centuries a university town, and the students easily gravitated toward this establishment, which quickly became a hotbed of radicalism and anti-Austrian sentiments. On 8 February 1848, a student was wounded there during a police raid, and this was the spark for a first insurrection attempt in Padova. Guglielmo Stefani was arrested and imprisoned in Venice after these events.
(3)"Ferdinand's Diaries became public domain 50 years after his death, although some portions of them are still redacted
(4) Von Moltke was in Magdeburg in 1848, a newly promoted colonel in the Prussian army. He was a keen student of Ferdinand's campaign, wrote a book about it and later on in his life he also wrote that "Ferdinand dash to Goito and his acceptance of the risk of confronting the Austrian army with converging columns was a brilliant move: the best way of fighting a war is to march separately and fight the enemy together. After Goito, I always kept this precept as foremost in my mind in all the campaigns that I planned and fought for the King of Prussia"
(5) Radetzki blamed himself in his "Memoirs" for making such a blunder
(6) Similar words can be found also in Ferdinand's diary
(7) Alfonso is obviously Alessandro La Marmora, who created the Bersaglieri elite corps, and lead them to victory after victory during the War of Italian Independence
(8) Ferdinand is referring to the bridge located in Marmirolo, some 10 km upstream of Goito
(9) The same passage can be found in Radetzki's "Memoirs", with a very telling addition: “I fought many times against Napoleon, I served the emperor of Austria on the field for 40 years. Until today, I thought I had seen everything on a battlefield. Today I lost all of Italy in a single morning: Pride Goes before a Fall" . Radetzki died in 1854, on his estates in Bohemia, a broken man blaming himself for Austria's misfortunes. The passage quoted above is the last entry in his memoirs, and in his will he asked that "Pride Goes before a Fall" be carved on his tombstone
 
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Also, changed the title because it was objectively too long (as well as, a bit outdated with respect to the course our story is undertaking).
 
I have no words... It's beautiful!
Well, I guess that it is my turn to gave no words... Thanks a lot! Really glad you liked it, and sorry for the long hiatus. Can't make any exact promises on the regularity of the updates, but Ferdinand is back, and he's here to stay and make (ALT)-history.
 
Thanks for your words. On the side of the political system, I second @LordKalvan: surprises are coming. ;)

Shame about the endemic corruption, but it's nothing we haven't seen before.

We as in, everyone in Romance-speaking Europe and Latin America; what's with Latin countries on both sides of the ocean and corruption, did the Roman clientelar system endure that much? :p
 
Shame about the endemic corruption, but it's nothing we haven't seen before.

We as in, everyone in Romance-speaking Europe and Latin America; what's with Latin countries on both sides of the ocean and corruption, did the Roman clientelar system endure that much? :p
Well, TTL *Italy will fare a lot better compared to OTL, but there are things that are not so easily changed. I do believe we can partially ascribe the "Latin" tendency towards clientelism and corruption (in a broader, say, soft-core sense) to Roman heritage, although the Roman Republic shows that you can have a (mostly) funcional and efficient state and a widespread/insitutionalized clientelar system.
 
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