Chapter 47: Egypt in the Maelstrom
Alexandria on the Eve of War
Coinciding with Osman Pasha’s invasion of Adana, the Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman Empire Ahmad Fevzi Pasha was tasked by Sultan Mahmud II with attacking the city of Alexandria. It was the hope of the ailing Sultan and his aging Grand Vizier Khosref Pasha that the Ottoman Navy might destroy or otherwise incapacitate much of the Egyptian flotilla before they could join with Ibrahim Pasha’s army in the Levant. It was believed that if such a decisive blow could be struck against their enemy, then the whole region would rise in revolt against the Kavalali once again and an Ottoman victory in the war would be all but assured. With the Levant in rebellion and their fleet destroyed, the Egyptian force in Syria would become trapped between the Mediterranean Sea to the West, the Ottoman Army to the North, the Syrian desert to the East, and the rebels to their South with little hope of escape or resupply.
To achieve that end, the lion’s share of the Ottoman Fleet, some 74 ships in total were dispatched on the mission to Alexandria in what was to be a coup de main against Muhammad Ali. Departing from their base in Constantinople at midday on the 20th of March, Ahmad Fevzi Pasha led his armada on a southerly route along the Aegean coast of Asia Minor. After passing the isle of Rhodes on the 21st the fleet immediately shifted course, bearing Southeast towards Egypt and the Nile Delta. Soon though, the weather began to turn against the Turkish fleet as dark clouds gathered on the horizon, the winds increased, and the seas worsened as a late winter storm fell upon the unsuspecting fleet, throwing eighteen ships far off course. The billowing winds of the tempest were so great that two ships, the 44-gun Frigate Mirat-i Zafer and the 80-gun Third Rate Necm-i Sevket would be blown as far away as Crete some 90 miles away to the West.
Rather than press on without them, Ahmad Pasha instead waited off the coast of Rhodes for three days while he searched for his missing ships and sailors. While his decision to wait may have been compassionate in nature, it was also rational given the extensive battering many of his ships had endured during the storm. Several ships suffered varying degrees of damage, most of which consisted of ruined rigging or ripped sails that would require mending, but some had suffered hull damage and were taking on water when they were thrown against hidden rocks and sand barges. Additionally, nearly three dozen sailors and officers had fallen overboard during the storm leaving some of the smaller ships undermanned necessitating some reshuffling of crewman between ships. While a search was made for the missing sailors, it was quickly abandoned the following day in favor of finding the missing ships and all men were presumed lost at sea. Eventually the last of the ships were discovered on the 25th and the last of the repairs were completed the following day allowing the fleet to set off once again for Alexandria this time without issue and would arrive at their destination at dawn on the 28th of March.
Rather than immediately bombard the city and the Egyptian fleet within its harbor as he had been instructed, Ahmad Fevzi Pasha would instead opt to enter negotiations with the civilian and military leaders of Alexandria, demanding the surrender of the city to the forces of the Ottoman Sultan. This questionable decision was compounded even further when he offered the Egyptian leadership until sunrise the following day to consider his demands. Whether Ahmad Pasha was simply overconfident of his fleet’s capabilities or reluctant to begin the attack no one can say, his decision to postpone the attack would cost the Ottomans dearly. The Egyptians for their part had been woefully unprepared for an attack against them so soon and spent several crucial moments in a panic, but when it became apparent that the Ottomans were not attacking immediately, they quickly collected themselves and prepared an attack of their own.
The Egyptians were at a distinct disadvantage, however, as the tight nature of their harbor’s entrance made it so only two or three ships could pass through at a time. With the Ottoman fleet positioned at its exit, any attempt to sortie would be spotted immediately and snuffed out under a withering volley of cannon fire. Four warships had been caught outside the harbor when the Ottomans arrived and another seven ships were docked in the old port, but they would most likely be overwhelmed before they could join with the rest of their forces coming from the new port. Despite this obvious handicap, the Egyptians hoped that they could strike the Ottomans whilst they remained unsuspecting of their true intentions and went ahead with the attack anyway. And so, with daylight fading the Egyptians made their move.
Despite his apparent reluctance to fight, Ahmad Pasha had permitted his ships to defend themselves if threatened, which the Egyptian sortie clearly was leading most to respond accordingly, as they turned their cannons on the approaching ships. Within moments, 2 of the 4 Egyptian ships outside the harbor were almost instantaneously destroyed by the withering cannon fire of the Ottoman fleet as were the first 3 ships that exited the harbor that came to aid them. The other two, the 80 gun Barecham and the 58 gun Aboukir were quickly captured by the Ottomans before they could make their attack. One ship, the old frigate
Souriya would succeed in firing upon the Ottoman fleet and make a frantic attack on the Ottoman Steamship
Mesir-i-Bahri, shooting one cannonball through the aft mast of the ship and another just above the waterline before it too was reduced to a floating mass of fiery debris by the heavy broadsides of the Turkish ships. Unable to effectively engage the Ottomans, who vigilantly guarded the opening to the port, the remaining Egyptian ships were forced to abandon their attack before it ever really began, with the only accomplishments of their failed endeavor being the loss of 8 ships. With the Egyptians showing their hand, Ahmad Pasha was forced to begin the attack on Alexandria itself, and within minutes of the failed attack, the city was under siege.
The Egyptians were only spared from a complete catastrophe by a combination of three factors; first the Egyptian fleet in Alexandria’s harbor represented only half the number of the vessels available to the Khedivate of Egypt. The other half of the Egyptian fleet had been scattered across the Eastern Mediterranean aiding Ibrahim’s forces in Syria at the time of the attack. They were also incredibly fortunate that Muhammad Ali had sent the order to recall them to Alexandria only days before the Ottomans arrived, providing the defenders with the sense that help was coming. The Ottomans for their part had been under the impression the entire Egyptian fleet had been in port at Alexandria resulting in a slackening of their diligence and determination to finish the siege as rapidly as possible.
Secondly, the high winds within the harbor mitigated the spread of the fires caused by the Ottoman bombardment. While many shells did indeed hit their targets, igniting munitions caches and sparking fires on sea and shore, these were relatively contained to the stricken ship or depot thanks to the swirling winds of Alexandria’s port which changed at a moment’s notice.[1] Finally, the defenses of Alexandria had been stiffened considerably over the many years of Muhammad Ali’s reign. The Citadel of Qaitbay at the mouth of the harbor had its walls reinforced, its guns were updated to contemporary standards, and the ramparts had been refurbished as had all the other forts in the city. Together with the littoral guns which had been positioned around the entrances to the two ports any Ottoman ship that dared enter their range risked annihilation.
The guns of Qaitbay proved especially adept at hitting the Turkish ships forcing Ahmad Pasha to steadily move his fleet further and further afield to protect his own vessels, but this in turn steadily reduced his own force’s accuracy. As a result, a stalemate of sorts developed as the Ottomans fired on Alexandria and the Egyptians in turn fired upon the Ottomans, only for both sides to miss their targets completely. Had he been aware of his own numerical advantage over the Egyptians, Ahmad Pasha could have pushed his advantage and destroyed the enemy fleet. Instead he continued to keep his distance from the littoral guns while his ships sporadically fired on the town to little effect. His predicament was made worse by the lack of soldiers aboard his ships, preventing him from landing a force down the coast which could in turn attack Alexandria from land. Because of this, the farce that was the Siege of Alexandria would continue for four long days with the Ottoman ships firing upon the city’s harbor to minimal effect. Eventually though the attack would cease at noon on the 3rd of April and it soon became apparent why.
Moharram Bey, commander of the Egyptian naval detachment aiding Ibrahim Pasha had returned to Alexandria with the remaining half of the Khedivate Fleet, some 51 ships and was charging upon the Ottoman fleet as fast as the winds would carry him. Though many of his ships were older than the freshly lain down Ottoman ships, the Egyptian crews were experienced sailors and their officers were adept commanders who had spent most of their lives at sea. Moharram Bey was himself a grizzled veteran of the war with the Greeks and the first war with the Ottomans in 1831, having directed invasion of the Morea and the naval bombardments of the littoral Levantine cities. With the arrival of the Main Egyptian Fleet, the battle of Alexandria began once more as the battered ships within Alexandria’s harbor made another determined sortie against the now outnumbered Ottoman fleet. Faced with a numerically superior force attacking from two opposing directions, Ahmad Pasha’s force quickly lost all sense of cohesion as the Egyptian ships broke through his hastily erected battle lines.
The engagement that followed was sordid affair as battle lines on both sides quickly collapsed leading to a mass frenzy on the waves. Smoke and gunfire filled the azure sky, ships crashed into one another, men fell overboard by the dozens, and friendly fire was abundant. One particularly account details the sinking of the Ottoman steamship
Eser-i Hayır by the
Mahmudiye, which had mistaken it for the Egyptian steamship
Mehmet Ali which had been spotted near the
Eser-i Hayr. With its vision obstructed by smoke
, the
Mahmudiye fired all 60 of its portside guns upon their own compatriots without question. Only when the smoke cleared could they see the Ottoman ravaged horsetail fluttering in the wind and realize their mistake. Of a total crew of 192, only 48 members of the Eser-I Hayr’s crew would survive this unfortunate case in mistaken identity and they would not be the only case that day.
Conflagration was also a clear and present danger for both fleets as open flames and lucky shots threatened to ignite exposed munitions caches aboard every ship. The old French Ship of the Line
Scipion, having been sold to the Egyptians in 1834, was the unlucky victim of a fireship, which attached itself to the hull of the old ship like a magnet to metal and doggedly resisted all attempts by the
Scipion’s crew to draw it away.
[2] Overshotting also risked blowing ships to smithereens as overanxious captains seeking to gain an advantage on their adversaries stuffed their cannons well beyond their intended capacity. Many cannonades were filled with extra balls or even grapeshot providing an extremely volatile, yet remarkably effective concoction. The large supply of black powder needed to fire these heavy loads risked destroying the guns or even sinking the ships, but due to their lethality to enemy ships the technique was permitted if only this once.
For two long hours, the battle would rage with the outcome listing on the edge of a knife, As the sun reached its pinnacle, Muhammad Ali’s trump card revealed itself when the Ottoman flagship, Mahmudiye suddenly and inexplicably burst into flaming debris. Over the course of the week-long engagement, Mehmet Ali had been courting Ahmad Pasha to his side with promises of riches and prestige.
[3] It also helped Muhammad Ali’s cause that Ahmad Fevzi had no love for his superior, the Grand Vizier Khosref Pasha. The pair had a particularly bad falling out many years before and had never reconciled in their many years of working together, if anything their relationship worsened following Khosref’s promotion to Grand Vizier. This dispute had also turned the once loyal Ahmad Pasha against Sultan Mahmud who had come to see Khosref Pasha as a kindred spirit, resulting in the Kapudan Pasha’s opposition to the Sultan’s more extreme reforms. As such he and a few of his fellow like-minded subordinates, proved amenable to talks with the Khedive of Egypt during their initial correspondence on the 28th of March.
It is likely that the bombardment of Alexandria thus far had been used as a bargaining tactic for Ahmad Pasha and his fellow co-conspirators to raise the price of their defection. While it did no real damage to the city or the ships hiding within its walled harbor, it did serve as a aggravation for Muhammad Ali as it denied him from aiding his forces in Syria to his fullest ability. By leveraging his blockade and bombardment of the city against Muhammad Ali, Ahmad Pasha believed he could pry more riches and privileges from him in return for his services. Instead, his plans were ruined by the sudden arrival of Moharram Bey’s ships which likely disrupted their arrangement, forcing the conspirators into action in a bid to destroy any evidence of their treason.
Still the destruction of the Ottoman flagship had the desired effect on the battle as it threw the rest of the Turkish fleet into confusion and despair. They were only saved from total defeat by the quick action of Topai Izzet Pasha who had become the effective commander of the Ottoman Navy following Ahmad Pasha’s supposed demise aboard the
Mahmudiye. With the battle clearly against them, Topai Pasha worked to regain control of the fractured fleet and ordered an immediate retreat. Though the Egyptians would attempt to chase down the fleeing Turkish ships, by dusk the battle effectively came to an end although shots would continue to ring out well into the night. In many ways, the battle of Alexandria was a tactical defeat for the Ottomans yet a strategic victory for them as well.
While the Ottomans were indeed forced to withdraw from Alexandria, the Egyptians clearly suffered worse losses in the battle. Over the course of the engagement the Ottomans would lose 3 Ships of the Line including their Flagship the
Mahmudiye, 2 steamships, 3 Frigates, 5 smaller escort ships (brigs, corvettes, sloops and gunboats), and nearly 2,000 sailors and officers who were either killed, wounded, or captured, including Kapudan Pasha Ahmad Fevzi, who would “miraculously” turn up in Alexandria where he would remain as a gilded "guest" of Muhammad Ali. They had succeeded in capturing three Egyptian ships; the 2nd Rate Ship Barecham and the 3rd Rate Aboukir during the initial attack on the 28th of March as well as 2nd Rate Fayoum on the 3rd of April. However, the Aboukir would be scuttled during the following battle on the 3rd to prevent its recapture by the Egyptians and the Fayoum would suffer extensive damage to its hull and it masts in the same engagement, forcing it to withdraw from the battle almost immediately after it was captured.
The Egyptians for their part lost 3 Ships of the Line, 4 frigates, 1 steamship, and 9 smaller vessels in both the siege and the naval battle that followed along with over 4,000 soldiers, sailors, and civilians over the course of the 5-day engagement. Their losses were recovered somewhat by the capture of the Ottoman 2nd Rate
Tesvikiye, the 3rd Rate
Ainduie, the steamship
Tahir-i Bahri, the frigates
Nouhan Bahri and Avnillah, and four smaller vessels
. In addition to the ships sunk or captured, dozens of vessels on both sides suffered terribly, with many taking on water and others needing extensive repair that would effectively sideline another 50 ships between the two fleets for several months. The port of Alexandria also suffered immense damage to its docks, dry-docks, munitions depots, and other military structures around the harbor, greatly reducing the Egyptian Navy’s ability to utilize Alexandria as a naval base for the immediate future. Furthermore, while the Ottoman Navy had been forced to retreat they did not go very far.
Once his damaged ships and injured crewmen had been sent back to Constantinople, Topai Pasha took his now reduced fleet of 46 ships to raid and pillage the Nile Delta and unlike Ahmad Pasha, he would prove to be a decidedly more loyal and therefore effective commander. This in turn forced Muhammad Ali to dedicate many of his remaining ships to hunting the Ottoman fleet as opposed to aiding his son Ibrahim Pasha who was now faced with defeating the Syrian rebels and the 100,000 strong Ottoman army with his force of 40,000 men. Ibrahim's only support was Suleiman Pasha’s force of 20,000 located to the South of Damascus and Bashir Shibab's Maronites on Mount Lebanon, but both were occupied repressing revolts in their vicinity. If he were to call on either of them, then Ibrahim would run the risk of inciting the region to rebellion once more. Ultimately, it was up to Ibrahim to defeat the Ottomans by himself.
Next Time: Fire and Thunder on the Plains of Syria
[1] In 1825, Greek Admiral Constantine Kanaris led an attack against Alexandria in OTL that was also foiled by the winds. Despite making his way into Alexandria’s harbor and attaching his fireships to the Egyptian ships, the Egyptian fleet was saved from a catastrophe by the changing of the wind. Lord Cochrane would make a similar attempt in 1827 several weeks before the battle of Navarino, but his attempt was similarly foiled by the wind. Had either attempt succeeded, the war in OTL may have gone a lot differently.
[2] The Scipion was the target of a fireship in the OTL battle of Navarino, but thanks to the cooperation of the Scipion’s crew and a neighboring British ship, the fireship was towed away and carefully sunk. Here it isn’t so lucky.
[3] Ahmad Fevzi Pasha defected from the Ottoman Empire to the Khedivate of Egypt during the Second Egyptian Ottoman War, citing growing Russian influence over the young Sultan Abdulmejid. In the OTL defection, Ahmad Pasha succeeded in taking the entirety of the Ottoman Fleet over to the Egyptians, here he is less successful given the fact that Sultan Mahmud is still alive, albeit barely, and the more extensive reformation of the Ottoman military and administration, has managed to root out several disloyal officers and administrators.
