Geoffrey Swain has argued in *The Origins of the Russian Civil War* that the Provisional All-Russian Government in Siberia (the "Driectory," basically a coalition of Socialist Revolutionaries and Kadets) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional_All-Russian_Government was overthrown not so much because it was failing as because it was starting to succeed:
"Whether Lenin had won a definitive victory against the democratic forces was by no means certain. The capture of Kazan in September and then Samara in October certainly put the People's Army on the defensive, but as the SRs constantly stressed during the last days of the directory, after an initial rout, volunteer units were staging a successful counter-offensive by the first fortnight in November 1918. On 5 November 1918 an offensive aimed at recapturing Samara was begun, and on 12 November 1918 the SR administration in Ufa could boast that a whole Bolshevik regiment had been taken prisoner. The successful recapture of Samara was expected with some confidence..." https://books.google.com/books?id=CawuAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA252
"From a Moscow perspective it is understandable that little attention need be paid to the coup staged in Omsk by Admiral Kolchak on 18 November 1918; the Bolsheviks' enemy changed its leading cadres, but remained the enemy. Kolchak's coup, however, has monumental significance from the perspective of the historian of Russia's forgotten first civil war. Kolchak's coup meant this: Russia's first civil war had been brought to an end. It had been transformed overnight from a war between Bolsheviks and patriotic socialists to a war between Bolsheviks and right-wing generals. The first civil war had been brought to an end not by Bolshevik victory in that war but the armed action of White generals whose action changed the whole nature of the civil war. Kolchak's coup was the last act in Russia's first civil war and the first act of Russia's second civil war, the civil war of popular memory. Kolchak's action ended a war that the moderate socialists might have won and started a war the Whites would inevitably lose, putting the real civil war, the forgotten first civil war, on ice until 1920. By the time fighting resumed in Kronstadt and Tambov, the majority of Russians, after seven years of war, were no longer prepared to take up arms..." https://books.google.com/books?id=CawuAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA8
Even if, as I think, Swain lets his sympathies for the "patriotic socialists" lead to an overestimation of their prospects, it is still an interesting question whether and how the Kolchak coup could have been avoided. (Here, I'm using the term "Kolchak coup" as shorthand for "the coup that brought Kolchak to power;" there is some dispute whether he gave prior appoval to it.) Swain IIRC discusses the suggestion that the SRs should have taken a leaf from the Bolsheviks' book and used political commissars to assure that the army remained committed to the Constituent Assembly. I think that might simply have provoked an earlier coup. And anyway, there was a widespread and justifiable belief that politicization of the army in 1917 had been one of the chief reasons things went wrong.
One thing I wonder about is whether a different attitude from Allied officers in Omsk might have made prevented the coup. Archangel (where an anti-Bolshevik coalition government was headed by N. V. Chaikovsky of the Popular Socialist Party) had a precursor of the Kolchak coup a couple of months earlier. Captain G.E. Chaplin, the commander of the armed forces, took control temporarily, but the Allies forced him to step down. In Omsk, by contrast, not only did the Allies do nothing to reverse the coup, but Colonel J.F. Nielson (whom General Knox, commander of the British military mission, had left in charge) was quite enthusiastic about Kolchak, and may have misled the coup plotters into thinking the British government wanted a coup. Nielson himself later acknowledged: "I think perhaps I lay myself open to the accusation of having moved slightly in advance of the very halting policy, or rather lack of policy, of our Government..." https://books.google.com/books?id=iNuKAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA13 Anyway, whatever encouragement Nielson may have given to the plotters was on his own initiative and was not the policy of the British government, which in fact extended de facto recognition to the Directory just before its overthrow.
(Some have suggested that Knox told Nielson to encourage the coup, but that seems unlikely. "On the day Knox left Omsk, ten days before the coup took place, he telegraphed the War Office: 'Kolchak is being urged by right elements to effect a coup d'etat. I told him that any attempt of this sort would at present be fatal.' Besides, Knox would have been aware of his political masters' intention to recognize the Directorate. This does not mean that after the coup had occurred Knox was filled with remorse. 'This bloodless revolution was necessary because the Socialist Revolutionaries were intriguing to undermine the discipline of the Army' he wrote to a friend..'From the Allied point of view it is a matter of indifference of what complexion the Government may be, so long as it is strong and just and willing and able to defend the new Russian army from internationaliss and other harmful propaganda. Kolchak is honest, patriotic and capable. He is the best man for the post in Siberia'..."
https://books.google.com/books?id=gsqEDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT146)
"Whether Lenin had won a definitive victory against the democratic forces was by no means certain. The capture of Kazan in September and then Samara in October certainly put the People's Army on the defensive, but as the SRs constantly stressed during the last days of the directory, after an initial rout, volunteer units were staging a successful counter-offensive by the first fortnight in November 1918. On 5 November 1918 an offensive aimed at recapturing Samara was begun, and on 12 November 1918 the SR administration in Ufa could boast that a whole Bolshevik regiment had been taken prisoner. The successful recapture of Samara was expected with some confidence..." https://books.google.com/books?id=CawuAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA252
"From a Moscow perspective it is understandable that little attention need be paid to the coup staged in Omsk by Admiral Kolchak on 18 November 1918; the Bolsheviks' enemy changed its leading cadres, but remained the enemy. Kolchak's coup, however, has monumental significance from the perspective of the historian of Russia's forgotten first civil war. Kolchak's coup meant this: Russia's first civil war had been brought to an end. It had been transformed overnight from a war between Bolsheviks and patriotic socialists to a war between Bolsheviks and right-wing generals. The first civil war had been brought to an end not by Bolshevik victory in that war but the armed action of White generals whose action changed the whole nature of the civil war. Kolchak's coup was the last act in Russia's first civil war and the first act of Russia's second civil war, the civil war of popular memory. Kolchak's action ended a war that the moderate socialists might have won and started a war the Whites would inevitably lose, putting the real civil war, the forgotten first civil war, on ice until 1920. By the time fighting resumed in Kronstadt and Tambov, the majority of Russians, after seven years of war, were no longer prepared to take up arms..." https://books.google.com/books?id=CawuAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA8
Even if, as I think, Swain lets his sympathies for the "patriotic socialists" lead to an overestimation of their prospects, it is still an interesting question whether and how the Kolchak coup could have been avoided. (Here, I'm using the term "Kolchak coup" as shorthand for "the coup that brought Kolchak to power;" there is some dispute whether he gave prior appoval to it.) Swain IIRC discusses the suggestion that the SRs should have taken a leaf from the Bolsheviks' book and used political commissars to assure that the army remained committed to the Constituent Assembly. I think that might simply have provoked an earlier coup. And anyway, there was a widespread and justifiable belief that politicization of the army in 1917 had been one of the chief reasons things went wrong.
One thing I wonder about is whether a different attitude from Allied officers in Omsk might have made prevented the coup. Archangel (where an anti-Bolshevik coalition government was headed by N. V. Chaikovsky of the Popular Socialist Party) had a precursor of the Kolchak coup a couple of months earlier. Captain G.E. Chaplin, the commander of the armed forces, took control temporarily, but the Allies forced him to step down. In Omsk, by contrast, not only did the Allies do nothing to reverse the coup, but Colonel J.F. Nielson (whom General Knox, commander of the British military mission, had left in charge) was quite enthusiastic about Kolchak, and may have misled the coup plotters into thinking the British government wanted a coup. Nielson himself later acknowledged: "I think perhaps I lay myself open to the accusation of having moved slightly in advance of the very halting policy, or rather lack of policy, of our Government..." https://books.google.com/books?id=iNuKAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA13 Anyway, whatever encouragement Nielson may have given to the plotters was on his own initiative and was not the policy of the British government, which in fact extended de facto recognition to the Directory just before its overthrow.
(Some have suggested that Knox told Nielson to encourage the coup, but that seems unlikely. "On the day Knox left Omsk, ten days before the coup took place, he telegraphed the War Office: 'Kolchak is being urged by right elements to effect a coup d'etat. I told him that any attempt of this sort would at present be fatal.' Besides, Knox would have been aware of his political masters' intention to recognize the Directorate. This does not mean that after the coup had occurred Knox was filled with remorse. 'This bloodless revolution was necessary because the Socialist Revolutionaries were intriguing to undermine the discipline of the Army' he wrote to a friend..'From the Allied point of view it is a matter of indifference of what complexion the Government may be, so long as it is strong and just and willing and able to defend the new Russian army from internationaliss and other harmful propaganda. Kolchak is honest, patriotic and capable. He is the best man for the post in Siberia'..."
https://books.google.com/books?id=gsqEDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT146)
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