President Johnson Is Dead: Turbulent Times in the New Frontier

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Prologue: Dallas, Texas
Welcome to the timeline! Plan to provide updates both here and the Atlas Forum. I welcome comments and/or questions and encourage debate, within reason, on the various topics covered in the timeline. Please do inform of any constructive criticism, mis-characterizations, and space bat historical discrepancies. Thanks, hope everyone enjoys the story! *TL Resumes 2/24!*

President Johnson is Dead
Turbulent Times in the New Frontier

Table of Contents
Introduction: That's the Way It Was

Chapter One: American Guardsman
Chapter Two: Ask Not

Complete Election Results
Election of 1960


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Johnson with Vice President Kennedy and Sec. McNamara in Palm Beach, 1963

Prologue: Dallas, Texas


Local television service in Dallas had suddenly been interrupted.

Visibly shaken and out of breath, network director Jay Watson delivered the shocking report.

"About ten or fifteen minutes ago, a tragic thing from all indications at this point has happened in the city of Dallas. Let me quote to you this. A bulletin, this is from the United Press, from Dallas. President Johnson and Governor John Connally have been cut down by assassin's bullets in downtown Dallas. They were riding an open automobile when the shots were fired."
Jay Watson, WFAA
When the news broke, millions of Americans stood paralyzed by their radio and television sets. Onlookers in Dallas, excited and eagerly awaiting sight of the presidential motorcade on this brief visit, panicked as the shots first rang out. Federal agents stormed the crowds, searching for the assailant. Dallas police tracked down and arrested an agitated schoolbook depository worker suspected of firing the shots. As this man was taken into custody, an all-together separate contingent of local officers found and arrested a second suspect nearer to the scene of the shooting.

Although medical professionals worked speedily and tirelessly, President Lyndon Johnson was pronounced dead at 12:45 CST. Press Secretary Bill Moyors announced this harrowing outcome to a sea of reporters and local journalists. The First Lady had been delivering her final lines to the Dallas Gold Star Mothers Organization when she was quietly informed of the events which had transpired. Ms. Johnson was rushed to the hospital where, upon arrival, she collapsed out of grief.

The news cycle ran for 72 hours straight following the initial announcement. Anchors breathlessly stumbled over their words as they struggled to convey the magnitude of the assassination. Walter Cronkite on CBS TV held a steady tone in bringing the news together, but even he had trouble comprehending, and more so putting into words, exactly how the nation ought to move forward. President Johnson, albeit a controversial figure throughout his tenure, was beloved by a great deal of the nation. His experience with Congress had become an insurmountable boost in accomplishing his multi-point plan for a greater society. Now, the torch was forcibly ripped from Johnson's grasp and handed to another. Though time seemed frozen, the clocks ticked forward.

"... so help me God."
36th President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Air Force One, Dallas Love Field
 
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The interesting bit is what happened between 1961 to 1963. I can see Kennedy annoyed and stressed by the situation Johnson had left him, as he was with the situation as Eisenhower had left him: a nuclear policy which amounted to genocide, the JCS treated with benign neglect, independence and executive ignorance about what they were doing, and filled with warhawks he could not remove all at once because the public would perceive it as Kennedy undermining the man who won WW2, a Soviet Union that was aggressive in the wake of the U2 Incident, and the possibility of a war in Laos which Eisenhower had avoided only to tell Kennedy he would have to pursue. Except Johnson being Johnson, with inexperience and ignorance in foreign policy as Johnson had, could have left a good deal of a more developed mess in his wake. And that is said with emphasis on Southeast Asia.
 
I think what my key interest here with Kennedy is that there is not enough time, as it were. The 1960s that Kennedy oversaw was essentially a period of restructuring the Eisenhower doctrines, many of which were woefully outdated and outright dangerous in a nuclear age. Flexible response rather than massive retaliation, reigning in the Joint Chiefs, taking a constructive approach to global issues rather than bluntly threatening the Soviets, etc. As I stated, were it up to Eisenhower, there would have been a ground war in Laos, direct US intervention when the Cuban exile invasion undoubtedly would have faltered which would have alienated the Latin American states and caused grave harm to US image abroad as an aggressor nation (likely giving propaganda to the Communists), and a crisis similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis would have involved US action, which we know now would have been met with the Soviets moving into West Berlin, attacking US forces with nuclear weapons, and WW3. The period of 1961 to 1963 was pivotal in terms of restructuring policy to be salient in the Cold War and clamping down on many brewing issues that made that period much more dangerous than people realize. But Kennedy does not have two odd years here to do that. He's not overseeing the Cold War in that period, and there may not be enough time to take pivotal action. It may be too late in the game, and he's going to have to deal with the hand he has been dealt. In foreign affairs, Johnson was not the person you wanted in office in 1964. There were a lot of tight rope issues he barreled his way through because he thought his pecker was big enough to ignore nuance. However, for this Kennedy, in foreign affairs, Johnson is not the person you want to succeed after two odd years because of how he may have handled foreign policy up to such a point.
 
Introduction: That's the Way It Was
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Senator Lyndon Johnson (D-TX), 1950

Introduction: That's the Way It Was

On the fifteenth memorial commemorating the tragic loss of President Lyndon Johnson, CBS aired a brief documentary program following its regular showing of WKRP in Cincinnati. Simply titled, L.B.J., the Robin Lehman piece touched on various high-profile moments in the life of the late president, starting with his ascendancy in Congress. The uncredited narrator bombastically explained, "Senator Lyndon Johnson attained the title of Majority Whip in 1951, serving for several years thereafter."

In a hotly contested Senate election in 1948, Johnson defeated former Texan Governor Coke Stevenson. A muddled process through and through, this controversial and debatably unfair primary bout resulted in Johnson taking his first real steps into the swamp of party politics. He won favor with the Old Guard of Southern Democrats, notably Georgian Senator Richard Russell, and as the CBS narrator told true, this would propel him into national spotlight as the Democratic Majority Whip and, eventually, Majority Leader.

Senator Johnson remarkably excelled at organizing his Democratic colleagues from this moment on, and did so without the slightest cause for concern. In mid-summer 1958, a reporter from the Washington Post exclaimed, "The influence of the Democratic wing of Congress is held less far less so by former heavyweights McFarland and Kefauver than tested Majority Leader, Senator Johnson. McFarland and Co. sat observantly in this latest session as Johnson effectively passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act all his own. The abundant influence of the senator from Texas may only be matched by that of Sam Rayburn in the House."

As President Eisenhower neared the end of his final term, murmurs of the primary season made their way through Washington. Of this complex moment in political history, the CBS program only had this remark to say. "There was one clear choice for the Democrats: Lyndon Johnson. He conquered the Legislative Branch, and now he was on to the Executive to take the reigns in the White House. Before long, loyal Democrats rallied around Johnson straight to the fateful party convention in Los Angeles where he selected little-known junior Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts as his running mate."

Ultimately, the conclusion reached in this segment does indeed match historical ends. However, those living from that era look soberly at 1960 sans rose-tinted glasses. LBJ supporter and Texas Governor to-be, John Connally, Jr., was present at the 1960 Convention and pieced the story together in an interview from "Johnson In Memoriam: The Power of Passage."

Connally was recorded stating, "The convention in L.A. carried over the strain of the primary. Humphrey got washed by Jack in Wisconsin, and that Kennedy racked up the delegates from there on out. First New Jersey, then Pennsylvania, Indiana. Once Nebraska rolled around in May, that was the moment we finally managed to get through to him. [Johnson] started on the campaign trail just in time to pick up about 40 or 45% of that Nebraskan delegation. It was a shocker for the Kennedy-ites (laughter) to see a Southern Democrat leap forward like he did, but that's the way it was with Lyndon."

"Johnson has emerged as a close second in Nebraska, out-performing polls by an astounding figure."
ABC Radio Broadcast, May 11th, 1960

"Sen. Johnson wins Majority of Delegates in West Virginia. Sen. Kennedy narrowly takes Maryland."
Chicago Tribune, May 18th, 1960
 
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Day One of the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, July 1960


John F. Kennedy's loss in West Virginia had been devastating to the morale of his campaign. A victory there was vital in ensuring the whole of the party that his candidacy was feasible in heavily protestant, traditionally Democratic, states. Contemporary historians may debate on how significant of an issue religion had been in this particular contest, but universally understood is how this crushing defeat on May 10th set the course for the remainder of the race. The loss not only adversely affected his confidence, but it dampened funding and narrowed demographic support.

The Kennedy staff lost a great deal of financing to the Johnson Campaign following West Virginia, but still retained a generous amount with to march forth through the remaining primary bouts. Typically, moderates, blue-collar workers, and voters above 40 years of age vastly preferred Senator Johnson in each of these primaries, whilst younger and more diverse constituencies favored Kennedy. Studies taken during this election process demonstrated a succinct fervor among Kennedy supporters who believed that the future of the party, as well as the country, hinged on their candidate's win over Johnson. As one Wyatt Miller of Maryland put it in an interview with the local Star Democrat publication, "There's a vibrancy and persona to Kennedy that you'd never feel with a Johnson-type."

Oregon, with its primary taking place shortly following Maryland, ended in a narrow win for Johnson. His tight-knit team of seasoned politicos and staffers had played the national field with former candidate Adlai Stevenson, and some carried on with President Truman. The Johnson Campaign had an abundance of on-hand capital and did not hold back in aggressively capturing swing communities with media spots and stump speeches.

It must be said that LBJ's campaigning had not been anti-Kennedy in any remote regard, instead focused on broad coalition-building. Senator Johnson proclaimed that, if elected, he would lay the groundwork for new domestic programs intended to provide a voice for those most disadvantaged in America: the poor, sick, and elderly. This combined with a promise to match the accelerating military might of the Soviet Union took much of the wind from his competitor's sails. Kennedy, much to the chagrin of his advisers, refused to turn bluntly negative against Johnson (the former's brother, Robert Kennedy, suggested highlighting LBJ's indifference to racial equality, but John Kennedy declined).

Faced with dual losses, the candidate took a suggestion from his father. To an extent, Kennedy turned to localized Democratic leaders in states like New York and Minnesota. Spending sleepless nights on drawn-out calls with bosses, figureheads and legislators, both John and Robert Kennedy pushed until that last minute to rack up the delegate count as high as possible. He had likely hoped that these delegations would back his campaign instead of Johnson's. Party Strategist Robert F. Murphy, then-serving as Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts, reflected in 1962 on John Kennedy's Post-Oregon plan.

"[Kennedy] had not known President Johnson the way we do now. Jack was a newcomer facing off against a giant. As Johnson built up the delegates from Tallahassee to Trenton, Kennedy understood he had one shot at keeping his ducks in line: that First Ballot. Should he have been awarded top place on the initial roll call, I believe the New York delegation would have followed suit - meaning an opening of the floodgates, so to speak. California was a final battleground, and in order to have any real chance at gathering the Western vote, he needed to either outright win or come within a hair's breadth. Pat Brown ended up on the ballot, and the man refused have his name be removed, even though we all understood he had no intention of actively seeking the party nod. He won the majority of those votes, and let me tell you those were Kennedy votes."

As Murphy explained, when the fate of the nomination is uncertain, the results of the first ballot could make all the difference in building momentum. Johnson, winning an easy victory in Florida and managing second in California, possessed enough bound delegates to cut heartily into Kennedy's total. As thus, even with his tallied score in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Wisconsin and Indiana, John Kennedy would ultimately fail to breakthrough the necessary threshold to secure the nomination. A majority of Western delegates lost any tepid confidence they felt for Kennedy and confirmed Johnson as the nominee on the second ballot.

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"Our party and our Nation must and shall extend the hand of compassion and the hand of affection and love to the old and the sick and the hungry. For who among us dares to betray the command, 'Thou shalt open thine hand--unto thy brother, to thy poor, and to thy needy, in thy land.'"
Excerpt from 1960 Democratic Nominee Lyndon B. Johnson's Acceptance Speech, July 13th, 1960
 
I'm about to commit a personal sin ... I can see Kennedy going into Vietnam here. Only in a Kennedy way, however. And because Johnson had set him up for it through bungled foreign policy. Your scenario just divided my world by zero. And he'd be seeking disengagement all the while through diplomacy rather than the Johnson approach of overwhelming force as the only means. Think the late 1960s attempt to end the war circa 1968 coming early, or something like the surge in Iraq. And I doubt he would trust Westmoreland and his posturing, which could lead to a rather different Vietnam. By the time Westmoreland was dropped, and progress was being made (debatable as the long term success of that was anyway), it was too late for the war. Kennedy may drop Westmoreland early on.
 
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The Democratic and Republican Tickets for 1960
Defeating his greatest political rival since Coke Stevenson, Senator Johnson finally won his presidential nomination. With the first step of the process complete, his eyes now turned to the general election. Taking down an unknown Massachusetts senator was one thing, but proving his worth to the American public to an extent great enough to win an electoral plurality was an entirely new matter to be dealt with. Johnson's team had its share of ideas in mind for how best to implement a straight New Deal-er campaign moving forward, however this strategy had ultimately proved unsuccessful when former Governor Adlai Stevenson utilized it in his 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns.

"The message [of a presidential campaign], if detached from the candidate, cannot alone garner votes," historian Theodore H. White wrote in The Making of the President. "Thomas Dewey certainly professed all of the correct talking points: nonetheless Harry Truman won his second term. Adlai Stevenson had promoted an esteemed domestic policy, yet lost in adjoining landslides to President Eisenhower. Moving toward the 1960 election, general polling favored the Republican candidate. These seemingly frivolous things, likability and character, must not be disregarded in this context."

As thus, even prior to his convention win, Johnson focused to a higher degree on the electoral map than his predecessors. Presenting a poor performance would most certainly bring about a repeat of the past two cycles, and the chance of locking himself within South was indeed a possibility. Unlike in '52 or '56, Johnson possessed two critical advantages unobtainable by Stevenson. First, Dwight Eisenhower would not be eligible to run for president in 1960. Second, a general awareness that the nation was becoming complacent, in regards to the economic and scientific rise of the Soviet Union, turned incumbency a touch more toxic than prior years.

Choosing the correct vice presidential candidate was of vital consequence, and had the potential to turn the electoral map in Johnson's favor. John Connally remarked that, in 1960, "Johnson absolutely required a guarantee for a regional advantage beyond the far South. Preferably, in the Midwest where July polls had been closer than in, say, New York. That was the thought process during the convention: a regional boost, not demographics."

Close aids to the senator relented in ensuing years that Kennedy had not been on Johnson's short-list whatsoever. This list included friendlier, well-known Democratic figures like Senator Humphrey of Minnesota and Senator Gore from Tennessee. Gore could have secured votes from those hedging liberal Republicans while Humphrey seemed the perfect piece in attaining the Midwest. Aside from geographic assistance, Johnson too fancied a confidant at his side, even if the two were to disagree on issues of political circumstance.

Kennedy had none of this. He was not a well-known figure moving beyond his primary supporters and, as one aid explained in a private interview, Johnson felt uneasy trusting Kennedy as a true companion. John Kennedy, the Johnson team would discover, also had not been in perfect health. Struggling with Addison's Disease, Kennedy took medicine constantly in order to alleviate his symptoms. With all of this in mind, however, Johnson's Campaign Manager, Walter Jenkins, insisted on him. Connally stated, "[Kennedy], in Walter's mind, was the key for winning in 1960. In theory, and if his charismatic style was advertised properly, he would win with Catholics, the under 30s, and the whole of New England. Humphrey did lose the Midwest to Kennedy, after all."

At last, Johnson made the call, and, somewhat reluctantly, admitted that his primary opponent did have the potential to sway non-voters and assist in acquiring those high-value Northern states come November. Kennedy was thereby selected as the vice presidential nominee for the Democrats. Understanding the latter's personality and background, LBJ made it a point to keep Kennedy literally behind him at all times in order to avoid, as Johnson put it, "presidential conflation."

Days following the Democratic Convention, the Republican Party met in the Chicago International Amphitheater and selected their unopposed nominee, Vice President Richard M. Nixon. Ever statesman-like and eager to start his executive tenure, Nixon presented himself as a man already accustomed to administrative politicking. His acceptance speech lambasted the Democrats' platform as financially irresponsible and their focus on foreign policy transparent. He drove hard and fast at Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, hardly taking a breath to chew apart his interpretation of Communism.

Nixon exited the gate raring to get moving with the general campaign. Both Kennedy and Johnson observed Nixon's mannerisms in his major speech and, each having been familiar with the vice president for several years, they had strategies in mind from the get-go. Assistant Communications Aide, Samuel Forrest, recalled in an interview for a Johnson Presidential Biography that the Texan's attitude toward Nixon was not akin to Kennedy's. For, while, "Kennedy observed this articulate adversary," Johnson only saw, "an entitled, querulous brat." Forrest exclaimed, "Johnson smiled at one point in Nixon's speech during an unobtrusive stutter, one I hadn't caught at the time, and said to me, 'We're going to wipe the floor with this s**t."

"Senator Johnson, the Democratic nominee, plans to challenge Vice President Nixon to a televised debate on the issues of the campaign. The Vice President is reported to be inclined to reject the Johnson proposal on the ground that a personal debate would be unwise."
The Washington Post, July 25th, 1960
 
I don't know how many of you watch these long C-SPAN and Book interview videos I post sometimes, but I watch them, and they are a great source of information. They're essentially a free college lecture.

 
I can't see a Johnson/Nixon debate. Johnson isn't a smiling photogenic former Frat boy like Kennedy who just got a BJ from some young giggly secretary, he's old school. He has the oratory yes, but could he could come up with it fast enough to really counter Nixon. I really don't think so. I've never really read much about the relationship between Johnson and Nixon either, but I'm sure it wasn't all peaches and cream. I'm just wondering if it is "can't be in the same room with him" or "keeping your mouth shut and go along with the B.S." Johnson's the latter. He did that with everyone, but I don't think Nixon was that way, he didn't have the level of personal connections/manipulation that Johnson did.
 
I can't see a Johnson/Nixon debate. Johnson isn't a smiling photogenic former Frat boy like Kennedy who just got a BJ from some young giggly secretary, he's old school. He has the oratory yes, but could he could come up with it fast enough to really counter Nixon. I really don't think so. I've never really read much about the relationship between Johnson and Nixon either, but I'm sure it wasn't all peaches and cream. I'm just wondering if it is "can't be in the same room with him" or "keeping your mouth shut and go along with the B.S." Johnson's the latter. He did that with everyone, but I don't think Nixon was that way, he didn't have the level of personal connections/manipulation that Johnson did.

The highlighted is incorrect. Oh dear goodness, is it incorrect. In this timeline, I wouldn't be surprised if LBJ's affairs got a fair bit more exposure after his death.
 
The highlighted is incorrect. Oh dear goodness, is it incorrect. In this timeline, I wouldn't be surprised if LBJ's affairs got a fair bit more exposure after his death.
LBJ definetly had affairs. Everyone did. LBJ had fewer than JFK. JFK's basically Austin Powers when it comes to sex. LBJ is well... I think his libido was much smaller than the Kennedy boys.
 
LBJ definetly had affairs. Everyone did. LBJ had fewer than JFK. JFK's basically Austin Powers when it comes to sex. LBJ is well... I think his libido was much smaller than the Kennedy boys.
He became a lot more sexually active once he was in the White House and, if fact, it's commonly believed that part of the reason he did so was that he was trying to "match Kennedy's record." as it were.
 
LBJ definetly had affairs. Everyone did. LBJ had fewer than JFK. JFK's basically Austin Powers when it comes to sex. LBJ is well... I think his libido was much smaller than the Kennedy boys.

LBJ was about as prolific as JFK. LBJ may have been more prolific than JFK. Regardless, he was in the same category in terms of extreme womanizing. And I'll quote Robert Dallek briefly.

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/04/three-new-revelations-about-lbj/377094/
Johnson had "an unfillable hole in his ego," Moyers says. Feelings of emptiness spurred him to eat, drink, and smoke to excess. Sexual conquests also helped to fill the void. He was a competitive womanizer. When people mentioned Kennedy's many affairs, Johnson would bang the table and declare that he had more women by accident than Kennedy ever had on purpose.

Oh God. I just had a thought. LBJ with Marilyn Monroe. *Shudders*
 
Anyway, off the topic of Johnson's genitalia (which, in itself, is an all too Johnson conversation), I agree that a debate would be bad. At worst, harmful. At best, boring. Johnson was not charismatic, and could not deliver a speech well. Frankly, he could, but only if he was telling you that you were a dirty hippie and f*ck you, Vietnam is working. But regardless, he could not deliver prepared words as anything but stiff. Same with Nixon. Frankly, Nixon may be better at a debate than LBJ.
 
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