Preparing for Barbarossa

I've seen it argued sometimes that Stalin was taken by surprise, dismissing reports of the German buildup to invasion as British propaganda. Yet he can hardly have been unaware of Hitler's ultimate intentions, so what could or should he have done that was different from, say the start of 1938?

One strategy that did work out OTL (after a fashion) was to ensure that Germany was at war with Britain and France first. Both he and they would have been willing to let Hitler fight the others first, and hope the result was close enough that they could profit from the result.

Which brings me to another question - is there a possible timeline where the boot is on the other foot, and Hitler launches Barbarossa with at least the acquiescence of Britain and France, if not their actual assistance?
 
Which brings me to another question - is there a possible timeline where the boot is on the other foot, and Hitler launches Barbarossa with at least the acquiescence of Britain and France, if not their actual assistance?

think it would take a Soviet move(s) on the Middle East? and probably coupled with a better German naval performance?
 

Deleted member 1487

Which brings me to another question - is there a possible timeline where the boot is on the other foot, and Hitler launches Barbarossa with at least the acquiescence of Britain and France, if not their actual assistance?
Arguably they would have IOTL if the Polish situation was handled differently. Richard Overy tackled the issue in his bio of Goering and during the diplomatic maneuverings to avert war apparently Goering got the British to agree to pressure the Poles to cut a deal on Danzig and the Corridor, which would have effectively puppetized the Poles economically, and claims that the Poles would have backed down under pressure from Chamberlain, but Hitler declared war anyway before the British could have worked on making the deal happen. So have Hitler listen to Goering and wait, slow walking the economic/political puppetization of Poland and then there is the avenue to the East that Hitler wanted, while Chamberlain's policy on Hitler was basically to direct him East. Public demands for action forced Chamberlain to alter course in his public presentation of policy, but at it's core he was still trying to accommodate Hitler right up to September 1939. Had the deal been cut in 1939 over Poland and Poland increasing forced to do Hitler's bidding, then Poland becomes the highway for the invasion East.

That said it would be pretty obvious what was coming, so Stalin would be more likely to be prepared for such a move in 1940, though with his army not having learned the OTL combat lessons of 1939-40. At that point Germany too is considerably weaker in some ways because of no chance to loot occupied Europe and having to play nice with Poland more so than OTL to avoid antagonizing the Allies, who he'll need to keep passive during TTL's Barbarossa. That is balanced by not being blockaded, having to garrison occupied Europe, having Poland as a puppet of sorts, not having expended the resources and men to conquer Europe and of course the USSR not knowing it's weaknesses or having the T-34/KV-1 in production...though they will still have the Stalin Line intact and benefit from a neutral Baltic states area even if Germany is starting further east in undivided Poland.
 
Goering got the British to agree to pressure the Poles to cut a deal on Danzig and the Corridor, which would have effectively puppetized the Poles economically, and claims that the Poles would have backed down under pressure from Chamberlain

If I were Polish leadership in that case, I would state "publicly" what the British were trying to get them to do (basically puppetize themselves to Germany) and hope that Chamberlain is embarrassed enough to renounce the whole proposed deal. Its pretty obvious to everyone anywhere after Prague March 1939 where this all leads.

If suppose If I were Chamberlain I might say then "privately" that look by 1941 we are through the danger zone (and France too) with our armaments production mature then we can pick fights with less risk (assuming that is his motivation to negotiate with Hitler still, if not he could pretend it is).

Regardless some messy politics, and the Molotov agreement is a bird in the hand for Hitler (the agreement seems a no brainer for the Soviets in this context).
 
Which brings me to another question - is there a possible timeline where the boot is on the other foot, and Hitler launches Barbarossa with at least the acquiescence of Britain and France, if not their actual assistance?

Arguably they would have IOTL if the Polish situation was handled differently ... the British to agree to pressure the Poles to cut a deal on Danzig and the Corridor, which would have effectively puppetized the Poles economically ... Had the deal been cut in 1939 over Poland and Poland increasing forced to do Hitler's bidding, then Poland becomes the highway for the invasion East.

what is a scenario after the fall of France? the Vichy regime would acquiesce and assist if it got the Nazis to withdraw from metropolitan France, but what about the UK?
 
Which brings me to another question - is there a possible timeline where the boot is on the other foot, and Hitler launches Barbarossa with at least the acquiescence of Britain and France, if not their actual assistance?

Acquiescence? Maybe. Assistance? Not unless the Germans are losing so badly that the Anglo-French would probably be better off invading in order to secure a buffer then wasting resources trying to prop-up the Nazis rotten structure.

then Poland becomes the highway for the invasion East.

Given how the poor infrastructure in eastern Poland damaged Soviet forces which moved up to the new border in 1939/40 and then the Germans going the other way in 1941, it would be less of a highway and more of a damp muddy road...
 
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Deleted member 1487

Given how the poor infrastructure in eastern Poland damaged Soviet forces which moved up to the new border in 1939/40 and then the Germans going the other way in 1941, it would be less of a highway and more of a damp muddy road...
Yet they still managed to make it to the gates of Moscow. Without the other fronts the various plans to build up the infrastructure could happen along the entire line instead of only the parts the Germans controlled. That fill in the OTL problematic rail 'gap' in East Poland. In fact that might actually dramatically strengthen Barbarossa logistics as arguably THE major rail bottleneck was specifically that area of East Poland between Brest and Minsk.

what is a scenario after the fall of France? the Vichy regime would acquiesce and assist if it got the Nazis to withdraw from metropolitan France, but what about the UK?
Effectively IOTL Vichy did assist via the occupation payments, rail equipment turned over to Germany (like it or not), PoW/civilian labor and all the captured trucks/weapons/munitions/etc.
I don't know what more Vichy could provide if the Germans left. I found a paper a while back that argued that without the bounty of resources taken from France the long war against the USSR would have been impossible. Not sure if that considers the full changes of the sort of 'what if' I proposed earlier, but at least IOTL occupied Western Europe was a pretty vital source of supplies for Germany and enabled their ability to cope with the blockade and war with 3 major world powers.
 
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Yet they still managed to make it to the gates of Moscow.

Because they were able to easily destroy the otherwise powerful forces that were grossly weakened being pushed west of that infrastructure gap from their own supply bases and the 1941 Germans possessed a logistics park that was about 4.2 times stronger then they possess IATL after scouring Western Europe for supplies and logistical inputs.

Without the other fronts the various plans to build up the infrastructure could happen along the entire line instead of only the parts the Germans controlled. That fill in the OTL problematic rail 'gap' in East Poland. In fact that might actually dramatically strengthen Barbarossa logistics as arguably THE major rail bottleneck was specifically that area of East Poland between Brest and Minsk.

The Germans couldn’t manage to do this OTL in three years with the resources of all of Continental Europe west of the Vistula under their effective control. Now somehow their supposed to do it in less then one year with effectively only the resources of Germany and Poland. Go figure.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Because they were able to easily destroy the otherwise powerful forces that were grossly weakened being pushed west of that infrastructure gap from their own supply bases and the 1941 Germans possessed a logistics park that was about 4.2 times stronger then they possess IATL after scouring Western Europe for supplies and logistical inputs.
It was quite a bit more than logistics that did in the Soviet border forces.
What are you basing that 4.2 times figure on?

The Germans couldn’t manage to do this OTL in three years with the resources of all of Continental Europe west of the Vistula under their effective control. Now somehow their supposed to do it in less then one year with effectively only the resources of Germany and Poland. Go figure.
They were also fighting the British, were blockaded, and of course poured resources into rebuilding their forces after 1941 and launching the 1942 offensive. I'd dispute that they did nothing to improve the rail situation in those three years, but building it up before running major forces is quite a bit different than doing it during a shooting war where there were major competing demands. Plus you can go research how much build up they were able to achieve with work on the part of the Polish rail net they controlled from 1940-41 IOTL, the Otto Programs to get an idea of what they could have done. Of course that was during the blockade and during a shooting war, in the scenario I suggested there wouldn't be any shooting leading up to the invasion of the USSR.
 
It was quite a bit more than logistics that did in the Soviet border forces.

Yes and no. While the manifest flaws of the Red Army in mid-‘41 and skills the German army had learned from the Polish and French campaign meant it would invariably have lost the border battles, the poor logistical position meant the length of time and the amount of damage the Germans took to both their combat and logistical elements were drastically reduced.

What are you basing that 4.2 times figure on?

Size of the German truck park. It’s the one with the easiest numbers available and hence allows for the most direct comparison, at least, and was most critical in supplying the opening phase of Barbarossa up through to August/September.

They were also fighting the British, were blockaded, and of course poured resources into rebuilding their forces after 1941 and launching the 1942 offensive.

The fight with the British (and later the Americans) inflicted a minuscule, when it wasn’t nonexistent, drain on German rail construction and repair resources until late into 1943. The ongoing collapse of German trade that had been underway since the winter of 1938-39, with the disintegration of stuff like the German import-export schemes and MEFO program, would effectively have the same consequences as the historical blockade. In fact, it’d be even worse since the conquests of 1940 allowed Germany to establish such a dominant military position in Europe that it was able to mitigate the worst effects of the blockade by taking physical resources from the territories it conquered and extorting it from the Axis minors and even otherwise neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden all the way into ‘44. IATL, it can’t do any of this and would be facing full collapse of it’s armaments sector by ‘41.

I'd dispute that they did nothing to improve the rail situation in those three years, but building it up before running major forces is quite a bit different than doing it during a shooting war where there were major competing demands. Plus you can go research how much build up they were able to achieve with work on the part of the Polish rail net they controlled from 1940-41 IOTL, the Otto Programs to get an idea of what they could have done. Of course that was during the blockade and during a shooting war, in the scenario I suggested there wouldn't be any shooting leading up to the invasion of the USSR.

Except I didn’t say they did nothing, rather I said what they did manage to do was unable to overcome the problems of the Eastern Polish rail gap. Even the Otto Program’s achievements fell well short of that and was done with much more resources then available to IATL. And if anything, the lack of a shooting war is as much of a hindrance as a help, as it reduces the urgency in addressing the problems and hence the devotion of resources to doing so.
 

Deleted member 1487

Yes and no. While the manifest flaws of the Red Army in mid-‘41 and skills the German army had learned from the Polish and French campaign meant it would invariably have lost the border battles, the poor logistical position meant the length of time and the amount of damage the Germans took to both their combat and logistical elements were drastically reduced.
Don't forget the issue of strategic surprise, mobilization, proximity to German supply hubs/bases, equipment issues, and so much more.
Soviet rail logistics in East Poland, mainly impacting the forces opposite AG-Center, were one of the least important issues and bit the Germans so much more throughout the campaign. They did after all have to supply across it while fighting through it. Then the Soviets still were getting wrecked much deeper in their territory, deep into pre-1939 Soviet territory, while the Germans were supplying through Soviet East Poland and into the USSR proper despite having to change the rail gauge on top of the quality of the roads and rail.

Size of the German truck park. It’s the one with the easiest numbers available and hence allows for the most direct comparison, at least, and was most critical in supplying the opening phase of Barbarossa up through to August/September.
Can you post some numbers that show they increased their motor vehicle park through foreign models by 420%?

The fight with the British (and later the Americans) inflicted a minuscule, when it wasn’t nonexistent, drain on German rail construction and repair resources until late into 1943. The ongoing collapse of German trade that had been underway since the winter of 1938-39, with the disintegration of stuff like the German import-export schemes and MEFO program, would effectively have the same consequences as the historical blockade. In fact, it’d be even worse since the conquests of 1940 allowed Germany to establish such a dominant military position in Europe that it was able to mitigate the worst effects of the blockade by taking physical resources from the territories it conquered and extorting it from the Axis minors and even otherwise neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden all the way into ‘44. IATL, it can’t do any of this and would be facing full collapse of it’s armaments sector by ‘41.
Not sure how you're coming to that conclusion given the impact of the strategic air war in 1941-42, including the diversion of economic resources into air defense, as well as the impact of the blockade on the German/European economy. Rail construction and repair were also tied down managing the situation throughout occupied Europe and Germany and weren't simply free for the Eastern Front; in 1941 the need to divert resources to the USSR to deal with the situation actually had a significant negative impact on the economies of Germany and occupied Europe, especially France.
German trade per-war was not falling apart in terms of the import-export clearing agreements. They were hurt by the cutting of trade with China of course, but the MEFO issue as well as various bond issuances hadn't come to a head by then. If war is declared they could defer those payments for the duration of the conflict, as they were held internally by German banks. And then, as was done IOTL, the war would be financed by taxation and war bonds. Axis minors were paid for their goods during the war, Romanian even held back oil until it got payment in the goods (weapons, coals, steel) it wanted. Switzerland and Sweden were paid for their exports, Switzerland through gold and other currency, Sweden with coal and other trade.

Certainly without conquering Europe they'd be in a worse position and have lower output compared to OTL, but you then have to factor in the other changes: no naval war, no inability to maintain global trade, no occupation expenses (need to feed and supplies the economies of included), no need to finance Italy's war effort, no need to fight Britain with all the expense that cost both to defend Europe against invasion/the air war/the war in the Mediterranean, no losses from fighting the Allies or Poland or in the Balkans, and so forth. IIRC something like >60% of war spending was on fronts other than the Eastern Front.

Except I didn’t say they did nothing, rather I said what they did manage to do was unable to overcome the problems of the Eastern Polish rail gap. Even the Otto Program’s achievements fell well short of that and was done with much more resources then available to IATL. And if anything, the lack of a shooting war is as much of a hindrance as a help, as it reduces the urgency in addressing the problems and hence the devotion of resources to doing so.
What problems were those exactly then? The Otto Program didn't cover Eastern Poland, it was the pre-invasion build up of their part of occupied Poland and was sufficient to cover all their needs, the problem was on the Soviet side of the border. I don't know what being in a shooting war did for speeding up dealing with the logistics in Poland, if anything it only slowed down the build up, as the steel for it went into munitions and replacement equipment lost in France.
 
Don't forget the issue of strategic surprise, mobilization, proximity to German supply hubs/bases, equipment issues, and so much more.

Quite a bit of which are also not really applicable IATL. The strategic surprise is vastly lessened, if not eliminated, the Germans are not as proximate to their supply hubs/bases, the Soviet equipment issues are made much better by being closer to their supply stations and thus having better access to ammo, spare parts, and fuel, and so much more.

Soviet rail logistics in East Poland, mainly impacting the forces opposite AG-Center, were one of the least important issues and bit the Germans so much more throughout the campaign. They did after all have to supply across it while fighting through it. Then the Soviets still were getting wrecked much deeper in their territory, deep into pre-1939 Soviet territory, while the Germans were supplying through Soviet East Poland and into the USSR proper despite having to change the rail gauge on top of the quality of the roads and rail.

By the time the Germans had cleared the Polish rail gap, the Soviet force they were facing were hastily mobilized reservists of much weaker combat value then those they had destroyed along the frontier, yet still gave them significantly more trouble, inflicting greater losses and holding the Germans up for far longer then their counterparts along the border had, owing both to their better supply situation and the worse German one.

Can you post some numbers that show they increased their motor vehicle park through foreign models by 420%?

Standard estimate on the number of motor vehicles for June 1941 is around 650,000 trucks for the Barbarossa forces alone. At the time of the Battle of France it was 140,000. It wasn't ALL foreign models, as German annual production was some 100,000 trucks (although about a quarter of these went into the civilian economy rather then the military), but first, that obviously isn't remotely enough to make up all the difference or even a majority of the difference and, secondly, since the Germans don't have a time machine to steal from themselves in the future, they won't have the vehicles they produced domestically between June 1940 and June 1941 IOTL for the ATL Barbarossa 1940.

Not sure how you're coming to that conclusion given the impact of the strategic air war in 1941-42, including the diversion of economic resources into air defense, as well as the impact of the blockade on the German/European economy. Rail construction and repair were also tied down managing the situation throughout occupied Europe and Germany and weren't simply free for the Eastern Front; in 1941 the need to divert resources to the USSR to deal with the situation actually had a significant negative impact on the economies of Germany and occupied Europe, especially France.

The draw of resources from the strategic air war in 1941-42 were miniscule to nonexistent. The British didn't even commence a sustained air campaign against the Germans until 1942 and even then it didn't reach levels that seriously drew on resources until '43. What's more, what raids did occur in this time period were rarely targeted against transport infrastructure or even much in the way of industry at all, tending to be much more symbolic or experimental (testing out new tactics, equipment, and bombing techniques) then practical. Hence rail construction and repair crews were hardly bothered by it nor were they bothered by the nonexistent need to rebuild the Western European railnet, which had been captured intact and already existed at standards similar to those within Germany. What hurt the Western European rail net in this period wasn't damage to infrastructure the need to divert looted rolling stock and locomotives... which IATL aren't available to the Germans, reducing their ral transport capacity further.

German trade per-war was not falling apart in terms of the import-export clearing agreements.

Yes they were. We've been over this: Tooze lays out in detail how German imports crashed in spring of 1939, with concurrent impact on German production: the Luftwaffe's aluminum access fell by 2/3rds and copper to a measly 1/5th. (Adam Tooze, "The Wages of Destruction," pp. 304-305). Overall German ammunition production had fallen to a mere 25% of 1938 levels by the summer of 1939, again, due to resource shortages. (Tooze, p. 314). Tank, artillery, and small arms production tell similar stories. Only the release of emergency strategic reserves of resources were able to restore the situation and those would have been exhausted by mid-1940, leaving the Germans with nothing left. The knocking out of France and consequent looting of her material stocks was hence a much needed reprieve. Not for nothing is the relevant chapter in Wages of Destruction titled "Going for Broke".

If war is declared they could defer those payments for the duration of the conflict, as they were held internally by German banks

And their imports cease, since those payments were owed to foreign countries and they won't take kindly to Germany not fulfilling their agreed upon trade deals.

Axis minors were paid for their goods during the war, Romanian even held back oil until it got payment in the goods (weapons, coals, steel) it wanted. Switzerland and Sweden were paid for their exports, Switzerland through gold and other currency, Sweden with coal and other trade.

All at extortionate rates so far below the market prices they might as well have been nothing. The fact they were able to barter instead of having to actually pay with much in the way of actual money was purely down to the threat of force and the sheer military dominance over the continent the Germans had managed to establish in the aftermath of the Fall of France.

Certainly without conquering Europe they'd be in a worse position and have lower output compared to OTL, but you then have to factor in the other changes: no naval war, no inability to maintain global trade, no occupation expenses (need to feed and supplies the economies of included), no need to finance Italy's war effort, no need to fight Britain with all the expense that cost both to defend Europe against invasion/the air war/the war in the Mediterranean, no losses from fighting the Allies or Poland or in the Balkans, and so forth.

All of which were miniscule drains compared to the war in the east in '41-'42 and which certainly weren't more then the windfall from the conquest of Western Europe, which sustained the German war effort through the vastly more costly periods of 1943-44, when the drains from both the war against the Soviets and the other fronts were vastly larger.

IIRC something like >60% of war spending was on fronts other than the Eastern Front.

A number you pulled from nothing, particularly when it comes to the most critical years of 1941-42.

What problems were those exactly then?

Same as those faced in 1941: an inability to ship adequate amounts to cover all needs, requiring the Germans to be selective and prioritize what they shipped.

The Otto Program didn't cover Eastern Poland, it was the pre-invasion build up of their part of occupied Poland and was sufficient to cover all their needs, the problem was on the Soviet side of the border I don't know what being in a shooting war did for speeding up dealing with the logistics in Poland, if anything it only slowed down the build up, as the steel for it went into munitions and replacement equipment lost in France.

I never said anything about the Otto Program not covering Eastern Poland or not, merely observing that the resources devoted would not have brought up Eastern Poland. Certainly, Germany couldn't expend those resources on Eastern Poland without denying them to the build-up of the rail-net in western Poland, rendering the whole exercise pointless. Most of the need to replace munitions and equipment were trivial expenses, as losses in France had been very low and were basically paid for themselves by the profits of the early conquest with vast surpluses. That much of the motorization of the German railway repair corps that was managed to be motorized (which proved to be inadequate) was done with captured Western European vehicles shows that claim that it cost German rail crews more then they gained is frankly bunk.
 
Arguably they would have IOTL if the Polish situation was handled differently. Richard Overy tackled the issue in his bio of Goering and during the diplomatic maneuverings to avert war apparently Goering got the British to agree to pressure the Poles to cut a deal on Danzig and the Corridor, which would have effectively puppetized the Poles economically, and claims that the Poles would have backed down under pressure from Chamberlain, but Hitler declared war anyway before the British could have worked on making the deal happen. So have Hitler listen to Goering and wait, slow walking the economic/political puppetization of Poland and then there is the avenue to the East that Hitler wanted, while Chamberlain's policy on Hitler was basically to direct him East. Public demands for action forced Chamberlain to alter course in his public presentation of policy, but at it's core he was still trying to accommodate Hitler right up to September 1939. Had the deal been cut in 1939 over Poland and Poland increasing forced to do Hitler's bidding, then Poland becomes the highway for the invasion East.

That said it would be pretty obvious what was coming, so Stalin would be more likely to be prepared for such a move in 1940, though with his army not having learned the OTL combat lessons of 1939-40. At that point Germany too is considerably weaker in some ways because of no chance to loot occupied Europe and having to play nice with Poland more so than OTL to avoid antagonizing the Allies, who he'll need to keep passive during TTL's Barbarossa. That is balanced by not being blockaded, having to garrison occupied Europe, having Poland as a puppet of sorts, not having expended the resources and men to conquer Europe and of course the USSR not knowing it's weaknesses or having the T-34/KV-1 in production...though they will still have the Stalin Line intact and benefit from a neutral Baltic states area even if Germany is starting further east in undivided Poland.

This is a TL that avoids the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, then? Has Stalin been left without a deal here with neither Germany or the Western Allies?

In this scenario we could also consider some other ramifications. For one thing, the entire Nordic area will be unoccupied and some shade of neutral here, instead of Denmark and Norway being occupied by Germany, and Finland being a German ally. Without the MR pact, TTL avoided the Winter War, and lessened the pressure Stalin has put on the Baltics as well. Sweden's and Finland's comparative positions are better in terms of trying to make independent policy decisions, and with Norway unoccupied, both have also a better chance of trading with countries outside the Baltic Sea. As a comparison, Germany is likely receiving less Swedish iron ore and ball bearings, and less Finnish nickel and molybdenum, as well. There will be less Finnish wood products (timber, paper, etc) arriving to Germany, too. Or, at the very least, Germany is paying more for these resources from the Nordic area.

Without war in the West, the Germans can use more Kriegsmarine assets on the Baltic. Given, though, that the Red Banner Baltic Fleet will likely just withdraw to Kronstadt and heavily mine its home waters, it is not easy to see how the additional German ships could be used to major advantage. Trying to sortie to the Gulf of Finland in force would likely just mean heavy losses to mines, submarines and MTBs, etc. Maybe the Germans could try more amphibious attacks in the Baltic coast than IOTL to manage some surprises and help reach Leningrad early.

On the other hand, Stalin's USSR benefits from a peaceful northwestern flank. Without the Germans in Norway and Finland, Murmansk and the Murmansk railway are not threatened. Leningrad is not threatened from the north and northwest, but instead the USSR will even be able to conduct some (necessarily) limited trade through neutral Finland. Less troops than IOTL will be needed all along the Finnish border from Leningrad to the Arctic Sea, and additionally the USSR avoids the manpower losses (dead, injured and POW) of the Winter War and the early Continuation War. By 1942, this would mean saving at the very least half a million Soviet soldiers. The USSR will not be losing a big chunk of Karelia to foreign occupation, either This is not a major issue resource-wise, but it would help in terms of morale and keeping the homefront somewhat more cohesive.
 
In the USSR from 1938 swich the focus of all major exercizes and trainning to in depth defence, make plans for counter attacks at expected favorable areas and train them. Also from 1938 start the dislocation of industrial centers to the east.
Get purged people out of jail and camps faster. Back Polikarpovs new I-180 in 1938 and later the I-185 in 1941. Buy building licenses for better aircraft engines regardless of cost. Cancel the BB and BC naval programs, etc.
In the USSR, after 1939 - Plan to keep the main defensive line on the 1938 lines and use delaying tatics in Poland after you've taken half of it. Prepare an extensive counter mobility plan in Poland so that as your covering forces withraw to the main defensive line they blow up bridges, railway junctions, etc.
 
In the USSR from 1938 swich the focus of all major exercizes and trainning to in depth defence, make plans for counter attacks at expected favorable areas and train them. Also from 1938 start the dislocation of industrial centers to the east.
Get purged people out of jail and camps faster. Back Polikarpovs new I-180 in 1938 and later the I-185 in 1941. Buy building licenses for better aircraft engines regardless of cost. Cancel the BB and BC naval programs, etc.
In the USSR, after 1939 - Plan to keep the main defensive line on the 1938 lines and use delaying tatics in Poland after you've taken half of it. Prepare an extensive counter mobility plan in Poland so that as your covering forces withraw to the main defensive line they blow up bridges, railway junctions, etc.

All this probably could be done, but how likely would Stalin realistically do this, even if he is sure a German attack is coming, but without foreknowledge about how the early parts of Barbarossa turned out IOTL?
Would 1938 Stalin, for example, be amenable to accept the idea that in the upcoming war the Germans would likely occupy as big a part of the USSR as they did of the Russian Empire by 1918, or would he be too hung up by the idea that the modern, mechanized Red Army will stop them much earlier than that?
 
All this probably could be done, but how likely would Stalin realistically do this, even if he is sure a German attack is coming, but without foreknowledge about how the early parts of Barbarossa turned out IOTL?
Would 1938 Stalin, for example, be amenable to accept the idea that in the upcoming war the Germans would likely occupy as big a part of the USSR as they did of the Russian Empire by 1918, or would he be too hung up by the idea that the modern, mechanized Red Army will stop them much earlier than that?
OTL the USSR built border defenses from 1928 (The Stalin line). When they occupied Poland they built a new line of defenses on the new borde (the molotov line)r. What I'm suggesting is a in depth defense option that regards occupied Poland as a buffer zone. They should plan for a delaying action and a vast counter mobility plan in Poland, and keep on strenghening the Stalin line while preparing pre planned counter attacks for predictable German penetration of the line.
The goal is to have the German Army, once and breaks the Stalin line, weaker and with worst logistics than OTL.
The strategic plan (and the sales pitch) would be to go on the offensive once the Germans are weakened enough.
Basically to go for a better planned, and compressed (both in time and space), version of OTL events.
 
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