You got a source for that as none of my books use it for incendiaries, just blast bombs. Now a Heavy often carried a cookie + incendiaries load but that's the nearest I can find. Pathfinders however did not carry either, they had various flare packages (either to illuminate or Target Indicate). Even if a raid was all Mosquito, the bombs were carried by separate aircraft who dropped on the flares (or at a given offset).
PQ 17.5
- Thread starter johnboy
- Start date
Nope. Cookie refers specifically to the 4000lb H.C.
What does he have to say on the subject of Burnett? I understood him from his command of the Belfast cruiser squadron at North Cape to be a competent if not particularly inspired or daring officer who managed to hold Scharnhorst to account long enough for Duke of York to arrive?
In chapter 4 he writes of his meeting with Burnett post pq17 in which he and the other home fleet destroyer captains were interviewed by Burnett
'we filed into his cabin led by Alistair Ewing of the Offa.
He said "Why did you leave the convoy?"
Ewing replied, flushing, "because we received an order
Burnett said "Well, I suppose it would be difficult for you to disobey an order"
There was a pause. Ewing must have seen from our faces the explosion that was coming, and said with quiet dignity, "I think we would like to go' and we all filed out of the cabin.
Safe to say that Hill had little or no respect for Burnett or indeed shore based staff. This was reinforced by his experience on Operation Tunnel and the loss of the Charybdis
Later on after Pq17 he returns to Scapa to work up the U class destroyer HMS Grenville and is greeted with an effusive welcome from Burnett saying how pleased he is to have Hill back in his command etc (this is after Hill had won a DSO for saving the Ohio on the Pedestal convoy). Hill's two word response was 'thank you'. He is clear in his biography that this was intended to make a point.
'we filed into his cabin led by Alistair Ewing of the Offa.
He said "Why did you leave the convoy?"
Ewing replied, flushing, "because we received an order
Burnett said "Well, I suppose it would be difficult for you to disobey an order"
There was a pause. Ewing must have seen from our faces the explosion that was coming, and said with quiet dignity, "I think we would like to go' and we all filed out of the cabin.
Safe to say that Hill had little or no respect for Burnett or indeed shore based staff. This was reinforced by his experience on Operation Tunnel and the loss of the Charybdis
Later on after Pq17 he returns to Scapa to work up the U class destroyer HMS Grenville and is greeted with an effusive welcome from Burnett saying how pleased he is to have Hill back in his command etc (this is after Hill had won a DSO for saving the Ohio on the Pedestal convoy). Hill's two word response was 'thank you'. He is clear in his biography that this was intended to make a point.
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My understanding of cookies was that they were intended to remove tiles and roofs to increase the effectiveness of the incendry bombs
The bomb is often known as a HC or High capacity in most documents I have seen - but I have always known them as 'cookies'
From what I understand there was only the one 4000 pound type and when you see 8000 HC bombs or cookies there were actually 2 x 4000 pound devices fitted together
This link may be of interest (it uses the term HC and Cookie for the same device although usually HC)
Mind you had this landed next to the young ladies in the story then....well.....
The bomb is often known as a HC or High capacity in most documents I have seen - but I have always known them as 'cookies'
From what I understand there was only the one 4000 pound type and when you see 8000 HC bombs or cookies there were actually 2 x 4000 pound devices fitted together
This link may be of interest (it uses the term HC and Cookie for the same device although usually HC)
Mind you had this landed next to the young ladies in the story then....well.....
1312 27 June 1942, - PQ 17(.5) Order of Battle
Allied Order of Battle PQ 17.5
CONVOY PQ17
(Commodore John C. K. Dowding)
Total: 39 Ships
36 merchant ships (25 U.S., 8 U.K., 2 Soviet, 1 Dutch); 3 rescue ships (U.K.)
MERCHANT SHIPS
Alcoa Ranger (U.S.), Azerbaijan (Soviet), Bellingham (U.S.), Benjamin Harrison (U.S.), Bolton Castle (U.K.), Carlton (U.S.), Christopher Newport (U.S.), Daniel Morgan (U.S.),
Donbass (Soviet), Earlston (U.K.), El Capitan (U.S.), Empire Byron (U.K.), Empire Tide (U.K.), Exford (U.S.), Fairfield City (U.S.), Hartlebury (U.K.), Honomu (U.S.), Hoosier (U.S.), Ironclad (U.S.), John Witherspoon (U.S.), Navarino (U.K.), Ocean Freedom (U.K.), Olopana (U.S.), Pan Atlantic (U.S.), Pan Kraft (U.S.), Paulus Potter (Dutch), Peter Kerr (U.S.),
Richard Bland (U.S.), River Afton (U.K.), Samuel Chase (U.S.), Silver Sword (U.S.), Troubador (U.S.), Washington (U.S.), West Gotomska (U.S.), William Hooper (U.S.),
Winston-Salem (U.S.)
RESCUE SHIPS (all U.K.)
Rathlin, Zaafaranm, Zamalek
CONVOY SCREEN
(Commander John E. Broome, RN, in Keppel)
LONG-RANGE ESCORTS
6 destroyers: Fury, Keppel, Leamington, Ledbury, Offa, Wilton
2 submarines: P614, P615
A/S SCREEN (all British unless noted)
4 corvettes: Dianella, Lotus, Poppy; La Malouine (Free French)
4 A/S trawlers: Ayrshire, Lord Austin, Lord Middleton, Northern Gem 23
2 auxiliary AA vessels: Palomares, Pozarica
4 minesweepers: Bramble, Britomart, Leda, Salamander
SUPPLY GROUP—FORCE Q
(All British)
3 fleet oilers: Grey Ranger, Aldersdale, Gray
1 destroyer: Douglas
CRUISER COVERING FORCE—CRUISER SQUADRON 1 (CS 1)
(Rear Admiral Louis K. Hamilton, RN, in London)
4 heavy cruisers
2 British: London, Norfolk, 2 U.S.: Tuscaloosa, Wichita
3 destroyers
1 British: Somali, 2 U.S.: Rowan, Wainwright
BATTLE FLEET
(Admiral Sir John Tovey, CINC Home Fleet, in Duke of York)
2 battleships
1 British: Duke of York, 1 U.S.: Washington (Rear Admiral R. C. Giffen—TF 39)
1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (Vice Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser)
2 heavy cruisers: Cumberland, Berwick
1 light cruiser: Nigeria
12 destroyers: 10 British: Ashanti, Blankney, Escapade, Faulknor, Marne, Martin, Middleton, Onslaught, Onslow, Wheatland, 2 U.S.: Mayrant, Rhind
SUBMARINES
8 British: Sahib, Sea Wolf, Sturgeon, Tribune, Trident, Unrivalled, Unshaken, Ursula, 1 Free French: Minerve, 5 Soviet: K2, K22, P2 Zvezda, S-56, S-54
German Order of Battle PQ 17.5
1ST COMBAT GROUP (I KAMPFGRUPPE) (TRONDHEIM)
(Admiral Otto Schniewind in Tirpitz)
2 battleships: Tirpitz, Bismarck
2 heavy cruisers: Admiral Hipper, Seydlitz
1 light cruiser: Koln
7 destroyers:
5th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-14 (Flag) Friedrich Ihn, Z-4 Richard Beitzen, Z15 Erich Steinbrinck, Z16 Friedrich Eckoldt
6th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-20 (Flag) Karl Galster, Z-10 Hans Lody, Z-6 Theodor Riedel
2ND COMBAT GROUP (II KAMPFGRUPPE) (NARVIK)
(Vice-Admiral Oskar Kummetz in Lutzow)
2 pocket battleships: Lützow, Admiral Scheer
8TH DESTROYER FLOTILLA
5 destroyers: Z-28 (Flag), Z-24, Z-27, Z-29, Z-30
2 torpedo boats: T-7, T-15
1 oiler: Dithmarschen
9 U-boats: U-88, U-251, U-255, U-334, U-355, U-376, U-456, U-457, U-703
ESCORT GROUP (OSLO)
4 torpedo boats: Lowe, Tiger, Leopard, Panther
5TH AIR FLEET, LUFTWAFFE (Bf 109 fighter aircraft not listed)
Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (Oslo)
16 Bf 110 long range fighters
103 Ju 88 bombers
42 He 111 torpedo bombers
15 He 115 seaplane torpedo bombers
30 Ju 87 dive-bombers
11 He-177 large bombers
22 BV 138 seaplane reconnaissance
33 FW 200 Condor reconnaissance
12 Ju-86P reconnaissance
7 Marinens Flyvebaatfabrikk M.F.11 reconnaissance
NOTE: Many of the bombers listed are in the South of Norway, so not all will be available to use against PQ17(.5)
CONVOY PQ17
(Commodore John C. K. Dowding)
Total: 39 Ships
36 merchant ships (25 U.S., 8 U.K., 2 Soviet, 1 Dutch); 3 rescue ships (U.K.)
MERCHANT SHIPS
Alcoa Ranger (U.S.), Azerbaijan (Soviet), Bellingham (U.S.), Benjamin Harrison (U.S.), Bolton Castle (U.K.), Carlton (U.S.), Christopher Newport (U.S.), Daniel Morgan (U.S.),
Donbass (Soviet), Earlston (U.K.), El Capitan (U.S.), Empire Byron (U.K.), Empire Tide (U.K.), Exford (U.S.), Fairfield City (U.S.), Hartlebury (U.K.), Honomu (U.S.), Hoosier (U.S.), Ironclad (U.S.), John Witherspoon (U.S.), Navarino (U.K.), Ocean Freedom (U.K.), Olopana (U.S.), Pan Atlantic (U.S.), Pan Kraft (U.S.), Paulus Potter (Dutch), Peter Kerr (U.S.),
Richard Bland (U.S.), River Afton (U.K.), Samuel Chase (U.S.), Silver Sword (U.S.), Troubador (U.S.), Washington (U.S.), West Gotomska (U.S.), William Hooper (U.S.),
Winston-Salem (U.S.)
RESCUE SHIPS (all U.K.)
Rathlin, Zaafaranm, Zamalek
CONVOY SCREEN
(Commander John E. Broome, RN, in Keppel)
LONG-RANGE ESCORTS
6 destroyers: Fury, Keppel, Leamington, Ledbury, Offa, Wilton
2 submarines: P614, P615
A/S SCREEN (all British unless noted)
4 corvettes: Dianella, Lotus, Poppy; La Malouine (Free French)
4 A/S trawlers: Ayrshire, Lord Austin, Lord Middleton, Northern Gem 23
2 auxiliary AA vessels: Palomares, Pozarica
4 minesweepers: Bramble, Britomart, Leda, Salamander
SUPPLY GROUP—FORCE Q
(All British)
3 fleet oilers: Grey Ranger, Aldersdale, Gray
1 destroyer: Douglas
CRUISER COVERING FORCE—CRUISER SQUADRON 1 (CS 1)
(Rear Admiral Louis K. Hamilton, RN, in London)
4 heavy cruisers
2 British: London, Norfolk, 2 U.S.: Tuscaloosa, Wichita
3 destroyers
1 British: Somali, 2 U.S.: Rowan, Wainwright
BATTLE FLEET
(Admiral Sir John Tovey, CINC Home Fleet, in Duke of York)
2 battleships
1 British: Duke of York, 1 U.S.: Washington (Rear Admiral R. C. Giffen—TF 39)
1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (Vice Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser)
2 heavy cruisers: Cumberland, Berwick
1 light cruiser: Nigeria
12 destroyers: 10 British: Ashanti, Blankney, Escapade, Faulknor, Marne, Martin, Middleton, Onslaught, Onslow, Wheatland, 2 U.S.: Mayrant, Rhind
SUBMARINES
8 British: Sahib, Sea Wolf, Sturgeon, Tribune, Trident, Unrivalled, Unshaken, Ursula, 1 Free French: Minerve, 5 Soviet: K2, K22, P2 Zvezda, S-56, S-54
German Order of Battle PQ 17.5
1ST COMBAT GROUP (I KAMPFGRUPPE) (TRONDHEIM)
(Admiral Otto Schniewind in Tirpitz)
2 battleships: Tirpitz, Bismarck
2 heavy cruisers: Admiral Hipper, Seydlitz
1 light cruiser: Koln
7 destroyers:
5th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-14 (Flag) Friedrich Ihn, Z-4 Richard Beitzen, Z15 Erich Steinbrinck, Z16 Friedrich Eckoldt
6th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-20 (Flag) Karl Galster, Z-10 Hans Lody, Z-6 Theodor Riedel
2ND COMBAT GROUP (II KAMPFGRUPPE) (NARVIK)
(Vice-Admiral Oskar Kummetz in Lutzow)
2 pocket battleships: Lützow, Admiral Scheer
8TH DESTROYER FLOTILLA
5 destroyers: Z-28 (Flag), Z-24, Z-27, Z-29, Z-30
2 torpedo boats: T-7, T-15
1 oiler: Dithmarschen
9 U-boats: U-88, U-251, U-255, U-334, U-355, U-376, U-456, U-457, U-703
ESCORT GROUP (OSLO)
4 torpedo boats: Lowe, Tiger, Leopard, Panther
5TH AIR FLEET, LUFTWAFFE (Bf 109 fighter aircraft not listed)
Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (Oslo)
16 Bf 110 long range fighters
103 Ju 88 bombers
42 He 111 torpedo bombers
15 He 115 seaplane torpedo bombers
30 Ju 87 dive-bombers
11 He-177 large bombers
22 BV 138 seaplane reconnaissance
33 FW 200 Condor reconnaissance
12 Ju-86P reconnaissance
7 Marinens Flyvebaatfabrikk M.F.11 reconnaissance
NOTE: Many of the bombers listed are in the South of Norway, so not all will be available to use against PQ17(.5)
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This was a weakness of the turtleback design, which other navies had moved on from post WW1. That's the problem with having your design team dispersed for 15 years.
1312 27 June 1942, - There are some concerns
1312 27 June 1942, Battleship Tirpitz, Trondheim, Occupied Norway
Vizeadmiral Otto Schniewind considered the forces under his command as he watched the two torpedo boats depart. With the confirmation from Kapitän zur See Friedrich Hüffmeier's light cruiser Koln that she and her two escorting destroyers had made harbour in Oslo, he had detached the two boats North to join forces with Vice-Admiral Oskar Kummetz's forces in Narvik. When the other three ships arrived, he would have eight escorts, including Koln. That was enough.
Now that Hitler had removed the navy's hand-break, he was quite determined to close with the British and do as much damage as possible to the convoy expected soon. Yet, he was also conscious that he was the custodian of virtually all of Germany's surface warfare power, aside from the two battlecruisers bottled up in French harbours. Tirpitz represented 43,000 tons of the best of German engineering, yet he was aware that she did have flaws.
The design of Tirpitz and her sister should have made use of dual purpose guns as occurred in other navies. Then there was the fact that, although Tirpitz's 37mm light AA had been increased, it was still hand loaded, a new weapon only being "in development". The lack of pumps and valves for fuel protection and transfer in Bismarck, shown after her damage, had been corrected in Tirpitz.
There were other aspects of Tirpitz's design that, whilst not weaknesses per see, suited her to certain types of combat. The battleships guns were as good as any afloat, but the same could not be said for her protection scheme. It was designed for combat in the North Atlantic, her designers anticipating wet weather and indifferent visibility conditions . As a result, she was optimized for short-range, flat-trajectory combat. Her armor scheme reflected this, with an armor layout that made it very hard to penetrate her vitals at short range. However, her deck armour was less than other contemporaries, but was vulnerable to long-range fire, reducing the total amount of protected volume in the vessel by carrying her armor deck lower in the ship than her contemporaries. In fact, her deck armour was not much more than half that of the latest Italian ships. Likewise, her underwater belt was, in his opinion, too shallow.
Vizeadmiral Otto Schniewind considered the forces under his command as he watched the two torpedo boats depart. With the confirmation from Kapitän zur See Friedrich Hüffmeier's light cruiser Koln that she and her two escorting destroyers had made harbour in Oslo, he had detached the two boats North to join forces with Vice-Admiral Oskar Kummetz's forces in Narvik. When the other three ships arrived, he would have eight escorts, including Koln. That was enough.
Now that Hitler had removed the navy's hand-break, he was quite determined to close with the British and do as much damage as possible to the convoy expected soon. Yet, he was also conscious that he was the custodian of virtually all of Germany's surface warfare power, aside from the two battlecruisers bottled up in French harbours. Tirpitz represented 43,000 tons of the best of German engineering, yet he was aware that she did have flaws.
The design of Tirpitz and her sister should have made use of dual purpose guns as occurred in other navies. Then there was the fact that, although Tirpitz's 37mm light AA had been increased, it was still hand loaded, a new weapon only being "in development". The lack of pumps and valves for fuel protection and transfer in Bismarck, shown after her damage, had been corrected in Tirpitz.
There were other aspects of Tirpitz's design that, whilst not weaknesses per see, suited her to certain types of combat. The battleships guns were as good as any afloat, but the same could not be said for her protection scheme. It was designed for combat in the North Atlantic, her designers anticipating wet weather and indifferent visibility conditions . As a result, she was optimized for short-range, flat-trajectory combat. Her armor scheme reflected this, with an armor layout that made it very hard to penetrate her vitals at short range. However, her deck armour was less than other contemporaries, but was vulnerable to long-range fire, reducing the total amount of protected volume in the vessel by carrying her armor deck lower in the ship than her contemporaries. In fact, her deck armour was not much more than half that of the latest Italian ships. Likewise, her underwater belt was, in his opinion, too shallow.
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1412 27 June 1942, - Departure
1412, 27 June 1942, SS River Afton, Hvalfjord, Occupied Iceland
"Jack" Dowding watched as the convoy formed up to steam out. This could be a dodgy one. He had 35 merchant ships, 6 destroyers, 11 escort vessels and 2 anti-aircraft ships to organize and get on their way. The covering force seemed more than adequate, yet, for all that, there were issues.
Intelligence indicated that the Germans had been steadily reinforcing their fleet in Northern Norway and they were certainly not putting their ships so far North for the clean air. Any German forces would operate close to the Norwegian coast, with support of shore-based air and U-boats. Allied forces would have no such luxury, with a potential return distance of over 1000 nautical miles. The convoy's cruiser covering force had been instructed not to go East of Bear Island, unless the convoy was threatened by the presence of a surface force. They were not to go beyond 25° East under any circumstance, equating to a point South of Svalbard. However, the German surface forces, if they sortied, could attack much further East than that.
Dowling had little confidence that the decoy convoy that left on the 25th would attract much attention, any more than the returning convoy QP 13. The Germans were too canny to waste resources sinking empty ships. Little could be expected from the Soviet Northern Fleet, which consisted of nothing larger than a destroyer.
PQ 17 in harbour
"Jack" Dowding watched as the convoy formed up to steam out. This could be a dodgy one. He had 35 merchant ships, 6 destroyers, 11 escort vessels and 2 anti-aircraft ships to organize and get on their way. The covering force seemed more than adequate, yet, for all that, there were issues.
Intelligence indicated that the Germans had been steadily reinforcing their fleet in Northern Norway and they were certainly not putting their ships so far North for the clean air. Any German forces would operate close to the Norwegian coast, with support of shore-based air and U-boats. Allied forces would have no such luxury, with a potential return distance of over 1000 nautical miles. The convoy's cruiser covering force had been instructed not to go East of Bear Island, unless the convoy was threatened by the presence of a surface force. They were not to go beyond 25° East under any circumstance, equating to a point South of Svalbard. However, the German surface forces, if they sortied, could attack much further East than that.
Dowling had little confidence that the decoy convoy that left on the 25th would attract much attention, any more than the returning convoy QP 13. The Germans were too canny to waste resources sinking empty ships. Little could be expected from the Soviet Northern Fleet, which consisted of nothing larger than a destroyer.
PQ 17 in harbour
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Like it! So what’s gonna make convoy 17 a little different in this timeline?
Just a question for you John, since we seem to be sailing in the same ocean. I posted a thread (https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ion-of-murmansk-and-the-kola-penisula.535458/) that has had very little response about thoughts of a successful German attack on the Kola Peninsula and occupation of Murmansk. I was wondering if you had any takes on such a subject in your research on this thread and the topic of the Russian convoys and this would have been one of its main strategic impacts. Regards Tangles.
I think they would have been hard pushed to get anywhere TBH. They achieved very little on land, not helped by either the half hearted attitude of the Finnish or the sheer inexperience in these sort of conditions of many German units. I think to take Murmansk any other way would need a combination of a combined amphibious and aerial assault using paratroops. The former the Germans were hopelessly untrained in, witness their shambolic plans for Sealion. Plus, the gulf was heavily mined inshore.
Not so much a couple of insignificant extra units, more the fact that the German surface units have the handbrake off. Of course, that was also the case later in 1942 and their performance was poor. Of course, as the war went on the German Navy became more inferior, not only in terms of tech like radar, but also due to the fact the surface units were swinging at anchor, a clear morale sapper.
Wait a second shouldn't those new orders the surface fleet has be found out about by the allies and the overall escort force beefed up?
They are not new orders, merely a removal of the requirement to consult Hitler before a sortie. Doesn't really give away much. "Knight's move" was already planned before that time.
I think taking Murmansk would have been pretty difficult. A more likely outcome of better German performance on that front would have been an advance to where the railroad was in artillery range. That could significantly delay cargo from the port reaching the rest of the USSR until they could drive the Germans back.
Quite honestly, I get Burnett's point here. The RN's tradition of rules-lawyering all the way from Drake by way of Vian to PQ17 and Leo Gradwell runs deep. Obviously that they were under direct instruction from 1SL to abandon the convoy adds more weight to their orders, however I suspect Burnett would have been quite happy had a destroyer captain suffered a mysterious radio failure, interference or suchlike and remained with the merchants.
1812 28 June 1942, - Koln arrives
1812 28 June 1942, cruiser Koln, Trondheim, Occupied Norway
Kapitän zur See Friedrich Hüffmeier's light cruiser Koln anchored in the Fjord, her two companion destroyers having already done so. The German naval forces were in their planned distributions for Operation Rösselsprung, with both ships being fully ready for action from the following morning, after refueling.
Kapitän zur See Friedrich Hüffmeier's light cruiser Koln anchored in the Fjord, her two companion destroyers having already done so. The German naval forces were in their planned distributions for Operation Rösselsprung, with both ships being fully ready for action from the following morning, after refueling.
well i don't think koln should be able to survive the weather let alone the enemy. the germans really built that class of cruisers way too lightly