Powerful pre-WW2 chinese navy?

Thanks for your input all.

I have found another link which perhaps might be of interest to some of you here regarding China and various aspects of it's naval history:
https://rwhiston.wordpress.com/2010/04/15/5/

More or less in line and with more detail with what I have written in this thread.

Assuming China somehow avoids getting involved in WW1 on the wrong side, it must also somehow avoid getting into a war with Japan (so it can continue to develop and enlarge this navy). I have read both here and other places regarding the "21 demands" of 1915 which apparently irked the UK and US, so if China plays it's card right in this ATL, they might jump to declare themselves on the side of the Entente, maybe even send some token troops and ships to Europe, what will the japanese do then if China flatly refuse the demands, go to war against China and risk themselves in a war with the Entente and probably the americans? I can see the two sides trying to get into the favours of the Entente, if China sends troops and ships then Japan will likely increase it's own commitments too.

This brings up a problem Yüan Shih-k'ai is a bottleneck. He has to go. I don't know who can replace him. I do know that Chiang kai Chek knows as much about sea-power and how to attain and apply it as the mythical man in the moon. The best answer I mean here is that China cannot look beyond herself to attain any form of sea-power. She has to attain for herself the basic tools and then build from her native base the fleet you want her to have in the OP. That is, the problem defined, going to be difficult. Every other power has at least a 100 year lead in the learning curve. The Japanese seem to have truncated the process, 1868-1908 (50 years), but realistically they imported the industrial revolution and the social system about the same time China went shopping for the polyglot fleet that she did not know how to use. China did not embrace the social change that she needed to figure out how to build European style institutions that go with European style technology. And she did not create a technology of her own to compete with the foreign devils.

Politically, i can see this increasingly powerful China standing up to Japan as being seen useful by the western empires (UK, US, France), as long as they are busy with each other it removes the threat to their own interests in the region, so they will likely do their best to manipulate the rivalry between China and Japan, but probably aiming not to give one or the other side the edge.

Politically, the current modern China, which is trying in the 21st century to pull a Tokugawa reform movement on its own (Zhou en Lai around 1974) in reaction to the Maoist revanchist Doaist style Great Leap Forward, is as I've earlier noted, is about where the Japanese were in WW I. This is not a good thing. Two choices as you point out, lie before China and it is a coin flip to see which way it will go.

We can attempt a PoD around 1909 and suppose Sun Yat Sen will absorb more of his Hawaiian experience than he did. He can be faulted for trusting Yüan Shih-k'ai and thus continuing and accelerating the very Manchu (Qing) corruptions that make 1920s China such an interesting criminal sociology study. If Sun Yat Sen can be convinced either by a trusted foreign advisor or by his own inner circle to do a Lenin, it will be hard on the ruling elite, and it will take on some of the attributes of the Russian Revolution, but the end result is a clean slate start that China can make around 1922 or ten years after the first attempt to govern. That is about how long a civil war should take before the KMT has the core areas of China under control.

This will be anathema to Japan and to many western nations. But we are addressing what is in China's best interests. As with many socialist revolutions, the top down control will be imposed by totalitarian means and by totalitarian ideologues. The tools, the Kuomintang and the army will tend to be the apparatii that will first benefit from the social and technological dislocations. Notice that China will not be a participant in WW I, except insofar as the Entente operates to neutralize German operations in China proper.

Any military issues the Chinese government addresses in its first plan will be to establish sovereignty where it can. Following the traditional Chinese model, this will be harassment, internal blockade and eventual waiting out the Xi Yang Gui Zi or (Yankees to befuddled Americans.) until they leave. (Hong Kong is a modern example.).

The KMT government (1928) can now theoretically go shop for its industrial base. They should look for things a government intent on asserting its sovereignty needs to have as tools. The shopping list is surprisingly not going to be naval per se, but more land oriented. The central government needs foundries, steel mills and at least a small precision tool and milling machine base. Guns from small arms to artillery first. Then aircraft and then automotive technology. In that order. Along with this base, China must send its best and brightest to friendly western societies to learn how the West does things. These Chinese must return and become the new technoratii, who will design and build the first Chinese versions of the formidable western tools.

In the interim, the Chinese, hire foreign experts to teach how to run, but not own the new Chinese tech base. Projected completion of these measures? 1938. Ambitious. From 1938, possibly 1935, the KMT can think about building a navy.

Anyway, to more technical matters, apart from the ships they could possibly have gotten before WW1 listed in the previous link, after the war i was looking at what possibilities there were to obtain truly modern ships, and there are lots: from Germany, any of the unfinished Mackensens, Sachsen etc., from Italy the Caracciolos, from France the Normadies, from UK some of the Hoods(!), and/or some of the follies, maybe some from the US too, not to mention many other options for second hand capital ships, as well as cruisers, destroyers, subs and other craft. Of course, money could be a problem, together with the willingness (or being allowed to in case of Germany) of some of these countries to sell to China, but then in the post-war period, any amount of chinese money would be a godsend for any of these countries.

One market only. Hired experts and it will be the United States. Not because the United States is a friend, or any less imperialist than any other nation infringing on Chinese sovereignty, but because the Americans are Japan's enemy, and "enemy of my enemy" is so Chinese.

Also, if China would go this way, surely sooner or later they would have modern shipyards built to be able to progressively built ships of all classes in the country. Could that China possibly become a naval powerhouse like it is today? Not impossible i would say.

Can China become a naval power capable of self defense? 1940 maybe. If the KMT pays attention to first things first. Build the army and the air forces to protect the core sovereignty, then look at the seas.
 
Aircraft lay mines. I could have used the US minelaying campaign against Japan (paralyzed some sub bases). Britain chose roof-breakers. Look at that tunnel system (see above). placing a charge at the exit; (parachute laid mine) is a guaranteed killer. Done by bomber. The British preferred to do it the hardest way.

Mines can be swept, like Germans did, and their sub casualties to mines were low. And again, airborne laid mines are WW2 technology.

LRMP aircraft were usually ASW and flew low. Surface search radar of the era was finicky. Lucky to gat a conning tower return at 20,000 meters. Wakes, however, especially at night, show up depending on altitude (~ 2500 meters) up to 3x the distance. Surface raiders, especially fleeing ones after an RRR are worse. Visual cue, then the radar to confirm or the bombsight, usually the bombsight after the searchlight illuminates. This is how the LRMPS worked.

And Chinese AMC's can perform worldwide operations. Say, in African waters. How will Japan send enough forces and enough LRMP aircraft, especially in, say, 1920's, to catch them? Again, you're crediting the aggressors late WW2 capabilities of Allies.

The Philippines (an archipelago) have those characteristics and it did not work. The Americans tried it. We see it in the Persian Gulf today with Iran and it does not work. He who rules the air, wins the reconnaissance and the elint battle. Radio betrays and then the fighters strafe and bomb. End of the camouflage and sampan supply systems. The Chinese tried these tricks themselves. Even Vietnam tried it. Simple to defeat, because no one can run such a system real-time without radio.

Again, we're talking about max. WW2 technology level in a limited war. If it was so easy, there would not have been single drop of spirits delivered to USA, Norway or Finland during prohibition.

The Russians were navally not too good in WW II. (They get better post war.) A naval power knows how the sea will be used.

Soviets had ample reconnaissance aircraft etc. In a broken coastline before advent of mapping radars it's easy to conceal small combatants. Especially if the said coast is filled with fairly similar sized civilian craft.

Mere days is not worth the waste of lives, time or resources. Either get out there in the deep blue and fight or put the money time and training into an air service and the land army.

No, even a small naval force is useful in preventing coup de main and rising political, economic and military cost of intervention. Especially if raiding strategy is used in addition to coastal defense as it forces the adversary to split her forces, making it more politically risky. The resources spent there are minimal compared to air and land forces and in case of raiders, can use civilian ships outfitted with old weaponry. German raider Atlantis, for example, had only 350 crew, mostly reservists.

Same question again? Factors such as port traffic, entry egress to sea-lanes and shoreside peerage architecture. A first class naval base is not a commercial port. It is a combination protected anchorage and a maritime industrial complex, as well as a fuel depot, warehouse for specialized naval stores and training facility. You can count the good ones on your fingers and toes. The USN has about 5, China has about 3. Russia has 4, Britain maybe 2 (these days) and France 1. India is building 1.

China with limited resources and ambitions would not need a first class naval base at all. It can not build even a second, or third class navy.
 
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Mines can be swept, like Germans did, and their sub casualties to mines were low. And again, airborne laid mines are WW2 technology.

One should study a different sea-power other than Britain when one makes that claim. The US mining campaigns (WW I and WW II) worked rather well. So did the German mining campaign against the US.

And Chinese AMC's can perform worldwide operations. Say, in African waters. How will Japan send enough forces and enough LRMP aircraft, especially in, say, 1920's, to catch them? Again, you're crediting the aggressors late WW2 capabilities of Allies.

WW I capabilities. One should study Japans Mediterranean as well as Pacific operations.

McPherson said:
The Philippines (an archipelago) have those characteristics and it did not work. The Americans tried it. We see it in the Persian Gulf today with Iran and it does not work. He who rules the air, wins the reconnaissance and the elint battle. Radio betrays and then the fighters strafe and bomb. End of the camouflage and sampan supply systems. The Chinese tried these tricks themselves. Even Vietnam tried it. Simple to defeat, because no one can run such a system real-time without radio.


Again, we're talking about max. WW2 technology level in a limited war. If it was so easy, there would not have been single drop of spirits delivered to USA, Norway or Finland during prohibition.

[Laughter] I cannot speak for Finland or Norway (although smuggling in the Baltic should be a fascinating topic to discuss.), but in the US case, it was law enforcement and not the US Navy giving chase. The Kennedys ran such an operations and were prepared to lose half their product to the American coast guard. There were quite a few "battles" involving such smuggling attempts. The other "naval campaigns" were around Cuba and across the Great Lakes. As a historic matter of interest, it was much safer to drive it across.
The modern equivalents today would be drug smuggling. Not recommended by sea because the casualty rates are incredibly high (about 60% loss of smuggler cargo and personnel), though the bandits involved have tried everything from speedboats to submarines.
The chief catchers are helicopters and aircraft and cutters. Again using peacetime and the Caribbean (a fair stand-in for the SW Pacific, the success rate is very low. Wartime op temps and a no capture/sink on sight policy can only drive the dangers up.

Soviets had ample reconnaissance aircraft etc. In a broken coastline before advent of mapping radars it's easy to conceal small combatants. Especially if the said coast is filled with fairly similar sized civilian craft.

In a bump and scrape war, the USN won. Superior sensors helped, but geography (choke points) aided immensely. When discussing the Chinese problem, in this light (1920s or now) it is important to remember that China faces the same kind of predicament. Called the First Island, Second Island and Third Island Chains; this predicament is a series of geographically defined canalizations that restrict naval maneuver to brown water operations in the South and East China Seas and in the Sea of Japan. It is interesting to see the PRC's attempts to solve these problems in the present day. What they have done is adopted a solution very familiar to the Americans, for it is the same solution the Americans used against European imperialists.

Brief history lesson.

Map%20of%20Caribbean%20Sea.jpg


C_plan_3.png


That is the Endicott system circa 1885.

Now look.

C_plan_4.png


Interesting, isn't it? The People's Liberation Army Navy has shown an assiduous interest in Alfred Thayer Mahan. People wondered why, but ignored what the PLAN was actually doing. They were not so interested in the usual tomes, about how the British beat the French in their naval wars, though it did give them an insight into American naval thinking. What the PLAN wanted was to know how the Americans went from a weak nation that could not even defend its shores in the War of 1812 to a regional power that could dominate the Caribbean and western North Atlantic against the British.

Alfred Thayer Mahan's technical writings mostly focus on how the Americans did it. Those maps above are the results. Of particular interest is the Hainan naval complex and an American complex called The Dry Tortugas. In both cases the geographic position is selected to defend a key stretch of coast, secure a major strait (Sable in the American case) and intimidate and dominate a nearby neighbor. (Cuba for the Americans and Vietnam for China.). These are also jump off locations for offensive naval operations into the Caribbean and the South China Sea respectively.

Anyway, both defense complexes (and they are DEFENSE) rely upon coast artillery to defend against enemies attacking the shores, while the fleet sorties from those complexes to conduct near shore operations. In the 19th century American case, these were armored cruisers and coast defense battleships and monitors. (The Spanish American War). In the PRC PLAN's current case, these are SAGs built around missile armed frigates.

I find the parallels geographically interesting and remarkable.

No, even a small naval force is useful in preventing coup de main and rising political, economic and military cost of intervention. Especially if raiding strategy is used in addition to coastal defense as it forces the adversary to split her forces, making it more politically risky. The resources spent there are minimal compared to air and land forces and in case of raiders, can use civilian ships outfitted with old weaponry. German raider Atlantis, for example, had only 350 crew, mostly reservists.

See above. American defenses today are primarily air and space based. China is also moving in that direction.

China with limited resources and ambitions would not need a first class naval base at all. It can not build even a second, or third class navy.

If the 1920 Chinese had the chance, I tend to think they will follow their PRC descendants current solutions.

Geography dictates strategy.

Alfred Thayer Mahan
 
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You know this topic got me to read more about China's history in the 19th century, which it looks it's hard to ignore to get to my ATL. There was some discussion here as well about why China couldn't pull a Meiji (or how could it pull one). Apart of course from the evil imperialist machinations of the west (and east, and Japan etc.), the local corruption was mindboggling, examples such as corrupt navy leaders sellings guns and ammo (!) from their ships, the royals using money earmarked for much needed weapons etc. to build palaces and marble ships and similar mindboggling nonsense. One can feel sorry for them, and it's hard to avoid paraleling China's with Japan's developments, if the chinese leaders were half as astute and determined to develop, preserve and streghten their country as the japanese, history might have been quite different (they are today and are doing it now, but that's 100 years later).

On more mundane details, i was reading that the large 1909 program was for 8 BB, 20 cruisers and 30 destroyers as well as many auxiliaries, and it was supposed to cost the equivalent of China's budget for one and half years - but spread over 7 years doesn't actually looks that bad, wasn't Japan spending at one point ONE THIRD of it's yearly budget on the naval and military buildup? Also a few years after the revolution there were plans to buy/build up to 100 submarines (!).
 
I don't think a 1909 POD is enough,nonetheless they could have modernized in other areas. I think I'd be better under a republican system.
Perhaps with an earlier xinhai revolution,but before compromising their limited resources they should do some soul searching and ask themselves what have we done wrong?and what Japan did right ?study the policies of the Meiji era and emulate them. Star with small craft workshops cottage industries ,then move to light industry textiles furniture then heavy industry steel chemicals, railroads
OTl xinhai revolution coincided with Japan taisho democracy that would gives China about 20 years to industrialize before Japan goes all militaristic. That's enough time to train a competent army with Western equipment and discipline. Then you have the necessary to build a navy,but I would stress the importance of not just buy or build ships it is also important train competent officers and crew members or ir will happen the same that in the first Sino Japanese war.
 
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