Lets assume that Germany fights a bit longer and more effectively, the western allies get resisted a bit less, meaning no battle of the bulge. The Soviets get chewed up worse, but the end result is the same. The holocaust gets stopped in 1944 after the July 20th plot (or July 15th if that makes things easier

) and Germany is led by a military dictatorship until the end of the war. Perhaps they surrender sooner, sparing Berlin the worst of the Russian invasion (this also means a Volkssturm under military command not under Goebbels).
Personally I keep regarding the idea that without Hitler the post-Nazi government would still fight to the bitter end with Stauffenberg in the bunker as pure anti-German wishful thinking. At some point, the Germans leverage the political bargaining chips created by the coup and the perspective of an early end to the war into a conditional surrender in all but name, just like the Japanese got.
As I said in the other thread, the most likely outcome is a effective conditional surrender with guarantees about qualified territorial integrity that ensures the loss of Prussia and Sudetenland to mass expulsion ethnic cleansing, but a West Germany that includes Austria (possibly after a referendum) and an East Germany that includes Pomerania and Silesia.
Does Germany accept the blame if the Holocaust is not experienced by the western allies personally (meaning the camps are not around for them to liberate-all the surviving inmates are shipped east. All are liberated by the Russians, so the Americans have no direct knowledge of anything to do with it. The camps, including Auschwitz, have been razed and forests planted on top)? Do the allies indoctrinate the German people with the crimes of Nazism?
See post above. Without good direct evidence of the Holocaust, and a substantially lower body count, the blame is only about starting a vicious imperialist war (awareness of atrocities against Slavs goes substantially down to a footnote in popular culture even more than OTL), so the outcome is substantially comparable to OTL Japan: the Allies make an half-hearted indoctrination effort, but soon give up, mindful of Cold War realities, so war guilt only makes an ambigous and incomplete imprint in German mass consciousness, like in Japan. But again, the anti-German stigma in Western mass consciousness is radically lower, at the same time.
What kind of power dynamic are we looking at?
In Germany, the society is less burdened by crippling guilt, it comes to identify Stauffenberg & co. and the German Resistance as substitute role models much like France did with DeGaulle and its own Resistance. As a result, Germany is somewhat less pacifistic (but still leans that way), and a conservative antifascist center-of-right mainstream mass party exists to the right of the CDU and FDP, butterflying away the CSU (and quite possibly the FDP as well) and splitting the right-wing electorate in 2-3 halves, like in post-war France.
Outside Europe, less negative public image of Germany may easily accelerate European integration, so the European Defense/Political Community effort may be accepted by France, so European integration shall be much more federal and supranational from the start, having a full-fledged European Army around since the early-mid 1950s to mirror the economic integration.
Complete EU defense integration shall have some interesting effects on some parts of the Cold War: a) for the Soviets, it means they face a rather more efficient European arm of the NATO, so they are forced to an even more burdensome arms race, which quite likely spells a slightly earlier collapse of the Soviet bloc b) the Suez campaign and the Algerian War may be fought rather more effectively by an European Army, even if other nations within the EU could still leverage France into giving up the Canal and Algeria all the same at the end. Still, this could cause all kinds of political butterflies for Egypt, Algeria, and France.
A West Germany and EU that include Austria shall be even more economically successful; likewise, a larger East Germany with Pomerania and Silesia may be slightly more successful for the Communist bloc (since East Germany was a bit more effiicent than Communist Poland). After the reunification, this could mean an even larger economic burden for West Germany and the EU (more people and land to receive subsidies) or slighlty lesser (a slightly better East Germany).
How are hitler and the nazis remembered?
Not substantially different from the crossbreed of a more efficient and vicious Mussolini and Italian fascism, and an explicilty fascist version of Japanese militarism. Evil and megalomanical, but not the ultimate evil, an largely forgotten by popular culture after a few decades. The latter stereotype gets in large part to be gradually but only partially incarnated by Stalin and Communism, as evidence and awareness of its own atrocities grows over the decades, but for the rest, there is lingering pop-culture archetype of ultimate evil, the clichè is more spread around and sees various short-lived incarnations in the "villain of the decade". That is, until Bin Laden and Al Quaeda show up, then pop culture shall have their enduring face of ultimate evil even more so than Stalin, without (mass awareness of) the Holocaust, the Islamist atrocities shall stand up even more shocking.