Post-WWII Political Effects of France Fighting On?

A semi-popular point of divergence on the site is the French government deciding to fight on in WWII, carrying out a fighting retreat south whilst evacuating as much of their forces as they can to Algeria, and continue as a belligerent. Ignoring the military aspect of things and the war itself what sort of political knock-on effects are likely to occur from this after the war? The Third Republic hasn't fallen for a start. During the war Lebrun remains President, Reynaud likely still Prime Minister, Daladier Foreign Minister, all of which means that de Gaulle likely spends the war as a junior member of the government rather than as its leader. If Weygand starts calling for an armistice then perhaps de Gaulle gets bumped up to Defence Minister to replace him, either way he's unlikely to be making many wartime broadcasts or triumphal entrances into Paris in 1944. I don't know enough about French history of the period or the personalities involved but hopefully we have some people on the boards that can shed a bit of light.
 
There are sveral major PoD swiftly following the first. I'll address just one in this post. Specifically a major internal political schisim between the exiles and the remain behind

Renauds decision to evacuate the government was not popular & a informal poll in the Chamber of Deputies revealed zero party solidarity in this. The estimated vote against was something like 75% against. Thats what led to Renauds resignation OTL. Odds are had Renaud not reversed his decision & resigned he would have been removed by a formal vote & a new government appointed anyway.

But, assume Renaud had anticipated this in sufficient time & avoided the legislative problem, or circumstances made a vote by the legislators impossible. In this case the continuation of the war is still unpopular by the general population, and the majority of politicians. That general unpopularity wont last under German occupation, but at the time, in June 1940 the majority of the French were terrified by the battle rolling over their homes and the clear possibility of a war occupation of all of European France. The cease fire & Armistice was very welcome across the board within France.

ATL this is very likely to be the same. If Renaud moves the government & continues the war there is a distinct possibility a large portion of the Deputies, perhaps a majority, will refuse to leave & reform the body in France & form a new government that asks for a cease fire & peace. In other words two French governments will exist & the Germans would be smart to take advantage of this.

OTL only about 80 of over 500 Deputies sought passage to Algeria. After the cease fire & Armistice came those who had done this were labeled "deserters" & "cowards" for "fleeing" France in its darkest hour. Similar attitudes were aimed at Renaud & his strongest supporters in the cabinet. Petain who intially supported Renaud avoided the label. Bottom line here is a 'Armistice' government remaining in France will intially be very popular, and even after three years of war would remain popular amoung some groups in France.

The political effects of such a split can reverbrate deeper & longer than the 'Free French'/Vichy split OTL. Among other things the colonial govenors will not have a clear government to follow. The Armistice group in France or the War group in Algeria? Odds are the colonies will go both ways & several remain with the Armistice government.
 

Deleted member 1487

Italy would have a reason to occupy Tunisia and would end up probably avoiding invading Egypt to secure Libya in the west (Tunisia was their big goal) and Hitler probably wouldn't mind offering French territory to Spain and Italy for their support. That probably actually helps Italy avoid the disaster of OTL Egypt invasion and may well prevent the invasion of Greece because of the need to focus on North Africa to secure as much of it as possible due to Algeria fighting on. Germany might well get involved there early and it might put off Barbarossa so that the Mediterranean option could be pursued to make sure the French aren't going to sandwich the Italians with the British there. Plus it opens up an avenue to defeating the French/British empires via that Mediterranean out of necessity. It probably chances the course of the war, potentially the outcome if Barbarossa doesn't happen as a result.
 
If Renaud moves the government & continues the war there is a distinct possibility a large portion of the Deputies, perhaps a majority, will refuse to leave & reform the body in France & form a new government that asks for a cease fire & peace. In other words two French governments will exist & the Germans would be smart to take advantage of this.

OTL only about 80 of over 500 Deputies sought passage to Algeria. Bottom line here is a 'Armistice' government remaining in France will intially be very popular, and even after three years of war would remain popular amoung some groups in France.

Among other things the colonial govenors will not have a clear government to follow. The Armistice group in France or the War group in Algeria? Odds are the colonies will go both ways & several remain with the Armistice government.

very interesting, could you have (grossly simplified) an Army-Navy split? with the French navy wanting to maintain control of the fleet and their prerogatives backing Reynaud?
 
Last edited:
Renauds decision to evacuate the government was not popular & a informal poll in the Chamber of Deputies revealed zero party solidarity in this. The estimated vote against was something like 75% against. Thats what led to Renauds resignation OTL. Odds are had Renaud not reversed his decision & resigned he would have been removed by a formal vote & a new government appointed anyway.

He can only be revoked if the assembly is, well, assembled, something that won't be possible without the approval of the government at this point. And i would like your source on this 75% against.

But, assume Renaud had anticipated this in sufficient time & avoided the legislative problem, or circumstances made a vote by the legislators impossible. In this case the continuation of the war is still unpopular by the general population, and the majority of politicians. That general unpopularity wont last under German occupation, but at the time, in June 1940 the majority of the French were terrified by the battle rolling over their homes and the clear possibility of a war occupation of all of European France. The cease fire & Armistice was very welcome across the board within France.

And the general population will do what exactly ?

ATL this is very likely to be the same. If Renaud moves the government & continues the war there is a distinct possibility a large portion of the Deputies, perhaps a majority, will refuse to leave & reform the body in France & form a new government that asks for a cease fire & peace. In other words two French governments will exist & the Germans would be smart to take advantage of this.

No way he doesn't have a majority of the deputies. I'm pretty sure that all the SFIO deputies and most of the minor left wing parties deputies will follow him in North Africa, and after that he only needs approximately a hundred deputies among the 380 centrist and rightist deputies. More than easy to do.

OTL only about 80 of over 500 Deputies sought passage to Algeria. After the cease fire & Armistice came those who had done this were labeled "deserters" & "cowards" for "fleeing" France in its darkest hour. Similar attitudes were aimed at Renaud & his strongest supporters in the cabinet. Petain who intially supported Renaud avoided the label. Bottom line here is a 'Armistice' government remaining in France will intially be very popular, and even after three years of war would remain popular amoung some groups in France.

Not it wouldn't be popular among anyone. Because who will lead it ? The only one able to lead a popular armistice government would be Pétain (who would be under arrest by Mandel as soon as the decision to continue the fight would be taken)

The political effects of such a split can reverbrate deeper & longer than the 'Free French'/Vichy split OTL. Among other things the colonial govenors will not have a clear government to follow. The Armistice group in France or the War group in Algeria? Odds are the colonies will go both ways & several remain with the Armistice government.

You mean the colonial governors who wanted the government to refuse the armistice and continue the fight ?

Since French North Africa will be Reynaud's, the only one left that's really critical is IndoChina. Anyone have any idea which way they might go?

Catroux joined De Gaulle in august 1940 after he refused the Japanese demands and was relieved by Pétain. Guess who he would support. Noguès who was the governor of Morocco and chief of the army for North Africa wanted to continue the war and told Pétain he would fight instead of giving up anything to the Italians, he was supported in that by the governors of Algeria and Tunisia. The AOF would follow North Africa. The AEF joined De Gaulle even in OTL it wouldn't change here as would the pacific territories. The governor of French Somalia joined de Gaulle in 1940, so would join an Algier government. Marcel de Coppet, the governor of Madagascar tried to stay in the war with the British. The only one who might follow an armistice government is the Haut Commissaire for the Antilles, Guyane and Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, but he wouldn't be able to stay in power for long.

Italy would have a reason to occupy Tunisia and would end up probably avoiding invading Egypt to secure Libya in the west (Tunisia was their big goal) and Hitler probably wouldn't mind offering French territory to Spain and Italy for their support.

Italy might try to occupy Tunisia, but with less troops (in tunisia alone compared to Tripolitania), of lesser quality, with less equipement of lesser quality, with less air support, with a weaker infrastructure, and with a supply line that the Franco-British could cut extremely easily. They would be lucky if they still control anything in Libya in the end of 1940.

That probably actually helps Italy avoid the disaster of OTL Egypt invasion and may well prevent the invasion of Greece because of the need to focus on North Africa to secure as much of it as possible due to Algeria fighting on.

Italy would be busy not getting invaded, not keeping North African territories.

Germany might well get involved there early and it might put off Barbarossa so that the Mediterranean option could be pursued to make sure the French aren't going to sandwich the Italians with the British there. Plus it opens up an avenue to defeating the French/British empires via that Mediterranean out of necessity. It probably chances the course of the war, potentially the outcome if Barbarossa doesn't happen as a result.

So Hitler would abandon his life goal and obsession of getting rid of the hive of judeo-bolshevik treachery that was the Soviet Union, but would try to invade North Africa so destroy a government that he considered finished ? Remember we are talking about the guy who thought the British were no longer a threat after a few weeks of aerial bombardment and who starter to move troops to the east as soon as the 1940 armistice was signed. But yeah, sure he would try to invade North Africa to be the best buddy with Mussolini (who probably wouldn't ask for help until Tripoli is occupied anyway)
 

Deleted member 1487

So Hitler would abandon his life goal and obsession of getting rid of the hive of judeo-bolshevik treachery that was the Soviet Union, but would try to invade North Africa so destroy a government that he considered finished ? Remember we are talking about the guy who thought the British were no longer a threat after a few weeks of aerial bombardment and who starter to move troops to the east as soon as the 1940 armistice was signed. But yeah, sure he would try to invade North Africa to be the best buddy with Mussolini (who probably wouldn't ask for help until Tripoli is occupied anyway)
You pointed out how serious North Africa would be ITTL, so he'd pretty much have to. In fact in the France Fights On TL that was done by some French guys:
http://francefightson.yuku.com/
Germany if forced to delay Barbarossa because of the situation in North Africa.

When I posted my first reply I hadn't considered the effect of the French Fleet, which as you say could well knock the Italians out of Libya quicker than anything. If you cut supply lines then you cannot invade anything. So no Greek campaign ITTL and perhaps Libya lost without the Germans being able to assist. So that leaves the Germans with a more minor contribution to the Mediterranean ITTL, just Italy stuck defending itself and losing its colonies. German intervention to defend them and keep them in the war then results, but not with major armor forces. If anything that means the Mediterranean stays open to British shipping and there are attempts at invasion of Italy by the Anglo-French with bloody results. In that case then with even less commitments to the Mediterranean/Balkans than IOTL the Germans are able to invade the USSR on time or slightly early, but with more forces than IOTL. It would be a quite interesting TL in that case.

As to OP's point about French Indochina, I wonder if the Japanese would move in if France doesn't surrender or has a surrender government on the continent and a Free French movement in control of the colonies (I think that even the Germans wouldn't care about the surrender attempt and just occupy the whole country if the Free French were a serious threat and the Italians were kicked out of Libya in 1940). If the Japanese were seriously concerned about the Allies declaring war they wouldn't invade French Indochina and would then avoid the expanded embargo. The British wouldn't be nearly as weak as IOTL and would probably with the French make efforts to really attack the continent via the Mediterranean in 1941 and on. But then the US might well not enter the war until much later if the Anglo-French have LL in 1941 and the Japanese don't move on them in mid-1941 without a French surrender like OTL Vichy. So then no expanded embargo and no pressure to attack the US. Course of the war is then radically different.
 
1.On Japan and its options
Remember reading somewhere that OTL the Japanese had about one year of finances left in them by Dec. '41 before they would be unable to pay for both imports and their war in China. Let's say they stretch it out through cuts and clever accounting for 6 more months - that leaves us with mid 1943, a time when any strike south would be even more doomed to failure than the one they did OTL.

2.On conquering Tunisia
I've argued before that theoretically, if the Axis were to cooperate and move fast by deploying two panzer divisions in Tripoli ASAP, taking Tunisia after outflanking the Mareth Line would not be beyond their capabilities. However, given the political realities of the time, Mussolini even considering German involvement requires some sort of disaster, meaning that by then it's too late to deploy any DAK equivalent

3.On conquering Libya
That said, I very much doubt the Allies would be able to actually conquer Tripoli as early as Dec. 1940. French forces would be in dire need of re-organization and the Italians would be fighting fully supplied right next to their supply hubs, behind fortified positions in hilly terrain facing a mostly infantry force, without having stuck their neck out to be cut off like they did OTL in Egypt.

4.On shipping through the Med
IMO, as long as Italy still has a navy and airforce and controls Sicilly and Pantelleria, shipping through the Med will only be conducted as OTL through heavily defended convoys during moments of great need.
 

Deleted member 1487

1.On Japan and its options
Remember reading somewhere that OTL the Japanese had about one year of finances left in them by Dec. '41 before they would be unable to pay for both imports and their war in China. Let's say they stretch it out through cuts and clever accounting for 6 more months - that leaves us with mid 1943, a time when any strike south would be even more doomed to failure than the one they did OTL.

2.On conquering Tunisia
I've argued before that theoretically, if the Axis were to cooperate and move fast by deploying two panzer divisions in Tripoli ASAP, taking Tunisia after outflanking the Mareth Line would not be beyond their capabilities. However, given the political realities of the time, Mussolini even considering German involvement requires some sort of disaster, meaning that by then it's too late to deploy any DAK equivalent

3.On conquering Libya
That said, I very much doubt the Allies would be able to actually conquer Tripoli as early as Dec. 1940. French forces would be in dire need of re-organization and the Italians would be fighting fully supplied right next to their supply hubs, behind fortified positions in hilly terrain facing a mostly infantry force, without having stuck their neck out to be cut off like they did OTL in Egypt.

4.On shipping through the Med
IMO, as long as Italy still has a navy and airforce and controls Sicilly and Pantelleria, shipping through the Med will only be conducted as OTL through heavily defended convoys during moments of great need.

The Italians couldn't get convoys to Tripoli if the French navy, based out of Algeria, got involved beyond June. Then its bye-bye Libya due to lack of supplies. Not only that but the French could invade from Tunisia as Tripoli is blockaded. And Malta would have free reign against Italian shipping.

As to getting convoys through the Mediterranean once Tunisia fell IOTL they were getting convoys through to Egypt before Pantelleriea fell. Also there is no way the Italian navy would be a threat against the combined Franco-British fleet in the Mediterranean.
 
Since French North Africa will be Reynaud's, the only one left that's really critical is IndoChina. Anyone have any idea which way they might go?

They were vulnerable to Japan & they knew it. Only Renaids government with the Brit & French fleets can prtect them militarily.
 

Deleted member 1487

1.On Japan and its options
Remember reading somewhere that OTL the Japanese had about one year of finances left in them by Dec. '41 before they would be unable to pay for both imports and their war in China. Let's say they stretch it out through cuts and clever accounting for 6 more months - that leaves us with mid 1943, a time when any strike south would be even more doomed to failure than the one they did OTL.

(/QUOTE]

With no occupation of Indochina Japan is not embargoed in 1941, perhaps not at all. So, for the moment Japan is not boxed into a corner & has no incentive to declare war.
 
When I posted my first reply I hadn't considered the effect of the French Fleet, which as you say could well knock the Italians out of Libya quicker than anything... So no Greek campaign ITTL and perhaps Libya lost without the Germans being able to assist. So that leaves the Germans with a more minor contribution to the Mediterranean ITTL, just Italy stuck defending itself and losing its colonies... In that case then with even less commitments to the Mediterranean/Balkans than IOTL the Germans are able to invade the USSR on time or slightly early, but with more forces than IOTL.

As to OP's point about French Indochina, I wonder if the Japanese would move in if France doesn't surrender or has a surrender government on the continent and a Free French movement in control of the colonies (I think that even the Germans wouldn't care about the surrender attempt and just occupy the whole country if the Free French were a serious threat and the Italians were kicked out of Libya in 1940).

fail to see how the French fleet on Allied side, Italians being dealt severe losses, and probing (at least) attacks on continent would accelerate or aid invasion of USSR?

they might have even been more serious in the Soviet Axis talks.

on Indochina, the Free French would have card that Vichy regime did not, KMT China troops.
 

Deleted member 1487

1.On Japan and its options
Remember reading somewhere that OTL the Japanese had about one year of finances left in them by Dec. '41 before they would be unable to pay for both imports and their war in China. Let's say they stretch it out through cuts and clever accounting for 6 more months - that leaves us with mid 1943, a time when any strike south would be even more doomed to failure than the one they did OTL.

With no occupation of Indochina Japan is not embargoed in 1941, perhaps not at all. So, for the moment Japan is not boxed into a corner & has no incentive to declare war.


So in that case how do Britain and exile France fair on just LL? How would the US get into the war? How would the East then play out if Italy if force out of Libya in mid-1940 by the Anglo-French fleet and as a result don't get into Greece due to their less stable situation in the Central Mediterranean? That would mean no Afrika Korps or Greek attack/occupation cost and likely no Luftwaffe commitment in the Mediterranean, plus then no US entry in late 1941 and no US public stomach for a DoW.

fail to see how the French fleet on Allied side, Italians being dealt severe losses, and probing (at least) attacks on continent would accelerate or aid invasion of USSR?

they might have even been more serious in the Soviet Axis talks.

on Indochina, the Free French would have card that Vichy regime did not, KMT China troops.
No Afrika Korps, no invasion of Greece/Crete, no major German commitments to the Mediterranean. There are more forces available for a quickly Yugoslav invasion and exit, along with proper occupation (though the extra troops needed to occupy all of France in 1940 might make that difficult) all adds up to a slightly earlier invasion of the USSR and with significantly more forces that would have more time to prepare and less wear and tear. A neutral Greece is pretty darn help to the Axis in 1941. Though perhaps it coaxes the Allies into attempting an attack in Italy in 1941 and they get a bloody nose from the effort. Churchill with Africa secure will be quite fixated on the 'soft underbelly' and knocking Italy out of the war, while the Germans wouldn't need to put much in to help the Italians repel the Allied invasion attempts until the US gets involved (if it does).
 
Last edited by a moderator:
So in that case how do Britain and exile France fair on just LL? How would the US get into the war? ....

Odds are before the summer of 1942. Perhaps early as March. Aside from the undeclared naval war going on in the Atlantic between the German submarines & US Navy Hitler himself was getting fed up with US support of the UK. The AT3 encryption system had been penentrated by German intel service in 1941. While it was not for sensitive secrets Hitler considered the information useful enough daily transcripts were delivered to his office. those made it clear just how deep US assistance to Britain went.

In the Autum of 1941 it was clear the US would be sending support to the USSR on the same scale. Japanese reports to Germany on Soviet flagged ships departing the US from west coast ports to Valadivostok made this clear.

Attacking German submarines, sending increasing quantities of aid to Germanys, enemies, continuing with the mobilization of a massive land army.. From the autum of 1941 through November 1941 the US increased its standing army from 230,000 to nearly two million men & far over two million were planned for 1942. No secret there, the remaining German diplomatic staff in North and South America could read that in the newspapers. In the spring of 1941 the US navy established bases on iceland, inside what Germany considered and declared part of the war zone.

Twice previously in 1941 Hitler had discussed declaring war on the US. Each time he dropped it, but US participation was increasing each month.
 
1.On Japan and its options
Remember reading somewhere that OTL the Japanese had about one year of finances left in them by Dec. '41 before they would be unable to pay for both imports and their war in China. Let's say they stretch it out through cuts and clever accounting for 6 more months - that leaves us with mid 1943, a time when any strike south would be even more doomed to failure than the one they did OTL.

On that we agree, the Japanese either have to get out of China or start to expand into European and American possession to sustain their spending by pillage. The first one is impossible for the army, so, war it is.

2.On conquering Tunisia
I've argued before that theoretically, if the Axis were to cooperate and move fast by deploying two panzer divisions in Tripoli ASAP, taking Tunisia after outflanking the Mareth Line would not be beyond their capabilities. However, given the political realities of the time, Mussolini even considering German involvement requires some sort of disaster, meaning that by then it's too late to deploy any DAK equivalent

German panzer divisions would be stuck in France until late august at least and so won't start a transfer to first southern Italy and then Tripoli before that, which means that before october or november they won't be available (and that is a exhausted and severly diminished PD), and even that may be pushing it (the last elements of the 15th PD arrived in may 1941 when the first arrived in March from southern Italy). To late, Tripoli would have had already fallen

3.On conquering Libya
That said, I very much doubt the Allies would be able to actually conquer Tripoli as early as Dec. 1940. French forces would be in dire need of re-organization and the Italians would be fighting fully supplied right next to their supply hubs, behind fortified positions in hilly terrain facing a mostly infantry force, without having stuck their neck out to be cut off like they did OTL in Egypt.

The Italians were NOT fully supplied. Actually they had a lot of supply problems : aircraft engines, artillery ammunitions, AT guns (they had something like 12 modern AT guns on the whole front), men (the better reinforced divisions had 2 third of their complement, the worst of barely half, with the black shirts bearing the worst of it [almost no black shirt regiment was at half strength...]), almost no armored support (200 L6 for the whole front). Opposed to them organized (they were neither in the process of moving from or to France, they were the force supposed to defend tunisia or attack libya) infantry forces larger than theirs in Tunisia plus the non sovereignty units in North Africa, enough mechanized elements in Tunisia to organize an adhoc (a french specialty actually) armored divisions (135 D1 tanks, 16 H35 tanks, 16 H39 tanks and motorized infantry)

On the subject of the western Libyan front, the British forces can be helped by one or two french infantry division, and 2 battalions of R35 (90 tanks) and various cavalry units (some of them motorized) from French Syria and Lebanon.

4.On shipping through the Med
IMO, as long as Italy still has a navy and airforce and controls Sicilly and Pantelleria, shipping through the Med will only be conducted as OTL through heavily defended convoys during moments of great need.

You mean almost unimpeded through the Mediterranean like IOTL with heavier losses sustained by the attacking forces than by the attacked force ?

With no occupation of Indochina Japan is not embargoed in 1941, perhaps not at all. So, for the moment Japan is not boxed into a corner & has no incentive to declare war.

FDR and the pro-china lobby in the US would find another excuse to embargo Japan. Like for example, the bombing of the Hanoi Kunming railroad on the French side (it's not unlike the japanese to bomb something into neutral territory), helping the Thai forces against the French, over the invasion of the Paracels and the Spratlys or any other stupid thing the Japanese Army might do..

I don't see why two factions that were butting heads against one another for several years now would change course. Also oil isn't the only problem of Japan. Cash was as much as a problem, and the only possibilities they had to change that was either stopping the war in China

No Afrika Korps, no invasion of Greece/Crete, no major German commitments to the Mediterranean. There are more forces available for a quickly Yugoslav invasion and exit, along with proper occupation (though the extra troops needed to occupy all of France in 1940 might make that difficult) all adds up to a slightly earlier invasion of the USSR and with significantly more forces that would have more time to prepare and less wear and tear. A neutral Greece is pretty darn help to the Axis in 1941. Though perhaps it coaxes the Allies into attempting an attack in Italy in 1941 and they get a bloody nose from the effort. Churchill with Africa secure will be quite fixated on the 'soft underbelly' and knocking Italy out of the war, while the Germans wouldn't need to put much in to help the Italians repel the Allied invasion attempts until the US gets involved (if it does).

Greece can easily be drawn into the allies by giving them the dodecanese islands that the Italians would have an hell of a time defending, and even if they don't join, Mussolini will invade greece sooner or latter to save face after the loss of the Italian African possession and possibly of Sardinia (which was very lightly defended). I think the most probable outcome is due to the dispertion of efforts in southern mediterannean and a longer campaign (and bloodier for the german army, and it was already bloody for it according to the latest research) of France, the German army will probably be weaker and more dispersed when the time comes for the final showdown with the USSR (the hypothesis taken by the FFO team).
 
doubt Japan would sign Tripartite Pact in Sept. 1940 or invade Indochina if France still in the war (albeit in exile.)

(they had declined to sign earlier Pact of Steel)

still think, despite ideology, they would be forced to include USSR in a pact because of limitless resources, pathway to resume trade with China (and Iran), and unreliable ally in Japan.
 

Deleted member 1487

Greece can easily be drawn into the allies by giving them the dodecanese islands that the Italians would have an hell of a time defending, and even if they don't join, Mussolini will invade greece sooner or latter to save face after the loss of the Italian African possession and possibly of Sardinia (which was very lightly defended). I think the most probable outcome is due to the dispertion of efforts in southern mediterannean and a longer campaign (and bloodier for the german army, and it was already bloody for it according to the latest research) of France, the German army will probably be weaker and more dispersed when the time comes for the final showdown with the USSR (the hypothesis taken by the FFO team).
I disagree because if Libya falls there is a threat of invasion of Sicily/Italy by the Allies, so dispersing via an attack on Greece is not really an option. Especially once the Yugoslav issue comes up Italy cannot afford to attack Greece in October 1940, nor disperse their strength away from Italy in the occupation.
 

Deleted member 1487

Odds are before the summer of 1942. Perhaps early as March. Aside from the undeclared naval war going on in the Atlantic between the German submarines & US Navy Hitler himself was getting fed up with US support of the UK. The AT3 encryption system had been penentrated by German intel service in 1941. While it was not for sensitive secrets Hitler considered the information useful enough daily transcripts were delivered to his office. those made it clear just how deep US assistance to Britain went.

In the Autum of 1941 it was clear the US would be sending support to the USSR on the same scale. Japanese reports to Germany on Soviet flagged ships departing the US from west coast ports to Valadivostok made this clear.

Attacking German submarines, sending increasing quantities of aid to Germanys, enemies, continuing with the mobilization of a massive land army.. From the autum of 1941 through November 1941 the US increased its standing army from 230,000 to nearly two million men & far over two million were planned for 1942. No secret there, the remaining German diplomatic staff in North and South America could read that in the newspapers. In the spring of 1941 the US navy established bases on iceland, inside what Germany considered and declared part of the war zone.

Twice previously in 1941 Hitler had discussed declaring war on the US. Each time he dropped it, but US participation was increasing each month.
Other than Germany DoWing the US, I doubt the US would DoW Germany because without Pearl Harbor the public isn't interested in declaring war that would then bring in Italy and Japan thanks to the Axis pact. If Germany opts to invade the USSR they probably aren't going to be in a position to DoW the US unless Japan starts it and forces Hitler's hand. So I really wonder if without Pearl Harbor the Germans or US would actually expand the war like that.
 
Other than Germany DoWing the US, I doubt the US would DoW Germany because without Pearl Harbor the public isn't interested in declaring war that would then bring in Italy and Japan thanks to the Axis pact. If Germany opts to invade the USSR they probably aren't going to be in a position to DoW the US unless Japan starts it and forces Hitler's hand. So I really wonder if without Pearl Harbor the Germans or US would actually expand the war like that.

You've been through this question before & seen the evidence.

Beyond that Hitler had half the vote in this, he considered three times (possibly more) declaring war & did so on the third round. Since the US participation in the Battle of the Atlantic was escalating at a increasing pace he'd had provocation enough within a few months. US military officers and technicians were already serving out of uniform with the Brits and Chinese. That activity was growing & Hilter knew it. The US was starting that autum to execute a plan to establish a large scale participation in construction and improvement of the Persian Gulf ports and Persian railway. Plans were on the table for the US to occupy the Azores & other Portuguese Atlantic islands were it necessary to prosecute the anti submarine campaign. Given his temper & declining mental health odds are Hitler would be provoked shortly.
 
Top