Post Valkyrie peace

Klaus-Jürgen Müller in his 1983 work "The German Military Opposition before the Second World War" wrote (if Wikipedia is to be believed): In Beck's opinion, once Germany was sufficiently rearmed, the Reich should wage a series of wars that would establish Germany as Europe's foremost power, and place all of Central and Eastern Europe into the German sphere of influence

How exactly is that not opportunism? Beck as you admit saw military action as a way to achieve political aims but only wished to conduct military action when the opportunity was right in his opinion. The fact that he viewed situations differently in terms of whether or not they presented a relatively risk-free opportunity than say Hitler or the Nazi party in general does not mean he was not opportunistic.

Opportunism to me (& wiki) means selfish behavoir without regard of principles or the constant shifting of principles and loyalities as it suits for temporary gain.

Beck never did this. His goals (a strong army and a strong Germany) stayed constant and his morals never changed (he always saw war as an aceptable tool of politics, although there were some boundaries he was unwilling to cross).

Opportunists change their opinions and principles, when their personal position changes (Stalin and Stalinist politicans in the west are a good example: changing from world revolution to peacefull coexistence to the social facism thesis to the popular front and back to the begining just as it suited the SU, but always claiming that reason and moral were on their side).
Beck never changed his principles and changed his opinions when facts demanded it as any sane person would.
(Not crossing the street right before an truck is just sane, as is not strating a war, when you can not win it.

All that you said about Beck and Goerdeler may have been right Uriel, but I don't see how Beck could not have been characterized as an opportunist. What exactly was he then?

A nationalist, not afraid to step over a few bodies if it suited his country (just like Churchill, Pearse, Clemencau, Bush, de Gaulle, ...)
Of course he was calculating and not allways screaming around what he thought, but that are basic treats of any officer or politican (I never said he was a nice person (though most who knew him do))


All well and good. However, how does that impact on the fact that the Allies were intent on...

Agree with all the following. Just wanted to make a point about the plotters.
 

Eurofed

Banned
No, they didn’t. Austria did not vote in 1919 to join Germany

Quoting from wiki:

"On November 11, 1918, Emperor Charles I relinquished power and, on November 12, German Austria was officially declared a republic. The provisional national assembly drafted a provisional constitution that stated that "German Austria is a democratic republic" (Article 1) and "German Austria is a component of the German Republic" (Article 2). Later plebiscites in the provinces of Tyrol and Salzburg yielded majorities of 98 and 99% in favor of a unification with Germany".

As for the their voting later; Hitler threatened to invade Germany when Schuschnigg proposed putting the idea to a vote, even before he’d heard the details of the proposed referendum because he knew he would never have won a fair vote on the issue.

Austria was a clericofascist dictatorship at the time and Hitler knew well how in such circumstances a plebiscite could be doctored to make it say whatever Schuschnigg wanted.

The Sudetenland Austrians considered themselves to be just that, and requested remaining as part of Austria,

And Austria wanted to join Germany.
 
Allies and Soviets establish occupation zones. Because they can't agree on everything, the Cold War begins to develop as it did IOTL except the quicker Western Allied advance might keep some of Central Europe outside the Soviet sphere.

Actually by 1944 the occupation zones had mostly been decided upon and the Soviets are getting their zones no matter how far the Allies advance.
 

Cook

Banned
on November 12, German Austria was officially declared a republic. The provisional national assembly drafted a provisional constitution...
You might want to pay attention to the time frame and events happening. The Austrians were facing rebellion by all the subject peoples and expecting the Serbian Army at the gates of Vienna at any time so they appealed to their ally, who they thought would continue to fight, to protect them. They were not yet aware of how disastrous Germany’s military position was until several days later. All that had been dropped by the time they were invited to Paris three months later; there they presented themselves as a newly independent nation, having freed themselves from the yoke of the Hapsburg Empire, just like their neighbours. The argument didn’t wash. Besides, no-one was going to be stupid enough to allow the largest nation in central Europe to grow even larger and present more of a threat to its neighbours.

And none of that is relevant to the thread.

By 1944 everyone in the Allied and Soviet camps realised that the treaty of Versailles had been too lenient and were not going to make the same mistakes again. Since the Valkyrie Conspirators hoped that they wouldn’t even suffer the leniency of Versailles, they were never going to be happy.

In November 1941, when the Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow, the British and Soviets agreed that East Prussia would be permanently lost to Germany and divided between Poland and the Soviet Union.

At Tehran in 1943 the debate wasn’t about if Germany would be occupied militarily and divided up into smaller states but for how long the occupation would last and how many parts to divide the monstrous empire into; Stalin favoured five or seven parts, Roosevelt preferred forty. Churchill at the time wasn’t sure how many parts but was certain that Prussia must be separated from the rest. It had been agreed prior to Tehran that Austria would be permanently cut away from Germany and Poland would be moved west at the expense of German Territory.

At best a successful Valkyrie Coup would have presented the Allies with the scenario that Bomber Harris had been predicting 'any day now' for three years and that Operation Roundup was designed in anticipation of; the German State collapsing internally allowing a rapid allied advance.

Actually by 1944 the occupation zones had mostly been decided upon and the Soviets are getting their zones no matter how far the Allies advance.
That Germany would be divided into zones of occupation had been agreed in 1944. Who would occupy where had to wait until Yalta.
 
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Let's try to remember that Austria, the Sudetenland, the Saar, and Danzig were peopled of German folks that in all evidence wanted to be in Germany since 1918, and had been forced to be elsewhere by the Versailles diktat. The national unity of willing ethnic Germans was a natural and legitimate aspiration of the German people, just like all the other peoples did in the same situation.
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Okay. I remember that but that doesn't have anything to do with what I saying to Adler. I was pointing out that Adler's statement was incorrect as the nationalists and the Nazis couldn't demand back something they never possessed in the first place. The demands of the July 20 plotters including retention of Austria. As I said elsewhere that might have been an achievable aim, but not the way it was presented. However Adler's statement would give the erroneous impression that demands including the Sudetenland and Austria (which were never in the unified German state of 1871-1918) were never under the control of a German government based in Berlin. That is correct is it not?
 
Opportunism to me (& wiki) means selfish behavoir without regard of principles or the constant shifting of principles and loyalities as it suits for temporary gain.


Beck never did this. His goals (a strong army and a strong Germany) stayed constant and his morals never changed (he always saw war as an aceptable tool of politics, although there were some boundaries he was unwilling to cross).

Opportunists change their opinions and principles, when their personal position changes (Stalin and Stalinist politicans in the west are a good example: changing from world revolution to peacefull coexistence to the social facism thesis to the popular front and back to the begining just as it suited the SU, but always claiming that reason and moral were on their side).
Beck never changed his principles and changed his opinions when facts demanded it as any sane person would.
(Not crossing the street right before an truck is just sane, as is not strating a war, when you can not win it.



A nationalist, not afraid to step over a few bodies if it suited his country (just like Churchill, Pearse, Clemencau, Bush, de Gaulle, ...)
Of course he was calculating and not allways screaming around what he thought, but that are basic treats of any officer or politican (I never said he was a nice person (though most who knew him do))




Agree with all the following. Just wanted to make a point about the plotters.

Okay, well we will have to agree to disagree on Beck. I strongly suspect that his goals were ultimately tied up in self interest. He wanted a strong Germany with a strong army but wanted the Army Chief of Staff to be the position of influence with the head of Germany's government on military matters (this stoked conflict with War Minister Werner von Blomberg who naturally did not appreciate Beck's advocacy for making him civil servant for all practical purposes). As he was a general and Chief of Staff it is difficult for me not to view his actions as being aimed primarily at increasing his own influence first, with a strong army being close behind and a strong Germany being a little further behind in terms of aims.

Then when he fell out of favour with Hitler he initiated contacts with the British and got involved with others planning to overthrow Hitler and rather coincidentally it seems he ended up being the proposed President or head of the Council of Regency for the new regime that was supposed to take effect if their plot succeeded.

To me that seems opportunistic, but I can see where others might disagree, so again we will probably just have to agree to disagree on this on yeah?
 

That Germany would be divided into zones of occupation had been agreed in 1944. Who would occupy where had to wait until Yalta.

Actually who would occupy where had pretty much been decided in 1944. See here:http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/other/us-army_germany_1944-46_ch09.htm


The zonal boundaries as proposed by the British and Soviets had been accepted by all by the end of June 1944 with everyone agreeing that the Soviets would occupy the eastern zone:

us-army_germany_1944-46_map2.jpg


The remaining dispute was over whether the British would occupy the northwestern zone and the Americans occupy the south or vice versa. This was resolved around September 1944 when it became apparent to Roosevelt that the position of the American and British Commonwealth armies meant the Americans were going to end up in the southern zone and that getting them into the northwestern zone would be a logistical pain in the ass. The southern zone was also agreed to once the Americans secured the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven along with transit rights.

The only thing decided at Yalta was the inclusion of a French zone which was carved out of the British and American zones. The northern half of the French zone in Germany was originally supposed to be part of the British zone, while the southern half or "wing" of the French zone in Germany proper was from what was supposed to be the American zone and all of the French zone in Austria came from what was supposed to be the American zone in Austria:

788px-Allied_Occupation_Zones.jpg
 

Cook

Banned
The only thing decided at Yalta was the inclusion of a French zone which was carved out of the British and American zones.
Well that and exactly where the Polish western border would be…and that Poland would not have an Occupation zone in Germany but that France would…that Berlin would be divided up into zones…that the zones would be areas of exclusive responsibility…that France would not be allowed to annex the Rhineland…that Germany would not be divided up into several smaller nations, a fair bit really, not to mention reparations and war crimes tribunals.

The decision not to divide up Germany into smaller states is really surprising because all there leaders had been in agreement to do exactly that going into the conference, the only difference of opinion lay in how many parts to cut it up into.
 
This again.

The myth of the undefeated German Army commenced right at November 11, 1919 and grew steadily from then onwards. The German regiments were allowed to return home in good order with their regimental colours and were greeted by their new Chancellor Ebert who told them that they remained undefeated. Even at the time there were allied voices who pointed out the importance of advancing into Germany proper and occupying German cities, so that the German people would know they had been defeated, Foch and Perishing being the foremost amongst them.

Versailles was really quite moderate, especially when compared to the terms imposed on France at the end of the Franco-Prussian war and the crushing terms applied to Russia at Brest-Litovsk. The German Nationalists in 1919 would simply not have been happy with the loss of any territory or any restrictions on their armed forces and given that Hitler’s demands in the years leading up to World War Two were for territories that had never been part of Germany, the claim that Versailles was to blame for WW2 losses all credibility.

Versailles was not the reason Hitler came to power; had the Weimer Republic accepted Versailles and, more importantly, had Versailles ever been enforced, Hitler would never have got anywhere.

Well, Versailles was unjust, unfair and caused the second world war.
If you do not belive it, its your problem

Why is this true?
Versailles created a lot "new" nations, that - instead of working together peacefull - had just hate and nationalism, tyrannized their "new" minorities and acted in the same (or worse) manner as the original "Lords"...
Germany got the alone guilt, something really stupid, cause it excused the ultra right wingers to destroy the weimar republic. It also shows clearly that Versailles wasn´t the try to create a peacefull europe but to take what you can get from the defeated enemy. This was the input from versailles

so beside france (still inferior in anything beside military) any other nation understood that Versailles was a mistake.
it gave a lot germans in foreign hands, hands that acted as bad or worse... so again the nationalists and revanchists got ammo for their propaganda.

hitler could rise cause germany was weak. germany was (military) weak cause of versailles.

the whole idea of versailles was to weaken the strongest economy (after the usa) so the own economy can overtake or benefit from.

that caused ww2...

instead of making a smart and "just" peace with a strong democratic germany as a base for benefit in europe they kicked the strongest in the balls as much and as long as possible. if you beat the 300pound gorilla you can kick him, but you have to kill him or you have to live with his reaction.
independent of hitler, germany would have overthrown the neighbours... just think about 1950 (world with versailles, no ww2, no hitler)
Germany will be superpower (economically) and france will be a third world nation, cause economical ruined. germany spent no money for its army, france has to spent a lot (think about the 1000pound monster in the east, poland needs really much support from france to survive, germany isn´t interested, but have strong ties with russia)

so you have germany - without the war around 90 million people, maybe unified with austria (i doubt the entente can stop this in 1940 in a peacefull manner?), economical and in high tech far ahead of france or great britain... the latter has big problems with india, in its colonies...

maybe a small but costly war with japan or italy? again, no german involvment, but you have to deal with red russia, facist italy and agressive japan... germany make profits (even with versailles, after some time the money germany has to pay isn´t important at all, but economical power will skyrocket...

but this time you have an enemy in central europe, powerful nr.2 in economics, without hitler you have no facism...

latest in the 50ties france depends on german good will, so versailles will be eliminated... even german nukes are possible (such weapon isn´t forbidden for germany...), just because you supress a nation with a treaty like versailles doesn´t mean that this nation will forget the evil things you did. without ww2 germany will be far more to the right, peace with poland or france is a no-go...but germany will be economical to france like the usa is to great britain today...

also, think about all the colonies, the troubles and the money to spent... and still the red monster...
 
Okay, well we will have to agree to disagree on Beck

I would be deligthed to

Quote:
As for the their voting later; Hitler threatened to invade Germany when Schuschnigg proposed putting the idea to a vote, even before he’d heard the details of the proposed referendum because he knew he would never have won a fair vote on the issue.
Austria was a clericofascist dictatorship at the time and Hitler knew well how in such circumstances a plebiscite could be doctored to make it say whatever Schuschnigg wanted.

I think the result of a plebiscite would be hard to predict (it would have taken place under more or less neutral conditions. Schuschnigg had allready accepted to include some Austrian Nazis in his goverment and would surely have had to accept German observers and free pro-Anschluß propaganda):
Most Austrians felt German but there was a lot of fear of the Nazis (Dollfuss murder and the propaganda of the last years would not have been forgotten, neither that the Nazis would seek revenge).
Hardest to predict might be how the supporters of the illegal left parties would have voted: would the abstain? would they realise that the were still much better off with Schuschnigg than with Hitler.

But why should Hitler have taken chances when he could just take it?
 
Well, Versailles was unjust, unfair and caused the second world war.
If you do not belive it, its your problem

While popular opinion is that Versailles was unjust, the terms themselves were less punitive than what the Germans demanded in Brest-Litovsk, and along the same lines as many other treaties of defeated powers, none of which are given the opprobrium of Versailles.

There are problems with Versailles and the peace in general, but it's not generally what's taught in schoolbooks.

1) The critical error was in agreeing to the armistice and not demanding a surrender. This created a sense in Germany that they had not been militarily defeated and caused them to expect a very lenient peace.

2) When the German government was presented the treaty, they took full responsibility and didn't force the army to publicly admit that Germany could not win - this is the source of the Dolchstosslegende.

3) The treaty was imposed on Germany instead of negotiated with them. So the Germans had no idea that they would not be getting the terms they imagined when they agree to an armistice.

4) Many of the terms of the treaty were not properly supported. Too much depended on Germany adhering to the terms. The various restrictions placed on Germany were simply unenforceable. In the end it allowed the Germans to evade those terms while still creating resentment against them, the worst of both worlds. This is actually a feature of many bad treaties.

To prevent this, the Allies should have made it clear what the basis of peace would be after the armistice. Germany would then either have to accept it, or fight on. This might have delayed the end of the war in 1919, but at the end there would be no doubt that Germany was militarily defeated, the German military would have accepted full responsibility for the defeat, and there would have been no "dictate" imposed on Germany, but a peace fully accepted by the German government perhaps with the most egregious errors avoided (like the war guilt clause which was put in simply as an afterthought to justify the reparations - it would not have materially affected the treaty and avoided a lot of anger).

This would not have eliminated all the bad issues of the treaties, but it would have resolved most of them. A firm US commitment to defend France from a European aggressor would also have likely addressed legitimate French security needs.

A Germany that accepted it was defeated in battle, and knowing it would face an unbeatable alliance of UK-France-US in any future match up would probably not have choosen to wage a second war.
 
From a military and political prospective I think Valkyrie wasn't the right way to go about it. Not with the German people thinking Hitler was almost a God and without Hitler's evil being well known other then by some of the elites in Germany. The fastest way to end the war with the least loss of life from the German POV is opening the door for the Americans and British to end the war as quickly as possible and hoping Stalin sees this as an Anglo-German alliance against him and does something stupid that ends up with him cut out of Eastern Germany. But, even if he doesn't millions of lives are saved.

peace.png


Though I think Valkyrie if it worked and it had a very small chance of doing so, but if it did it would have a powerful effect on the German psyche today. I know people don't like to talk about that or deny it, but the German public is today and will be for decades completely riddled with guilt that may never end over the Final Solution.

If Germans stopped it instead of foreign troops it would have had a powerful effect on the mindset of Germans and collective guilt over the Final Solution wouldn't have taken hold anywhere near to the degree it has in Germany.
 
Introduced parts of the Morgenthau plan

When in 1944?

Adler17 said:
Morgenthau plan was as worse as the so called "Endlösung". If the Allies demanded that, they were as bad as the Nazis. Luckily they did not totally introduce it.

They didn’t introduce any of it.

Wrong. President Truman halted the implementation of the Morgenthau plan, but this was not until it had been under implementation for a full 17 months. You can do very serious damage during one year and a half of running amok.

As General Clay would later state regarding the occupation directive guiding his and General Eisenhower's actions: "there was no doubt that JCS 1067 contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in Germany during the early months of occupation."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucius_D._Clay

According to many historians Truman did not end the Morgenthau plan until the speech made by secretary of state, James Byrnes, in Stutgart in September 1946.
http://www.jstor.org/pss/2147827

What these old historians did not know was that president Truman and secretary Byrnes agreed with them, because documents of the UK government that were declassified in 2006 show that Byrnes told the UK government exactly the same thing.

"b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart speech. They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel prodn to 5.8 m. tons. And during Loan talks, cdn't oppose them too strongly."

" Before this was completed I had seen Byrnes (before Stuttgart speech) & asked wtr. this meant he wd. overthrow Morgenthau policy. He said yes - with Truman's authy. Later saw him & took him thro' all points in my memo."
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2006/march/policy_germany.htm
 
That Germany would be divided into zones of occupation had been agreed in 1944. Who would occupy where had to wait until Yalta.

Technically yes, officially no formal proposal had been made regarding occupation zones. But there had been numerous discussions on the topic and in all of these, which all parties agreed upon, the Soviets had an occupation zone in the eastern regions of Germany.
 

Maur

Banned
To prevent this, the Allies should have made it clear what the basis of peace would be after the armistice. Germany would then either have to accept it, or fight on. This might have delayed the end of the war in 1919, but at the end there would be no doubt that Germany was militarily defeated, the German military would have accepted full responsibility for the defeat, and there would have been no "dictate" imposed on Germany, but a peace fully accepted by the German government perhaps with the most egregious errors avoided (like the war guilt clause which was put in simply as an afterthought to justify the reparations - it would not have materially affected the treaty and avoided a lot of anger).
It wouldn't. By that time Ludendorff was running around in circles screaming "we need peace! we need peace! or the army will collapse in two days, tops!" ;)
 

Cook

Banned
Wrong. President Truman halted the implementation of the Morgenthau plan, but this was not until it had been under implementation for a full 17 months. You can do very serious damage during one year and a half of running amok.
Here’s a tip for you: Don’t rely on Wikipedia. Or to give it its full title WikiIsubmitwhateverbullshitIwantapedia.

The Morgenthau Plan never won popular support in the three government’s administrations and was killed deader than a Dodo at Yalta.

It was agreed that Germany’s cities and industry would be rebuilt and this was done, but first priority had to be rebuilding the cities and industries of the former occupied nations. It would hardly make sense to anyone in 1945 to rebuild Nazi cities while their victims were still camping under canvas in rubble. Any letters objecting to this sense of priority should be addressed to the complaints department of Mr A. Hitler, current whereabouts unknown but last seen in the garden of the former Reich Chancellery.

 
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