1. Uh.... no, because what I wrote is taken STRAIGHT from
The Federalist Papers. The French never tried it until AFTER de Gaulle pushed a variant through. He saw the American system and wanted a French version.
No-one has ever found out who gave de Gaulle Federalist #9 and #10 for example.
Your proposals with the government are irrelevant and in any case the OP's proposals already define the scope of political changes in the thread: your proposals concerning French armed forces are consistently things which the French already did or make absolutely no sense for the French situation.
2. The American neutrality laws were not a problem at all for France. The French government was.
Please inform me how the French government is the one which is responsible for the Americans pulling their advisors out of France and stopping the export of supplies.
3. Summary of indices...
a. Fuel supply.
b. Fuel COSTS.
c. Maintenance capability.
d. Duties.
Cut to the chase and tell me how you are going to get French planes to fly 6,000+ kilometre without refueling in 1931 and how you are going to make a 23,000 kilometre route compete with a 10,000 kilometre route, instead of posting random lists.
4. Pre-war 1930s PanAm is not relevant? Good one. The Doolittle surveys started in 1935.
Your map is not pre-war: it is a wartime map
5. You are NOT going to like this.
You need to stop being so schizophrenic. You made the case for an Interwar period French long 75mm direct assault gun, I informed you that there were good reasons for why this didn't work, and your response was to post WW1 tanks and WW2 tanks, and when challenged about this you have shifted the subject to random Italian vehicle designs with absolutely no relevance to the original topic. Please stay on subject.
Nah. If the French had been like the Americans,
they would have had embedded observers riding along with the British Army "Experimental Mechanized Force" and played with one of their own and then staged their own "Louisiana Maneuvers" based on the 1927 British and 1929 American experiments. Then the fighting around Sedan (1940) might have gone a bit differently.
Your examples are not pre-war observation of foreign maneuvers - you posted battles that happened in 1940. In any case it is irrelevant - the French did send observers to look at what the British were doing throughout the 1930s. They were not impressed with the quality of the British army and its implementation. They also did their own training and exercises - or do you think that the DLMs with a balanced force of tanks, armored reconnaissance cars, motorized artillery, motorized and mechanized infantry, and anti-aircraft artillery just emerged out of the thin air?
And the point about Kasserine which you missed completely was that the Americans did everything I wrote they did and they were badly beaten, because the idiot, Fredendall, used FRENCH command and control methods (bunkered up 40 kilometers to the rear using telexes, instead of the ones prescribed by then current British doctrine (lead from the van with the units embedded. As it was, PATTON, who came in to clean up the mess, reached back 80 years and used American methods from the American civil war 80 years past where troop leaders rode up front with the actual troops and where they could see the battle eyes on and lead from the front. It worked.
Again, random changing of the subject is not good form nor does it make sense. You posted the idea of the Lee as an appropriate model for a French interwar vehicle mounting a long 75mm gun, then posted two battles as examples of the vehicle, and now
Actually, NO. Your evidence has been the one that is inconsistent and not on point or linear in progression.
Simply saying "But no, you" is not actually a valid counter-argument.
It is in black and white, replete with examples; Bad@Logic. I will even repeat it. Convergent interests. Cut a deal with Stalin. Diplomacy.
Give an example of the Franco-Soviet alliance working and successfully working and containing Germany while simultaneously 1)Preserving Eastern European states without Soviet control, 2)Getting the Poles to accept Soviet aid, 3)Being able to offer a secondary front to the French while presenting an attractive opportunity to the Soviets to actually do so: you will quickly find that diplomacy is not built on individuals alone but upon reality, and reality militated against an effective Soviet-French alliance. You may repeat the stale reasoning of "convergent interests" without any further justification all you want, but the reality of Interwar diplomacy shows otherwise.
If the ACTUAL case is that the Germans learned from WWI, then what are you suggesting I wrote here, again? What the HELL do you think I mean by German Maneuver Warfare, which the HERR published for crying out loud? You want to know what the Americans used as instruction manuals for the Louisiana Maneuvers? GERMAN comic books made for Private Hans Goofus in 1938 explaining to him in pictures how it was supposed to work. All the armor school did was translate the word balloons from German to English. Prepared by the their troop training command. And then there were the professional journals with articles written by a gentleman named Heinz Guderian in 1936 forward. If the Americans could get the articles and write doctrine from it, what about the French?
Again, you change the subject and engage in the most bizarre posting style. You pointed out that every power learned the lessons of 1940-1945 through war and now it switches to studying the Germans and their doctrine: do you REALLY think that the French didn't study the Germans and their war of war? They very much did so and there were plenty of reports prepared on the Germans and how their army worked, which is mentioned even in documents I've posted such as "Où est la masse de manœuvre?"The French problem wasn't lack of interest or study of the Germans and what they were doing - it is that they drew different conclusions about how new technology, military possibilities, and ideas would impact their doctrine, and had to filter them through their own army which had its own logic, possibilities, limitations, and objectives. And despite how simplistic you make things out to be, things were never as obvious as you try to write: there were German officers themselves who, writing in their own military journals, questioned the wisdom of German military doctrine and preferred the French style.
Note that the Louisiana Maneuvers were based in what I wrote? Again the root lessons were WWI and sources were the French, the British and the Germans well before 1940.
Your claim is that the Americans were watching what happened in 1940 in France and North Africa, without any mention whatsoever of anything pre-war. By definition it is useless and if you want to suggest something about the French army and learning in the Interwar leading up to 1940 you need to talk about something for the French to learn THEN, not American 1941 military maneuvers.
The 4.7cm could deal with can opening out to about 500 meters with the majority of panzers until the Germans thicken up the PZKWIII and IV. This was bound to happen. Then there is the little FACT that the 7.5 cm/40 could throw a heavier shell 1000 meters and punch through plate that a 4.7 cm skipped off at 1000 meters.
Which would be all very well and good - except the French weren't USING that gun. The French weren't using a 75mm/40 gun, they were using the canon de 75 mle.1897/33 and if you look at penetration tables for only has 50mm/30 degrees at 400 meters with its normal Mle 1910 APHE - sources meanwhile for the 47mm gun differ, with the conservative statistics suggesting 60mm at 30 degrees at 600 yards and 80mm at 15 degrees at 200 yards. Optimistic penetration levels are 106mm at 100m, and 57mm at 1,000m against armor with zero degrees of slope. Even at 1,000 meters the 47mm would have had better penetration, and even if the French got decent 75mm AP, the difference is not that great, with the American M2 75mm guns with similar muzzle velocity only achieving 65-75mm penetration at that range - so for a few millimeters extra penetration which is OVERKILL in 1940 when the most heavily armored German tank has 30mm of frontal armor, you pay for that with a gun which is 500 kilograms heavier, larger, and much less stealthy. The French were not idiots with their choice of anti-tank guns, and stop assuming they were.
And this is ignoring your bizarre logic that the French early 1930s designed tank guns are supposed to be based around fighting 1943 tanks: the real answer to that is the 75mm L/53 TAZ mle 1939, NOT a warmed over field gun that is 40 years old and offers broadly inferior anti-tank performance to even a 47mm AT gun.
So why not do what the Americans DID? Make NEW ones. About 80,000 I believe.
Yes, let us make new models of the obsolete 40 year old artillery gun. You're full of good ideas aren't you?