Post Arrow Canadian Aviation Industry

To this day Canada has a significant aviation industry, Bombardier group claims to being the third largest aircraft manufacturer in the world, but with the notable exception of a military aircraft industry. Which as some of our Canadian members are likely to point can be blamed, to the CF-105 cancellation back in 1959.

Arguably the claim holds a degree of truth hence the obvious question is how much. So lets posit, George Drew doesn't catch meningitis, he remains at the head of Progressive Conservative's and leads them to one more electoral defeat at the hands of the Liberals in 1957. CF-105 goes into production for the RCAF by the early 1960s as originally expected.

So how does the Canadian aviation industry evolve from there? The Arrow likely gets some export orders but being a dedicated interceptor, at least at this stage and big and relatively complex I wouldn't expect that many of them. Nevertheless a domestic Canadian aircraft industry not just making but also designing fighter aircraft is still there. Do we see Canada remaining in the fighter design business either on its own with the NFA in the 1970s becoming a domestic design, or in partnership with Britain and Europe? Or is CF-105 even in success the last of it?
 

Archibald

Banned
Considering the longevity of the Phantom and Mirage IV, I can see the Arrow lasting, with upgrades, until the 2000's.
The Arrow could very well evolve into a air-to-ground fighter bomber in the 60's, a bit like the Phantom or Mirage III. It would need a different radar, however.
My favourite scenario is different, however. The Arrow had superior performance to the Phantom. With sparow III I can see the Arrow being the only aircraft able to shoot a Mig-25 in the late 60's... some years before the Eagle or Tomcat.
It happened Israel and Imperial Iran bought F-14s and F-15s to shoot Mig-25 out of the sky. They both tried with the Phantom, but it couldn't do the job.Perhaps they could buy Arrows ?
Better, the Arrow could have the F-108 / YF-12 radar and AIM-47 missiles, making it a Tomcat before the date.

As for how the Canadian aircraft industry could evolve, no idea. Even with the Arrow in production, cost of 4th generation fighters were so high it is not certain Canada produce an Arrow successor. The example of Sweden in interesting. The Viggen is a rather massive aircraft. Yet the Grippen was made much, much smaller than the Viggen. Perhaps Canada would have followed a similar path - opting for a much smaller machine, the size of an F-5 or an F-18.

I can see something like a cross between a Mirage 2000 and a F-18 - crap, would'nt that be a Rafale ? :p
 
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Avro Canada had several proposals including:

A long range passenger jet
avro-canada-long-range-jet-1956_zpse501d62e.jpg


A supersonic transport and space threshold vehicle
hQ9iWC4.jpg
 
Lascaris said:
George Drew doesn't catch meningitis, he remains at the head of Progressive Conservative's and leads them to one more electoral defeat ...CF-105 goes into production
How are they paying for both the Arrow & BOMARC? It was the pressure to buy BOMARC, & the subsequent excessive costs of both programs, plus the 1957 White Paper, that effectively killed the Arrow.

How do you get around either no BOMARC or no White Paper?
Lascaris said:
Arrow likely gets some export orders but being a dedicated interceptor, at least at this stage and big and relatively complex I wouldn't expect that many of them.
It's conceivable you get orders from Japan, Oz, & NZ, not least (for the latter) on Commonwealth grounds--but expect stiff cost competition from the U.S. (which will be heavily subsidized:eek::rolleyes:)
Lascaris said:
Do we see Canada remaining in the fighter design business either on its own with the NFA in the 1970s becoming a domestic design, or in partnership with Britain and Europe? Or is CF-105 even in success the last of it?
Much as I'd like to imagine continuing Canadian fighter designs, IMO the Arrow is probably the last (or second-last) to appear in any case. Costs are shortly going to get prohibitive, &, unlike Israel, we haven't the pressing need for domestic designs. Partnerships in the likes of the Eurofighter might be in the cards, tho.

The proposals for jet airliners look good, tho the experience with the C.102 is not promising (considering the lunatics in charge at TCA:confused::rolleyes:). I have a hunch the civil side is a dead letter in the face of the 707.

There's another impact that needs dealing with, tho: if Canadian engineers don't go south, what happens to the Apollo program? Does Canada get a bigger piece? Even, say, an actual contract?:cool: (Yeah, that's probably ASB, but a Canadian-built LEM...:cool: And, for cost reasons, it'd be attractive.;))
 
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Australia bought 3 combat jet aircraft types in the 60s; 116 Mirage IIIO, 20 A4G and 24 F111C. The Arrow isn't a good fit to displace any of these aircraft.
 

Delta Force

Banned
The Orenda Iroquois turbojet could have been a major export item. France placed an order for 300 engines to power the Mirage IV, but when the future of the Arrow program became uncertain they opted to produce a more powerful version of their Atar turbojet instead.
 
The Orenda Iroquois turbojet could have been a major export item. France placed an order for 300 engines to power the Mirage IV, but when the future of the Arrow program became uncertain they opted to produce a more powerful version of their Atar turbojet instead.

But the future was in Turbofans.

The Iroquois was a lighter, slightly more powerful in thrust than the Pratt and Whitney J75-P-19W turbojet, as used in the F-105 or J75-P-17 used in the F-106.

It was an advance, but it would soon lose out to the P&W F100 series turbofan, that was even lighter still, plus had better fuel consumption and thrust to weight ratio.

That said, the Atar wasn't anywhere close to the Iroquois or J75 in power.
 

Delta Force

Banned
But the future was in Turbofans.

The Iroquois was a lighter, slightly more powerful in thrust than the Pratt and Whitney J75-P-19W turbojet, as used in the F-105 or J75-P-17 used in the F-106.

It was an advance, but it would soon lose out to the P&W F100 series turbofan, that was even lighter still, plus had better fuel consumption and thrust to weight ratio.

That said, the Atar wasn't anywhere close to the Iroquois or J75 in power.

Some turbojet engines were developed into turbofans. For example, the General Electric CJ805-23 was a turbofan development of the J79 and was used on the Convair 990 airliners.
 
The big issue would be what could Canada do with civilian orders, because in a military the size of Canada's its just not gonna work to base an industry entirely on military aircraft. Even with the Commonwealth (and assuming the giant screwups that the British defense industry was chocked full of in the 1950s, 60s and 70s) its a massive stretch, and you'll always have the Americans as stiff competition in both the military and civilian fields.

Best bet? Get the long-range airliner going early as the first real business jet, and develop the De Havilland Canada airliners as OTL, as well as the flying boats and the Dash-7 / Dash-8 series. Having created the business jet market Canadair pushes hard on it, while Avro Canada, having built the Arrow, looks at other projects. Canada never buys the Starfighter, and the Canuck is eventually modified for ground-attack and other duties as the Arrows take over their supersonic jobs. The RAF quickly realizes what a load of crap the White Paper is, but not before the EE Lightning bites it as a result, resulting in a fat RAF order for the Arrow. This makes Avro Canada a pile and results in a merger between Avro Canada and Canadair in the mid-1960s. A strong aerospace industry results in political demands for better armed forces developments, and the Canadian armed forces get better gear across the board as a result, with most of it made in Canada.

The big move is the Vickers VC10. Air Canada and Canadian Pacific Air Line, along with Canadair and Orenda engines, get in on its development and as a result the VC10 doesn't come with older RR Conways but rather the newest turbofan from Orenda, the Orenda Haida, which proves to be a substantial fuel efficiency improvement on the RR Conway or anything offered on the Boeing 707, giving the VC-10 a sizable number of orders from Commonwealth countries and all VC-10s made for the North American markets are assembled by Canadair, as well as military patrol plane versions which begin development in the late 1960s. The VC10 proves an excellent plane for Canadian environments and improvements happen through the 1960s as a result of the demands to top the 707 and DC-8.

The big breaks comes in the late 1960s. Canadair and McDonnell Douglas do a deal to pass off construction of the RAF's ordered fleet of Phantoms to Canadair, relieving tension on the company's assembly lines (taxed by the need for USAF, USN and USMC Phantoms during the Vietnam War) and with the hope of the F-4 being bought by Canada. This effort is successful, and all RAF and RCAF Phantoms are built in whole or in part by Canadair, which buys a chunk of McDonnell Douglas as a result, a result helped by the development of the CL-84 Dynavert for the Canadian Army - the Dynavert was soon also bought by several other armed forces due to its capabilities. The second big break comes in 1969, when Orenda bets huge on its future and buys a massive stake in Rolls-Royce, saving it from bankruptcy. The resulting Rolls-Royce Orenda company also pushes for Canadair involvement in the Lockheed L-1011, that also proving vital to Lockheed's survival. Rolls-Royce Orenda proves to be a huge player in the world of aircraft engines thanks to the RB211 series, and Canadian L-1011s are soon also being made by Lockheed, a situation as before followed by orders from British Airways and Qantas, both of whom take delivery of long-ranged L-1011s in the 1970s. The Arrows proves to be tough and reliable and the RCAF's fleet, which by the late 1960s is almost entirely Canadian-made, is a major source of pride to the nation's armed forces, so as a result when the time comes to begin the NFA programs in the late 1970s, Canadian involvement was highly sought after, both for the expertise and investment.

The result is the by-then obsolete Arrow is replaced beginning in 1981 by the F-15 Eagle, a decision heavily influenced by Canadair's investment in McDonnell Douglas. Canuck F-15s are not only made in Canada, they also include a sizable number of avionics improvements (including the ability to carry air-to-ground ordinance) and some aerodynamic improvements, as well as Rolls-Royce Orenda PST.18 Blackfoot turbofan engines, which prove to be an improvement in power on the American Pratt and Whitney F100s though at a small cost in fuel efficiency. The development of the CF-15D in Canadian service as a two-seat strike fighter foresaw the American F-15E Strike Eagle. The Canadian F-4s would be ultimately complemented by the Panavia Tornado, which were license-built by De Havilland Canada and entered CF service in 1985, at first supplementing and then eventually replacing the F-4 in Canadian service, which was retired in 1994. The Arrow's fighter variants were retired in 1986, but recon versions lasted until 1998 in RCAF service. The Tornado proved a great airplane for Canada but was always seen as somewhat underpowered, until RR Orenda got on that job with its improvement of the Turbo-Union engines, upgrades that eventually were also sold to Britain, the Netherlands and Saudi Arabia.

The stress of RCAF orders in the 1980s forced Canadair out of the airliner business, leaving that to De Havilland Canada. The company's problems with development costs however became a non-issue when the company merged with Bombardier Transportation in 1986, and Bombardier absorbed the Dutch Fokker company in the late 1980s and into the 1990s. That move resulted in Bombardier using the Fokker 100 as a base to develop its own short-range 737 competitor, and to nobody's surprise Air Canada, Canadian Airlines and Air Transat were all buyers of the new aircraft, named the Bombardier B Series, which entered service in 2001, while the following C Series would be an all-new aircraft, that aircraft entering service in 2012. Both would also prove highly successful with Western European and Latin American operators.

By 2015, the Canadian airliner business is focused on Canadair, which is a company focused on helicopters, business jets, smaller propeller-driven aircraft, specialized aircraft (water bombers and the like) and military projects, while Bombardier is the world's third largest (behind Boeing and Airbus) maker of airliners, making their aircraft in Canada, the Netherlands and Northern Ireland. Canadair's involvement with the making of the L-1011 lasted to the end its production life in 1985, and their involvement with McDonnell Douglas resulted in them being an owner of a chunk of Boeing after their merger in 1996, as well as Canadair being the second-largest supplier of components to Boeing (after Kawasaki Heavy Industries) and with Canadair providing components to the 777, 747-400/747-8 and 787 Dreamliner projects. The aerospace industry in Canada almost always buys its components and materials from Canadian manufacturers, and its one of Canada's several massive value-added manufacturing sectors - along with automobiles and auto parts, railroad vehicles, consumer electronics, shipbuilding, metals finishing and recycling and petrochemical refining - that provide an estimated 1.2 million direct jobs and as much as 21% of Canada's GDP.

OOC: Perhaps a little optimistic, but not insane. :)
 
In the immiadete post war period having a Canadian aircraft company build a STOL bush transport would be very advantageous. Maybe buying Miles aircraft in the late 40's and developing the skyvan series, if a link up with shorts is made after they have taken on the Sky van then by the mid fifties Canada could be building indigenous transport aircraft up to the size of the Short Belfast and challenging the Hercules for export sales.
 
It's conceivable you get orders from Japan, Oz, & NZ,


Not likely for NZ in my opinion - too much aircraft for NZ's needs, and even if the RNZAF wanted it Treasury would likely veto it on cost grounds as not being cost effective (we wouldn't be able to afford enough of them, and IOTL it's why the RNZAF got the A-4 instead of the F-4).

Also given the lack of significant underwing stores capability and thus being forced to rely on what can be carried in the weapons bay will place limitations on any air to ground conversion of the Arrow without a significant re-design.
 
By 1942, Prime Minister MacKenzie King is appalled by casualties among Canadian air crew serving in RAF Bomber Command, so he bans any more transfers. Canadians who graduate from the BCATP are only allowed to serve with Ferry Command or Coastal Command. By early 1944, RCAF Coastal Command Liberators routinely re-fuel in Iceland as they close the mid-Atlantic gap to U-boats.
With all this trans-Atlantic experience, Canadian airlines are perfectly placed to fly mail and passengers, especially after New Found land joins Confederation in 1949. Foreign airlines (Aeroflot, BOAC and TWA) a re either denied landing rights (Gander and Goose Bay) or must pay obscene prices for avgas. Trans Canada Airlines cheerfully flies all those passengers to their destinations in Cuba or a dozen different destinations in North America.

Victory Aircraft quits building Lancaster bombers to concentrate on York freighters. York Mark 2 is powered by American radial engines, while York Mark 3 adds a nose wheel and cargo hatch under the tail.

AVRO sells moderate numbers of CF-100 interceptors and convinces the RCAF to settle for a small batch of bare-bones of Arrow Mark 1s with American-made engines, missiles and fire control systems. Arrow Mark 2s are powered by Orenda Iroquois engines. Mark 3s get Velvet Glove missiles, Mark 4s get Canadian Marconi fire control systems etc. Arrows sell well to allies with long coastlines to defend (e.g. Australia and NZ).

Most of the Canadair North Stars get radials, and are followed by hundreds of turboprop Yukons. TCA introduces a fleet of Yukons for their longer routes.
Only the first batch of Canadair-built Arguses are powered with radial engines. As more fuel efficient turboprops come on the market, later Argus sport turboprops and pressurized cabins to reduce transit time. Russian submariners receive so many embarrassing "love letters" (from RCAF Coastal Command) their divorce rate rises faster than a Soyuz rocket!

After they complete the Hurricane contract, Canadian Car and Foundry (Thunder Bay) build a few hundred Budd Conestogas which prove especially handy for delivering bulldozers and radar components to the Pine Tree Line and later DEW Line.

Fairchild of Montreal also decline to bid on Curtiss Helldiver contracts. Instead they build components for Grumman. After the war, they build a few Husky bush-planes, but are forced to hire Robert Noordyn to help work out Husky's worse weaknesses, which he does by doubling the size of the engine and vertical fin. In return, the Noordyn factory sub-contracts to build Husky sub-components when Fairchild gets too busy building C-119 and C-123 cargo planes for the Korean and Vietnam Nam conflicts.h

Meanwhile, DeHavilland of Canada refuses to license DHC-1 Chipmunk production to the parent company and sells hundreds of trainers to allied air forces.
DHC-2 Beaver sell well especially after Alaskan operators insist on extended cabins and larger doors. Turbo-Beavers sell well especially when the US Army delays selling of of their Korean War-vintage Beavers.
DHC-3 Otters only sell in small numbers until they add nose wheels and PT6A engines just as the over-night courier business takes off during the 1970s.
The US Army only buys a few hundred DHC-4 Cariboos, but they LAPES so many tons of supplies into Akhenaten Sanh, that the USMC says "If you don't buy them, we will." But by that time, DHC has already flown the Buffalo prototype so they spend the next decade selling transports to NATO and every third world dictator who can scrape up the bucks. Canadian Airborne Regiment jump-masters RCAF pilots are frequently sent on training missions to third world countries that have bought DHC airplanes.
The DHC-7 STOL-liner is still-borne, but they thousands of Dash-8 commuter-liners, which are joined a decade later by Dash-9 turboprops on the longer routes.

Pioneer Parachutes (Smiths. Falls, Ontario) sews most of those LAPES chutes but struggles to sew fast enough to meet demand. In desperation they start tying together square panels. This square/round compromise leads to a series of square troop chutes that vaguely resemble the modern AT-11.
When Domina Jalbert swings by Pioneer - on his way to visit the old homestead - he sketches put a new concept. After the Canadian National parachute team brings home the precision-landing medals from the 1970 World Meet, Pioneer opens a skydiving division.
After the VanDoos rece platoon sneaks behind "enemy lines" a few too many NATO exercises, they are invited to share their new-found HAHO skills with NATO allies.
 
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I'm not going to argue NZ purchase; just an idea off the top.:)

I do disagree with "long range airliner". The C.102 was closer to the 727/737 than the DH.106 or 707, & that market is huge.:eek::eek: (Some 5000 built at last count, IIRC.) If you add in the idea of C.102s as bizjets, equal to the JetStar, IMO you've got the best possible combination for Avro Canada into the 21st Century.:cool::cool:
 
To be fair, the cancellation of the Avro 105 was a distinct point in time, but it was really just the manifestation of a larger trend: The post-war realization that even in the military the best technology is not always the best solution. Similar cancellations were happening at that time in the US and UK... and probably too in the USSR...

Let's face it. The 105 was a complex, expensive machine scratching the limits of technology. It may be that its cancellation caused the 'death' of Canada's leading role as an aircraft designing nation. But if it had not been cancelled, the cost of putting it into service, with all inevitable cost overruns, production delays and difficulties ironing out the bugs in operational service would be just as detrimental to the Canadian defense and aircraft industry.
 
Agreed!
The Arrow's cancellation was the tipping point when Ottawa told the RCAF that their ambitions far exceeded the dollars Canadian tax-payers were willing to spend.
Fortunately the USAF was willing to trade CF-101 long-range interceptors for RCAF instructor pilots during the Viet Nam War. The RCAF paid far less than market rate for Voodoos.

During the same era, the RCN wasted millions of dollars on HMCS Bra d'Or, an experimental, sub-chasing hydrofoil that asked far more than 1960s-vintage metallurgists could deliver.

The RCN was wise enough to scrap their grandeos plans for an all-singing, all-dancing fleet to focus on what they did best. The RCN shifted its R&D budget to developing the Beartrap helicopter haul-down system and sold significant numbers to the Italian, Indian and American navies.

Meanwhile the Canadian Army cancelled it's stumbling Bobcat APC. Speaking of stumbling and fumbling, one look at the Bobcats' hatches revealed that heavily-armed infantrymen were priority last!
The Canadian Army wisely bought reliable M-113 and M-113 and a halfs from FMC. Two decades later General Motors of Canada bought license rights to build Mowag Piranha APCs and now dominate the wheeled APC market.
 
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To be fair, the cancellation of the Avro 105 was a distinct point in time, but it was really just the manifestation of a larger trend: The post-war realization that even in the military the best technology is not always the best solution. Similar cancellations were happening at that time in the US and UK... and probably too in the USSR...

Let's face it. The 105 was a complex, expensive machine scratching the limits of technology. It may be that its cancellation caused the 'death' of Canada's leading role as an aircraft designing nation. But if it had not been cancelled, the cost of putting it into service, with all inevitable cost overruns, production delays and difficulties ironing out the bugs in operational service would be just as detrimental to the Canadian defense and aircraft industry.


I think this is a good point - for all it's virtues, the Arrow was an expensive machine very much optimised for a single role that would be a resource pit in service to the detriment of other types and capabilities. Like the TSR.2 I think a lot of the love for the Arrow is heart rather than head - both capable machines, but not necessarily the right ones.
 
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