post 1945 naval thinking shifts mostly to Littoral warfare

destiple

Banned
WI post 1945 the USSR and China focus solely on littoral naval combat and build no surface ships for any blue water operations.So much so that by 80s they still have

no aviation cruisers
no large ASW ships
no large rocket ships
they still have a large SSN, SSGN and SSBN fleet as in the OTL

They focus solely on and have much higher number of
1-fast missile craft
2-Torpedo boats
3-More stocks of sophisticated mines
4-coastal mobile land based ASM like Sepal and Silkworm
5-More strike aircraft designed for anti-shipping strikes
6-small coastal ASW corvettes
7-coastal Subs diesel electric
just think of how IRGC naval threat is nowdays esp with their swarm tactics

How would that influence NATO naval response and how can they counter such threats more effectively in the 70s and 80s ?
 
NATO is able to focus more resources on ASW and coastal warfare. US, GB and others retire some of their cruisers earlier. Northern flank is basically secure

Easy way to counter is airpower, small coastal craft can't carry decent AA fits, even the largest can only carry something like Osa, anything else is vulnerable to helicopters with ATGMs, as was demonstrated in the gulf war. So more helicopter equipped craft, actually see that DDH variant of the Spruances for the US, build the DDG-2's with a hangar where the aft 5"/54 is, etc. US doesn't change much, probably same with UK/France. For other NATO nations, fewer Submarines, more naval helicopters, probable early development of light Anti Ship missiles
 
The USN and RN would still be rather large due to institutional inertia, if for nothing else. NATO navies might focus perhaps more on offensive role on Northern Flank earlier. They would still need a lot of long range ASW and air defence combatants as their main bases would be far away.

I would guess the White Sea would be the main SSBN bastion, and the forces you mention would be quite enough to secure them.

Meanwhile, the Soviets would waste the saved money on draining the Aral Sea dry earlier or buying yet another brand of ICBM's.
 

destiple

Banned
NATO is able to focus more resources on ASW and coastal warfare. US, GB and others retire some of their cruisers earlier. Northern flank is basically secure

Easy way to counter is airpower, small coastal craft can't carry decent AA fits, even the largest can only carry something like Osa, anything else is vulnerable to helicopters with ATGMs, as was demonstrated in the gulf war. So more helicopter equipped craft, actually see that DDH variant of the Spruances for the US, build the DDG-2's with a hangar where the aft 5"/54 is, etc. US doesn't change much, probably same with UK/France. For other NATO nations, fewer Submarines, more naval helicopters, probable early development of light Anti Ship missiles


What kind of tactics would their torpedo boats adopt to attack larger NATO vessels like DD, DDG and frigates ? esp when the latter are equipped with ASM which far outranges the torpedoes
I ask that esp since in the OTL too torpedo boats persisted in quite huge numbers in the navies of NK, china and even USSR and poland up to the 80s even though the ASM were in widespread use
 
They're still going to build large ASW ships. Early on they need them to detect enemy SSBN's approaching their coast and by the 70s and 80s they need them to protect against enemy SSN's attempting to sink Soviet SSBN's.
 
What kind of tactics would their torpedo boats adopt to attack larger NATO vessels like DD, DDG and frigates ? esp when the latter are equipped with ASM which far outranges the torpedoes
I ask that esp since in the OTL too torpedo boats persisted in quite huge numbers in the navies of NK, china and even USSR and poland up to the 80s even though the ASM were in widespread use
NATO only got an effective AShM in 1973 with Exocet, Harpoon and Otomat following in 1977. USSR stopped building torpedo boats in 1970, after that new craft with torpedoes had them for ASW, Poland stopped in 1973 for the same reason. China was still building them into the 90's, but they and North Korea keep them as pure coastal defense platforms, have them hidden close to shore as ambush weapons, USSR would use their torpedo boats the same way
 

destiple

Banned
NATO only got an effective AShM in 1973 with Exocet, Harpoon and Otomat following in 1977. USSR stopped building torpedo boats in 1970, after that new craft with torpedoes had them for ASW, Poland stopped in 1973 for the same reason. China was still building them into the 90's, but they and North Korea keep them as pure coastal defense platforms, have them hidden close to shore as ambush weapons, USSR would use their torpedo boats the same way
SO essentially if they remain close to shore they are less likely to be vulnerable to Anti ship missiles ? as the missiles would have a hard time picking them out against the shoreline ?
 
SO essentially if they remain close to shore they are less likely to be vulnerable to Anti ship missiles ? as the missiles would have a hard time picking them out against the shoreline ?
More if they remain close to shore they would be hard to detect, as in the missile equipped warship might not know they were there, and thus the torpedo boat could get into torpedo range without being seen. The Chinese were planning on hiding their ships in caves for instance, could hide in small inlets, behind islands, etc., point is not to be seen until time to launch torpedoes

Of course NATO would know that and not send its ships in close unless they absolutely had too, or they were absolutely certain there was nothing there, but that would count as a win for the defenders
 

destiple

Banned
More if they remain close to shore they would be hard to detect, as in the missile equipped warship might not know they were there, and thus the torpedo boat could get into torpedo range without being seen. The Chinese were planning on hiding their ships in caves for instance, could hide in small inlets, behind islands, etc., point is not to be seen until time to launch torpedoes

Of course NATO would know that and not send its ships in close unless they absolutely had too, or they were absolutely certain there was nothing there, but that would count as a win for the defenders

seems like the best use of TB would be as an anti-invasion force

They could target the slower and less well defended amphibious ships and the escorting destroyers/frigates only if they come too close to the shore to provide fire-support or close escort the transports/supply ships ?

Isnt there a minimum range to deploy anti-ship missiles too ?

Also I believe the torpedoes might have less chances of being decieved by countermeasures atleast back in the 70s and 80s ?
 
seems like the best use of TB would be as an anti-invasion force

They could target the slower and less well defended amphibious ships and the escorting destroyers/frigates only if they come too close to the shore to provide fire-support or close escort the transports/supply ships ?

Isnt there a minimum range to deploy anti-ship missiles too ?

Also I believe the torpedoes might have less chances of being decieved by countermeasures atleast back in the 70s and 80s ?

The problem of such a green water navy is that it is vulnerable to airpower and torpedo has limited range. The boats would be easily destroyed in port if air defence failed to stop air attacks. Also, the USMC has adopted and became experts in heliborne operations by the 70s, any modern invastion is a 3D affair.

There is a min range for ASMs, bu differs for different type and the Standard SAM has demostrated itself as effectivr anti boat weapon in OTL Persian Gulf Tanker War.

Furthermore, such lack of blue water navy would have serious effect to Soviet global geopolitics and diplomatic strategy. With control of vital global SLOC by the West, it would make Soviet support of pro USSR regimes around the world difficult.

At the end of the day, military forces are a tool to achieve political aim, esp. the Navy. The design and development of force capacity should be tailored to political aim, not vice versa.
 
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Exactly what purpose does a littoral navy do for the Russians. NATO is not going to be coming up close to Russian waters (amphibious landing near Murmansk?). The Soviet Navy was interested in amphibious operations against NATO in the Baltic, anti-CVBG operations (littoral ships useless here), protection of SSBNs (only get bastions when you have missiles long enough range, not with Yankee class), and very importantly anti-shipping to interdict flow of troops/supplies US to Europe. Even in the Med, "littoral" ships won't work against NATO forces, they don't work for offensive amphibious operations. Beyond the coastal defense forces they had OTL, expanding this would be a waste. Whether or not building fewer larger ships by them is a better move is another question, replacing them with more coastal forces - nope.
 
seems like the best use of TB would be as an anti-invasion force

They could target the slower and less well defended amphibious ships and the escorting destroyers/frigates only if they come too close to the shore to provide fire-support or close escort the transports/supply ships ? ...

The Germans and Italians tried this. Allied airpower and surface escorts shut them down. Nearly unrecorded were the battles between the German subs and torpedo boats trying to get past the Allied air and surface screen defending Operation NEPTUNE. There was a nasty air/surface battle as the German boats transited from Brest & Cherbourg to the Channel, that segued into some residual surface gunfights.

On the surface this effort requires the invaders Destroyers to return to their original late 19th Century role as 'Torpedo Boat Destroyers'.

WI post 1945 the USSR and China focus solely on littoral naval combat and build no surface ships for any blue water operations.So much so that by 80s they still have

no aviation cruisers
no large ASW ships
no large rocket ships
they still have a large SSN, SSGN and SSBN fleet as in the OTL

They focus solely on and have much higher number of
1-fast missile craft
2-Torpedo boats
3-More stocks of sophisticated mines
4-coastal mobile land based ASM like Sepal and Silkworm
5-More strike aircraft designed for anti-shipping strikes
6-small coastal ASW corvettes
7-coastal Subs diesel electric
just think of how IRGC naval threat is nowdays esp with their swarm tactics
...

This composition is mostly a defensive force. A littoral naval strategy or doctrine is not necessarily defensive. Offensive naval ops along the Norwegian, Korean, Japanese, or Alaskan coasts would use larger craft, but not necessarily require a blue water fleet.
 
seems like the best use of TB would be as an anti-invasion force

They could target the slower and less well defended amphibious ships and the escorting destroyers/frigates only if they come too close to the shore to provide fire-support or close escort the transports/supply ships ?

Isnt there a minimum range to deploy anti-ship missiles too ?

Also I believe the torpedoes might have less chances of being decieved by countermeasures atleast back in the 70s and 80s ?
That would be the idea, in practice no one is going to launch a major invasion without air cover, and aircraft will murder torpedo boats

AShMs have minimum ranges, but torpedoes have a longer range than that, torpedo boat really should not be getting that close unless using a straight runner, and in that case they have guns to worry about

Depends on the torpedo, old fashioned straight runners are basically immune to countermeasures, homing torpedoes, have soft kill countermeasures like with missiles, but no effective hard kill ones
 

destiple

Banned
A littoral naval strategy or doctrine is not necessarily defensive. Offensive naval ops along the Norwegian, Korean, Japanese, or Alaskan coasts would use larger craft, but not necessarily require a blue water fleet.
Interesting, can you please elaborate and give some examples
thanks
 

destiple

Banned

Depends on the torpedo, old fashioned straight runners are basically immune to countermeasures, homing torpedoes, have soft kill countermeasures like with missiles, but no effective hard kill ones


can the soviet RBU mortars be used against torpedoes ?
 
Depends on the torpedo, old fashioned straight runners are basically immune to countermeasures, homing torpedoes, have soft kill countermeasures like with missiles, but no effective hard kill ones

can the soviet RBU mortars be used against torpedoes ?
Now? Yes after the upgraded RPK-8 was introduced in 1991

In the 70's and 80's, purely theoretical, it could happen but not very likely, hence not an effective countermeasure
 
Interesting, can you please elaborate and give some examples
thanks

Soviet Littoral campaign in the far East 1945. They did a series of offensive landings & had more planned. Earlier they ran offensive ops along the coast of the Black and Baltic seas.

Chinese. Communists 1948/49 did some offensive littoral ops with scratch flotillas.

There's some other possibilities, but I'd have to check the literature.
 
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With a sea denial strategy you need SAMs and fighters dedicated to creating an air-defense umbrella combined with shore based ASMs to act like coast guns once did, push off the big units so your small guys can get in position and have safe haven to attack, retreat, repeat. I might suggest an ASW corvette and an AAW frigate to let us go into green water operations beyond the umbrella. That lets the Warpac control the Baltic and Black Seas, they can threaten to useless the Norwegian coast, the Western side of Japan and possibly support Amphibious ops in the Baltic as planned. I think the USSR still goes after submarines to counter the CV(N)s but maybe no surface fleet. Essentially the way they evolved but cutting short the sea control and power projection missions and ships to fulfill it. NATO should emphasize air power to counter this, its own "TBs" are more hunters with ASMs designed to go after fellow small fry, backed by air, sort of how NATO planned to deal with the horde of tanks on land? Only the USA and less so UK or France need Carriers, and these might get yet more ASW focus? Have the USAF gobble up the anti-shipping mission and the USN gets reduced?

When I toy with post-Great War German or Austrian navies the Baltic and Adriatic as well as North Sea fleet(s) look like this, these constricted seas quickly become dominated by shore based airpower, the ships need to be fast and stealthy to survive, only an ASW mission demands bigger ships and these need close air defense so a corvette and frigate heavy "littoral" fleet over a bunch of SS and FAC. Nothing revolutionary really.
 

destiple

Banned
That would be the idea, in practice no one is going to launch a major invasion without air cover, and aircraft will murder torpedo boats

AShMs have minimum ranges, but torpedoes have a longer range than that, torpedo boat really should not be getting that close unless using a straight runner, and in that case they have guns to worry about

Depends on the torpedo, old fashioned straight runners are basically immune to countermeasures, homing torpedoes, have soft kill countermeasures like with missiles, but no effective hard kill ones

SO essentially against major NATO navies like USN and RN this approach of soviets will likely not work very well
however against smaller opponents like Japan, Norway, Germany where they can get a degree of local air control over the narrow seas they can probably use these littoral forces to support flanking operations or small scale amphibious operations in support of the army?
 

destiple

Banned
On the surface this effort requires the invaders Destroyers to return to their original late 19th Century role as 'Torpedo Boat Destroyers'.
very much so
if the defenders ( with the TB, missile boats and littoral forces) have a degree of air superority then they can turn the tables on the attacker( with larger warships) too , the 70s and 80s destroyers are likely to be quite vulnerable to air attack.
SO in the end it seems like shore based ( carrier based if available to the attacker) airpower is the most vital component of ASUW in the narrow seas
 
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