Possibly Different Gettysburg

67th Tigers

Banned
@SFCRMD: Yes, I too am tiring of the whole thing. 67th like many of the Brits on these pages feel that, despite the outcome of the ARW and the tie of War of 1812, there is no way the US could ever have won against their blessed land until about 1940. Only then do they concede that the US may, perhaps, be on par with their own super great military establishment.

To truly understand Gettysburg, or any of the other battles of the Civil War (or really any war for that matter) one must at least walk over the battlefield to see the lay of the land. Failing that at least concede that others may know a bit more than you and gone on with life.

Spring's PhD Thesis has finally been published. I'd suggest you read it.

Or, of course, you could try actually being an infantry officer.....
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Yeah, it Just Might ...

SHEESH, What a Moron ...

At that Point, Shouldn't he have Just Gone through with The Attack; Hitting The Wrong Part of that Line Had to be Better than Actually Attempting to Maneuver-Under-Fire?

:eek:

He'd have hit Stannard's 2nd Vermont Brigade, who were well drilled but brittle. Maneouvering under fire is alway bad, and having to mount a major change of axis like this is invariably fatal to attacks. This was true in Fredericks time as well...

This is The Point you Usually Make about The Difference between Shot and Shock, Isn't it ...

How The Same Soldiers who will Accept 1-in-10 Casualties due to Rifle-Fire, Will Break, If Faced with 1-in-100 Casualties due to Bayonet ...

Fire can't take a position, even today we have to push to bayonet point. However, American military theory had little emphasis on shock, and a lot on fire....


Don't you Also Observe, This was The PRIMARY Reason Why Continental Troops were Head-and-Shoulders over their American-Counterparts in Combat Efficacy?

Depends. The fact that once an attack has lost momentum it's nearly impossible to restore was well known at least before Marlborough. Hence the need to keep pushing forwards. It apparently didn't really work for the Austrians in 1866, but a closer inspection will find other reasons why that war machine failed....

However, as Bilby notes in his Small Arms at Gettysburg, musketry in the ACW was far behind European practice. The British have already headed off on their tangent that will see the Germans in 1914 think that the British have massed machineguns instead of riflemen. If I compare the British and Federal infantry, for every hit the Federals make, the British will make 10 or more.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
On a note the artillery opposing the charge in question was:

From the CS right:

Rittenhouse's D/5th US with 6 10pdr Parrott's on Little Round Top, although only two could be placed to fire into the charge

Just N was McGilvery's Brigade, with 39 guns (8 batteries). These 39 guns were the concentration that got 7 minutes of uninterupted rapid fire with Canister at Pickett (mainly Kemper's Bde) during his oblique. Their line of fire was straight down Plum Run Valley, and so if Pickett hadn't strayed S they wouldn't have gotten an effective shoot. They were also shielded from the main Confederate Arty strikes by the terrain.

2 additional batteries were brought up to cover the gap between McGilvery and Hazard.

At the Stone Wall was Hazard's Brigade (27 guns), reinforced by 2 batteries (above) but they had prettymuch been silenced apparently. (see his report). 35 guns in this area were destroyed by the Confederate bombardment.

On Cemetary Hill was Osborne's Brigade, with 39 guns (8 btys)

Wainwright's Brigade (24 guns) further north didn't have arcs to fire into the attack.

So Pickett had few guns to his front, what there were were two major concentrations to either flank of the attack.
 
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The Confederates would have won anyway if it were not for Pickett's Charge
LOL. Lee blew his chance to win the first night, by not taking "that hill there" (damfican recall the name:mad::mad:) at the end of Cemetery Ridge, from which he could've enfiladed the Union line.:eek: He didn't push his JOs hard enough & demand it be taken that night. A long flank move around his right might've done it, had he been able to risk it. Of course, if Lee'd disciplined Stuart a little better, kept him on a tighter leash, Stuart's cav might've actually been at Gettysburg, instead of haring off after prizes...:eek: Once you discount these 2 options, Lee's others were withdrawal from a battle he hadn't wanted in the first place, or destroy his army.:eek: He chose destruction.:eek::eek:
The offensive on the third day was not suicidal, it was conceptually brilliant, but poorly executed. Pickett was simply out of his depth as a DC
Give me a break. Crossing half a mile of open ground, broken by fences, under Fed arty & rifle the whole way? The Fed riflemen could've exhausted there ammo allotments before Picket ever came in contact, & shot his division to pieces without any arty at all.:eek: Add to that most of the Confederate counterbattery was long, he had damn all chance.:eek:
Longstreets suggestion for a move around the Union Left, South of the round tops holds merit....This option was there then but Lee was like a bull with a red cape. Now would this have caused a great victory, who knows. The political butterflies are endless. I do say though that the left or southern flank of the union was the spot that offered the best chances for the ANV in the battle on that day.
Lee couldn't risk this, IMO, not knowing exactly where the Federals were deployed. He risked sending his flank force right into them, being divided & defeated in detail.
 
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It was called Culp's Hill if I recall correctly. As for the long flanking move around his right, Longstreet did infact suggest and argue for that after day one, and again after the dual attack on each flank on day two failed.

Had Stuart actually been screening the ANV it's quite possible Buford's calvary would've run into an abumush as Stuart should've beaten the Federals to Gettysburg quite easily.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
LOL. Lee blew his chance to win the first night, by not taking "that hill there" (damfican recall the name:mad::mad:) at the end of Cemetery Ridge, from which he could've enfiladed the Union line.:eek: He didn't push his JOs hard enough & demand it be taken that night. A long flank move around his right might've done it, had he been able to risk it. Of course, if Lee'd disciplined Stuart a little better, kept him on a tighter leash, Stuart's cav might've actually been at Gettysburg, instead of haring off after prizes...:eek: Once you discount these 2 options, Lee's others were withdrawal from a battle he hadn't wanted in the first place, or destroy his army.:eek: He chose destruction.:eek::eek:

Cemetery Hill, and there was no line to enfilade then. What CH did do was dominate all the roads into and out of Gettysburg, and thus controlled Lee's freedom of action.

Ewell's decision not to take CH that evening was perfectly justified, his command was in danger of being destroyed.

Give me a break. Crossing half a mile of open ground, broken by fences, under Fed arty & rifle the whole way? The Fed riflemen could've exhausted there ammo allotments before Picket ever came in contact, & shot his division to pieces without any arty at all.:eek: Add to that most of the Confederate counterbattery was long, he had damn all chance.:eek:

With respect, you're greatly exaggerating the effects of the weapons systems.

Federal artillery had a very hard shoot, the ground in front contains a lot of dead ground, and there were no range markers out. Federal artillery was largely ineffective except for the canister shoots against Kemper and Brockenborough.

As for rifles, the longest range any infantry opened fire was 200yds, and that was ineffective. Some rifle armed units reserved fire until 90yds, and the smoothbore armed units until 50yds (where they were far more devastating than the rifles). Effective infantry range in the ACW was around 100yds, that being the range where range estimation and accurate sight setting was not necessary to hit.

Lee couldn't risk this, IMO, not knowing exactly where the Federals were deployed. He risked sending his flank force right into them, being divided & defeated in detail.

More to the point, he couldn't extend his lines any further. He was already dangerously overextended, hence his decision on the 2nd day for Longstreet's Corps to drive up the Emmitsburg pike and assault CH from the south. For course, when Hood was hit the drifted into a pointless fight for the Roundtops, ground with no tactical signifance whatsoever.
 
As for rifles, the longest range any infantry opened fire was 200yds, and that was ineffective. Some rifle armed units reserved fire until 90yds, and the smoothbore armed units until 50yds (where they were far more devastating than the rifles). Effective infantry range in the ACW was around 100yds, that being the range where range estimation and accurate sight setting was not necessary to hit.

:) And I can tell you from personal experience just how fast that range degrades. I used to shoot replica blackpowder guns as a hobby, one of which was a long rifle. When I first took it out shooting, I could regularly hit bullseyes from 50 yards. But even using modern chemicals to clean it (better than anything they had available way back when), the accuracy slowly degraded. After a year, I could barely hit the target at 50 yards, much less the bullseye. If I ever take it up again, I'm probably going to have to replace the barrel..
 
Cemetery Hill, and there was no line to enfilade then. What CH did do was dominate all the roads into and out of Gettysburg, and thus controlled Lee's freedom of action.
And had Lee taken it on the first night, the Federals could never have set up on the ridge....
With respect, you're greatly exaggerating the effects of the weapons systems.
Really not. The .58 Springfield could be lethal at 1000m or more. And in volley fire, SOP at the time, actually being able to hit a specific target was irrelevant.... I'm presuming a willingness to sweep the field with fire.
More to the point, he couldn't extend his lines any further. He was already dangerously overextended, hence his decision on the 2nd day for Longstreet's Corps to drive up the Emmitsburg pike and assault CH from the south. For course, when Hood was hit the drifted into a pointless fight for the Roundtops, ground with no tactical signifance whatsoever.
Which kind of undercuts the idea of the flank move, no?
 
And had Lee taken it on the first night, the Federals could never have set up on the ridge....

Failure to take some of the high ground on the 1st day does not rest on Lee's shoulds but on Ewells. While some on this site, DMA in particular if I remember correctly, will defend Ewell for not trying to take said high ground on the 1st day but regardless the responsibility for not doing so rests with him all the same.

Lee saw the importance of the high ground upon arriving at the battlefield and sent a message to Ewell urging him to take it but Ewell felt that it was not in his power to take the high ground and hold it so it could be reinforced because of the difficulty he would have had in approaching it, the difficulty he would have had in taking it from the strongly place Union defenders and the difficulty he would have had in keeping it considering the large Union troops converging on the battle.

In short Ewell believe it was too difficult a task to be completed before night fell and chose not to try.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
And had Lee taken it on the first night, the Federals could never have set up on the ridge....

Ewell's orders were discresionary. The situation was such that his Corps was dangerously overextended with a hanging flank and Federal forces threatening it. Little wonder he consolidated.

Of course, with the benefit of hindsight we know he probably should have gone forwards..

Really not. The .58 Springfield could be lethal at 1000m or more. And in volley fire, SOP at the time, actually being able to hit a specific target was irrelevant.... I'm presuming a willingness to sweep the field with fire.

Couldn't hit bog all at 1,000 yds though. At 200 yds it usually required 1,000 rds fired per hit. It's not really an issue of the weapons system, since the British and other well trained European Armies could smash enemy formations at 1,000 yds. It's an issue of training in the verities of the rifle, which didn't really happen.

If interested, the latest book in this field (following on from Griffith, Nosworthy, Bilby and Barloon's Thesis) is Hess's.
 
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