Possible effects of a failed Sea Lion on Allied operations latter in the War

Which allied operation/option do you think is the most plausible

  • Liberating Norway

    Votes: 30 35.3%
  • Invading italy

    Votes: 36 42.4%
  • Do nothing

    Votes: 19 22.4%

  • Total voters
    85
Yes I mean really of all the possible outcomes of a failed marine mammal that is the one none of us foresee...of course some might suggest there are multiple reasons for that including Hitler's own expressed desires, the fact that Germany had a narrow window of opportunity to attack the USSR if Britain was still alive.

The humming and hawing in the fall of 1940 was Hitler deciding whether in light of the unexpected defeat of France he could risk accelerating the execution of his designs against Russia, or if he'd finish the war with Britain before starting one with the SU. The risk was a two-front war. The gain was that if Russia were gone the British might throw in the towel. In January 1939 Hitler had no intention of invading the SU before 1948, unless those Z-Plan battleships had wheels.
 
The former case, aside from being ASB, is incorrect because with Britain gone, dealing with the empire is a matter of occupation which can be left to the Italians and Japanese

Were the British Empire to fall the Powers would stampede for the spoils, Germany inclusive. There would be no rush with respect to Russia - Hitler could smash Stalin later.

Germany simply doesn't have the 2-3 years needed to grind down the British in a long war in either the Atlantic or the Med. They have 1 year before the US enters the war and destroys any hope of victory over Britain completely.

That's an argument for Sealion. The Barbarossa argument was whether eliminating the SU could leave Germany in position to defeat the Anglo-Americans. We know now that the USAAF would rip Germany to shreds in 1945/46 in either case, but at the time what Hitler was doing was balancing the risks between the options. The risk of Sealion was a defeat that could rob him of the initiative, the risk of Barbarossa was getting bogged down in a two-front war if it failed.

The pace of Soviet rearmament and reform makes it pretty clear how a German attack in 1942 or later would turn out.

Hitler perceived no 'window' for attacking the SU based on Russian strength. If it were just Germany and the Soviets, he thought he could smash the door down in 1941 or 1951.
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Z

That to me says Hitler in 1939 planned on dealing with Russia after 1948.

The Germans did not anticipate the Battle of France was going to end in 1940. Since in 1939 Hitler was planning on building a navy then dealing with Russia after 1948, the cancellation of the Z-Plan probably accelerated his schedule. My guess? Maybe 5 years.


The fall of France so quickly was not expected. In the wake of its surrender there were a number of options that were looked at, including the invasion of Russia. This occurred in the summer of 1940 only because France had been defeated. Had France not been defeat by, say, 1941, no such planning would have occurred until 1941.

Again, the key event was the defeat of France. Before that moment, Hitler had no plans to invade Russia. After that moment, it was possible and it was examined seriously starting in July 1940 and selected for execution in November 1940.

Right, but on an unrelated note some internet echo chambers are so deafening that even the slightest sound can cause a cacophony. The danger with Sealion wasn't that it was ASB, it's that its execution - even in failure - would reinforce the alternative German strategy, also examined in 1940, of maintaining its alliance with the Soviet Union. The idea that Germany has to invade the SU in 1941 is an invention, a fiction, a plot device to move the movie forward. Sealion was dangerous not because it was likely to work, but because it reinforced the chances for the worst possible AH WW2 - one where the SU didn't wind up on the side of the allies.

1. Hitler never planned of fighting the British until he realised that they didn't like him so how is navel rearmament needed for taking out of the USSR?

2. What that book I mention states the Generals agreed with Hitler on invading the USSR as a way to defeat the British by removing all potential allies off the continent

3. So how do you explain what actually happened in OTL if such an invasion is fiction and a plot device

4. The last thread you argued this in you lost and now you've come into my thread and started arguing the same thing.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=361777
 
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The humming and hawing in the fall of 1940 was Hitler deciding whether in light of the unexpected defeat of France he could risk accelerating the execution of his designs against Russia, or if he'd finish the war with Britain before starting one with the SU. The risk was a two-front war. The gain was that if Russia were gone the British might throw in the towel. In January 1939 Hitler had no intention of invading the SU before 1948, unless those Z-Plan battleships had wheels.

So your saying Hilter didn't expect the plan to work until it actually worked in regards to the BOF?

Were the British Empire to fall the Powers would stampede for the spoils, Germany inclusive. There would be no rush with respect to Russia - Hitler could smash Stalin later.



That's an argument for Sealion. The Barbarossa argument was whether eliminating the SU could leave Germany in position to defeat the Anglo-Americans. We know now that the USAAF would rip Germany to shreds in 1945/46 in either case, but at the time what Hitler was doing was balancing the risks between the options. The risk of Sealion was a defeat that could rob him of the initiative, the risk of Barbarossa was getting bogged down in a two-front war if it failed.



Hitler perceived no 'window' for attacking the SU based on Russian strength. If it were just Germany and the Soviets, he thought he could smash the door down in 1941 or 1951.

So it appears you do think a successful Sea Lion was actually possible despite the lack of transport, the Royal Navy not being removed by the Luftwaffe.

The US wasn't even in the War in June 1941 or when planning for Barbarossa begun so that assertion to defeat the anglo Americans is wrong and they didn't even know about Japans plan to attack Pearl Harbour till it was happing (the book I referenced) and the book I referenced specifically states that the OKW believed the British would sue for peace after seeing the USSR fall in 3 months.

How would it as at worst it would be 6 divisions lost and all his paratroopers as tanks were not being included in the first wave and the transports had to taxi each wave to the Beach.

Edit Plus you seem to be forgetting the fact Hitler only was interested in the Mediterranean and Africa because Mussolini dragged by invading Greece and attacking Egypt and Hitler had to bail him out and I would think TTL Hitler wouldn't bail him out as he believes he can win the War by destroying the USSR.
 
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Were the British Empire to fall the Powers would stampede for the spoils, Germany inclusive.

Germany is incapable of doing so. Africa and the Middle East? Requires Italian assistance and would thus wind-up going to Italy? British Asian Colonies? The Germans are incapable of reaching those and thus they would go to Japan. The America's? The United States would react harshly to any Nazi attempts to interject.

Germany is simply incapable of acquiring British colonies before other powers. That only leaves the Soviet Union.

That's an argument for Sealion.
If one ignores that it would fail. You've expressed the delusionalism on other threads that it would not, but since you've never managed to prove how it would while others have provided plentiful proof of how it would not. I mean, sure Hitler would go for it if he thinks it could provide him the quick victory. But it won't. And with it's failure, in his own mind and the mind of his generals, the only other option to avoid a prolonged war which Germany cannot win is to invade the Soviet Union before it gets too powerful.

That this would still lead to a prolonged war which Germany could not win was a result of Hitler not understanding what the USSR had already managed to achieve.

The Barbarossa argument was whether eliminating the SU could leave Germany in position to defeat the Anglo-Americans.
And with the failure of Sea Lion, that argument gains extra-strength.

We know now that the USAAF would rip Germany to shreds in 1945/46 in either case, but at the time what Hitler was doing was balancing the risks between the options.
And he perceived fighting the Soviets in 1941 to be the lesser risk. With the failure of Sea Lion, that perception would be confirmed.

Hitler perceived no 'window' for attacking the SU based on Russian strength.
Yes, he did. Repeatedly during Barbarossa he justified his strike as a pre-emptive (although in reality, the correct term would have been preventive) strike against the Soviet Union before it became too strong. Most explicitly at one meeting, he showed his staff intelligence reports of the Soviets construction of new armaments factories in the Urals and explicitly declared:
"Now you see how far these people have already got. We must strike at once!"

Hitler was very much aware that when it came to waging the war needed to achieve his goals, time was not on his side. So he had to strike and strike fast.

The US wasn't even in the War in June 1941 or when planning for Barbarossa begun so that assertion to defeat the anglo Americans is wrong

It's not entirely wrong, it just isn't the whole story either. Hitler had a variety of reasons for Barbarossa among them the possibility that victory in Russia would bring Britain to seek terms and the acquisition of resources in case they didn't and the US did enter the war (because US involvement was clearly growing, what with the neutrality patrols and lend-lease). The strategy doesn't stand up to objective scrutiny, but the German military system never really subjected it to that and the few individuals who did and voiced their concerns were duly ignored. So waging war against the USSR as a means of putting Germany in a better position to fight the Anglo-Americans was indeed one reason. But so were others: Nazi ideologies demand for lebensraum, forestalling the growth of Soviet military power, Nazi racism, the Germans problematic economic situation, and many more were all factors that combined with the general strategic situation to push along the decision to invade the Soviet Union, as well as the equally important decisions of "when" and "how".

Although, put it bluntly, viewing Germany's strategic situation in WW2 objsective it is clear they are between a rock and a hard place: a quick and speedy invasion of the Britain is guaranteed to fail. A quick and speedy invasion of Russia is also guaranteed to fail. To wage a naval-air war against Britain plays to Germany's weaknesses (the lack of a proper navy and strategic air power), accelerates American entry into the war, which then makes trying to wage a naval-air war against Britain an exercise in futility. To try and knock the British out through the Mediterranean Strategy runs into problems of logistics, the lack of naval-air power, and over reliance on inadequate allies. And ignoring Britain isn't in the cards because Britain isn't going to let themselves be ignored, what with the air raids, blockade, and peripheral campaigns. Trying to rope Stalin into the Axis Pact just means turning Germany into a Soviet client state while Stalin sits around and does nothing but get stronger.

Any strategic option they go for is going to suck. But given their ideological blinders, the Germans thought they were picking one that would succeed.
 
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It's not entirely wrong, it just isn't the whole story either. Hitler had a variety of reasons for Barbarossa among them the possibility that victory in Russia would bring Britain to seek terms and the acquisition of resources in case they didn't and the US did enter the war (because US involvement was clearly growing, what with the neutrality patrols and lend-lease). The strategy doesn't stand up to objective scrutiny, but the German military system never really subjected it to that and the few individuals who did and voiced their concerns were duly ignored. So waging war against the USSR as a means of putting Germany in a better position to fight the Anglo-Americans was indeed one reason. But so were others: Nazi ideologies demand for lebensraum, forestalling the growth of Soviet military power, Nazi racism, the Germans problematic economic situation, and many more were all factors that combined with the general strategic situation to push along the decision to invade the Soviet Union, as well as the equally important decisions of "when" and "how".

Although, put it bluntly, viewing Germany's strategic situation in WW2 objsective it is clear they are between a rock and a hard place: a quick and speedy invasion of the Britain is guaranteed to fail. A quick and speedy invasion of Russia is also guaranteed to fail. To wage a naval-air war against Britain plays to Germany's weaknesses (the lack of a proper navy and strategic air power), accelerates American entry into the war, which then makes trying to wage a naval-air war against Britain an exercise in futility. To try and knock the British out through the Mediterranean Strategy runs into problems of logistics, the lack of naval-air power, and over reliance on inadequate allies. And ignoring Britain isn't in the cards because Britain isn't going to let themselves be ignored, what with the air raids, blockade, and peripheral campaigns. Trying to rope Stalin into the Axis Pact just means turning Germany into a Soviet client state while Stalin sits around and does nothing but get stronger.

Any strategic option they go for is going to suck. But given their ideological blinders, the Germans thought they were picking one that would succeed.

True but I think its would be more accurate to say British plus it would be out of character for Hitler to invite Stalin to the axis as he believed his purpose was to lead a struggle against the USSR and everyone saw the double cross with the Non-Agresion Pact coming, Stalin was just caught off by the timing.
 

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Z

That to me says Hitler in 1939 planned on dealing with Russia after 1948.

The Germans did not anticipate the Battle of France was going to end in 1940. Since in 1939 Hitler was planning on building a navy then dealing with Russia after 1948, the cancellation of the Z-Plan probably accelerated his schedule. My guess? Maybe 5 years.


The fall of France so quickly was not expected. In the wake of its surrender there were a number of options that were looked at, including the invasion of Russia. This occurred in the summer of 1940 only because France had been defeated. Had France not been defeat by, say, 1941, no such planning would have occurred until 1941.

Again, the key event was the defeat of France. Before that moment, Hitler had no plans to invade Russia. After that moment, it was possible and it was examined seriously starting in July 1940 and selected for execution in November 1940.

Right, but on an unrelated note some internet echo chambers are so deafening that even the slightest sound can cause a cacophony. The danger with Sealion wasn't that it was ASB, it's that its execution - even in failure - would reinforce the alternative German strategy, also examined in 1940, of maintaining its alliance with the Soviet Union. The idea that Germany has to invade the SU in 1941 is an invention, a fiction, a plot device to move the movie forward. Sealion was dangerous not because it was likely to work, but because it reinforced the chances for the worst possible AH WW2 - one where the SU didn't wind up on the side of the allies.

Jeez, now I can't take part in the discussion any longer because I have to pull on the Mod hat.

Would it actually cause you harm to, just occasionally, NOT derail any thread that even mentions SeeLowe?

You manage to come in and wreck EVERY conversation with derailments that as frequently as not are not germane and add nothing to the discussion at hand.

It is actually quite disrespectful to the OP and the other posters.
 
Out of curiosity does anyone actually know if plans fore liberating Norway were drawn up by the British High Command? Because I figure that could factor in into any decision. Edit Provided the timing of the plans for Italian operations became known as well.
 
Out of curiosity does anyone actually know if plans fore liberating Norway were drawn up by the British High Command? Because I figure that could factor in into any decision. Edit Provided the timing of the plans for Italian operations became known as well.

Operation Apostle however much of it seems to have an air of First United States Army Group about it...in other words more a deception plan with teeth than an entirely serious operation.

I really trend towards the likely outcomes of seelöwe fail being more felt on the German home and Eastern Fronts than anywhere that the British would have an offensive impact. It is worth recalling that for conducting landings in places the British did not control the ports initially they were not a whole lot better off than the Germans but they understood how much resources they were lacking in the area.

I cannot see the Germans really losing a major chunk of their land forces, as pointed out above by others there is a very real chance even with a go order that the whole thing would have descended into farce and chaos at the loading stage for the first lift of the first wave.

The Golden outcome for the Allies in my somewhat suspect opinion would be that the Germans suffer enough losses among their naval escorts that the RN and RAF are able to significantly interdict iron ore traffic from Narvik which would have had a significantly hobbling effect on the German war economy, not enough to win the war by itself but truly major ramifications for the war fighting potential of the Reich.

However it is hard to gauge if that would have significantly shortened the war as the Nazi regime may simply have focused on defensive warfare earlier. Their dogma in the later war was that the unnatural alliance against them would break up given time and it is possible that they simply switch to that world view a bit earlier when the wheels fall off the conquest train.


All too likely though all that would happen is that a few million Soviet citizens might live that otherwise fell into German occupation zones which while a good thing would be hard for scholars without magical knowledge of OTL to assess.
 
Operation Apostle however much of it seems to have an air of First United States Army Group about it...in other words more a deception plan with teeth than an entirely serious operation.

I really trend towards the likely outcomes of seelöwe fail being more felt on the German home and Eastern Fronts than anywhere that the British would have an offensive impact. It is worth recalling that for conducting landings in places the British did not control the ports initially they were not a whole lot better off than the Germans but they understood how much resources they were lacking in the area.

I cannot see the Germans really losing a major chunk of their land forces, as pointed out above by others there is a very real chance even with a go order that the whole thing would have descended into farce and chaos at the loading stage for the first lift of the first wave.

The Golden outcome for the Allies in my somewhat suspect opinion would be that the Germans suffer enough losses among their naval escorts that the RN and RAF are able to significantly interdict iron ore traffic from Narvik which would have had a significantly hobbling effect on the German war economy, not enough to win the war by itself but truly major ramifications for the war fighting potential of the Reich.

However it is hard to gauge if that would have significantly shortened the war as the Nazi regime may simply have focused on defensive warfare earlier. Their dogma in the later war was that the unnatural alliance against them would break up given time and it is possible that they simply switch to that world view a bit earlier when the wheels fall off the conquest train.


All too likely though all that would happen is that a few million Soviet citizens might live that otherwise fell into German occupation zones which while a good thing would be hard for scholars without magical knowledge of OTL to assess.

So It would most likely be limited to operation against Italian bases in the Mediterranean (Islands) and potentially Sicily.

Given what you and ObssesedNuker have said it does seem like the USSR does better in the war so I would say it does look like an earlier end to the War in Europe.
 
1. Hitler never planned of fighting the British until he realised that they didn't like him so how is navel rearmament needed for taking out of the USSR?

Battleships don't have wheels so when the Z-Plan was approved as top industrial priority in January 1939 it fixed the target in the west until 1948.

2. What that book I mention states the Generals agreed with Hitler on invading the USSR as a way to defeat the British by removing all potential allies off the continent
As previously stated, the key event was the unexpected defeat of France. In April 1940 this was not anticipated to occur in 1940. When France went down, Germany was presented with an unexpected strategic opportunity. That's why after the French campaign you see different German factions pulling in different directions - Sealion, the Med, the Atlantic campaign, Russia. Hitler looks at them all, sounds Stalin, dips his toe in the Channel and decides the water is cold, and picks Russia. He picks Russia in part because of the Anglo-American emerging threat, in part because Stalin asked for more than he was willing to barter.


3. So how do you explain what actually happened in OTL if such an invasion is fiction and a plot device
The plot device is that the invasion of Russia had to be in 1941 or not at all. This artificial timeline was never part of Hitler's thinking - he thought before the war Germany could whip Russia whenever it wanted. 1941, 1951, 1961. To June 1940 Hitler had no intention of invading Russia in 1941. It was going to be later than that.
 
Germany is incapable of doing so. Africa and the Middle East? Requires Italian assistance and would thus wind-up going to Italy? British Asian Colonies? The Germans are incapable of reaching those and thus they would go to Japan. The America's? The United States would react harshly to any Nazi attempts to interject.

The sketch was that Japan takes the possessions in the Far East, the Russians in the Persian Gulf and India, the Germans and Italians in Africa, the ME and the Med.

If one ignores that it would fail. You've expressed the delusionalism on other threads that it would not, but since you've never managed to prove how it would while others have provided plentiful proof of how it would not. I mean, sure Hitler would go for it if he thinks it could provide him the quick victory. But it won't. And with it's failure, in his own mind and the mind of his generals, the only other option to avoid a prolonged war which Germany cannot win is to invade the Soviet Union before it gets too powerful.
Once Germany was in Russia the war is over. The danger to Sealion was that it was the wrong strategic direction for the Western Allies because it wasn't a land war in Asia. Now, if you believe Stalin was a big Democracy loving Santa Claus that would attack Germany, that's your prerogative. But I don't. I think Stalin would have propped up Hitler and fought the Americans to the last German.

Yes, he did. Repeatedly during Barbarossa he justified his strike as a pre-emptive (although in reality, the correct term would have been preventive) strike against the Soviet Union before it became too strong. ]
Hitler thought the Russians were inferior and that the master race could clean their clocks whenever they wanted.


It's not entirely wrong, it just isn't the whole story either. Hitler had a variety of reasons for Barbarossa among them the possibility that victory in Russia would bring Britain to seek terms and the acquisition of resources in case they didn't and the US did enter the war (because US involvement was clearly growing, what with the neutrality patrols and lend-lease).
Essentially, you are arguing that Hitler will eventually give up on the Sealion strategy and go east. That may or may not be correct, but it is a tacit admission of my point - that Sealion had to be off the table before Germany would invade Russia, which was the moment Germany lost the war. That made Sealion inherently dangerous.

Trying to rope Stalin into the Axis Pact just means turning Germany into a Soviet client state while Stalin sits around and does nothing but get stronger.
The Allied terms were unconditional surrender. The war wasn't going to be over until Hitler double tapped in the Bunker. The idea of Germany being a client state of Russia was irrelevant to Western Allied war objectives. Actually, counter to them. There was no discussion in the White House to the effect of, "well, if we can just get Hitler into the position where he's dependent on Stalin, then it's OK that Germany owns Western Europe".
 
If someone were to write this up on another site and provide a link, I'd read it.

Another thi ng to consider is that, with the invasion threat well and truly dead by October 1940, Britain has different R&D priorities. There were ideas on paper to fix the Vulture engine. These got binned because if the invasion scare. Production of the Merlin was prioritised over development of the Griffon. The decision to fix the Taurus engine or licence build the Twin Wasp was deferred until mid 1941, where they stuck with fixing the Taurus. My guess is that at least one of these decisions turns out differently from OTL.

Sorry if I appear ignorant or say something completely wrong on this but I take it these are fighter engines?

The thinking in this thread so far has been largely land based while actually the major effects of a Sea Lion (the failed is intrinsic) will be felt more in the naval and industrial logistic sphere.

Losses among German infantry, paratroops and the fairly limited amount of armour for the first wave while high for a single operation are not likely to significantly impair the strategic ability of the Heer. Obsessednuker has referenced the loss spare part parts that may have more of an impact but overall fairly minor on the front end.

The Luftwaffe will possibly suffer more losses overall than OTL it is hard to gauge but again likely not enough to significantly degrade its future performance.

The KM will have a nightmare. Its heavy units unless committed in some kind of revised plan were unavailable for the original time frame but everything else will suffer significant losses. These are unlikely to be total, someone tends to survive every massacre but they will be heavy. U-boats were to be diverted from the Atlantic to the western approaches of the Channel which would have prevented them performing their main roll of attacking UK merchant shipping and seen them far more exposed to destroyers and Coastal Command. Less British and Allied merchies sunk more permanently untersee boats.

The key losses however would have been to the coastal and riverine craft assembled for the operation. Remember all these boats, ferries and and barges represented significant investment over years if not decades. Replacing the likely losses from the first wave would have taken years even worse if a second wave were attempted.

This then impact the German's ability to move goods around their empire and particular those Rhine barges which hurt enough even during their brief absence OTL. Here though the RN will be able to put pay in a much shorter time to far more craft than they scored OTL.

That and the fact that a lot of the OTL escorts would also have been lost is severely going to crimp the German's ability to run coastal convoys and of course Rhine traffic will be hit long term in a big way.

None of this is going to win the war for the Allies but it will degrade Germany capabilities in industrial production in a big way that will not be recovered for a long time. For example in OTL the production of torpedoes was almost strangled by the unavailability of Rhine and Baltic barges, here that impact would be extended with likely ramifications for the Battle of the Atlantic.

Potentially,though this is unlikely, the loss of escorts could be significant enough that the RN could cut off the supply of iron ore from Sweden via Norway to Germany and that would also have had very dramatic effects on the war while rendering the Germany occupation of Norway a moot point.

It is the potential effects of the loss of transports that would be most significant to the Germans, followed by the loss of escorts and the loss of troops actually being somewhat in last place in terms of impacts of which there are others which other posters have or will point out.

Just to double check would you say this effectively means that there is the possibility that Germans occupation of Norway is rendered moot, indicating it makes more sense to look into Italy?
 
Yes, but that's ten months with less production than OTL, so they'll still be behiind. OTOH, maybe it's the kick they need to go to full wartime production, which would even things out, or more than, since IIRC they didn't get there until 1942.

Of course, it does have its effects elsewhere. The Kriegsmarine no long has a surface fleet to speak of (I can imagine the Bismarck and Tirpitz are frozen on the slips due to both lack of enthusiasm from Hitler and reallocation of resources to more essential industries), so the British don't need to keep as many big ships back home, and can instead send them East, to the Med. or Singapore.

I don't think I properly looked at this before but would this effectively remove the worse aspects of the Battle of the Atlantic and potentially could mean the threat of u-boats from potential operations in Norway for the most part? (When looking at Hitlers OTL deployment of them to help surface Navel operations.)
 
Not by much. Oh production would be slowed down, but IMO more of the slow-down will be in new surface vessels. of course, now much of an effec this has depends on the number of destroyers the British lose.
 
Just to double check would you say this effectively means that there is the possibility that Germans occupation of Norway is rendered moot, indicating it makes more sense to look into Italy?

My contention is essentially that the British do not have the capacity to build enough landing craft to radically alter matters even with a Sea Lion. That said a launched Sea Lion would have a substantive impact on the German war economy. Now some people think that the loss of productivity would force the cancellation of German forays to North Africa but myself I feel those were always politically driven, Hitler had a fan boy crush on Mussolini.

That said a really bad outcome for Sea Lion (looked at from the German perspective) might see the Germans forced to choose between the Battle of the Atlantic and the Ost Front, a really really bad outcome would see Norway rendered valueless as a strategic asset to the Germans and even a moderately bad outcome would see the Germans likely somewhat diminished in the Battle of the Atlantic (as well as struggling more against the Soviets).

I do not see an easy way for the British to get a crack at Italy early...do recall their Navy is doing just fine and Germany still have most of its land forces. However despite the convoluted route I would say the strategic compass points Med for the British. The big problem for an invasion of Norway is simply the lack of lift capacity given the Germans have something like 12 divisions there.
 
Not by much. Oh production would be slowed down, but IMO more of the slow-down will be in new surface vessels. of course, now much of an effec this has depends on the number of destroyers the British lose.

I see, but given what was mentioned about the torpedoes earlier I think we could see issues arising in armaments supply but could someone else verify how important the barges were for torpedo production?

My contention is essentially that the British do not have the capacity to build enough landing craft to radically alter matters even with a Sea Lion. That said a launched Sea Lion would have a substantive impact on the German war economy. Now some people think that the loss of productivity would force the cancellation of German forays to North Africa but myself I feel those were always politically driven, Hitler had a fan boy crush on Mussolini.

That said a really bad outcome for Sea Lion (looked at from the German perspective) might see the Germans forced to choose between the Battle of the Atlantic and the Ost Front, a really really bad outcome would see Norway rendered valueless as a strategic asset to the Germans and even a moderately bad outcome would see the Germans likely somewhat diminished in the Battle of the Atlantic (as well as struggling more against the Soviets).

I do not see an easy way for the British to get a crack at Italy early...do recall their Navy is doing just fine and Germany still have most of its land forces. However despite the convoluted route I would say the strategic compass points Med for the British. The big problem for an invasion of Norway is simply the lack of lift capacity given the Germans have something like 12 divisions there.

I do believe however Hitler did get cross with Mussolini from time to time the most notable example being Greece, but Hitler did always bail Mussolini out but I wonder if that would disappear after a failed Sea Lion as Hitler (this is aside from his ideological motivations) and the OKW were of the opinion by removing the USSR Britain would be forced to sue for peace and he could convince Mussolini that he could get his territorial changes in Africa this way.

The 12 divisions would be the man issue and landing transports so I think its looking like operations against Italian bases and Islands (including Sicily).
 
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