pontoon bridges on time at Fredericksburg

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67th Tigers

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No I'm not describing Chancellorsville. There really aren't any comparisons to be made there. The campaign is occurring on very different ground far to the east of Chancellorsville. If Lee enters the Wilderness then he's lost. Period.
 
No I'm not describing Chancellorsville. There really aren't any comparisons to be made there. The campaign is occurring on very different ground far to the east of Chancellorsville. If Lee enters the Wilderness then he's lost. Period.

So how did he beat Joe Hooker there? Again, Hooker did precisely this at the start of the Chancellorsville campaign, stealing a march against Lee when he heavily outnumbered him. Lee embarked on a plan no sane man would have used and won his greatest victory by so doing. In the Chancellorsville Campaign the Union general executed a masterful plan that took full advantage of his numerical superiority and completely unmoored Lee from his lines, taking him by surprise. Then Lee starts crashing into Joe Hooker in the Wilderness and the first part of that campaign was overshadowed by the second. And we're talking here about the biggest idiot in the US high command bar Sigel.
 
The main problem with the Wilderness is whether Burnside enters it in after him.

And if Burnside isn't entering it, that leaves Lee without that particular bit of terrain...oh well. Shucks. Etc. It does not make him doomed...Burnside, even speaking as a guy defending him from Snake in this thread, is that stupid.
 
So how did he beat Joe Hooker there? Again, Hooker did precisely this at the start of the Chancellorsville campaign, stealing a march against Lee when he heavily outnumbered him. Lee embarked on a plan no sane man would have used and won his greatest victory by so doing. In the Chancellorsville Campaign the Union general executed a masterful plan that took full advantage of his numerical superiority and completely unmoored Lee from his lines, taking him by surprise. Then Lee starts crashing into Joe Hooker in the Wilderness and the first part of that campaign was overshadowed by the second. And we're talking here about the biggest idiot in the US high command bar Sigel.

Wow, you just don't get it, do you? Even after pointing it out in details, you are so stuck at replaying Chancellorsville, you don't understand that the battle has no relationship to the situation we're describing.

At Chancellorsville: Lee is between Hooker at the Wilderness and Richmond. Even though outnumbered, Lee is blocking Hooker's advance.

This scenario: Burnside is between Lee and Richmond. Lee is not blocking Burnside's advance.

At Chancellorsville: Although Lee's forces are temporarily divided, he gathers them together relatively quickly within one day.

This scenario: Lee's forces are very scattered, and one half of his army is almost a week away.

At Chancellorsville: The Wilderness is right next to the battlefield.

This scenario: The Wilderness is nowhere near the battlefield.

The reason 67th Tigers said that Lee has lost if he enters the Wilderness is not because Lee is incapable of winning there if the Union gives battle. Its that by entering the Wilderness he is refusing to do battle, and Burnside simply marches into Richmond unopposed. Bringing up Chancellorsville in this situation is a non-sequiter.

Burnside only needs to march 30 miles to the North Anna. That's not impossible - even for Burnside. He may take longer than he should, but he has a good head start.

I don't see much value in continuing this debate so I'm not going to reply to anymore of Snake's posts in this topic (unless he brings up something relevant). Of course, Snake is certainly welcome to post whatever he wants and other people can respond to it.

However, I'd like to continue discussion with anyone that is dealing with the specifics of the alternate campaign.

Lets assume Lee has Longstreet arrive at the North Anna right before Burnside arrives. Let's say it's November 23. 35,000 troops against 120,000. Lee has to make some effort to protect Richmond. Let's say Burnside fights badly and does not destroy Longstreet as he should. However, Lee must retreat, and Burnside is delayed by several days.

Burnside resumes his march towards Richmond. Let's say it takes him until November 30 to reach there. Lee informs Davis that he cannot stop the Army of the Potomac from reaching the capital, but that he will have his entire army soon and will drive the enemy from Virginia. Davis and the Confederate government make plans to temporarily leave the capital, making sure the most important papers and such are not left behind.

News that Burnside has "defeated" Lee and taken Richmond is greeted with immense joy at the White House and the northern newspapers. Despite the feelings from his subordinates that they missed an opportunity to destroy half of Lee's army, Burnside gets a tremendous (and probably fatal) ego boost. However, the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac get a much needed ego boost. They have "outfoxed" Lee and taken the capital.

At this point, where does Lee assemble his combined army (say about 67,000 strong)? I think by December 1, he should have everyone. What is Lee's next move? A direct attack against the Army of the Potomac in Richmond? Or does he attempt to somehow force Burnside to move out? What does Burnside do? Stay at Richmond and rest on his laurels? Or does he move some troops south to take Petersburg, or something else? Who has the worse supply situation? Lee since Burnside is blocking his railroads? Or Burnside if Lee cuts off his from Washington? Who will feel the pinch first?

So where does the next battle take place, and how much does Burnside probably blunder?
 
Wow, you just don't get it, do you? Even after pointing it out in details, you are so stuck at replaying Chancellorsville, you don't understand that the battle has no relationship to the situation we're describing.

At Chancellorsville: Lee is between Hooker at the Wilderness and Richmond. Even though outnumbered, Lee is blocking Hooker's advance.

This scenario: Burnside is between Lee and Richmond. Lee is not blocking Burnside's advance.

So then we're talking the start of the Wilderness Campaign where U.S. Grant gets an entire army over the Rapidan before Lee is precisely ready to bring on a major battle. We're talking the Army of the Potomac, not exactly renowned for its speed on the offensive with an extremely cumbersome organization trying to get across the Rappahannock to Richmond, against the general whose patented skill-set is to attack the enemy when and how that enemy least expects it.

At Chancellorsville: Although Lee's forces are temporarily divided, he gathers them together relatively quickly within one day.

This scenario: Lee's forces are very scattered, and one half of his army is almost a week away.

Actually he divided them twicefold and used half of them to stop Sedgwick at Fredericksburg itself where here Burnside's taking the risk of putting the entire army south of the Rappahannock as opposed to just half of it. The same Burnside who resorted immediately to headlong attacks.

At Chancellorsville: The Wilderness is right next to the battlefield.

This scenario: The Wilderness is nowhere near the battlefield.

This assumes both that Burnside moves the Army of the Potomac with lightning speed, which is not exactly typical of that army and that Lee sits around with his thumb up his rectum during this same timeframe.

The reason 67th Tigers said that Lee has lost if he enters the Wilderness is not because Lee is incapable of winning there if the Union gives battle. Its that by entering the Wilderness he is refusing to do battle, and Burnside simply marches into Richmond unopposed. Bringing up Chancellorsville in this situation is a non-sequiter.

Burnside only needs to march 30 miles to the North Anna. That's not impossible - even for Burnside. He may take longer than he should, but he has a good head start.

Yes, and the Overland Campaign pursued a direct route to Richmond while driving the Army of Northern Virginia headlong....after 60,000 Yankees were dead and trench warfare became a basic part of the Virginia war. Against an Army of Northern Virginia depleted of leaders and ability to restore casualties. With the best general in charge.

Here this is the slow, lumbering glacier-army under General Failure that's going to do unchallenged what took Grant weeks of bloodthirsty direct slogging against an Army of Northern Virginia gutted by Lee's leadership style without Lee doing his patented surprise headlong attacks.

I don't see much value in continuing this debate so I'm not going to reply to anymore of Snake's posts in this topic (unless he brings up something relevant). Of course, Snake is certainly welcome to post whatever he wants and other people can respond to it.

However, I'd like to continue discussion with anyone that is dealing with the specifics of the alternate campaign.

Which I actually am doing by noting that Burnside is not in a position to march to the North Anna unopposed, particularly with JEB Stuart, Longstreet, and Jackson all around. The same people who were masters at hitting the Army of the Potomac with strategies that sane people would not do.

Lets assume Lee has Longstreet arrive at the North Anna right before Burnside arrives. Let's say it's November 23. 35,000 troops against 120,000. Lee has to make some effort to protect Richmond. Let's say Burnside fights badly and does not destroy Longstreet as he should. However, Lee must retreat, and Burnside is delayed by several days.

Something like the first day of Second Manassas, then?

Burnside resumes his march towards Richmond. Let's say it takes him until November 30 to reach there. Lee informs Davis that he cannot stop the Army of the Potomac from reaching the capital, but that he will have his entire army soon and will drive the enemy from Virginia. Davis and the Confederate government make plans to temporarily leave the capital, making sure the most important papers and such are not left behind.

Which is something that a much more logistically powerful Army of the Potomac relative to the Army of Northern Virginia took a little less than a calendar year to accomplish against an already-weakened ANV.

News that Burnside has "defeated" Lee and taken Richmond is greeted with immense joy at the White House and the northern newspapers. Despite the feelings from his subordinates that they missed an opportunity to destroy half of Lee's army, Burnside gets a tremendous (and probably fatal) ego boost. However, the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac get a much needed ego boost. They have "outfoxed" Lee and taken the capital.

At this point, where does Lee assemble his combined army (say about 67,000 strong)? I think by December 1, he should have everyone. What is Lee's next move? A direct attack against the Army of the Potomac in Richmond? Or does he attempt to somehow force Burnside to move out? What does Burnside do? Stay at Richmond and rest on his laurels? Or does he move some troops south to take Petersburg, or something else? Who has the worse supply situation? Lee since Burnside is blocking his railroads? Or Burnside if Lee cuts off his from Washington? Who will feel the pinch first?

So where does the next battle take place, and how much does Burnside probably blunder?

Burnside is as likely to capture Richmond in November 1862 as Baldy Smith was to capture Petersburg in 1864. It doesn't take a genius to blunt Burnside or to use cavalry and guerrillas to bamboozle him and hold his overcumbersome army in confusion Second Manassas style and then force him right into the Wilderness.
 
@ Everybody but mostly Snake:

Some details on the Chancellorsville Campaign and the Wilderness Campaign are in order. Courtesy of Chancellorsville, Stephen Sears, and The Battle of The Wilderness, May 5-6, Gordon C. Rhea.

Hooker certainly "stole a march" on Lee, if by "stole a march" you mean moved troops from point A to point B without Lee being aware of it. That much is certainly true. The details however are important. In this case, point A is the Union Army's winter quarters to the northeast of Lee. And point B is the area from Ely's Ford to Chancellorsville proper, northwest and west of Lee. Which one depends on how you define Lee being aware of it.

Its value for the current discussion is minimal. Using both straight-line distance and marching distance, Lee's army is closer to Richmond than both point A and point B. Furthermore, he controls the RF&P railroad thus increasing this advantage.

(I would love to talk about the 10 or so different lucky breaks that Lee got during the Chancellorsville Campaign - by all rights Hooker should have won, and it was *minimally* his fault, but they are not relevant to this discussion).

With Grant the situation is even more interesting. His winter camps lay between the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers, while Lee's lay significantly far to the west. In terms of distance to Richmond, Lee's distance was slightly closer. To start.

It is true that Grant never planned to battle in the Wilderness. However, his original plan was *NOT* to move south of it. He planned to turn west and go up directly against Lee. He hoped, ideally, that Lee would take up a defensive position at or near Mine Run, as he had done late in 1863. Its north flank would be against the Rapidan River, but its southern flank would be more open. Grant then planned to turn said flank utilizing his 2:1 numerical advantage. Tactically this would place Grant minimally closer to Richmond than Lee. Strategically once battle had joined the distances would be equal.

Furthermore Grant calculated how quickly Lee would move from his Winter Camps to the Mine Run line, based on the aforesaid 1863 campaign. The AoTP and the IXth corps were moving behind schedule, but Grant had never intended to beat Lee to the Mine Run line. The slowness of the Union army became important only when Lee attacked Grant. Also it should be pointed out that the IXth corps did not get across the Rapidan River until May 6th, halfway through the battle, and elements of the VIth corps also arrived late on the 5th. So *no*, in fact Grant did not have his entire army across the river before Lee had already started the battle, let alone been prepared to.

The important points of all the above: with the Wilderness Campaign, for a short time on May 4th Grant was closer to Richmond than Lee. But Lee was entirely aware of this fact and moving to attack Grant at that moment, while Grant was never intending to move directy on Richmond in the first place.

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Now let's compare to the hypothetical.

Assumption 1: Burnside intends to move to Richmond, with the intent of capturing it, as quickly and directly as reasonably possible. "Lee's Army" is not the primary objective in late 1862. Knowing Burnside, "quick" means anything but, but "directly" means a straight line if at all possible, and Burnside certainly can aim for that.

Assumption 2: The pontoon bridges arrive on time. This is the hypothetical assumption.

Marye's heights and surrounding territory is an obvious position for anybody, so we can assume that Burnside will assemble his army there. Considering that iOTL, Franklin's Grand Division crossed in a single day with no problems, unopposed, we can assume that with twice (or more) the # of pontoons, it will take Burnside no more than 2 days to cross and assemble his full army on the southern bank of the Rappahannock River. This assumes that they are unopposed, but as others have mentioned there was only 1 Confederate regiment in the area, acting only as survelliance, so yes, I argue this qualifies.

Another point of clarification: By crossing at Fredericksburg, the word "Rapidan" should *NOT* enter this discussion. The Rapidan is a tributary of the Rappahannock, that enters it above Fredericksburg, so if Burnside crosses at Fredericksburg he crosses both rivers at once, they being the same river.

Now let's talk about geography. From Fredericksburg, the direct route to Richmond is pretty much due South. This route can be done, using any of the following: Telegraph Road, the RF&P Railroad, Bowling Green Road. All of these will at least get you to the North Anna River, and all of these go directly south.

Also from Fredericksburg, the route to get into the Wilderness is due West. Using the Orange Turnpike and/or Orange Plank Road. To enter the Wilderness, starting from Fredericksburg, requires at least a 5 mile march.

(Now for some geometry :D)

We can call this 5-mile line segment W-F. Burnside does not intend to do this, but instead march to Richmond, the longer segment F-R. The angle W-F-R is a right angle. Therefore, the instant Burnside leaves Fredericksburg en route to Richmond, his distance to the Wilderness will increase. And it will continue increasing until he reaches Richmond or is otherwise stopped.

In particular Burnside's distance to the Wilderness will never be equal to 0. This includes the case where Burnside does not move at all beyond Fredericksburg, because in this base case he is still 5 miles to the east of it.

Therefore, Burnside will at no point in this campaign ever be in the Wilderness. Q. E. D.

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Now let's throw Lee into the picture. According to various other posters, and I believe them for the moment, at the instant the pontoon bridges are set up in this hypothetical the nearest large Confederate force is Longstreet's corps, which they say is a 4 day march to the west. A lot of people have been saying that Burnside will cross his entire army over the river in 1 day. I say that pontoon crossings are a tricky affair, given also supply trains, so I give him 2 days.

In the best case for Lee he knows the instant that Burnside starts crossing the river and immediately moves his men to intercept him. Neither of these are necessarily true statements, but we'll assume them for now.

Therefore, by the time Burnside has his entire army across the river, Longstreet's corps, half of Lee's army, is still 2 days march to the west of Fredericksburg.

Now from Burnside's perspective, the whole point of this campaign was to get to Richmond before Lee can intercept him. The move to Fredericksburg in the first place was supposed to be unexpected and gain him a temporary time advantage, which it succeeded in. However slowly Burnside will move, I argue that he *WILL*, in fact, move towards Richmond. Sitting in Fredericksburg accomplishes nothing, and is contrary to his strict campaign plan, as approved by Lincoln (apparently an important point to Burnside).

A fair-to-poor day's march for Union troops is ~10 miles. Less than that is definitely poor, or at least leisurely. Burnside may not be able to organize the march well (maybe), but he certainly is not *trying* to be leisurely. Again, that would go against the whole goal of getting to Richmond first. So I assume he can manage 10 miles a day.

The marching distance from Fredericksburg to the North Anna River is ~25 miles. So in 2 days Burnside will definitely be almost there. 2.5 days and he will be there.

Now let's make another geometry figure. The triangle LFN. L-F-N is a right angle, again centered at Fredericksburg. N is the crossing sites of the North Anna River due south of F. L is Longstreet's position at the specific time that it would take him 2 days to traverse the line L-F.

It will, we have seen, take Burnside 2.5 days to traverse the line F-N. During this time he is travelling in a straight line.

Longstreet would like to intercept Burnside. The distance he has to cover to the east will take a minimum of 2 days, by which time Burnside has almost reached N. Longstreet could, at this point, reach F, but that serves little purpose. (Actually, cutting Burnsides supply lines at this point....an interesting idea. One that should be discussed. But not the topic at hand).

If Longstreet adds on any southward distance he increases the time it takes him to make the march. Because this is the hypotenuse it does not add on time to the same order of magnitude. Still, to travel the line L-N should take absolutely no less than 2.5 days. Probably more, but we can go with 2.5.

Note that that is the same amount of time it takes Burnside to get to N. And the route Longstreet would take would involve the Virginia Central railroad, thus placing him on the south bank of N.

In other words, assuming that Lee's men (Longstreet's) march as fast as can reasonably be expected, and Burnside's march as slowly as can be reasonbly expected, Lee will still not catch up to Burnside until the North Anna River.

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Of course, once the North Anna is reached, Lee has every possibility of beating Burnside in detail. If nothing else, the OTL inverted V should do quite nicely. Certainly should buy another week or so to bring up Jackson's corps.

On the other hand, Burnside will start with a 4:1 superiority. And Lee will not have any pre-made entrenchments. And the inverted-V is not an obvious position. iOTL it took Lee 2+ days to determine it and put his army into said position. So perhaps Burnside would even win such a fight. Or perhaps not, he is Burnside after all, and Franklin sucks as a wing commander. But it is certainly a discussable topic.

However, the bottom line is, there will be NO fighting BEFORE the North Anna River, and words such as "Rapidan" and "Wilderness" will have no role to play in the campaign.
 
@ Everybody but mostly Snake:

Some details on the Chancellorsville Campaign and the Wilderness Campaign are in order. Courtesy of Chancellorsville, Stephen Sears, and The Battle of The Wilderness, May 5-6, Gordon C. Rhea.

Hooker certainly "stole a march" on Lee, if by "stole a march" you mean moved troops from point A to point B without Lee being aware of it. That much is certainly true. The details however are important. In this case, point A is the Union Army's winter quarters to the northeast of Lee. And point B is the area from Ely's Ford to Chancellorsville proper, northwest and west of Lee. Which one depends on how you define Lee being aware of it.

He also had a larger army structured better to attack than Burnside did and used its large size to full advantage which Burnside is not.

Its value for the current discussion is minimal. Using both straight-line distance and marching distance, Lee's army is closer to Richmond than both point A and point B. Furthermore, he controls the RF&P railroad thus increasing this advantage.

(I would love to talk about the 10 or so different lucky breaks that Lee got during the Chancellorsville Campaign - by all rights Hooker should have won, and it was *minimally* his fault, but they are not relevant to this discussion).

All of which would apply moreso to an overly cumbersome Army of the Potomac directed by General Failure, no?

With Grant the situation is even more interesting. His winter camps lay between the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers, while Lee's lay significantly far to the west. In terms of distance to Richmond, Lee's distance was slightly closer. To start.

It is true that Grant never planned to battle in the Wilderness. However, his original plan was *NOT* to move south of it. He planned to turn west and go up directly against Lee. He hoped, ideally, that Lee would take up a defensive position at or near Mine Run, as he had done late in 1863. Its north flank would be against the Rapidan River, but its southern flank would be more open. Grant then planned to turn said flank utilizing his 2:1 numerical advantage. Tactically this would place Grant minimally closer to Richmond than Lee. Strategically once battle had joined the distances would be equal.

Nor did Lee want the Battle of the Wilderness to start when it did, Grant took him by surprise when he ordered the Army of the Potomac to attack.

Furthermore Grant calculated how quickly Lee would move from his Winter Camps to the Mine Run line, based on the aforesaid 1863 campaign. The AoTP and the IXth corps were moving behind schedule, but Grant had never intended to beat Lee to the Mine Run line. The slowness of the Union army became important only when Lee attacked Grant. Also it should be pointed out that the IXth corps did not get across the Rapidan River until May 6th, halfway through the battle, and elements of the VIth corps also arrived late on the 5th. So *no*, in fact Grant did not have his entire army across the river before Lee had already started the battle, let alone been prepared to.

The IXth Corps under command of that same man who commands the entire Army of the Potomac under its worst structure for an offensive campaign in conjunction with being led by General Failure.

The important points of all the above: with the Wilderness Campaign, for a short time on May 4th Grant was closer to Richmond than Lee. But Lee was entirely aware of this fact and moving to attack Grant at that moment, while Grant was never intending to move directy on Richmond in the first place.

Not that Lee ever understood Grant was actually after the Army of Northern Virginia as opposed to Richmond, which may say more about Lee than anything else.


Now let's compare to the hypothetical.

Assumption 1: Burnside intends to move to Richmond, with the intent of capturing it, as quickly and directly as reasonably possible. "Lee's Army" is not the primary objective in late 1862. Knowing Burnside, "quick" means anything but, but "directly" means a straight line if at all possible, and Burnside certainly can aim for that.

Provided JEB Stuart and the nearest Confederate forces just sit and do nothing, yes.

Assumption 2: The pontoon bridges arrive on time. This is the hypothetical assumption.

Marye's heights and surrounding territory is an obvious position for anybody, so we can assume that Burnside will assemble his army there. Considering that iOTL, Franklin's Grand Division crossed in a single day with no problems, unopposed, we can assume that with twice (or more) the # of pontoons, it will take Burnside no more than 2 days to cross and assemble his full army on the southern bank of the Rappahannock River. This assumes that they are unopposed, but as others have mentioned there was only 1 Confederate regiment in the area, acting only as survelliance, so yes, I argue this qualifies.

Another point of clarification: By crossing at Fredericksburg, the word "Rapidan" should *NOT* enter this discussion. The Rapidan is a tributary of the Rappahannock, that enters it above Fredericksburg, so if Burnside crosses at Fredericksburg he crosses both rivers at once, they being the same river.

Now let's talk about geography. From Fredericksburg, the direct route to Richmond is pretty much due South. This route can be done, using any of the following: Telegraph Road, the RF&P Railroad, Bowling Green Road. All of these will at least get you to the North Anna River, and all of these go directly south.

Also from Fredericksburg, the route to get into the Wilderness is due West. Using the Orange Turnpike and/or Orange Plank Road. To enter the Wilderness, starting from Fredericksburg, requires at least a 5 mile march.

(Now for some geometry :D)

We can call this 5-mile line segment W-F. Burnside does not intend to do this, but instead march to Richmond, the longer segment F-R. The angle W-F-R is a right angle. Therefore, the instant Burnside leaves Fredericksburg en route to Richmond, his distance to the Wilderness will increase. And it will continue increasing until he reaches Richmond or is otherwise stopped.

In particular Burnside's distance to the Wilderness will never be equal to 0. This includes the case where Burnside does not move at all beyond Fredericksburg, because in this base case he is still 5 miles to the east of it.

Therefore, Burnside will at no point in this campaign ever be in the Wilderness. Q. E. D.

Yes, if he marches entirely uninterruptedly and the Confederates just ignore his slow-moving army.

Now let's throw Lee into the picture. According to various other posters, and I believe them for the moment, at the instant the pontoon bridges are set up in this hypothetical the nearest large Confederate force is Longstreet's corps, which they say is a 4 day march to the west. A lot of people have been saying that Burnside will cross his entire army over the river in 1 day. I say that pontoon crossings are a tricky affair, given also supply trains, so I give him 2 days.

In the best case for Lee he knows the instant that Burnside starts crossing the river and immediately moves his men to intercept him. Neither of these are necessarily true statements, but we'll assume them for now.

Therefore, by the time Burnside has his entire army across the river, Longstreet's corps, half of Lee's army, is still 2 days march to the west of Fredericksburg.

Now from Burnside's perspective, the whole point of this campaign was to get to Richmond before Lee can intercept him. The move to Fredericksburg in the first place was supposed to be unexpected and gain him a temporary time advantage, which it succeeded in. However slowly Burnside will move, I argue that he *WILL*, in fact, move towards Richmond. Sitting in Fredericksburg accomplishes nothing, and is contrary to his strict campaign plan, as approved by Lincoln (apparently an important point to Burnside).

A fair-to-poor day's march for Union troops is ~10 miles. Less than that is definitely poor, or at least leisurely. Burnside may not be able to organize the march well (maybe), but he certainly is not *trying* to be leisurely. Again, that would go against the whole goal of getting to Richmond first. So I assume he can manage 10 miles a day.

The marching distance from Fredericksburg to the North Anna River is ~25 miles. So in 2 days Burnside will definitely be almost there. 2.5 days and he will be there.

Now let's make another geometry figure. The triangle LFN. L-F-N is a right angle, again centered at Fredericksburg. N is the crossing sites of the North Anna River due south of F. L is Longstreet's position at the specific time that it would take him 2 days to traverse the line L-F.

It will, we have seen, take Burnside 2.5 days to traverse the line F-N. During this time he is travelling in a straight line.

Longstreet would like to intercept Burnside. The distance he has to cover to the east will take a minimum of 2 days, by which time Burnside has almost reached N. Longstreet could, at this point, reach F, but that serves little purpose. (Actually, cutting Burnsides supply lines at this point....an interesting idea. One that should be discussed. But not the topic at hand).

If Longstreet adds on any southward distance he increases the time it takes him to make the march. Because this is the hypotenuse it does not add on time to the same order of magnitude. Still, to travel the line L-N should take absolutely no less than 2.5 days. Probably more, but we can go with 2.5.

Note that that is the same amount of time it takes Burnside to get to N. And the route Longstreet would take would involve the Virginia Central railroad, thus placing him on the south bank of N.

In other words, assuming that Lee's men (Longstreet's) march as fast as can reasonably be expected, and Burnside's march as slowly as can be reasonbly expected, Lee will still not catch up to Burnside until the North Anna River.

All this assumes that Burnside, already slow as anything and once again the biggest General Failure in the Army of the Potomac moves with an unprecedented speed and that the usual friction of war does nothing to impair his movements, nor the usual phobia of Lee doing a double somersault and landing on the Army's flank and rear at the same time.

Of course, once the North Anna is reached, Lee has every possibility of beating Burnside in detail. If nothing else, the OTL inverted V should do quite nicely. Certainly should buy another week or so to bring up Jackson's corps.

On the other hand, Burnside will start with a 4:1 superiority. And Lee will not have any pre-made entrenchments. And the inverted-V is not an obvious position. iOTL it took Lee 2+ days to determine it and put his army into said position. So perhaps Burnside would even win such a fight. Or perhaps not, he is Burnside after all, and Franklin sucks as a wing commander. But it is certainly a discussable topic.

However, the bottom line is, there will be NO fighting BEFORE the North Anna River, and words such as "Rapidan" and "Wilderness" will have no role to play in the campaign.

Assuming General Failure's huge, cumbersome army makes it there entirely uninterrupted and less afraid of what the ANV will do to it than what it will do to the ANV.
 
Now you're just spouting nonsense do you have a clue as to how burnside was before the battle at fredericksburg and the actual course of the campaign leading up to the battle. Pretty good if you ask me. And did any of you ever know or stop to consider that burnside actually worked with the navy who sent group of five gunboats to attack at the mouth of the Rappohannok. How do you think the battle/campaign would have played out if this foray were successful? Also, let's say that burnside composes a more aggressive and direct order to Franklin, ordering for a surprise movement before dawn on the 13th of December as was expected by the Left Grand Division commander the day before when burnside visited his headquarters. This would lead to an earlier and concentrated effort by the union left at Fredericksburg. Is this possible? With the left secured, burnside could have then ordered Sumner forward, as planned, and with both forces moving in conjunction could have at least forced Lee to retire, as per burnsides strategy.
 

CalBear

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Wait...

You reactivated a thread that has been dead for 18 months to argue with someone who has been Banned?

Seriously?

Don't do that.
Now you're just spouting nonsense do you have a clue as to how burnside was before the battle at fredericksburg and the actual course of the campaign leading up to the battle. Pretty good if you ask me. And did any of you ever know or stop to consider that burnside actually worked with the navy who sent group of five gunboats to attack at the mouth of the Rappohannok. How do you think the battle/campaign would have played out if this foray were successful? Also, let's say that burnside composes a more aggressive and direct order to Franklin, ordering for a surprise movement before dawn on the 13th of December as was expected by the Left Grand Division commander the day before when burnside visited his headquarters. This would lead to an earlier and concentrated effort by the union left at Fredericksburg. Is this possible? With the left secured, burnside could have then ordered Sumner forward, as planned, and with both forces moving in conjunction could have at least forced Lee to retire, as per burnsides strategy.
 
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