pontoon bridges on time at Fredericksburg

[Blackfox5]

On November 17, 1862 advance elements of the Army of Potomac arrive at Fredericksburg. Detailed planning earlier by commanding Union General Burnside had insured that the pontoon bridges necessary to cross the Rappahannock River were present. Maj. Gen Edwin "Bull" Sumner leads his troops into Fredericksburg, pushing out the token Confederate force in the area and occupies Marye's Heights. From there, he covers the the rest of the Army of the Potomac as it crosses the river. Once fully assembled, it will advance towards Richmond.

General Lee orders the Army of Northern Virginia to assemble at the North Anna River to defend Richmond. However, there is political pressure to engage the Union Army as far north as possible to protect Richmond. Furthermore, neither Longstreet's Corps nor Jackson's Corps is in position, both will need to travel many days before they can arrive (IOTL it took Longstreet until Nov 23, and Jackson Nov 26 to move all their men into Fredericksburg).

How long will it take for the Army of the Potomac to cross and attack Richmond? How much time is needed for Lee to assemble his army? Is it possible for the Union to defeat the Confederates in detail? Can Lee stop Burnside in time, or will Richmond fall before the Confederate Army can engage? What will be the results of battle once they do fight?

This seems one of the more plausible PODs in the American Civil War, but I can't remember it being discussed. If the pontoon bridges had been assembled as Burnside planned, then the Army of the Potomac should have crossed without interference and been able to move quickly to Richmond. It's just that people bungled it. What if they hadn't and Burnsides plan worked?

 

[Elfwine]

Lee is caught at least somewhat wrongfooted, which has never ended well for him.

Whether Burnside can take advantage of this I don't know, but it can't be worse than OTL.

Maybe Lee attacks Burnside? That wouldn't be inappropriate - for Lee to decide to do, that is.

 

[Ryan the Rebel]

There was a thread on this a few years, and a failed TL somewhere. I'll try to find them for you later, using school computers for things like this is frowned on

 

[galileo-034]

See this TL:
http://www.myalternatehistoryplace.com/leescannae.html

 

[Snake Featherston]

Burnside had the same problem Joe Hooker did. He thought in terms of the battle, not the campaign. Had he won at Fredericksburg he would probably have been at a loss for what to do afterward, giving the Confederacy time to restore some kind of line before Virginia, and this is before the CSA's loyalist manpower pool started to collapse in 1863. The South can still throw men up at Burnside, which it could not do in 1864.

Now, a longer-term consequence of this is that adoption of fortifications as standard tactics is going to be delayed a bit in the overall war, increasing the death toll for both sides in the war.

I think the most plausible consequences for ATL "Fredericksburg" is that it turns into the First Battle of the Wilderness and Lee suckers Burnside into going after him in the Wilderness of Spotsylvania. Burnside was not that good a tactician, less so than Hooker, and he'd preside over an even more ignominous winter rout than the Chancellorsville one. Lee used that idea no less than twice IOTL so it's not impossible he'd use it IATLs as well to counter the Army of the Potomac's numerical superiority, and nothing in Burnside's short career indicates he'd handle that Wilderness very well. Though if he fails there the result may be a somewhat-different strategy adopted by Joe Hooker who *was* a good planner. Though it's also worth remembering that Joe Hooker maneuvered Lee out of his lines without a battle and even captured Fredericksburg, which didn't make Chancellorsville any less Lee's crowning moment of awesome. Burnside......was less good at leading battle than Joe Hooker was. Kind of a Union John Bell Hood.

 

[Elfwine]

Be nice. Burnside did have some decent ideas.

Still, he's not the kind of man who can come up with an effective response to being caught with one boot on.

As opposed to how Meade (nevermind Grant and Thomas - I swear Grant must have been someone who did better under pressure) could at least face that as "Okay. This is bad. But we can deal with bad."

That worries me more than tactical ineptitude per se.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Be nice. Burnside did have some decent ideas.

Still, he's not the kind of man who can come up with an effective response to being caught with one boot on.

As opposed to how Meade (nevermind Grant and Thomas - I swear Grant must have been someone who did better under pressure) could at least face that as "Okay. This is bad. But we can deal with bad."

That worries me more than tactical ineptitude per se.

That in bold is the problem, especially in the nightmarish terrain of the Wilderness. You'd need to be someone of Grant or Thomas's caliber to do well in that particular area, and Burnside was a good junior officer, not a commanding officer. If anything Burnside's Wilderness Offensive would make Hooker's look good.

 

[67th Tigers]

Something anyone writing a TL on this might like to know is that the same Hoof and Mouth that paralysed McClellan's army after Antietam broke out amongst Lee's army a month later and essentially paralysed it. Lee was making desperate pleas to Jackson at least as early as the 7th November to march to unite the army, but Jackson didn't start marching until the 21st. He simply couldn't sustain his army corps without transport. If you ever want a study in contrasts look up and compare Lincoln's and Davis's responses to effectively identical crises (that in the future after I finish writing up a piece on Grant's massive overestimates of enemy strength in 1862).

Lee was actually in the process of trying to launch an attack on McClellan's forces when McClellan was relieved, believing he had caught 9th Corps unsupported, but quickly aborted as soon as it was clear in fact the whole enemy force was facing him. He would attack only if he believed he had an advantage.

As to Burnside - this battle plan at Fredericksburg was fine, but it was badly implemented. The primary culprit is Franklin, who repeated the mistakes he made in the Maryland campaign and showed himself probably a bit out of his depth commanding an "army". Burnside bears some responsibility, but the roads were so bad that communications were severely restricted. It took over an hour to ride from Burnside's HQ to Franklin's. A message an reply might take three hours. Burnside going over there himself (as eventually he was forced to) would be a last resort.

 

[67th Tigers]

That in bold is the problem, especially in the nightmarish terrain of the Wilderness. You'd need to be someone of Grant or Thomas's caliber to do well in that particular area, and Burnside was a good junior officer, not a commanding officer. If anything Burnside's Wilderness Offensive would make Hooker's look good.

Yeah, there was no finesee in Grant's Wilderness movements. It was simply a grinder to break though to better ground. Not his fault, Lincoln denied him all other options....

 

[Snake Featherston]

Yeah, there was no finesee in Grant's Wilderness movements. It was simply a grinder to break though to better ground. Not his fault, Lincoln denied him all other options....

It's hard to be finessed in a terrain that breaks up all coherence in units. Lee discovered the same principle the Axis did in the Battle of the Heurtgen Forest. Unfortunately for Lee his attempt to completely annihilate the Army of the Potomac by first a flank and then a frontal attack failed and Grant just moved south instead of retreating like Lee so fervently believed he would. Lee kept believing that up until the Bloody Angle of Spotsylvania and then he finally woke up to reality.

Now, had Lee tried that against the Rock of Chickamauga, the Anti-Lee would have annihilated the Army of Northern Virginia instead.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Something anyone writing a TL on this might like to know is that the same Hoof and Mouth that paralysed McClellan's army after Antietam broke out amongst Lee's army a month later and essentially paralysed it. Lee was making desperate pleas to Jackson at least as early as the 7th November to march to unite the army, but Jackson didn't start marching until the 21st. He simply couldn't sustain his army corps without transport. If you ever want a study in contrasts look up and compare Lincoln's and Davis's responses to effectively identical crises (that in the future after I finish writing up a piece on Grant's massive overestimates of enemy strength in 1862).

Lee was actually in the process of trying to launch an attack on McClellan's forces when McClellan was relieved, believing he had caught 9th Corps unsupported, but quickly aborted as soon as it was clear in fact the whole enemy force was facing him. He would attack only if he believed he had an advantage.

As to Burnside - this battle plan at Fredericksburg was fine, but it was badly implemented. The primary culprit is Franklin, who repeated the mistakes he made in the Maryland campaign and showed himself probably a bit out of his depth commanding an "army". Burnside bears some responsibility, but the roads were so bad that communications were severely restricted. It took over an hour to ride from Burnside's HQ to Franklin's. A message an reply might take three hours. Burnside going over there himself (as eventually he was forced to) would be a last resort.

Actually the plan was not to fight at Fredericksburg at all but like Hooker's in the Wilderness to maneuver Lee out without a battle. The actual fight would have been somewhere around the territory of the Wilderness/Spotsylvania. If Burnside's plan works, he has no Battle of Fredericksburg.

 

[67th Tigers]

Actually the plan was not to fight at Fredericksburg at all but like Hooker's in the Wilderness to maneuver Lee out without a battle. The actual fight would have been somewhere around the territory of the Wilderness/Spotsylvania. If Burnside's plan works, he has no Battle of Fredericksburg.

?

When Burnside takes command the Army is concentrated at Warrenton and what he executes is a variant of McClellan's plans. McClellan intended to strike Longstreet at Culpepper Ct Hse destroying him if possible and if not driving him back to Gordonsville behind at the head of the North Anna then change base via Fredericksburg. Burnside (at the insistence of Washington) foregoed the striking Longstreet part of the plan (Lincoln considered attacking Longstreet wreckless, and fired McClellan for it).

Burnsides intent was to advance down the R&F RR to Hanover Junction, which was also where Lee thought he'd intercept him. The Wilderness area would not have featured in the campaign.

 

[Snake Featherston]

?

When Burnside takes command the Army is concentrated at Warrenton and what he executes is a variant of McClellan's plans. McClellan intended to strike Longstreet at Culpepper Ct Hse destroying him if possible and if not driving him back to Gordonsville behind at the head of the North Anna then change base via Fredericksburg. Burnside (at the insistence of Washington) foregoed the striking Longstreet part of the plan (Lincoln considered attacking Longstreet wreckless, and fired McClellan for it).

Burnsides intent was to advance down the R&F RR to Hanover Junction, which was also where Lee thought he'd intercept him. The Wilderness area would not have featured in the campaign.

Er, no, his plans were for the pontoon bridges to arrive rapidly, him to get over the Rapidan and interpose himself between Lee and Richmond to force Lee on the defensive. Which in actuality would have led to a winter Battle of the Wilderness and no more. Once Burnside is actually over the Rapidan, Lee would figure out the obvious means to counter Federal artillery and numerical superiority is to hit Burnside in the Wilderness, and as Lee liked to fight, Burnside gets crushed far worse than in the actual Fredericksburg.

 

[Blackfox5]

Burnside had the same problem Joe Hooker did. He thought in terms of the battle, not the campaign. Had he won at Fredericksburg he would probably have been at a loss for what to do afterward, giving the Confederacy time to restore some kind of line before Virginia, and this is before the CSA's loyalist manpower pool started to collapse in 1863. The South can still throw men up at Burnside, which it could not do in 1864.

While I agree with you that Burnside is not the same caliber of general as Lee and is outclassed, you really aren't answering the questions I asked,and I think avoiding the major questions of the POD.

There is unlikely to be any Battle of Fredericksburg at all. Burnside already has the heights and town in this scenario. The only question is how does it take him to assemble his full army so he can continue his advance to Richmond.

How long does it take Lee to assemble his army? Is it in enough time to to stop the Union Army from seizing Richmond? If so, where does Lee make his stand? Is it at the North Anna River? If so, how long does it take the Union Army to reach there? How long does it take Lee's forces to get there? Can all of them reach there before the Union Army does? Details here matter as its essentially a race to the North Anna River.

Doesn't the Union Army have a lead start on the Confederates? Longstreet will probably be able to reach North Anna in time, but can Jackson actually reach it before Burnside? Isn't it likely that Burnside would reach the North Anna when Lee only has half his army (Longstreet's Corps)? Faced with that, what would Lee do? Engage the enemy? Or maneuver (retreat) so he can join Jackson's forces with a fully assembled army?

In fact, is Lee fighting a defensive battle at all in this scenario? Or must he attack the Union Army to prevent its advance?

I have to admit I find 67th Tiger's comemnts to be more in line with my limited knowledge and interpretation of events than Snake Featherston's. Burnside intends to advance on Richmond. Why would he divert his forces west towards the Wilderness? He's going to avoid that entirely. Hanover Junction is not the Wilderness. If Lee sits his army in the Wilderness (which I'm fairly certain was NOT his plan), what does he do when Burnside ignores him and moves south to Richmond. How long does Lee stay there while Burnside keeps moving? It's not going to take Burnside that long to reach Richmond unopposed.

To be more explicit, how does the Battle at Hanover Junction/North Anna turn out? If Burnside wins there (possible if he faces only a partial force, much more in doubt if Lee has everyone there), what happens next?

 

[Snake Featherston]

While I agree with you that Burnside is not the same caliber of general as Lee and is outclassed, you really aren't answering the questions I asked,and I think avoiding the major questions of the POD.

There is unlikely to be any Battle of Fredericksburg at all. Burnside already has the heights and town in this scenario. The only question is how does it take him to assemble his full army so he can continue his advance to Richmond.

How long does it take Lee to assemble his army? Is it in enough time to to stop the Union Army from seizing Richmond? If so, where does Lee make his stand? Is it at the North Anna River? If so, how long does it take the Union Army to reach there? How long does it take Lee's forces to get there? Can all of them reach there before the Union Army does? Details here matter as its essentially a race to the North Anna River.

Doesn't the Union Army have a lead start on the Confederates? Longstreet will probably be able to reach North Anna in time, but can Jackson actually reach it before Burnside? Isn't it likely that Burnside would reach the North Anna when Lee only has half his army (Longstreet's Corps)? Faced with that, what would Lee do? Engage the enemy? Or maneuver (retreat) so he can join Jackson's forces with a fully assembled army?

In fact, is Lee fighting a defensive battle at all in this scenario? Or must he attack the Union Army to prevent its advance?

I have to admit I find 67th Tiger's comemnts to be more in line with my limited knowledge and interpretation of events than Snake Featherston's. Burnside intends to advance on Richmond. Why would he divert his forces west towards the Wilderness? He's going to avoid that entirely. Hanover Junction is not the Wilderness. If Lee sits his army in the Wilderness (which I'm fairly certain was NOT his plan), what does he do when Burnside ignores him and moves south to Richmond. How long does Lee stay there while Burnside keeps moving? It's not going to take Burnside that long to reach Richmond unopposed.

To be more explicit, how does the Battle at Hanover Junction/North Anna turn out? If Burnside wins there (possible if he faces only a partial force, much more in doubt if Lee has everyone there), what happens next?

Lee *will* attack Burnside, but let's remember Burnside was slow and the Wilderness is a perfect zone to hit his army in. No matter what he intends the friction of war and moving logistics through the Wilderness are formidable, the Grand Divisions are hopelessly cumbersome and will have a hard time moving intact through there. This'd slow him down in time for Lee to fight a Chancellorsville/Wilderness style fight, and Burnside wasn't even a Hooker.

He'd be driven out with his tails between his legs in a Union defeat that'd be more like TL-191 Lee. Burnside's force is too cumbersome for the kind of rapid, hard-hitting offensive, and Lee would exploit that in the Wilderness for the same reason he used that tactic twice IOTL. 67th Tiger's ideas depend on a USA which has drooling idiot Neanderthals in charge and a Confederate army of supermen. The actual plans Burnside used and his military structure was not good to get out of the Wilderness rapidly. Neither Hooker nor Grant, both of whom put much more thought into what happened after they got over the Rapidan were able to get out of there before Lee got there.

Burnside, who'd probably get a case of the galloping jimjams once he realizes Lee's not there and be nervous would be in outright panic once the Army of Northern Virginia starts attacking his army in the Wilderness. Lee will understand and realize in an open-field battle he can't prevail against even an idiotic Northern general. If, however, he hits that general in a dense country that gives the Confederacy's infantry structure which is still superior at this phase to the Army of the Potomac's a fighting chance, Fredericksburg will be a lesser defeat than what actually happens.

Burnside doesn't fight at Fredericksburg, leading to Lee using the Wilderness for the first time to defeat a US offensive south of it. Let's keep in mind here that this is not 1862, the Army of the Potomac has never beaten the Army of Northern Virginia in a major battle. Jackson and Longstreet are both healthy, in full command of their armies, and ready and willing to hit the US Army in the flank. Burnside's attempt to get to Hanover Junction is with the cumbersome Grand Division formation and with a general whose idea facing Marye's Heights and the part of the line that a competent general would have used to outflank Lee *in* Fredericksburg was to attack Marye's Heights headlong is both 1) going to make it south before an Army of Northern Virginia nearing its wartime peak even knows he's there and 2) going to actually be a good leader of a battle in the open which Burnside.....never was in real life, to be blunt (see: Crater, Battle of).

 

[Blackfox5]

Are we even looking at the same maps? The Wilderness does not lie between Fredericksburg and Hanover Junction. Burnside can avoid the Wilderness entirely.

And whatever the limitations of Burnside, his plan was built on the need to move swiftly. Once over the Rapahannock, he does not have the reason for the display he showed at the real Battle of Fredericksburg where he allowed Lee to assemble his entire army in front of him.

Instead, we have Lee's army separated and much farther away than Burnside is to Richmond.

It seems to me this is what will happen if Lee does what you want him to.

Nov 20 - Lee instructs Longstreet to assume defensive positions at the Wilderness. Burnside begins to move his force south towards Hanover Junction.

Nov 21-24 - Lee continues to wait at the Wilderness for Jackson to arrive. Burnside continues to move south.

Nov 25 - Jackson finally reaches the Wilderness, and Lee has his full army. By this time, Burnside crosses the North Anna River unopposed.

Nov 26 - Dec 1 - Lee keeps telling his army commanders to not worry because Burnside will attack them.

Dec 1 - Burnside seizes Richmond and Jefferson Davis flees the Confederate capital.

I'm sure the exact dates of those events are off because I am not an expert ont he movements of these troops. But it seems obvious to me that by positioning his troops at the Wilderness for a defensive engagement, that Lee more or less abandons the field so Burnside can drive south to Richmond unopposed.

I can't see that happening, so I'm pretty sure Lee must either attack Burnside while he is enroute to Hanover Junction, or somehow get all of his army at Hanover Junction before Burnside (possible, but unlikely). Or fight a defensive battle with only Longstreet's Corps.

I have the feeling your definition of "the Wilderness" is a lot different than mine. When I hear "the Wilderness" I am thinking of the place Grant and Lee fought which is clearly west of Fredericksburg by about 15 miles. I see Burnside moving south along the Richmond & Fredericksburg Railroad which is way to the east of even Spotsylvania. Being a railroad, I think that country must be fairly open than the woods to the west. Unless that area is also considered to be part of the Wilderness (which I do not think it is, but I could be wrong), I don't understand why you keep claiming Burnside will attack Lee at the Wilderness. I can certainly be wrong as I am not an expert in this area, but I am having trouble understanding your claims.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Are we even looking at the same maps? The Wilderness does not lie between Fredericksburg and Hanover Junction. Burnside can avoid the Wilderness entirely.

And whatever the limitations of Burnside, his plan was built on the need to move swiftly. Once over the Rapahannock, he does not have the reason for the display he showed at the real Battle of Fredericksburg where he allowed Lee to assemble his entire army in front of him.

Instead, we have Lee's army separated and much farther away than Burnside is to Richmond.

It seems to me this is what will happen if Lee does what you want him to.

Nov 20 - Lee instructs Longstreet to assume defensive positions at the Wilderness. Burnside begins to move his force south towards Hanover Junction.

Nov 21-24 - Lee continues to wait at the Wilderness for Jackson to arrive. Burnside continues to move south.

Nov 25 - Jackson finally reaches the Wilderness, and Lee has his full army. By this time, Burnside crosses the North Anna River unopposed.

Nov 26 - Dec 1 - Lee keeps telling his army commanders to not worry because Burnside will attack them.

Dec 1 - Burnside seizes Richmond and Jefferson Davis flees the Confederate capital.

I'm sure the exact dates of those events are off because I am not an expert ont he movements of these troops. But it seems obvious to me that by positioning his troops at the Wilderness for a defensive engagement, that Lee more or less abandons the field so Burnside can drive south to Richmond unopposed.

I can't see that happening, so I'm pretty sure Lee must either attack Burnside while he is enroute to Hanover Junction, or somehow get all of his army at Hanover Junction before Burnside (possible, but unlikely). Or fight a defensive battle with only Longstreet's Corps.

I have the feeling your definition of "the Wilderness" is a lot different than mine. When I hear "the Wilderness" I am thinking of the place Grant and Lee fought which is clearly west of Fredericksburg by about 15 miles. I see Burnside moving south along the Richmond & Fredericksburg Railroad which is way to the east of even Spotsylvania. Being a railroad, I think that country must be fairly open than the woods to the west. Unless that area is also considered to be part of the Wilderness (which I do not think it is, but I could be wrong), I don't understand why you keep claiming Burnside will attack Lee at the Wilderness. I can certainly be wrong as I am not an expert in this area, but I am having trouble understanding your claims.

Can is not equal to will, and as far as the guy himself, I'll remind you that this is the same Burnside who when his plan went awry led the worst-conducted battle on the US side of the war. This guy would not know where Hanover Junction is, much less how to get there. His plan was also built on the exact opposite of how the historical Battle of Fredericksburg was fought, so......

 

[Elfwine]

In fairness to Burnside, it must be noted that half the problem with "so where is Hanover Junction?" has nothing to do with being a dunderhead and everything to do with map quality.

Or a lack of it.

I think also Burnside is given a bit too little credit here, but its a matter of degree, not the issues involved - Burnside lacks either the willpower or the vision to handle the kind of situation Lee will throw at him (he knew it and told Lincoln he was unfit for command).

I don't have a good map handy so I'm going to ignore the Wilderness issue, but one thing that ought to be noted.

If, by some chance, Burnside steals a march on Lee, Lee will still have Stuart's cavalry searching for Burnside - so if not in the Wilderness the battle will be somewhere else between Fredericksburg and Richmond.

The ANV can outmarch the pre-Meade Army of the Potomac - or at least what the Army of the Potomac's commanders will ask of it, so...

I don't think this will be a worse disaster than Fredericksburg, but it won't be much better. Burnside is simply not the kind of general to coordinate an effective attack or respond well to Lee pulling a fast one - and Burnside is something of the Elmer Fudd of Union generals.

At least at this level. Seems to have been relatively competent at corps level and below (the initial plan for the Crater seems to have had some actual thought put into it - before Grant interfered and Burnside gave up even trying to deal with it).

Not necessarily all credit to Burnside, but even merely recognizing a subordinate has a good plan is not bad.

Still, Burnside should never have been given more than a division or small scale independent command.

Pity Meade is too junior. He had the steel and sense to deal with Lee. No Grant, Thomas, or the like - but good enough to face him.

 

[Blackfox5]

Yes, Burnside is a dunderhead and clearly outmatched by Lee. In all likelihood, he will be defeated at some point. How bad that defeat is certainly up to question, but it is possible that he might win even one battle before that happens. A lot depends on specifics.

Here is a link to a Wikipedia map of the Overland Campaign. Look at the Richmond-Fredericksburg Railroad. That should basically be the path Burnside will take. It's significantly far from the Wilderness.

Now here's a link to a Wikipedia map of the Fredericksburg Campaign. Look how far away Jackson is initially, and how far away even Longstreet is at the time Burnside first reached Falmouth on November 17.

IOTL, Burnside sat there from November 17 to December 11, giving Lee 3-4 weeks to set up forces. ITL, Burnside's forces first cross on November 17. Let's say it takes him two days to cross the entire army. So on either November 19 or 20 he can begin marching to Richmond.

IOTL, Longstreet was able to deploy his forces on Marye's Heights by November 23. Jackson only leaves his position in the Shenadoah on November 22 (anticipating Lee's order that was made only on November 26) to reach Fredericksburg on November 29 a full week later.

So let's look at what happens now. By the time Longstreet arrives (by himself), Burnside has 3-4 days of marching unopposed. How much can Burnside cover in those 3-4 days? It only took Grant 2 days to move from Spotsylvania Courthouse to the North Anna River. Given the winter and Burnside probably not moving as fast, that means Longstreet's Corps might be able to confront Burnside's entire army before he can cross the North Anna River. But that might be 35,000 troops against 120,000 men.

No matter how stupid Burnside is, it's hard to see Lee doing much with just Longstreet. Consensus by historians seems to be that even at Fredericksburg, when Longstreet had excellent defensive position at Marye's Heights, that Burnside could have won. Is there anywhere as good Lee could deploy Longstreet? I am not aware of any.

So what does Lee do? Attack Burnside? Or wait for Jackson who will probably not arrive for 5-6 more days (possibly longer as Burnside moves farther south each day)?

In the meantime, what does Burnside do? Does he ignore Lee's half an army and continue to Richmond? Or does he attempt to engage Longstreet's Corps and destroy him before Jackson arrives?

Burnside may be a dunderhead, but this is exactly what he planned to do. And this time, it is working. The morale of the Army of the Potomac is likely to high - they've outwitted Lee and are facing, at most, half his army. The way to Richmond is either clear or facing a force only 1/4 their size.

Burnside can still do something incredibly dumb, but if he only follows the plan he already devised and Lincoln approved, he should have Richmond. If he does engage Lee around the North Anna River, he has a fair chance at victory anyway. Only if he sits on his ass for a week will he face Lee's entire army, and he doesn't have the reason to do so at the North Anna River like he did in Fredericksburg. Will Lee even risk a possible engagement like this before Jackson arrives? How much faster can Jackson actually move his men (as I don't think he was phoning it in historically when he moved to Fredericksburg).

Even if Burnside is ultimately defeated, this should be interesting. Burnside has a very good chance of either seizing Richmond or defeating Lee in a minor battle, both of which would help erode the mythic statue Lee would eventually have and give the Union a much needed boost in confidence even if defeated later. If Richmond is seized, it's possible that the Union could hold it even if Burnside is defeated in a future battle. Burnside will probably be kept in command until he makes a blunder sometime later.

If Richmond falls, or if Longstreet's Corps is mauled a bit, what does Lee do next (with Jackson arriving, he is going to be aggressive especially if Longstreet's Corps had not been in battle)? Where does Davis relocate the government? What does he order Lee to do?

We all know Burnside is the living embodiment of the Peter Principle, but that doesn't change the facts on the ground with the POD being kept in mind. Simply saying "Burnside is a stoopidhead" doesn't explore the POD.

 

[Elfwine]

Burnside being a dunderhead probably means he fails to grasp the opportunity.

So back up from the "Richmond falls" a bit. Does Burnside know he's only facing part of the ANV?

This is very important.