Poll: Ottoman Italy?

Is an Ottoman Italy Possible?


  • Total voters
    170
Except that it didn't get easier. And that the Italian Wars are not the only possible source of conflict here.
Yes, attacking the Ottomans in southern Italy after someone else has just attacked and failed is easier than being the first to attack. That, and the Italian wars were very much the primary battlefield at the time, in fact there they were the only wars France fought in in the latter 1400s that weren't internal. Going somewhere else is, unlikely.


Which is why the rebuilt part is relevant.

I'm not going to say Lepanto was secretly an Ottoman victory - but if the goal was to hurt the Ottomans, I think the sultan has the last say.
I don't see where you get that the rebuild is relevant from me telling you they didn't use their navy for the rest of the war. Holding Cyprus is a matter of being stronger than a Venetian landing party, not being navally relevant.

It's a rather consistent pattern of success. This is not just Albania, Serbia, Bosnia, and the Byzantines.

Not requiring naval strength to subdue would mean more if Naples was a formidable naval power.
My point is that this pattern of success contains no nations generally thought of as strong. Pretty much the total opposite of strong in fact, they were all conquered or vassalized already, Byzantium being the exception. Naples, at least until the death of Ferdinand I, was a very strong country. If the Ottomans are going to take it, it is going to be far more difficult than anything they did in the Balkans.

Naples can and often did ally with more significant naval powers, and the worse their situation gets, the more likely others are to help.


Not really. The Ottomans can seize supplies from the locals - sure the locals won't like it, but its not as if they like it much more from their own rulers or from the OTL Christian rulers that battled over the area.

This doesn't cover everything, but it does make a dent in the tons of fodder and bread we're talking about. And levying citizens - I hope you mean for moving supplies and repairing walls and stuff, and not for cannon fodder.
Siezing supplies is difficult, and it is something that Naples' forces don't have to deal with. Not only that, but the area that you can sieze supplies from is very limited compared to the area you can import them from, and in times of war the tendancy was to gather the food and people behind fortifications. Realistically, any strategy that depends on foraging is a bad one, and the Ottoman military in this period was large enough to starve itself pretty quickly if their supply line is cut.

Repeat, conquered and vassalized. That is not comparable to say, the Habsburg situation another half century from now.

Using "Habsburg" instead of "Austria" because I'm looking at the nontotal control of Hungary, not the lack of taking Vienna.
You are right, Ottoman control of Wallachia was far looser. Hungary didn't decide its own foreign policy, have its own monarch, or drive the Austrians out of their land. Wallachia did all of these. In fact, conquered isn't even correct, the Ottomans controlled it by backing their preferred claimants, and pressuring climants they didn't like, with varrying degrees of success. Calling that conquest is really stretching it.

Or something else. They cared about fighting in southern Italy OTL because it was a desirable and reasonably accessible prize, in Ottoman hands that becomes considerably more problematic (Even if idealogically more desirable).
Being in Ottoman hands doesn't make it appreciably more difficult to take IMO, the Ottomans have other things to deal with and pretty much no local support. War with the Mamluks, Hungarians, Persian, or Moscow could easily draw the Ottoman military away, something that the Kingdom of Naples doesn't have to deal with. For a patient monarch Ottoman Naples should be easier to take than independant Naples, and that was certainly taken IOTL.

So, more idealogically desirable, and easier to take.

Neither of them are isolated. And papal endorsement doesn't necessarily mean what it used to (it doesn't necessarily mean what it used to in the olden days either).


Being recognized as a kingdom in your own right only goes as far as that means anything for the ruler. I'd rather not treat that as "Very much" if that ruler is like say Philip II (just as an example of a Christian king in the era of the Ottomans as a potential threat).

The jizya has to be compared to the taxes they pay otherwise. The kids forcibly drafted is certainly an issue, however.
Depends on the king. Some will look to hold Naples in a personal union, others will look to seperate it off for a younger son or other sympathetic candidate. Either way, they actually seemed quite alright with Spanish rule IOTL.

I don't know exactly how the Jizya compares to other taxes at the time, but being taxed differently based on your religion is an easy way to cause riots if the majority are on the losing end.


The Ottomans didn't spend very much time on it. And what I meant was is that just because - let's pick France because it has the longest tradition of contributing to crusades and because irony (OTL's alliance with the Ottomans is almost certainly not happening) - France's kings want to do something here doesn't mean they'll do well. The crusades launched against the Ottomans have a terrible track record - not a complete failure, but its far more believable that the Ottomans would win than their opponents given the trend.
I'll concede that the Ottomans didn't spend nearly the same level of time on it, but treating this like a crusade instead of an Italian war doesn't make a lot of sense to me. This wouldn't be a coalition of different nationalities marching through Ottoman territories with Orthodox Christian majorities, it would be a Kingdom trying to press claims on a territory that is as close to their own homeland as it is to that of the Ottomans.

A very low value on it or regard it as indefensible.

If Venice is losing men and ships at an alarming rate, its not likely to keep throwing them at the Ottomans no matter how valuable the colonies are - it loses them anyway, in this scenario.
They fought the Ottomans for centuries on and off IOTL, so I imagine they would fight similarly tooth and nail here, especially in the early period when their navy is still a match for the Ottomans. Later, when they are more dependant on foreign alliances to compete with the Ottomans they might give it up more easily, but it took them a long time IOTL to be convinced to give in, and I don't see that changing.


To put it mildly. The fact that neither the little states of the Balkans or the attempts at crusade have managed anything that threatened the Ottoman Empire or forced it on the defensive (yes, we have Belgrade as a loss a quarter century before Otranto - but that only saw the Ottomans go elsewhere, and not even as in focusing only on Asia Minor over trying the Balkans).
The difference of opinions comes from my belief that it is the unique situation they found themselves in, not the Ottomans themselves, that accounts for this rapid expansion. Being able to call 80,000 or more men against opponents who can scarcely raise 20,000 is pretty rare, and not something that the Ottomans can claim responsibility for, for instance.

How about the fact the Ottomans are a considerably more formidable military force than most European powers?

I don't disagree on Rome, but I do disagree that the history up to this point indicates that it would hurt the Ottomans as seriously as Christian Europe might want.
Again, I'm of the opinion that the Ottomans accomplished their success with higher casualties and more major defeats than justifies calling them an especially formidable force. Losing with ten times the men of your opponents is rare, but they did it three times in Albania, lost to a force a fifth their size in Wallachia on multiple occasions, and the Hungarians, their great rivals, clocked in at between a quarter and a half of their forces at Belgrade.

No idea what the response would be on Rome exactly, but it likely depends allot on who the pope is and what his relationships with the current leading monarchs are. Not sure if this is a disagreement exactly, but I do think that any chance of further Ottoman expansion going unnoticed and unopposed are gone if they take Rome. They just look to threatening after that.
 
I don't see where you get that the rebuild is relevant from me telling you they didn't use their navy for the rest of the war.

Yes, they did. The "Ottoman Navy was an empty shell after Lepanto" is pretty much a myth born by a selective reading of events. For example, there were no major naval commitments in the war by EITHER side after the battle, so insisting that this is proof that the Ottomans were finished as a naval power would suggest that Spain and Venice were also finished. In fact, towards the end of the war the Ottoman Navy transported troops to Tunis, something supporters of the myth like to brush under the carpet. (I've actually read someone stating that transporting troops doesn't count as a naval action.)

What severely weakened the Ottoman Navy in the long run was a long and costly war with Persia that diverted funds away from it. While Lepanto undoubtedly had an effect--bringing an end to the composite archers they'd used as their primary naval weapon, for example--it was not the grand end of the Turks as a sea power that has entered the common knowledge.
 

Deleted member 67076

Could a joint French Ottoman Invasion of Italy happen?
 
We seem to be talking about an invasion around 1500, so before the Reformation and the split to Protistantism so religion is not an issue in Europe (at least not overtly).

If the Ottomans could land a fleet in Italy they would face a unitied Western Europe with France and Spain at the for front , but support from the HRE and even the northern Euopean states (such as England, Norway etc.).

The Pope is bound to call a Crusade so he can retake Rome.

One interesting point is would this shake up the church enough that Martin Luther won't need to nail his proclamation onto the cathedral door?
 
Yes, they did. The "Ottoman Navy was an empty shell after Lepanto" is pretty much a myth born by a selective reading of events. For example, there were no major naval commitments in the war by EITHER side after the battle, so insisting that this is proof that the Ottomans were finished as a naval power would suggest that Spain and Venice were also finished. In fact, towards the end of the war the Ottoman Navy transported troops to Tunis, something supporters of the myth like to brush under the carpet. (I've actually read someone stating that transporting troops doesn't count as a naval action.)

What severely weakened the Ottoman Navy in the long run was a long and costly war with Persia that diverted funds away from it. While Lepanto undoubtedly had an effect--bringing an end to the composite archers they'd used as their primary naval weapon, for example--it was not the grand end of the Turks as a sea power that has entered the common knowledge.
I am not propagating said myth, I am saying that the conquest of Cyprus does not prove that the Ottoman navy was strong after Lepanto, because it took place before Lepanto. If you have evidence (like the bit about transporting troops to Tunis) then that's fine, but Cyprus is in no way an indicator of Ottoman naval power after Lepanto.

Have you any more detail (or an article on the matter) on the Tunis action? I do consider it to be relevant, but just how great an indicator it is is something I feel I need more info to understand, and as I stated earlier my knowledge about the Ottomans centers around the latter 1400s.
 
Yes, attacking the Ottomans in southern Italy after someone else has just attacked and failed is easier than being the first to attack. That, and the Italian wars were very much the primary battlefield at the time, in fact there they were the only wars France fought in in the latter 1400s that weren't internal. Going somewhere else is, unlikely.
And facing the Ottomans is much harder than facing the Neapolitans.

I don't see where you get that the rebuild is relevant from me telling you they didn't use their navy for the rest of the war. Holding Cyprus is a matter of being stronger than a Venetian landing party, not being navally relevant.

Being able to hold an island does take a certain amount of naval power.

My point is that this pattern of success contains no nations generally thought of as strong. Pretty much the total opposite of strong in fact, they were all conquered or vassalized already, Byzantium being the exception. Naples, at least until the death of Ferdinand I, was a very strong country. If the Ottomans are going to take it, it is going to be far more difficult than anything they did in the Balkans.

A very strong country according to what?

And this pattern of success does not need any especially mighty nations - a nation that wasn't very strong wouldn't manage this and wouldn't manage to handle having things like the crusades thrown at it (more later in this post).

Naples can and often did ally with more significant naval powers, and the worse their situation gets, the more likely others are to help.

If those others feel that helping is worthwhile.

Siezing supplies is difficult, and it is something that Naples' forces don't have to deal with. Not only that, but the area that you can sieze supplies from is very limited compared to the area you can import them from, and in times of war the tendancy was to gather the food and people behind fortifications. Realistically, any strategy that depends on foraging is a bad one, and the Ottoman military in this period was large enough to starve itself pretty quickly if their supply line is cut.

Not very difficult, as numerous armies would testify. Not ideal, but not impossible.

You are right, Ottoman control of Wallachia was far looser. Hungary didn't decide its own foreign policy, have its own monarch, or drive the Austrians out of their land. Wallachia did all of these. In fact, conquered isn't even correct, the Ottomans controlled it by backing their preferred claimants, and pressuring climants they didn't like, with varrying degrees of success. Calling that conquest is really stretching it.

Wallachia may have had periods of trying to do that, but I'm missing any sign of that being the norm between ~1480 and the Ottomans being driven back.

And I think the hospodars go rather beyond backing their preferred candidates.

Being in Ottoman hands doesn't make it appreciably more difficult to take

Other than the tiny detail that the Ottoman military is an effective force. Even if it can't focus everything on Naples, I'd still trust in the Janissaries over the average European foot soldier.

IMO, the Ottomans have other things to deal with and pretty much no local support. War with the Mamluks, Hungarians, Persian, or Moscow could easily draw the Ottoman military away, something that the Kingdom of Naples doesn't have to deal with. For a patient monarch Ottoman Naples should be easier to take than independant Naples, and that was certainly taken IOTL.

So, more idealogically desirable, and easier to take.

So, the Ottomans station a garrison there while the bulk of the army is elsewhere. This brings us to the above question of quality.

As for local support, I don't see much local support for the OTL French invasion.

Depends on the king. Some will look to hold Naples in a personal union, others will look to seperate it off for a younger son or other sympathetic candidate. Either way, they actually seemed quite alright with Spanish rule IOTL.

Probably comparable to other areas ruled by a greater power (heck even the native rulers are only relatively native by this point so far as Naples goes - among other places, but Denmark's German kings is a different sort of issue).
I don't know exactly how the Jizya compares to other taxes at the time, but being taxed differently based on your religion is an easy way to cause riots if the majority are on the losing end.

So, why are we seeing so few of those in the Christian areas the Ottomans did rule OTL?

I'll concede that the Ottomans didn't spend nearly the same level of time on it, but treating this like a crusade instead of an Italian war doesn't make a lot of sense to me. This wouldn't be a coalition of different nationalities marching through Ottoman territories with Orthodox Christian majorities, it would be a Kingdom trying to press claims on a territory that is as close to their own homeland as it is to that of the Ottomans.
Because if we're treating it as an Italian war, that definitely means bickering, politics, and people allying with the Ottomans for their own purposes. Including see (let's pick France still) the French as an invading foreigner no more welcome than the other invading foreigner.

And I'm not entirely sure about the closeness issue, though I think we need to answer where we're measuring to for that to mean anything (Naples is a lot closer to the Balkans than the Iberian peninsula, but not necessarily so than Anatolia).

They fought the Ottomans for centuries on and off IOTL, so I imagine they would fight similarly tooth and nail here, especially in the early period when their navy is still a match for the Ottomans. Later, when they are more dependant on foreign alliances to compete with the Ottomans they might give it up more easily, but it took them a long time IOTL to be convinced to give in, and I don't see that changing.

"on and off" being the key phrase.

The difference of opinions comes from my belief that it is the unique situation they found themselves in, not the Ottomans themselves, that accounts for this rapid expansion. Being able to call 80,000 or more men against opponents who can scarcely raise 20,000 is pretty rare, and not something that the Ottomans can claim responsibility for, for instance.

So the Ottomans can't claim responsibility for creating a state able to raise and support such forces.

Yes, they started in a favorable situation for SOMEONE doing that, but they were that someone (far from a given when we first hear of Osman), and they maintained that something - which took more than just some random ghazi borderling getting lucky, even if you argue that Osman himself was that.

Again, I'm of the opinion that the Ottomans accomplished their success with higher casualties and more major defeats than justifies calling them an especially formidable force. Losing with ten times the men of your opponents is rare, but they did it three times in Albania, lost to a force a fifth their size in Wallachia on multiple occasions, and the Hungarians, their great rivals, clocked in at between a quarter and a half of their forces at Belgrade.
I'd give a great deal to see the source for those casualties. (I'm sure its recorded, I'm just not convinced of the people writing of how they had repulsed the Ottomans would know the facts if they bit them on the ass).

But however heavy their losses, they clearly were far from crippling - which one would think someone regularly suffering major defeats or Pyrrhic victories would feel.
No idea what the response would be on Rome exactly, but it likely depends allot on who the pope is and what his relationships with the current leading monarchs are. Not sure if this is a disagreement exactly, but I do think that any chance of further Ottoman expansion going unnoticed and unopposed are gone if they take Rome. They just look to threatening after that.
Yeah, at that point we run into "It might be possible in the sense it isn't violating physics or even logistics, but no one will let it happen."

Naples is one thing (bad enough or not being a good question), but "all Italy" is too much.
 
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