Poland in the Axis

WI instead of the Robentrop-Molotov Pact, Germany secretly negotiates with Poland the return of the territories lost after WWI in the East to the newly created country? In exchange Germany would allow and support the Polish annexation of Lithuania (Poland and some territorial claims on Lithuania at the time). This way Poland would be compensated for the territories returned to Germany on its Western border and obtain a much more secure exit to the Baltic Sea.

So let’s assume that on the 23.08.1939, instead of OTL MR-Pact, it is signed in Warsaw an agreement between Germany and Poland containing the following main bullets:
- Return of Danzig, the corridor, and the more heavily german-etnic populated areas of West Prussia and Posen to Germany;
- A population exchange program on the swapped territories (Germans in Polish territory to settle on the German side of the border and vice versa);
- German acquiescence and support (diplomatic mostly) to the Polish annexation of Lithuania (As compensation for the territories lost to Germany);
- Polish entrance to the Axis – thus military alliance with Germany;
- German acceptance of moving the Eastern Polish border further to the East following a successful war against the SU (As compensation for Polish entrance to the Axis and participation in the invasion of the SU).
- Several economical e military cooperation measures, specially aiming to update the Polish military and, thus, preparing it for the future conflict against the SU.

On the 24.08.1939 Poland issues an ultimatum to Lithuania to deliver the claimed territories (Vilnius area mainly) and starts mobilizing its military.

Thoughts? What kind of POD could make this feasible? What reaction would come from the WA? And from the SU?
 
A German-Polish axis would be anti-Soviet in the first place. How would they agree on dividing up the Soviet lands?
 
WI instead of the Robentrop-Molotov Pact, Germany secretly negotiates with Poland the return of the territories lost after WWI in the East to the newly created country? In exchange Germany would allow and support the Polish annexation of Lithuania (Poland and some territorial claims on Lithuania at the time). This way Poland would be compensated for the territories returned to Germany on its Western border and obtain a much more secure exit to the Baltic Sea.

So let’s assume that on the 23.08.1939, instead of OTL MR-Pact, it is signed in Warsaw an agreement between Germany and Poland containing the following main bullets:
- Return of Danzig, the corridor, and the more heavily german-etnic populated areas of West Prussia and Posen to Germany;
- A population exchange program on the swapped territories (Germans in Polish territory to settle on the German side of the border and vice versa);
- German acquiescence and support (diplomatic mostly) to the Polish annexation of Lithuania (As compensation for the territories lost to Germany);
- Polish entrance to the Axis – thus military alliance with Germany;
- German acceptance of moving the Eastern Polish border further to the East following a successful war against the SU (As compensation for Polish entrance to the Axis and participation in the invasion of the SU).
- Several economical e military cooperation measures, specially aiming to update the Polish military and, thus, preparing it for the future conflict against the SU.

On the 24.08.1939 Poland issues an ultimatum to Lithuania to deliver the claimed territories (Vilnius area mainly) and starts mobilizing its military.

Thoughts? What kind of POD could make this feasible? What reaction would come from the WA? And from the SU?


Poland did not have territorial claims on Lithuania, it was the opposite. Nothing could have replaced the Corridor in terms of access to the sea (with the exception of Danzig itself), and certainly not Lithuania. The Corridor and Posen were by no means 'heavily populated with Germans', their number was no more then 10% of the total population. Poland would only have entered an alliance of this sort with Germany if it had no other choice, i.e. the British and French declared that they would no go to Poland's aid in the event of a German attack. Poland did not need any of the USSR's territories, and would have gotten indigestion because of the Ukrainian and Belorussian populations.
 
ASB with a Nazi regime in power, ASB with an army/nationlist/conservative regime too.

Frankly a large number of non-Nazi Germans hated the very fact that Poland exisited much more so than the Soviets.
 
After its successful war against the infant Soviet regime in 1920, Poland wasn't very aggressive in demanding even more Ukrainian and Byelorussian territory. IIRC correctly Pilsudski wanted to go for more territory, but more nationalistic Poles didn't as it risked watering down the Polish element in the new state even more than it was.
At their last meeting, in January 1939 Hitler did compliment Polish foreign minister Beck, saying that every Polish division stationed on its eastern border with the Soviets meant one less division that Germany had to dedicate for its own defense against the Soviets. I've often wondered about Poland being a giant version of Slovakia or Croatia to the Germans, i.e. a helpful slavic German ally in the war.
 

abc123

Banned
I've often wondered about Poland being a giant version of Slovakia or Croatia to the Germans, i.e. a helpful slavic German ally in the war.

Trouble with that is that Lebensraum is impossible without Poland, and Lebensraum ( together with racism as justification for taking others territories ) was one of the most important points of Nazi plans.
Lebensraum can easily exist without Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia or Bulgary, but it can't without Poland.;)
 
Trouble with that is that Lebensraum is impossible without Poland, and Lebensraum ( together with racism as justification for taking others territories ) was one of the most important points of Nazi plans.
Lebensraum can easily exist without Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia or Bulgary, but it can't without Poland.;)

Why not? There's lots of room on the other side.
 
WI instead of the Robentrop-Molotov Pact, Germany secretly negotiates with Poland the return of the territories lost after WWI in the East to the newly created country?

Poland would NEVER give any land to Germany. Let alone their only seaport. I am seriously sick of these threads that assume that the Poles couldn't see the transparent aggression in German-Polish threads. Poland hated, well, everyone that shared a border with them.
 
Originally posted by ruisramos
On the 24.08.1939 Poland issues an ultimatum to Lithuania to deliver the claimed territories (Vilnius area mainly) and starts mobilizing its military.

At the time Vilnius area already belonged to Poland. Besides Poland wouldn't have needed any help in defeating Lithuania. Poles bullied Lithuanians into renewing diplomatic relations in 1938, but after that they were not interested in any part of Lithuanian territory, AFAIK.

Return of Danzig, the corridor, and the more heavily german-etnic populated areas of West Prussia and Posen to Germany;

Absolutely out of the question. Danzig possibly, with some Germans guarantees concerning of Polish commerce going through the port, but even that very grudgingly. The rest is impossible - that would have meant giving up most developed Polish provinces in which Germans were actually a minority.

Several economical e military cooperation measures, specially aiming to update the Polish military and, thus, preparing it for the future conflict against the SU.

Uh, I'm not sure if Germany was actually capable of such help - their economy was already in trouble with too rapid rearmament of their own country. Also Poles actually had most of the advanced technology and equipment, they were only unable to produce it in necessary numbers - they were just starting their own military upgrading program.

And another fact. After occupation of Czechoslovakia despite German assurances in Munich, nobody trusted Hitler's word anymore.
 

Cook

Banned
- Return of Danzig, the corridor, and the more heavily german-etnic populated areas...
Others have said it already; there was no possibility of the Poles willingly relinquishing the territories to Germany, or of giving up their rights in Danzig, but that does not rule out an alliance.

Hitler was an Austrian; unlike the Prussian politicians that had dominated the Weimer Republic he was indifferent to the loss of the provinces of Posen and Polish Pomerania (i.e. the Corridor) at the end of World War One. It didn’t even rate a mention in Mein Kampf, whereas reclaiming the South Tyrol (lost to Italy in 1918), takes up most of a chapter of his political opus; he went so far as to declare that any German willing to give up the sacred German territory of the South Tyrol was a traitor to the German race deserving to be shot. Despite this he happily abandoned the Germans of the South Tyrol in order to win an alliance with Mussolini.

It is ironic that the Nazis fabricated stories of Germans being persecuted in the Sudetenland and later in Posen and Pomerania in order to justify attacking Czechoslovakia and Poland while ignoring the ethnic Germans of the South Tyrol who really were being persecuted by Rome.

While Hitler wanted good relations with Poland there was no mention of ‘the corridor’ or of Danzig; his first act of foreign policy was to sign a non-aggression pact with Poland and agreeing to freeze their common border for a period of ten years. He also ended a tariff war with the Poles that while hardly effecting Germany at all had been highly damaging to Poland. This cost him some popularity domestically and he readily defended his actions in speech after speech to the Reichstag on the matter, all because it was more valuable to him to lever Poland away from the French and have them as a (hopefully friendly) buffer between him and the Soviet Union. In early 1938 Count Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, noted in his diary that ‘The Polish Corridor is accepted for an indefinite period by Germany , which actually desires to see the power of Poland increased as a means of strengthening the anti-Bolshevik barrier.’

Later when he concluded that Poland was not going to become a full-fledged ally he manufactured claims to the corridor and to Danzig but, as he explained to his generals, they were never the issue; he just required something to justify the invasion of Poland that he had already decided on. So if instead of turning against the Poles he had persisted with efforts at an alliance there would have been no mention of changes of territory.

There is a far more serious obstacle to any alliance between Berlin and Warsaw than a couple of Polish provinces: Ribbentrop. The Number One Parrot of Germany (as Goering liked to refer to him) was a truly inept and dim-witted individual who should never have been appointed Reich Foreign Minister. He was considered by almost everyone who met him as being extremely vain and stupid; Mussolini told his son-in-law Ciano that ‘you only have to look at his head to see that he has a very small brain.’ A skilled foreign minister will seek to achieve his government’s objectives by assessing the requirements of his opposite number and finding common ground, being prepared to give up on some negotiating points where necessary. Ribbentrop did none of this; he simply stated what he wanted, not as a basis for negotiations but as the endpoint. For an alliance with Poland it is really necessary to prevent Ribbentrop from becoming foreign minister, keeping Constantine Neurath in the foreign office and leaving Ribbentrop with his party bureau instead.

Even without a loss of territory and without Ribbentrop in the F.O, the Poles would not have willingly joined an alliance with Germany; they’d been invited to join the Anti-Comintern Pact when it was founded in 1936 and had declined. The Poles wanted to be considered a major power and pursued their own ‘third way’ accordingly and to be fair, Poland was the big fish in the small pond of Eastern Europe for more than ten years following World War One. They Polish government tried to maintain an equal distance between Berlin and Moscow; entering into non-aggression pacts with both. The only way the Poles would have entered into an alliance with Germany is if they were forced to do so by pressure from the Soviet Union, much as Rumania was.

So a scenario does present itself and Lithuania does play a part, but in 1938 rather than 1939 and based on the existing dispute between the two states rather than any further Polish territorial ambitions.

In 1920 the Poles had invaded Lithuania and captured Vilnius, Wilno to the Poles. For the next eighteen years the two states had no diplomatic relations, no direct rail, telephone or telegraph lines and even mail traffic between the two countries had to go via a neutral third country and be repackaged before being sent on to its destination. In March 1938 the Polish government decided to end this dispute.

On 17 March 1938 an envoy from the Polish government delivered an ultimatum to the Lithuanian government. The ultimatum gave Lithuania 48 hours to recognise Polish territorial claims and establish diplomatic relations. To back up their words the Polish army mobilised four divisions on the border with Lithuania. To make things worse, the German ambassador delivered a message that in the event of hostilities between Poland and Lithuania, Hitler would be obliged to protect the Germans of Memel; Lithuania would be facing not just an attack from the south by the Poles, but a simultaneous attack from the west by the Germans as well.

Most of the rest of Europe, distracted by the German Anschluss of Austria that had taken place a few days before, took little interest in events transpiring on the Baltic coast. The exception was Moscow; the Soviet Union informed the Lithuanians that they would back them and warned Warsaw that an attack on Lithuania would be considered a violation of the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact. But relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union were strained, the Lithuanians not trusting Soviet true intentions. The Lithuanian government, faced with the prospect of attack by its two powerful neighbours and the only offers of help coming from a country that it did not share a border with and did not trust, backed down; the Polish threats, in defiance of Soviet warnings, had worked.

If that wasn’t bad enough, the Poles did the same thing six months later. In September, in concert with German demands on the Sudetenland, the Poles demanded that Czechoslovakia hand over the Teschen region and once again mobilised troops. Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov called in the Polish ambassador and informed him that they were, once again, threatening the non-aggression pact between them. Here the Poles were clearly ignoring Soviet threats, confident that there would be no consequences and by and large there were none; the Soviets had been diplomatically frozen out of Europe by the Munich conference and aside from Soviet newspapers denouncing the Poles as ‘Hitler’s attack dogs’ nothing happened.

That the Soviet Union did not take any action, not even recalling their ambassador from Warsaw for consultations, is rather surprising because this had resulted in a serious loss of prestige by the Soviet Union. At the time, with Maxim Litvinov as Foreign Commissar, the Soviet Union was fully committed to the international order, the League of Nations and the Collective Defence that it had been founded on. Here was Poland, threatening one neighbour and taking part in the invasion of another (and not just any other, a Soviet ally) and all in defiance of Soviet threats! A great power whose warnings were ignored ceased to be a great power; Stalin knew that better than anyone so his lack of action is incredible.

So here is a potential alternative:

Following the Polish army’s occupation of the Teschen region in October in defiance of Soviet warnings, Commissar Litvinov called in the Polish ambassador and informed him that by their actions, the Poles had violated the non-aggression pact between them. Therefore Poland ‘should consider the pact at an end’. The Soviet ambassador to Warsaw would also be recalled ‘for consultations’; the Soviet Union was breaking off relations with Poland. Reports started to come in of Red Army troop increases on the Polish – Soviet border.

Reich foreign minister Neurath seized the opportunity presented by this breach in relations between the neighbouring states. In discussions with the Polish ambassador, Jozef Lipski, Neurath expressed his Fuhrer’s desire for closer relations between Berlin and Warsaw, especially in the wake of the undisguised threats from the Soviet Union, and was keen on a direct, face to face meeting with his Polish opposite number. He was even prepared to travel to Warsaw to achieve it. This would be only Hitler’s second visit to a foreign capital as head of state, the other being his highly successful visit to Rome in May where, along with cementing the relationship between the two fascist powers, Hitler had given up all claims to the South Tyrol. Lipski, highly excited at the prospects of such a visit, passed on the message to foreign minister Beck, along with a strong recommendation that the Polish government accept the offer.

Jozef Beck was keen on the idea; a state visit by the leader fast becoming the most powerful man in Europe carried with it a huge amount of prestige. Finally Poland was going to be accorded the recognition it deserved, not by the French or British, but by Germany. It would also be very popular domestically; the occupation of the Teschen had been greeted with cries of ‘long live Hitler’ in the streets of Warsaw. But such a visit also carried the potential to go very badly set back Polish – German relations; in a series of meetings between Beck and Neurath the two foreign ministers sought to hammer out exactly what would be covered in Hitler’s visit, what would be discussed and resolved and, just as importantly, what would not be discussed.

It was agreed that Hitler’s state visit to Warsaw would see a re-signing of the German – Polish non-aggression pact; extending it out from the five years that it still had before it expired, to twenty-five years. Such an agreement was a major coup for Beck; it guaranteed Poland’s borders not just the current German ruler, but his foreseeable successors as well. Neurath put it to his Polish counterpart as ‘a Locarno Treaty of the East’; the French signing of the Locarno Treaty in 1925, securing Germany’s western borders without committing to a similar agreement on Germany’s eastern borders had led to a falling out between the two allies.

Neurath had also cautiously proposed the establishment of an extra-territorial road and rail link across Polish territory south of Danzig between East Prussia and the rest of Germany. Beck had rejected the extra-territoriality nature of the link because it had the clear potential to undermine Polish sovereignty, instead proposing a rail link be built specifically for German traffic, and that such traffic would not be subject to Polish tariffs, provided that the trains were sealed for the duration of their transit of Polish territory, a nominal fee per carriage or box car would of course be paid, to go towards the maintenance of the rail line.

Poland would also sign the Anti-Comintern Pact. The malevolent nature of the Bolshevik regime could no-longer be safely ignored. The pact committed the signatories only to consult on measures ‘to safeguard their common interests’ and was directed only at the Soviet Union; as far as the Poles were concerned at least it didn’t impinge on the (currently suspended) Franco-Polish alliance of 1921. The Locarno treaty may have led to the 1921 treaty being suspended, but the Poles wanted to keep all options open.

There remained only the issue of Danzig*. Neurath explained that the Fuhrer was keen to see the League of Nations high commissioner depart and Danzig return to Germany. Beck was adamant and firm, any encroachment on Polish rights within the Free State would mean war. It was a situation that threatened to unravel all of their efforts and kill off any hopes of improved relations, but it was hardly something that wasn’t anticipated; the Poles had been saying the same thing for twenty years, only an idiot would not have been prepared for it: “Herr Minister, what we are proposing isn’t a great change. After all, a swastika already flies over Danzig.”

Neurath was absolutely correct; Danzig was not just a thoroughly German city, it was also a thoroughly National Socialist city as well. The Nazi party had controlled Danzig’s government since June 1933, only six months less than they had ruled Germany itself and the State President of Danzig also had the rank of gauleiter. Nazi rule in Danzig was hardly less severe than in Germany proper: the Prussian state Gestapo operated freely within the territory.

*There also remained the other, darker issue that both united and divided the two regimes: the Jews.

The 2nd of February 1939 saw what comedians labelled ‘the German invasion of Poland’. Three trains, each powered by two locomotives, pulled into the central station in Warsaw. On board were more than six hundred officials and their wives, more even than had accompanied the Fuhrer to Rome the year before; Berlin had pulled out all the stops in their efforts to impress on their Polish hosts just how important they considered the visit.

When the Fuhrer stepped off the train he was greeted Polish President Moscicki and by Marshal Rydz-Smigly, the de facto head of government who lead him past the Polish honour guard. Accompanying Hitler was Reichmarshal Goering, and in the following days both Hitler and their Polish hosts would praise the efforts of Goering in helping to bring about the visit and the agreements that were to be signed. In reality Neurath had done the hard work, Goering had just kept Beck happy with numerous hunting visits to Carinhall. But Goering was the Nazi party’s rock star so Goering got the credit; Neurath was just a bureaucratic functionary, a relic from the pre-Nazi days. The state visit entailed a series of balls, banquets, military reviews and parades. It wasn’t quite Rome in May, but the Poles still laid on quite a show before the players got down to the real business of the visit.

The treaties that were signed in Warsaw fall into two groups, those that were public, and the other, unpublished agreements. Publicly the non-aggression pact was renewed for a further twenty-five years. There was also the Anti-Comintern Pact, solemnly signed by the Poles in Warsaw and duly condemned in Moscow.

Then there was the agreement that had threatened to derail the very elaborate trains before they’d pulled out of the station in Berlin: the Danzig Lease. Danzig sovereignty would nominally be resumed by the Third Reich, but would be leased to Poland of the next 100 years for trade purposes. The League of Nations High Commissioner would depart. The city would enjoy internal self-government (which in reality meant rule from Berlin) from Poland, but would be part of Poland’s customs zone. It would remain demilitarized, Germany undertaking not to move any armed forces into the city.

There were also trade agreements, most notably Poland would supply Germany with oil from its fields in return for tanks and other military equipment.

Then there were the secret agreement: Both parties recognised that the other had interests in Lithuania and undertook not to change the status of Lithuania without consultation with the other party and not to the detriment of the other party. Both parties acknowledged the other had an interest in the future of Slovakia, and would likewise consult.

It was a momentous moment diplomatically and as President Moscicki said in his speech following the signing ‘it stood to guarantee the future peace and prosperity, not just of Poland and Germany, but of all of Central Europe.’

As the Fuhrer stepped back from the broad oak table where he’d just signed the treaty documents, he turned his back to the watching crowd of Polish dignitaries and international journalists and towards the German delegation. Of the Germans, only Goering caught Hitler's sly smile and wink…
 
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sharlin

Banned
Wouldn't you also need a massive shift in the Germans way of thinking towards the Poles, you'll have to get rid of the nationalism and hatred towards the Poles somehow first for the poles to not go 'Okay so you HATE us, your leader has repeatedly stated that OUR land should be returned to you. I'm sure this won't have any bad consiquences, lets be friends!'
 

Cook

Banned
Wouldn't you also need a massive shift in the Germans way of thinking towards the Poles, you'll have to get rid of the nationalism and hatred towards the Poles somehow first for the poles to not go 'Okay so you HATE us, your leader has repeatedly stated that OUR land should be returned to you. I'm sure this won't have any bad consiquences, lets be friends!'
No, because prior to the start of 1939, he didn’t. In fact, Hitler repeatedly praised both the Poles and their former leader, Marshal Pilsudski. In no less than five separate speeches to the Reichstag Hitler singled out Marshal Pilsudski as someone that the Germans could honourably negotiate with, and in those same speeches acknowledged the Polish right to access to the sea.
 
The only way this would work is if the Poles saw the Soviet as a bigger threat and allied with the Germans to protect themselves.
 

sharlin

Banned
And baring in mind this is Nazi germany and they had a sterling record when it came to treaties and listening to the wishes of other nations at the time.
 
Another possible way of getting Poland into the Axis occurred to me. France manages to wiggle out of its obligations to Poland. The Poles try to hold out, hoping that its allies might reconsider, but once Stalin attacks it becomes clear that all hope must be abandoned. Poland surrenders to Germany. Hitler accepts the surrender and grabs Danzig, and probably more depending on whatever is going on inside his head at the time, leaving a rump Polish state which joins the Axis.


A very good post.

And baring in mind this is Nazi germany and they had a sterling record when it came to treaties and listening to the wishes of other nations at the time.

Before they broke the treaty of Munich their record wasn't that bad, was it?
 

Cook

Banned
And baring in mind this is Nazi germany and they had a sterling record when it came to treaties and listening to the wishes of other nations at the time.
The OP’s proposal was to get Poland into the Axis alliance, beyond that is open to discussion. But since we are considering it, when it comes to his allies, Hitler demonstrated about the same level of reliability as any of the other powers at the time. No-one could argue that Britain and France enjoyed much creditability as reliable allies after Munich.
 
I think that's doable. There are two more issues that need to be ironed out during the negotiations:
- What about the Westerplatte? Does Poland retain symbolic military presence in Danzig or is it entirelly demilitarized?
- What about the income from the cross-corridor tariffs? IIRC that constituted significant percentage of Polish budget.
 

Cook

Banned
There are two more issues that need to be ironed out during the negotiations:
- What about the Westerplatte? Does Poland retain symbolic military presence in Danzig or is it entirelly demilitarized?
- What about the income from the cross-corridor tariffs? IIRC that constituted significant percentage of Polish budget.
My thinking was that the de facto situation as it existed in early 1938 would be formalised with the withdrawl of the LoN High Commisioner.
I’ve got a mental block and can’t remember the correct term for such shared sovereignty. Hopefully it’ll come to me tomorrow.
 
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