Stalin seemed to have a need for the USSR to include everything that had been part of the Russian Empire so supposing in 1945 the Polish state once again became part of the 'Russian' Empire. I assume a directly Soviet Poland will have the same western border but it's eastern one might be a little bigger including all of East Prussia and Lwow (Lviv), the Soviets did brutally dominate Poland anyway in otl but here as a direct part of the USSR things might be even worse. What would Poland have been like as an SSR? How much would the inclusion of Poland have changed things?
Poland as an SSR
- Thread starter Zelda
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Napoleonrules
Banned
Stalin was only able to get Poland's western border moved west into majority German populated areas only because he took eastern Poland lands that were dominated by White Russians (Belarussians, not to befused with White as in Republican during the civil war in 1917). In an ATL where he outright annexes pre-war Poland no way does the West, which still recognizes the Poland govt-in-exile located in London, allow Stalin to give part of the Soviet German sphere in Germany to Poland. East Germany ends up bigger. Poland's govt in exile remains in London. Warsaw Pact probably takes the name of a different city where the treaty takes places. Budapest Pact. Poland may not get Solidarity and be a model for 1989-1991. Could theoretically delay for a few years. Does this mean that the internet is delayed dur to national security as the Cold War could be extended and hotter?
First of all, even in 1920 (when the Bolsheviks were anticipating victory over Poland), Stalin insisted that Poland be an at least nominally independent soviet republic. As Robert Service notes in his *Stalin: A Biography* (pp. 179-80) this
question was being debated in the summer of 1920--not only for Poland but for Germany as well--by Lenin and Stalin:
"Stalin and Lenin also undertook preliminary planning for the kind of Europe they expected to organise when socialist seizures of power took place. Their grandiose visions take the breath away. Before the Second Comintern Congress, Lenin urged the need for a general federation including Germany, and he made clear that he wanted the economy of such a federation to be 'administered from a single organ.' Stalin rejected this as impractical:
'If you think you'd ever get Germany to enter a federation with the same rights as Ukraine, you are mistaken. If you think that even Poland, which has been constituted as a bourgeois state with all its attributes, would enter the Union with the same rights as Ukraine you are mistaken.'
"Lenin was angry. The implications of Stalin's comment was that considerations of national pride would impel Russia and Germany to remain separate states for the foreseeable future. Lenin sent him a 'threatening letter' which charged him with chauvinism. It was Lenin's objective to set up a Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia. His vision of 'European socialist revolution' was unchanged since 1917. But Stalin held his ground. The Politburo had to acknowledge the realities of nationhood if the spread of socialism in Europe was to be a success.
"These discussions were hypothetical since the Red Army had not yet reached Poland, far less set up a revolutionary government in Warsaw..."
In 1945, incorporating Poland into the USSR made even less sense. Why alienate so many Poles this way (granted most Poles would oppose a communist-dominated government in any event, but even left-wing Poles otherwise open to such a government would be violently opposed to the loss of independence) when you had a secure "loyal" government with the trappings of independence? Also, it would make relations with the West even worse, deprive the Soviet bloc of another UN seat (the West was reluctant enough to give the USSR three UN seats; they would not give it a fourth), etc.
And btw, Stalin did not try to create a Finnish SSR--even the Finnish Democratic Republic of 1939-40 was nominally independent--even though Finland had been under the Tsar...
question was being debated in the summer of 1920--not only for Poland but for Germany as well--by Lenin and Stalin:
"Stalin and Lenin also undertook preliminary planning for the kind of Europe they expected to organise when socialist seizures of power took place. Their grandiose visions take the breath away. Before the Second Comintern Congress, Lenin urged the need for a general federation including Germany, and he made clear that he wanted the economy of such a federation to be 'administered from a single organ.' Stalin rejected this as impractical:
'If you think you'd ever get Germany to enter a federation with the same rights as Ukraine, you are mistaken. If you think that even Poland, which has been constituted as a bourgeois state with all its attributes, would enter the Union with the same rights as Ukraine you are mistaken.'
"Lenin was angry. The implications of Stalin's comment was that considerations of national pride would impel Russia and Germany to remain separate states for the foreseeable future. Lenin sent him a 'threatening letter' which charged him with chauvinism. It was Lenin's objective to set up a Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia. His vision of 'European socialist revolution' was unchanged since 1917. But Stalin held his ground. The Politburo had to acknowledge the realities of nationhood if the spread of socialism in Europe was to be a success.
"These discussions were hypothetical since the Red Army had not yet reached Poland, far less set up a revolutionary government in Warsaw..."
In 1945, incorporating Poland into the USSR made even less sense. Why alienate so many Poles this way (granted most Poles would oppose a communist-dominated government in any event, but even left-wing Poles otherwise open to such a government would be violently opposed to the loss of independence) when you had a secure "loyal" government with the trappings of independence? Also, it would make relations with the West even worse, deprive the Soviet bloc of another UN seat (the West was reluctant enough to give the USSR three UN seats; they would not give it a fourth), etc.
And btw, Stalin did not try to create a Finnish SSR--even the Finnish Democratic Republic of 1939-40 was nominally independent--even though Finland had been under the Tsar...
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Napoleonrules
Banned
Thank for explaining why OTL ended up the way it was. However, welcome to AH.com where the point is to change part of the past and see how it plays out.
There was a place set aside for Finns, it was called Karelia (and no, there's not a difference. Karelians are simply Finns who got separated by a border).
This is not quite true. Karelian is closely related to Finnish but not identical. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karelian_language In any event, Moldavian and Romanian are really the same language, yet Stalin did not attempt to annex Romania even though there was a Moldavian SSR.
To get back to Poland: if there was any slight chance of Stalin making it and other eastern European "people's democracies" SSR's, I would say it would be after 1948, when the split with Tito would convince him that the local Communists in eastern Europe were not to be trusted. Still very unlikely, but more plausible than in 1945.
Note, too, that the USSR (especially Stalin) was paranoid about foreign invasion. With some historical reason, of course.
Thus the ONLY places where the USSR borders on NATO countries are a tiny (200 km) border with Norway, and heavily mountainous and thus defensible border with Turkey (and both of those are relatively minor powers that couldn't possibly invade the USSR on their own.
Satellite nations and neutrals covered the rest of their border with the West.
Making (all of) Poland an SSR would make that defensive barrier much thinner, firstly, and secondly would consist only of East Germany (DDR) who were, well, Germans, and therefore not to be trusted...
This geostrategic thinking is (one of the reasons) why Putin is so very unhappy with the Baltics being actually free, and especially in NATO, and why he desperately wants to keep the Ukraine from following suit.
Of course, that kind of thinking is what led to the Roman (or for that matter the Russian) empire.
'we have enemies on our borders. Conquer them and protect our homeland.' Next generation 'we have enemies on our NEW borders, we must...'
Thus the ONLY places where the USSR borders on NATO countries are a tiny (200 km) border with Norway, and heavily mountainous and thus defensible border with Turkey (and both of those are relatively minor powers that couldn't possibly invade the USSR on their own.
Satellite nations and neutrals covered the rest of their border with the West.
Making (all of) Poland an SSR would make that defensive barrier much thinner, firstly, and secondly would consist only of East Germany (DDR) who were, well, Germans, and therefore not to be trusted...
This geostrategic thinking is (one of the reasons) why Putin is so very unhappy with the Baltics being actually free, and especially in NATO, and why he desperately wants to keep the Ukraine from following suit.
Of course, that kind of thinking is what led to the Roman (or for that matter the Russian) empire.
'we have enemies on our borders. Conquer them and protect our homeland.' Next generation 'we have enemies on our NEW borders, we must...'
It was highly likely that had the Finns lost the Winter War or caved to the Soviet demands before it, the Finnish fate would have been essentially the same as in the Baltics - Soviet occupation, "free elections", new "people's parliament" humbly asks to join the USSR within a few months. There's nothing in the Kuusinen government that would have guaranteed that it would not be annexed into the USSR in short order - rather vice versa, it was set on a very similar trajectory as the later Baltic transitional governments would be, from the get-go.
Napoleonrules
Banned
I agree, but if I was a time traveling meddler in history I would point out that OTL Finland was actually better for the USSR than if it had been turned into an SSR. The USSR had a basic veto over Finland's foreign affairs and it was a great buffer and helped the Baltic Sea be very neutral.
It's certainly possible. OTOH, after World War II, Stalin did not even make Finland a "people's democracy," let alone part of the USSR. So that (as well as Poland) throws some doubt on the idea that he was determined to incorporate all pre-1917 territory ruled by the Tsar into the Soviet Union.
Well, having Finland as an SSR would mean the USSR could hold a sword over Stockholm instead of Helsinki and try to Finlandize Sweden instead. An airbase and naval base at Mariehamn would be pretty intimidating to anyone at the Swedish capital. And of course being able to extend the USSR's own defences directly that West, instead of trusting they could take over/use the Finnish defences and land and sea area in case of war would be a boon. It allows several vital minutes to try to stop Western bombers and missiles inbound over Scandinavia. More direct naval control over the northern Baltic Sea would be good as well.
I doubt Stalin would trust such a time traveler in 1939 anyway over this particular issue. He was far too suspicious for that.
Equating Stalin's view on Finland in the late 30s and post-1944 is, in my view, a bit reductionist and maybe also anachronist. The outcome of the war in regards to Finland was due to historical contingency and the fact that the Finns proved to be a tougher nut to crack during the war than Stalin expected back in mid-1939 or before. The record shows that the Soviet leadership saw Finland (and the Finnish ability to wage war) in a lot different light in 1945 than they had before the Winter War - the Finnish forces that in the 30s were seen as "White militia" managed to stop determined Soviet attacks to crack the Finnish defence in 1939-40 and 1944 as well. So what Stalin planned to do in 1939 can not really be determined from what he did 1944, IMHO. The situation had simply changed - and so did the plans.
I see the post-1944 position of Finland as a result of Soviet cost-benefit analysis - the benefits from conquering Finland directly were seen as smaller than the costs of the campaign to take it. The costs had proven a lot bigger than taking the Baltics, while the benefits were not significantly bigger. We can argue that the Soviet position after 1945 was so much better than in 1939 that Finland became a lot more peripheral issue than before - a threat to Leningrad, sure, in the wrong hands. But now as the USSR was the single great power in the Baltic Sea, the Finnish area was much less likely to be used as a staging ground for an invasion against the USSR. On the other hand, the Anglo-French drive to protect Finland in 1940 and the US refusal to declare war to Finland in 41-44 were also taken into account in this calculation by Stalin - I think he had a rather over-inflated view of how much the Western powers would have been ready to use effort to support Finland in case of a new Soviet attack.
So, there were both pushing and pulling factors to explain why Stalin did not go for direct takeover in Finland after 1944. Right or wrong with full hindsight, he settled on isolating and neutralizing Finland, planning on a possible future takeover via infiltration and an internal coup by a proxy Communist organization. At the time it appeared to look like a good option to the USSR.
This line of thinking informs the discussion about the position of Poland as well, IMO - quite possibly Stalin thought that annexing Poland directly and assimilating it into the USSR would have been too costly, comparatively. It would have, say, diminished the ethnic Russian majority in the USSR and made things more unstable. Poland was easier to manage as an ostensibly independent satellite state outside the USSR proper - more cost-effective that way.
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Cook
Banned
"That would depend on which particular Polish Communist you are referring to; a good Bolshevik doesn't allow nationalist ideas to influence him."
"That would depend on which particular Polish Communist you are referring to; a good Bolshevik doesn't allow nationalist ideas to influence him."
Adam Ulam's comment is that "more eloquent than the conditions [which the Bolsheviks set for peace with Poland] was the creation of the Polish Revolutionary Committee, which was obviously to become the first Polish Bolshevik government. Its chairman was Julian Marchlewski, among its members Dzerzhinsky and his colleague on the Cheka, I. Unshclicht. None of its members had had for years the slightest connection with the Polish working class. The very names of the members of this intended government were enough to make the most radically minded Polish worker join in the defense of his country." *The Bolsheviks,* p. 447