PODs for the Vicksburg Campaign

To go along with my thread on PODs for the Atlanta Campaign, I thought a thread for the various phases of the campaign for Vicksburg could be interesting. I only have one POD I was considering, but I suppose others will add more.

- During the Steele's Bayou Expedition, Porter found himself facing the very real prospect of having to scuttle his fleet when the Confederates trapped him on Deer Creek. Had Sherman not been able to rescue Porter and the latter had to scuttle his fleet, what would Grant do next with his naval contingent having been dealt a severe blow?
 
I've got a few for the Vicksburg Campaign:
  • Landing at Rodney (April 30): This was the location Grant had initially designated for his beachhead across the Mississippi. It was not changed until a clever 'contraband' showed up with news of a better and closer location for a beachhead: Bruinsburg. Rodney was about ten miles south of Bruinsburg, which would have bought at least a day's worth of time for Pemberton to reinforce Grand Gulf. To defend Grand Gulf, Bowen (or Loring if he actually took responsibility) could rely on the unfordable (Big) Bayou Pierre. With the highway and railroad bridges likely burned, the only Federal option was to cross an unfordable stream in the face of serious enemy resistance.
    Further, even if the Army of the Tennessee succeeded in vaulting across Bayou Pierre, Bowen could simply retreat into the fortified town. The landward defenses of Grand Gulf were similar to that west of Port Gibson; in prepared positions, the Confederate defenders could deal Grant a bloody nose while Pemberton massed his forces to contain Grant.
  • Loring's plan on May 9: Loring proposed a rather bold but viable plan on May 9 (according to Timothy B. Smith). He suggested that Bowen's Division move out behind Fourteenmile Creek and hold up Grant's advance while Loring and Carter Stevenson crossed the Big Black at Baldwin's and Hall's Ferries and strike Grant's exposed left flank and rear, rolling Grant away from Grand Gulf and into Jackson. The main problem posed here is the lack of experience of Pemberton and his staff. The whole march on May 15 was a comedy of errors and misunderstandings, with the whole army marching 4 miles in 8 hours. The second problem is the lack of cavalry and, surprisingly, helpful locals to serve as scouts.
  • Battle of Bolton Depot (May 15-16): This scenario posits that Pemberton reluctantly obeys Johnston's order to march to Clinton. After a fitful march, Pemberton finds Bolton Depot occupied by Federals on the evening of May 15. Pemberton has run into 4 Federal Divisions (Hovey, Logan, Crocker and Osterhaus) while 3 Federal Divisions (Carr, A.J. Smith and Blair) are in place to imperil his rear. Given how close Sherman is, Grant may decide it prudent to recall one of Sherman's Divisions (most likely Steele's) to make a night march to Clinton and come to the army's support the following day. Pemberton is caught strung out along a single road (the Jackson Road) and Grant is in position to perform a Battle of Mansfield on Pemberton. If the Confederates lose heavily, then their only option is to flee west to Baker's Creek, where there are only two crossings: the Jackson Road Bridge and the Lower Crossing. Given A.J. Smith's and Blair's OTL route, there is a possibility Grant simply destroys Pemberton west of Baker's Creek.
  • A Decisive Champion Hill (May 16): Prior to Grant's arrival, Hovey was able to get one of his couriers through to McClernand and receive a response to his inquiry. During the Battle of Champion Hill, neither Grant or McClernand managed to effectively communicate each other as the couriers rode a 2-hour long path. Had the couriers made the 15 minute cross-country path, McClernand would have received Grant's order to press on (though cautiously) and might have gobbled Bowen's Division with a flank and rear attack. The results of McClernand's attack would determine what came next: if McClernand broke through Loring as well, Pemberton would have no choice but to surrender; if Loring held his ground long enough, Pemberton might be able to slip away to Vicksburg or, if Grant took the opportunity to seal off Baker's Creek by marching Logan and Crocker across, march south and away from Vicksburg. If the latter occurs, Pemberton likely follows Loring's OTL tortuous route back to Johnston in Jackson and his army is practically destroyed as a combat unit owing to severe straggling and abandoned arms.

 
I've got a few for the Vicksburg Campaign:
  • Landing at Rodney (April 30): This was the location Grant had initially designated for his beachhead across the Mississippi. It was not changed until a clever 'contraband' showed up with news of a better and closer location for a beachhead: Bruinsburg. Rodney was about ten miles south of Bruinsburg, which would have bought at least a day's worth of time for Pemberton to reinforce Grand Gulf. To defend Grand Gulf, Bowen (or Loring if he actually took responsibility) could rely on the unfordable (Big) Bayou Pierre. With the highway and railroad bridges likely burned, the only Federal option was to cross an unfordable stream in the face of serious enemy resistance.
    Further, even if the Army of the Tennessee succeeded in vaulting across Bayou Pierre, Bowen could simply retreat into the fortified town. The landward defenses of Grand Gulf were similar to that west of Port Gibson; in prepared positions, the Confederate defenders could deal Grant a bloody nose while Pemberton massed his forces to contain Grant.
  • Loring's plan on May 9: Loring proposed a rather bold but viable plan on May 9 (according to Timothy B. Smith). He suggested that Bowen's Division move out behind Fourteenmile Creek and hold up Grant's advance while Loring and Carter Stevenson crossed the Big Black at Baldwin's and Hall's Ferries and strike Grant's exposed left flank and rear, rolling Grant away from Grand Gulf and into Jackson. The main problem posed here is the lack of experience of Pemberton and his staff. The whole march on May 15 was a comedy of errors and misunderstandings, with the whole army marching 4 miles in 8 hours. The second problem is the lack of cavalry and, surprisingly, helpful locals to serve as scouts.
  • Battle of Bolton Depot (May 15-16): This scenario posits that Pemberton reluctantly obeys Johnston's order to march to Clinton. After a fitful march, Pemberton finds Bolton Depot occupied by Federals on the evening of May 15. Pemberton has run into 4 Federal Divisions (Hovey, Logan, Crocker and Osterhaus) while 3 Federal Divisions (Carr, A.J. Smith and Blair) are in place to imperil his rear. Given how close Sherman is, Grant may decide it prudent to recall one of Sherman's Divisions (most likely Steele's) to make a night march to Clinton and come to the army's support the following day. Pemberton is caught strung out along a single road (the Jackson Road) and Grant is in position to perform a Battle of Mansfield on Pemberton. If the Confederates lose heavily, then their only option is to flee west to Baker's Creek, where there are only two crossings: the Jackson Road Bridge and the Lower Crossing. Given A.J. Smith's and Blair's OTL route, there is a possibility Grant simply destroys Pemberton west of Baker's Creek.
  • A Decisive Champion Hill (May 16): Prior to Grant's arrival, Hovey was able to get one of his couriers through to McClernand and receive a response to his inquiry. During the Battle of Champion Hill, neither Grant or McClernand managed to effectively communicate each other as the couriers rode a 2-hour long path. Had the couriers made the 15 minute cross-country path, McClernand would have received Grant's order to press on (though cautiously) and might have gobbled Bowen's Division with a flank and rear attack. The results of McClernand's attack would determine what came next: if McClernand broke through Loring as well, Pemberton would have no choice but to surrender; if Loring held his ground long enough, Pemberton might be able to slip away to Vicksburg or, if Grant took the opportunity to seal off Baker's Creek by marching Logan and Crocker across, march south and away from Vicksburg. If the latter occurs, Pemberton likely follows Loring's OTL tortuous route back to Johnston in Jackson and his army is practically destroyed as a combat unit owing to severe straggling and abandoned arms.
Porter's flotilla in the Steele's Bayou Expedition consisted of the ironclads Louisville, Cincinnati, Carondelet, Mound City, and Pittsburg. Porter ran the Vicksburg defenses with four of these five (the Cincinnati was not present), plus the Benton, Tuscumbia, and the Lafayette (the former two being ironclads). I'm not sure how Porter would feel about running the guns with only three ships, but Grant had exhausted every other avenue, and what he went with was pretty much all he had left.

Based on his performance at Charleston and Petersburg, I've wondered if Beauregard would have better at Vicksburg than Pemberton. Beauregard's staff was typically decent, particularly his adjutant, Thomas Jordan.
 
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Porter's flotilla in the Steele's Bayou Expedition consisted of the ironclads Louisville, Cincinnati, Carondelet, Mound City, and Pittsburg. Porter ran the Vicksburg defenses with four of these five (the Cincinnati was not present), plus the Benton, Tuscumbia, and the Lafayette (the former two being ironclads). I'm not sure how Porter would feel about running the guns with only three ships, but Grant had exhausted every other avenue, and what he went with was pretty much all he had left.
I suspect that Porter would have to run the gauntlet whether he likes it or not. Welles' order on April 11 instructed Porter to relieve Farragut at Port Hudson (basically ordering him to run the gauntet without actually saying it). Besides, Grant was willing enough to run the transports (which were owned by the army) past the guns after the first was successful.
Based on his performance at Charleston and Petersburg, I've wondered if Beauregard would have better at Vicksburg than Pemberton. Beauregard's staff was typically decent, particularly his adjutant, Thomas Jordan.
Based on his performance at Charleston not much would change in the more static portion of the Vicksburg Campaign. In the mobile phase of the Vicksburg Campaign, he might perform better than Pemberton. Given that he adopted a defensive pose before deciding on a surprise attack during the Bermuda Hundred Campaign, I see the campaign diverging as Grant moves towards the Southern Mississippi Railroad. Beauregard might attempt Loring's plan or a variation of it (halt Grant at Fourteenmile Creek with Carter Stevenson's division while he attacks Grant's right with say Bowen's Division and Gregg; Loring's Division marches to cut off Grant). The main problem for Beauregard is his severe lack of cavalry to keep a watch of Grant's movements, not to mention his extremely poor relationship with Jeff Davis.
 
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