PODs for the Atlanta Campaign

As I'm reading Castel's Decison in the West, I thought I might make a list of a few PODs for the Atlanta Campaign:

1. At the battle of Chickamauga, John Bell Hood was wounded in the leg, requiring amputation. The surgeon himself doubted Hood's chances of survival, yet he managed to live. If he dies, another commander will be promoted to the vacant corps command. Assuming Cleburne keeps his proposal private, only sending it to Hardee and Johnston, he could receive the command. Snake Creek Gap and Resaca will likely go as OTL, but Cleburne could decide to go ahead with the attack at Cassville that Hood failed to make.

2. Had Johnston properly defended Snake Creek Gap, it's likely Sherman will simply look for another way around the Confederate flank, but could he lose patience and decide to attack their positions on Rocky Face Ridge anyway? If the Union is mauled here, it could allow Johnston to make a counterattack.

3. Johnston initially wanted to organize his army into three corps - one with three divisions under Hardee, and two with two divisions each under Thomas C. Hindman and Mansfield Lovell. Davis didn't approve, probably because of the stigma of New Orleans that Lovell carried. I haven't much support for this, but apparently Davis suggested Lee's artillery chief, William Pendleton, for a corps command, but Johnston declined. It could be interesting to see how some combination of these possibilities work out.

Extra PODs are more than welcome, feel free to suggest any.
 
To add a few from the Union perspective:
  1. A cancellation of the Red River Campaign: If the campaign had been aborted, Banks' Army of the Gulf would have been available for a Mobile Campaign and A.J. Smith's Detachment of the Army of the Tennessee would have been present for the Atlanta Campaign. As such Sherman could execute his original concept of marching the Army of the Tennessee to Rome. Johnston had been fairly negligent of preparing Rome for an attack, despite full awareness of its vulnerability and the impact of its loss. With Banks keeping Polk pinned at Mobile, McPherson can march on Rome with ease. Such a move would force Johnston to withdraw a far greater distance than historical and increase the odds of a severe mauling of the Army of Tennessee.
  2. Aside from McPherson's infamous decision at Snake Creek Gap, there was another incident much later in the Atlanta Campaign. During the Battle of Peach Tree Creek on July 20, 25,000 Northerners advanced against only 3,500 Rebel cavalry supported by 700 Georgia Militia at a rate of one mile in three hours. Logan reported little difficulty in pushing the XV Corps onto the outer line of the Atlanta fortifications. But Blair was busy pushing Wheeler’s troopers to a ridgeline 2 miles east of Atlanta, dominated by a treeless eminence known as Bald Hill. Had McPherson been aggressive, he could have sent Logan to help sweep Wheeler and turn Brown’s flank, which would have been disastrous for the Army of Tennessee, with most of its strength arrayed against Thomas along Peach Tree Creek. The Atlanta Campaign could have been decided right then and there, but McPherson, just as he did at Snake Creek Gap, lost a golden opportunity to seize Atlanta.
To add one from the Confederate perspective:
  1. The Battle of Atlanta, the biggest fight of the campaign, holds a lot of interesting PODs. Not only was there an opportunity to maul Sherman's flankers, but there was also an opportunity to cripple its mobility by capturing its wagon train at Decatur. The battle, frankly speaking, was fought when the situation was most ideal for the Union. Dodge's XVI Corps was sent to refuse the XVII Corps' flank because of McPherson's gut feeling, not out of evidence. Just before the battle was about to begin, McPherson thought it would be safe to send one of the three brigades that made up XVI Corps to tear up more of the Georgia Railroad. Wheeler also came close to seizing the Army of the Tennessee's wagon train, if not for Sprague's determined defense and Hardee's order to Wheeler to come support his faltering attack instead of pursuing Sprague's battered brigade and the wagon train.
 
To comment on your PODs:

1. At the battle of Chickamauga, John Bell Hood was wounded in the leg, requiring amputation. The surgeon himself doubted Hood's chances of survival, yet he managed to live. If he dies, another commander will be promoted to the vacant corps command. Assuming Cleburne keeps his proposal private, only sending it to Hardee and Johnston, he could receive the command. Snake Creek Gap and Resaca will likely go as OTL, but Cleburne could decide to go ahead with the attack at Cassville that Hood failed to make.
Wouldn't Cheatham have the nod? Cheatham was also senior to Cleburne and didn't require a promotion to legally command a corps. Cheatham's own record as a division commander was good, if not as stellar as Cleburne's.
Had Johnston properly defended Snake Creek Gap, it's likely Sherman will simply look for another way around the Confederate flank, but could he lose patience and decide to attack their positions on Rocky Face Ridge anyway? If the Union is mauled here, it could allow Johnston to make a counterattack.
While Sherman was impatient at Kennesaw Mountain, there was no way for Sherman would be foolish enough to strike such a natural fortress. Besides, what does Johnston defend Snake Creek Gap with? To cover such a gap, one would need a division or more to 'properly' fortify it. A brigade would at best could only mount a delaying action against an army.

Johnston initially wanted to organize his army into three corps - one with three divisions under Hardee, and two with two divisions each under Thomas C. Hindman and Mansfield Lovell. Davis didn't approve, probably because of the stigma of New Orleans that Lovell carried. I haven't much support for this, but apparently Davis suggested Lee's artillery chief, William Pendleton, for a corps command, but Johnston declined. It could be interesting to see how some combination of these possibilities work out.
Did Johnston seriously propose that? God help the Army of Tennessee if those commanders were actually chosen. Thomas C. Hindman was frankly loathed by his own division and his performance at Prairie Grove does not inspire much confidence. Hindman exerted very little command and control and let the battle be almost totally fought by his division commanders. Some historians have theorized that Hindman felt little confidence in himself and preferred the military expertise of his division commanders. It's said that when Hindman left, everyone including Hindman himself was glad.

Lovell is more of a question mark. Lovell lost the majority of his troops to transfers before the battle for New Orleans. What was left of his field command, Ruggles's brigade, was sent to Beauregard and A.S. Johnston at Corinth weeks before the Federal naval attack. Ironclad construction at New Orleans had been massively delayed, and the main Confederate vessel had no engines and was positioned as an immobile floating battery. Without straw, Lovell could not make many bricks. Lovell's performance under Van Dorn at Corinth was not terrible, but not distinguished either.

William Pendleton as corps commander would be a tragic mistake. Frankly speaking, the man meant well but was an utter buffoon when it came to actual war. AFAIK his only positive contribution to the CSA was his help in improving Lee's supply of horses.
 
To comment on your PODs:


Wouldn't Cheatham have the nod? Cheatham was also senior to Cleburne and didn't require a promotion to legally command a corps. Cheatham's own record as a division commander was good, if not as stellar as Cleburne's.
One of my main reasons for thinking Johnston could choose Cleburne is that he was one of the only commanders to put it in a good showing in the debacle at Missionary Ridge, stalling Sherman and most of his forces. You're definitely right about Cheatham being senior to Cleburne, and so were several other division commanders in the AoT. The usual rank for Confederate corps commanders was lieutenant general, and both Cheatham and Cleburne were major generals, so I'm not sure what you mean about Cheatham not requiring a promotion.

In any case, I think Cheatham would also attack at Cassville. Unfortunately, Maney did not quite measure up to Cheatham as a division commander.
 
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I'm not sure what you mean about Cheatham not requiring a promotion.
Huh. I stand corrected, thanks for the correction.
Unfortunately, Maney did not quite measure up to Cheatham as a division commander.
I definitely agree. His record as division commander shows him as a victim of the Peter Principle. In all of the battles he participated in as division commander (Peach Tree Creek, Atlanta, Jonesborough), none of them particularly contributed much to the Confederate cause and his actions at Peach Tree Creek arguably hurt the Army of Tennessee's chances of victory (Maney halted shortly after going two hundreds yards, which threw off Loring's division which was guiding on Maney (and thus prematurely triggered Stewart's advance), and then stalled at the Federal skirmish line.)

In my opinion, the best corps commanders available to the Army of Tennessee was B. F. Cheatham, A. P. Steward, W. J. Hardee and anybody not Wheeler. The best way to hurt the Confederates would be to appoint S. D. Lee, T. C. Hindman, Carter Stevenson, and Wheeler to corps command.
 
While Sherman was impatient at Kennesaw Mountain, there was no way for Sherman would be foolish enough to strike such a natural fortress. Besides, what does Johnston defend Snake Creek Gap with? To cover such a gap, one would need a division or more to 'properly' fortify it. A brigade would at best could only mount a delaying action against an army.
Johnston was trying to get Davis to send Polk's "Army" (really a corps) sent to him throughout April, so perhaps he could do it if he gets those troops a few weeks early?

In the case of an attack at Cassville, I can see Sherman pulling back behind the Conasauga, but I'm not where Johnston can flank him after that.
 
Johnston, Hardee, and Polk were advised to move when an enemy battery began shelling their vantage point atop Pine Mountain. Johnston and Hardee moved quickly, but Polk was killed by a shell. Had all three been killed, Hood would have taken command of the AoT in the immediate aftermath, with Cheatham, Hindman, and Loring as acting corps commanders. Should Hood decided he's out of his depth and resign, Davis could be forced to send Beauregard, or even Robert E. Lee, though this would probably depend on Longstreet not being wounded.
 
Johnston, Hardee, and Polk were advised to move when an enemy battery began shelling their vantage point atop Pine Mountain. Johnston and Hardee moved quickly, but Polk was killed by a shell. Had all three been killed, Hood would have taken command of the AoT in the immediate aftermath, with Cheatham, Hindman, and Loring as acting corps commanders. Should Hood decided he's out of his depth and resign, Davis could be forced to send Beauregard, or even Robert E. Lee, though this would probably depend on Longstreet not being wounded.
Why would Hood decide he’s out of his depth? I am aware that Hood was genuinely reluctant to take command of the Army of Tennessee as the Union armies approached Atlanta, but he never gave up trying to lead the army until the rout at Nashville and the subsequent retreat. If he had to be replaced, I suspect that Beauregard would receive the command. Lee was definitely not going to leave Petersburg while Grant was so close to the city. Regarding the acting corps commanders, only Cheatham is a safe pick. Hindman is a disaster, and Loring is capable on the battlefield but nothing but trouble outside of it. Hindman in the long term would probably be replaced by S.D. Lee who was not much better. This would have an interesting effect on the campaigns fought in Mississippi. Loring might be replaced by Alexander P. Stewart, who was his junior in seniority. A.P. Stewart was regarded by many to be a dependable commander and performed well as corps commander (with the exception of Ezra Church).
 
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