POD for a continued GDR

[La Rouge Beret]

East Germany or the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist in 1990, when their citizens voted for reunification with West Germany. My question is what POD is required for the GDR to remain as a separate state and how long would it be possible to remain as a separate country?

The reunification process was not a popular outcome for several foreign leaders at that time including Mitterand, Thatcher and Andreotti. What are your thoughts on a POD or the number of butterflies to achieve this?

 

[The Oncoming Storm]

How about instead of pursuing Glasnost and Perestroika, Gorbachev, or a more hard line leader, copy Deng Xaioping's model of allowing capitalist reforms while still maintaining an authoritarian state. This allows Honecker and the other East Bloc leaders carte Blanche to squash any dissent, they also reform their economies adopting "To get rich is glorious!" as the guiding principle. The proletariat are then too busy buying consumer goods to worry about their civil rights.

As to how long it could last, the PRC is stronger than it's ever been so if the reform programme had worked then we could still have a Wasaw Pact innsome form today.

 

[Albidoom]

they also reform their economies adopting "To get rich is glorious!" as the guiding principle. The proletariat are then too busy buying consumer goods to worry about their civil rights.

A bit problematic, since in a lot of eastern european states the people were already comparatively wealthy. Well, not rich, but the average GDR citizen usually had several thousand Ostmarks in Bank savings, if only by the sheer lack of anything meaningful to buy with it.
And the main issue would be how to get enough consumer products to keep the citizens content (BANANAS!!) when you easily had to wait up to five years (or even longer) to buy a car.
Well, they could reduce their military spending and especially the GDR could have done better will a less bloated internal security system, but if the Warsaw Pact survives (especially with some hard-liners) then the NATO in Western Europe won't demilitarize either thus the Eastern Bloc will also feel the need of keeping the defensive budgets up.

Also the fact that there will always be some kind of indirect propaganda by television, thanks to the FRG right next to it (and the West Berlin enclave for some nice extra coverage)
So the east germans (otl quite well off among the eastern bloc) will always be able to see that the west germans are even better off and free.

As to how long it could last, the PRC is stronger than it's ever been so if the reform programme had worked then we could still have a Wasaw Pact innsome form today.

In some form, possibly, but let's not forget that China has twice (or already thrice?) the population than the entire Warsaw Pact. Plus different past etc.

And given how Honecker behaved, a hardliner GDR might develop into some sort of North Korea analogue

 

[Decrian]

You could have democratic reforms as in OTL but no unification. Maybe a sort of a German Confederation or something with the FRG and GDR as member nations. There was a discussion back then in West and East Germany about possibilities like that.
The main problem I see is that the GDR will never reach the wealth and GDP level of West Germany or that of the eastern states in OTL Germany. There is just no way the ruined GDR economy can compete on the world market.

 

[Valdemar II]

You could have democratic reforms as in OTL but no unification. Maybe a sort of a German Confederation or something with the FRG and GDR as member nations. There was a discussion back then in West and East Germany about possibilities like that.
The main problem I see is that the GDR will never reach the wealth and GDP level of West Germany or that of the eastern states in OTL Germany. There is just no way the ruined GDR economy can compete on the world market.

Neither could Slovenia nor the Czech Republic (which really are the best comparison), and while still poorer than Germany*, they aren't badly off today, and may reach the German GDP per capita in a few decades.

If I should give a few POD: No West Berlin, it served both as a drain of GDR's population and intellectual capital, but also as a broadcasting central for West German "propaganda"**. Beside that letting GDR keep Lower Silesia would both enlarge the East German economy, but also keep a very pro-Communist area in GDR and enlarge the Valley of Ignorance.

*In fact even today the former GDR have the same GDP per capita as Slovenia.

**like common TV programs which showed how rich the West Germans was.

 

[Albidoom]

Come to think of it, how about if West Germany doesn't want the reunification (and thoughtfully has it worked into the constitution)? That might be the easiest way.
Of course working out a correlating TL with all the corresponding developments leading to that is the hard part of it (especially getting the conservative voting part of the population accepting that).

 

[La Rouge Beret]

Entirely correct... if the reforms initiated under Walter Ulbricht continue then the per capita income of the GDR may raise. When I was studying for my undergraduate degree a lecturer from Bavaria spoke about the folly of integrating East Germany. His point of contention was that this risked a consistent hole in the budget to rehabilitate the East. Another idea would be if the West clearly outstrips the East, and for the West German citizens the notion of integration would destroy their way of life... thinking of Cyprus in this example.

 

[mowque]

Entirely correct... if the reforms initiated under Walter Ulbricht continue then the per capita income of the GDR may raise. When I was studying for my undergraduate degree a lecturer from Bavaria spoke about the folly of integrating East Germany. His point of contention was that this risked a consistent hole in the budget to rehabilitate the East. Another idea would be if the West clearly outstrips the East, and for the West German citizens the notion of integration would destroy their way of life... thinking of Cyprus in this example.

Exactly. Might be more effective to have the East do worse and the West do even better?

 

[Dan1988]

Hmm, could East Germany, at some point, have toyed around with some Yugoslav-style economic reforms that could allow them to have an infusion of Western capital whilst still maintaining a separate East Germany?

 

[Super_Cool]

What would be the status of Berlin in this situation?

 

[Wendell]

The problem is that the DDR was an intellignce agency with a state, and could not decide what its cultural influences were or should have been. In essence, the DDR was a fake country imposed on a population barred from ever really making that country their own.

 

[VictorLaszlo]

It's very well possible that there would not have been a German reunification in 1990 if the citizens of West Germany had been more aware about the costs of the reunification. A different outcome in the 1987 Bundestag elections with the Social Democrats victorious might lead to this very situation, since I remember, that Oskar Lafontaine, their candidate in the 1990 elections was quite outspokenly against a hasty reunification, pointing out, that the costs of a hasty reunification would be far higher than acknoledged by the Kohl administration and would inevitably lead to significantly rising taxes (which in the end they really did).

Once the GDR recovers economically on its own, it is far from certain, that the peoples of the East German states will be as inclined to join the FRG as they were in 1990, especially after experiencing, that West Germany was not willing to spend a part of their seemingly unlimited resources to help their eastern brethren.

 

[DrakonFin]

In essence, the DDR was a fake country imposed on a population barred from ever really making that country their own.

Yep. One could say that for a continued GDR, the problem was not that the people were brainwashed, it was that they were not brainwashed enough.

 

[La Rouge Beret]

It's very well possible that there would not have been a German reunification in 1990 if the citizens of West Germany had been more aware about the costs of the reunification. A different outcome in the 1987 Bundestag elections with the Social Democrats victorious might lead to this very situation, since I remember, that Oskar Lafontaine, their candidate in the 1990 elections was quite outspokenly against a hasty reunification, pointing out, that the costs of a hasty reunification would be far higher than acknoledged by the Kohl administration and would inevitably lead to significantly rising taxes (which in the end they really did).

Once the GDR recovers economically on its own, it is far from certain, that the peoples of the East German states will be as inclined to join the FRG as they were in 1990, especially after experiencing, that West Germany was not willing to spend a part of their seemingly unlimited resources to help their eastern brethren.

I agree with your sentiment Victor, perhaps if the FRG leadership is changed then the GDR remains. However how would the GDR evolve politically or economically... would Angela Merkel rise to the top in this equation?

 

[Emperor Qianlong]

And given how Honecker behaved, a hardliner GDR might develop into some sort of North Korea analogue

I always toyed with that idea of a North Korea like GDR. It's so terrible and entertaining at the same time, but I don't think it's very plausible.

It's very well possible that there would not have been a German reunification in 1990 if the citizens of West Germany had been more aware about the costs of the reunification. A different outcome in the 1987 Bundestag elections with the Social Democrats victorious might lead to this very situation, since I remember, that Oskar Lafontaine, their candidate in the 1990 elections was quite outspokenly against a hasty reunification, pointing out, that the costs of a hasty reunification would be far higher than acknoledged by the Kohl administration and would inevitably lead to significantly rising taxes (which in the end they really did).

Once the GDR recovers economically on its own, it is far from certain, that the peoples of the East German states will be as inclined to join the FRG as they were in 1990, especially after experiencing, that West Germany was not willing to spend a part of their seemingly unlimited resources to help their eastern brethren.

I must say, I considerably disagree with that assessment. While the SPD was against a hasty reunification, they weren't entirely against a reunification. An SPD victory in 1987 will, in my opinion, delay the reunification (possibly to the mid-to-late-1990s), but not remove it entirely. I don't think that East Germany being forced on to get on it's own feet would decrease the will to reunification.

Generally said, the GDR was, for all intends and purposes, doomed in 1989, primarily because without communism, there was no justification for this state to exist any further. The only way, in my opinion, to keep the GDR alive would be that other European countries (in particular Britain as one of the countries which in 1989 still legally possessed occupying rights) would explicitly forbid the two German states to reunify. The rational reason for that was on the one hand that the other great powers of Western Europe could more easily treat West Germany as one of them because of similar population (Britain, France and West Germany all had approximately 60 million people in 1989), whereas a unified Germany would have a population of 80 million. Additionally, there was the irrational fear that this would create a resurgent militarist Germany that would once again threaten Europe with land claims.

In OTL, Kohl was very successful in taking the wind out of these anti-reunification arguments (primarily so because he was very keen at achieving a reunification at all costs - which he literally did in the end! ), but it's possible that a SPD-run West Germany, which isn't so intensely focused on reunification, will be unable to convince western powers that a reunification poses no dangers. For instance, the right-wing resurgence in Germany in the early 1990s (both in east and west - the 'Republicans' gained almost 11% in the state elections in Baden-Württemberg in 1992!) would be viewed as a strong argument against reunification.

 

[Mulder]

I always toyed with that idea of a North Korea like GDR. It's so terrible and entertaining at the same time, but I don't think it's very plausible.



I must say, I considerably disagree with that assessment. While the SPD was against a hasty reunification, they weren't entirely against a reunification. An SPD victory in 1987 will, in my opinion, delay the reunification (possibly to the mid-to-late-1990s), but not remove it entirely. I don't think that East Germany being forced on to get on it's own feet would decrease the will to reunification.

Generally said, the GDR was, for all intends and purposes, doomed in 1989, primarily because without communism, there was no justification for this state to exist any further. The only way, in my opinion, to keep the GDR alive would be that other European countries (in particular Britain as one of the countries which in 1989 still legally possessed occupying rights) would explicitly forbid the two German states to reunify. The rational reason for that was on the one hand that the other great powers of Western Europe could more easily treat West Germany as one of them because of similar population (Britain, France and West Germany all had approximately 60 million people in 1989), whereas a unified Germany would have a population of 80 million. Additionally, there was the irrational fear that this would create a resurgent militarist Germany that would once again threaten Europe with land claims.

In OTL, Kohl was very successful in taking the wind out of these anti-reunification arguments (primarily so because he was very keen at achieving a reunification at all costs - which he literally did in the end! ), but it's possible that a SPD-run West Germany, which isn't so intensely focused on reunification, will be unable to convince western powers that a reunification poses no dangers. For instance, the right-wing resurgence in Germany in the early 1990s (both in east and west - the 'Republicans' gained almost 11% in the state elections in Baden-Württemberg in 1992!) would be viewed as a strong argument against reunification.

But the SPD needs a coalition partner to govern. Once it seems like they are trying to prevent unification, the FDP (and even some right-wing SPD members) might jump ship and the SPD government collapses. And Lafontaine as chancellor is unlikely. This guy has about 0 appeal to centrists.

 

[simonbp]

The wackiest outcome I could imagine would be a post-USSR confederation forming out of Poland, East Germany, the Czechs, and Slovakia. And given that the easiest way to do that is to have the USSR fall harder and faster (outright civil war?), Kaliningrad would likely be lobbed off and become the fifth member of the confederation.

The Confederation would clearly be Polish-dominated, but with enough independence for the member states that it doesn't feel that way. Thus the GDR survives as political entity, though de jure not entirely sovereign (as opposed to simple de facto).

 

[SlickWilly]

The GDR was severely broke, economically prior to the wall falling!

 

[Shevek23]

The wackiest outcome I could imagine would be a post-USSR confederation forming out of Poland, East Germany, the Czechs, and Slovakia. And given that the easiest way to do that is to have the USSR fall harder and faster (outright civil war?), Kaliningrad would likely be lobbed off and become the fifth member of the confederation.

The Confederation would clearly be Polish-dominated, but with enough independence for the member states that it doesn't feel that way. Thus the GDR survives as political entity, though de jure not entirely sovereign (as opposed to simple de facto).

And the only thing I can see tying that motley crew together into a Confederation would be if the Eastern European leadership were on the leftist side of a Soviet civil war. Otherwise nationalism and the option of more direct unilateral ties to Western nations would fragment them.

So--civil war in Russia; the more left-wing Communists lose--either to more rightist Communists of a more Stalinist mold, or to anti-Communist nationalists. But somehow, the Eastern Bloc leadership manages to hold on and recognizes a need to band together to stay afloat.

Now it is a fact OTL that not all opposition to the Soviet-controlled Eastern system came from the Right; other dissidents included more idealistic Communists who wanted to see the system reformed, either within their own country or for the bloc as a whole.

So perhaps it goes like this:

1) A reformist movement in the Soviet bloc as a whole gains favor and has some success, both on economic fronts and on the front of general political culture, winning over more genuine and broader legitimacy for the Eastern Bloc governments.

2) Unfortunately the success is mixed; especially in the USSR there are both bottlenecks and conflicts of interest; a somewhat Stalinist backlash takes form and when the reformist leadership stumbles, in Russia itself there is a nasty power struggle, escalating in some places to a shooting civil war (but not one that goes nuclear, as it just might in a split Soviet Union!)

3) However, in the Eastern bloc nations, at least in the ones simonbp mentioned, the Stalinist side, which is prevailing in Russia, has no traction; defeated reformist Soviets flee to the European capitals and help dislodge what forces and agencies the rightists have there; the rightists gaining control in Moscow and eventually throughout the Soviet Union itself (perhaps having lost Kaliningrad--and hey, what if they lose their grip on Leningrad too!) recognize that they had best cut their losses and concentrate on negotiating a settlement with the new Central Bloc, involving verifiable agreements on limiting arms and otherwise preventing the Central Bloc from becoming a Western staging area for an attack on the remaining USSR.

4) The new Central coalition is prevented from simply joining the West as a bunch of independent nations by their shared reformist/leftist version of Leninism, which is economically successful enough to pre-empt any powerful organized sentiments for ditching the Marxist regimes completely. With success comes a certain openness in internal politics, enough that the various national regimes enjoy legitimacy on their own hooks. They confederate both as a military alliance and to form an economic planning and cooperation bloc. They continue to trade with the USSR despite the bad blood of the recent Soviet civil war, but both sides haggle more firmly over terms.

This presupposes that they guys running the various former Warsaw Pact nations (BTW, they may well call the new federation a second Warsaw Pact!) were quite different people from the ones OTL of course.

In particular I'd think that events in Poland in the 1970s, that led up to Solidarnosc and General Jarulzelski's coup, would have to have gone quite differently; perhaps the Marxist/socialist reformist elements that fed into the rise of Solidarity OTL instead gained traction in Poland and other East Bloc states and eventually Moscow as reforms of the official Soviet-ruled systems. Otherwise, if Poland moved as OTL to any degree, I'd see no chance whatsoever of the Poles retaining any Marxist government; they'd ditch it for a more right-wing one immediately and seek ties to the West at once.

 

[Lyly]

The wackiest outcome I could imagine would be a post-USSR confederation forming out of Poland, East Germany, the Czechs, and Slovakia. And given that the easiest way to do that is to have the USSR fall harder and faster (outright civil war?), Kaliningrad would likely be lobbed off and become the fifth member of the confederation.

The Confederation would clearly be Polish-dominated, but with enough independence for the member states that it doesn't feel that way. Thus the GDR survives as political entity, though de jure not entirely sovereign (as opposed to simple de facto).

And the only thing I can see tying that motley crew together into a Confederation would be if the Eastern European leadership were on the leftist side of a Soviet civil war. Otherwise nationalism and the option of more direct unilateral ties to Western nations would fragment them.

So--civil war in Russia; the more left-wing Communists lose--either to more rightist Communists of a more Stalinist mold, or to anti-Communist nationalists. But somehow, the Eastern Bloc leadership manages to hold on and recognizes a need to band together to stay afloat.

Now it is a fact OTL that not all opposition to the Soviet-controlled Eastern system came from the Right; other dissidents included more idealistic Communists who wanted to see the system reformed, either within their own country or for the bloc as a whole.

So perhaps it goes like this:

1) A reformist movement in the Soviet bloc as a whole gains favor and has some success, both on economic fronts and on the front of general political culture, winning over more genuine and broader legitimacy for the Eastern Bloc governments.

2) Unfortunately the success is mixed; especially in the USSR there are both bottlenecks and conflicts of interest; a somewhat Stalinist backlash takes form and when the reformist leadership stumbles, in Russia itself there is a nasty power struggle, escalating in some places to a shooting civil war (but not one that goes nuclear, as it just might in a split Soviet Union!)

3) However, in the Eastern bloc nations, at least in the ones simonbp mentioned, the Stalinist side, which is prevailing in Russia, has no traction; defeated reformist Soviets flee to the European capitals and help dislodge what forces and agencies the rightists have there; the rightists gaining control in Moscow and eventually throughout the Soviet Union itself (perhaps having lost Kaliningrad--and hey, what if they lose their grip on Leningrad too!) recognize that they had best cut their losses and concentrate on negotiating a settlement with the new Central Bloc, involving verifiable agreements on limiting arms and otherwise preventing the Central Bloc from becoming a Western staging area for an attack on the remaining USSR.

4) The new Central coalition is prevented from simply joining the West as a bunch of independent nations by their shared reformist/leftist version of Leninism, which is economically successful enough to pre-empt any powerful organized sentiments for ditching the Marxist regimes completely. With success comes a certain openness in internal politics, enough that the various national regimes enjoy legitimacy on their own hooks. They confederate both as a military alliance and to form an economic planning and cooperation bloc. They continue to trade with the USSR despite the bad blood of the recent Soviet civil war, but both sides haggle more firmly over terms.

This presupposes that they guys running the various former Warsaw Pact nations (BTW, they may well call the new federation a second Warsaw Pact!) were quite different people from the ones OTL of course.

In particular I'd think that events in Poland in the 1970s, that led up to Solidarnosc and General Jarulzelski's coup, would have to have gone quite differently; perhaps the Marxist/socialist reformist elements that fed into the rise of Solidarity OTL instead gained traction in Poland and other East Bloc states and eventually Moscow as reforms of the official Soviet-ruled systems. Otherwise, if Poland moved as OTL to any degree, I'd see no chance whatsoever of the Poles retaining any Marxist government; they'd ditch it for a more right-wing one immediately and seek ties to the West at once.

The idea of a Central European Soviet Confederation sounds pretty intriguing. I'd like to see someone with the knowledge develop the idea, though it does sound challenging!