The German concentration on heavy tanks will produce less, not more tanks. The more material you use per unit, the less number of units can be produced with the same amount of material. All this assumes the Allies and the Russians are standing pat and not developing better weapons. The JSIII was a match for any German tank. The Allies had tanks and tank destoyers with 90 mm guns by the end of the war. These could be moved up 6 months. They weren't that far behind the Germans in jet production with examples in use by the end of the war. Experience shows the Allies managed to improve their aircaft faster than the Germans. Why not with their jets? As an afterthought about Sicily - what would the effect of the Allied naval forces adding their support to the ground war there? Could this have blunted the German counterattack like they did in Normandy?
PoD – Battle of Kursk (version 2.0)
- Thread starter whatisinaname
- Start date
Hyperion
Banned
There is no possible way you could have a German division in the Easter Front moved directly to Sicily within only a month or so. To truely send a combat effective unit to Sicily, it would probably take the German army 4 or 5 months to reequip units from the Eastern Front.
Also, other individuals are correct in stating in that if the Germans concentrate on much larger, heavier tanks, they will have less tanks than what they had historically. Better individual tanks perhaps, but less of them than the weaker ones that they would have had in OTL.
Also, other individuals are correct in stating in that if the Germans concentrate on much larger, heavier tanks, they will have less tanks than what they had historically. Better individual tanks perhaps, but less of them than the weaker ones that they would have had in OTL.
Stalker
Banned
Yes, putting all efforts in improving tanks - that way would lead to a dead end. IMO, Germany would be simply enough to build more the best tanks it ever produced - Pzkw V Ausf. E and Pzkw V Ausf. F - "Panthers". Its high-velocity 75-mm main long-barrelled gun, with its fast reloading was a formidable weapon against all Russian mid tanks, and it also proved no worse for Russian JS-2 (in spring-summer 1944) when fighting from the ambushes and in skirmish battles where Germans excelled -everywhere where they coud shorten distance down to less than 1 km to make their Kwk-42 effective against front armor of JS-2s. The German industry also had to go on produsing Pzkw-IV whose technoogy by 1943 was very smoothly established. These Panzers still were a very good weapon.
JS-3 never took part in WWII athough Berlin saw them in May 1945 in victory parade.
The main point here is that putting efforts in expensive producing of more powerful tanks would - and my colleagues have pointed that out above - result in discrease of general tank-producing rate, and the Allies (including Russians) will have an upper hand with armoured forces in the battlefied. They had far more raw materials, more powerful industria base, far more human resources. They could substitute tanks and personnel at much faster rate than Germans, and if one would say that in such a condition Germans could do nothing but to emphasise the goality of weapons and personnel, I woud argue that generally Germans had both better compared to the Allies (including Russians) but by a very narrow margin, so risking into slowing tank-production in attempt to get something better was unjustified. I like the example of Japanese pilots whose training up to 1945 went in unchanged fasion, so Japan to the end of the war could annually produce only a imited number of qualified pilots. Americans like Russians adopted shortened course of preparing pilots. So what did the sides in Pacific had by 1943 after Pearl Harbor, Miduway, Guadalcanal? How many experienced Japanese pilots were still alive, with Japan unable to compensate losses as easily as the Americans. This holds true for German personnel as well. Quality of both the personnel and weaponry means money and time - and Germany had no such luxury.
JS-3 never took part in WWII athough Berlin saw them in May 1945 in victory parade.
The main point here is that putting efforts in expensive producing of more powerful tanks would - and my colleagues have pointed that out above - result in discrease of general tank-producing rate, and the Allies (including Russians) will have an upper hand with armoured forces in the battlefied. They had far more raw materials, more powerful industria base, far more human resources. They could substitute tanks and personnel at much faster rate than Germans, and if one would say that in such a condition Germans could do nothing but to emphasise the goality of weapons and personnel, I woud argue that generally Germans had both better compared to the Allies (including Russians) but by a very narrow margin, so risking into slowing tank-production in attempt to get something better was unjustified. I like the example of Japanese pilots whose training up to 1945 went in unchanged fasion, so Japan to the end of the war could annually produce only a imited number of qualified pilots. Americans like Russians adopted shortened course of preparing pilots. So what did the sides in Pacific had by 1943 after Pearl Harbor, Miduway, Guadalcanal? How many experienced Japanese pilots were still alive, with Japan unable to compensate losses as easily as the Americans. This holds true for German personnel as well. Quality of both the personnel and weaponry means money and time - and Germany had no such luxury.
Grey Wolf
Donor
Intelligence
John Hughes-Wilson in 'The Puppet-Masters' argues that the Soviets won primarily because of the intelligence they were receiving from 'Werther' (who he alleges was Bormann, tho' I'm rather more dubious myself). The thrust of the argument is that it didn't really matter what the Germans planned in order to outwit the Soviets, because the Soviets had the plans almost immediately afterwards. They were able to strip other 'fronts' and concentrate overwhelming force at Kursk because they knew both where the Germans were going to focus, and that they would not be launcing any other major offensives elsewhere. Of course, intelligence does not win a battle, but it can put the pieces in place for a battle to be won.
Jon'
John Hughes-Wilson in 'The Puppet-Masters' argues that the Soviets won primarily because of the intelligence they were receiving from 'Werther' (who he alleges was Bormann, tho' I'm rather more dubious myself). The thrust of the argument is that it didn't really matter what the Germans planned in order to outwit the Soviets, because the Soviets had the plans almost immediately afterwards. They were able to strip other 'fronts' and concentrate overwhelming force at Kursk because they knew both where the Germans were going to focus, and that they would not be launcing any other major offensives elsewhere. Of course, intelligence does not win a battle, but it can put the pieces in place for a battle to be won.
Jon'
whatisinaname
Donor
Hi all
I am not going to continue with the ans I have "gone of the boil" with this story.
But it has created quite a debate.
Thanks
I am not going to continue with the ans I have "gone of the boil" with this story.
But it has created quite a debate.
Thanks
The Soviets were also able to stockpile enough supplies in the area, and at Kursk they had the benefit of interior lines.
Germans did actually have a plan for after a successful Kursk.They planned to retreat to the Panther-Wotan line in late 1943 and proceed to bleed the Soviets white against these fortifications, while their own forces recuperated.In Otl,the panther-wotan fortifications were never completed,but in the areas where some fortifications existed,the Germans managed to actually stem the Soviet advance for a short while.I'm not saying a line of fortifications could lead to German victory in the east,but it could make the Russian body count much higher,slowing soviet advances and giving the Western allies a chance to reach Berlin first in 1945.