#18
April 2, 1982
The Victory Bar, Stanley, Falkland Islands
There’s an air of agitation in the pub, even with the lights out and all seemingly still. The people of the town have huddled there, in secret, doing their best to keep quiet. In hushed tones, they watch the street, keeping an eye out.
“Colin! Quick, down here! Colin they’re coming, hide! Switch the torch off, dammit!”
“Did you see them?”
“Yes, they’re almost here.”
“God, I can’t stand still.”
“Just take a breath, I’m right here.”
“Thank you, dear.”
Indistinct chatter can be heard outside for a moment before the door opens, outlining two figures. One flips a switch on the wall, flooding the room with light and revealing tasteful decorations, a small buffet, and (as they pop up from behind the bar) a number of Judith Allen’s friends and family.
“SURPRISE!!!! HAPPY BIRTHDAY, JUDITH!!! FOR SHE’S A JOLLY-GOOD FELLOW, FOR SHE’S A JOLLY GOOD FELLOW…”
----
2010
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (Go Pumas). A lecture of Contemporary Latin American History is in session.
“There’s a common perception among the devout, particularly the devout in Latin America, that Pope John Paul II can be seen as the instigator of the restoration of democracy in Argentina.
“The reasoning goes that he directed the Papal mediation between Chile and Argentina in their conflict over Tierra del Fuego; he set the terms fairly and in a Christian context, knowing that the junta would not keep to them; and he therefore provided a sort of moral shield for the good Christians of Argentina to reject this government and depose it.
“This certainly gives the Pope more credit than he deserves, and oddly makes him look a lot more Machiavellian than you’d think his fans would want. While it’s true the terms of the treaty were meant as a rebuke to Argentine expansionism, Papal correspondence suggests a certain naivety from the pontiff, if anything. To paraphrase, he believed the church’s moral weight would keep President Galtieri from acting, not that it would provoke him into actions that would result in his downfall.
“If you want to determine where the junta really lost its footing, you should look in two places: first, a change in the policy of the United States, and second in the regime’s own ill-informed assumptions.
“The US had been in bed with the Argentines since the start of the junta, using Argentine soldiers to carry out terror missions throughout Latin America with CIA support. Even as this policy wavered under Jimmy Carter, it never entirely ceased. The election of John Anderson put the final nail in its coffin.
“So let’s start a leverett for a moment and talk about Anderson and Castro.
“There was a phrase you used to hear in the US during the 1970s: “Only Nixon could go to China.” The idea being that only a person who deeply embodied certain principles could breach those principles without suffering politically. In this case Nixon, an ardent Cold Warrior, normalized relations with China.
“But by the end of the 1980s and indeed since then, you were most likely to hear this said, instead: “Nixon had his China; Anderson had his Cuba.” This was a reframing of the context of both events in terms of the idea of presidential prerogative. The idea that the
president- simply by the nature of the office- could set the foreign policy agenda, rather than being beholden to it. In other words, it didn’t matter that Nixon was perceived as a Cold Warrior, or that Anderson was perceived as a moderate. He who held the power would use it as they saw fit. In Anderson’s case, by casting out feelers to Castro.
“The reasons behind
El Bloqueo, the attempted isolation of Cuba, were stuck in the past. The ineffectiveness of the attempt was evident to all serious observers. It simply took Anderson to say it, and to use the possibility of a thaw to seek a settlement with the Cubans.
“It didn’t hurt that the Soviets were in turmoil over their ongoing leadership crisis. The Soviets were at best uninterested in antagonizing the West through Cuba, what with domestic concerns, strains on the Eastern Bloc, and increasing commitments in Afghanistan and the Middle East all occupying their attention. While unable to thoroughly lock down power, the reformists in the Kremlin were increasingly ascendant at this time, and furthering the cause of de-escalation was of growing importance, at least to the voices most directly concerned with the Americas.
“While the Soviets still supported Cuba economically, Castro began to feel exposed diplomatically. The pause in US hostility- it would be overstating things to call it anything more concrete than that- allowed Cuba to reframe its goals in Africa and Central America in a way that didn’t openly conflict with new US policy in the region. Castro was willing to play the statesman, to ease up on repressive behavior- at least abroad, if not domestically- and to maybe get that Nobel Peace Prize one day.
“While never committed to paper, the back-channel agreement involved the cessation of gray ops, particularly those which so frequently led to the commission of human rights violations. The Cubans and the US would both pull back support for paramilitary activities as soon as possible, and both sides would commit to free and fair elections throughout the region. The guarantors of all of this would be the Contadora Group.
“The methodology behind this ‘restructuring’ pleased no one. The US helped the Argentine terror units evacuate the region, avoiding prosecution. The quasi-legal and illegal armies formerly kept afloat solely through CIA resupply were simply abandoned, creating a minor humanitarian disaster. By the early 1980s these armed camps had grown in size to become basically small, isolated cities in the jungle, without any infrastructure of their own. Food was scarce at the best of times, sanitation dicey. When the CIA tap ran dry, starvation set in, disease close behind. Hundreds died. Thousands began the dangerous and illegal trek to the Rio Grande. The rest mostly turned to naked banditry, which would plague the jungle provinces of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras for the next decade.
“The wealthy classes of several countries panicked and thousands were granted asylum in the US, taking a significant portion of the region’s liquid wealth with them. Tens of thousands of others, mostly non-political bystanders, caught scent of the panic and tried to follow in their wake, creating a panic of a different kind at the US border.
“Meanwhile, the Cubans frequently took a more direct approach to their own paramilitaries. Those who demonstrated loyalty and stood down were eased back into the more legitimate, less radical political structures of their home countries, or else given Cuban citizenship. Those who protested or who were deemed too corrupt to court were executed in the field, or in some cased, given up to the CIA.
“While political violence remained a problem, the ‘Commitment to Democracy’ (as it somewhat blandly came to be known) did result in several successes. The Contadora Group security forces and election monitors became adept at tamping down violence at least during the various elections sponsored over the next few years. Democratic norms, including elections, returned to El Salvador in 1982. By 1984 it was joined by Nicaragua and Guatemala. Democracy promotion projects also advanced in Honduras, and even in Contadora group member, Panama.
“As one can imagine, Castro had no trouble spinning events as a victory for Cuba and for himself, personally. The governments that came to power in Central America were mostly center-left in flavor rather than radical left revolutionaries, and in the case of Guatemala the new government was classically liberal in nature. But the rhetorical game was what counted to him. Right-wing and military governments were sidelined, and anyone willing to pose for a picture with Fidel was deemed sufficiently revolutionary for the pages of
Granma.
“Anderson for his part suffered some fallout when the effects of his new policy started to be noticed, and when the speculation about a deal with Castro began to make the rounds in domestic right-wing circles. But the political reality in the States at the time was chaotic enough that no one was able to effectively capitalize on vague political movements in what was, to many minds in the US, a backwater theater of the Cold War. All most people heard from the news was that democracy was increasing
in the region, and that immigration was increasing
from the region. There were some important political consequences from the latter phenomenon, but they wouldn’t be a factor until at least 1984.”
