Playing hell in Tennessee!

[Tomboric]

29 November, 1864, 5:30 p.m.
Columbia Pike
North of Spring Hill, Tennessee

Darkness was drawing nearer by the minute and the windy late November afternoon was rapidly drawing to a close. What Lieutenant General Alexander P. Stewart could make out through his field glasses filled him with confidence. His corps had been marching at a decent pace all day. Coming from Columbia, his men had followed the Old Settlers Road north and had crossed three rivers, including the wider Rutherford Creek. While the steady sound of battle could be heard to the west, Stewart stoically followed Army Commander John Bell Hood's original orders until he reached the Mount Carmel Road. Even the pleas of a staff officer from Benjamin Cheatham's corps for support, ostensibly on Hood's behalf, had not rattled him, although his inner tension had risen. Against the backdrop of the bigger picture, the success or failure of Cheatham's attack was of little consequence. Only when his three divisions and the artillery had crossed the Columbia Pike did the wiry 43-year-old with the thick black hair allow himself to breathe a sigh of relief. Mounted videttes reported that blue-clad troops had formed a semicircle to the southwest of his position. It was done. Stewart's 11,000-men corps had passed Schofield's Army of the Ohio and blocked the route of march to their destination of Nashville. Stewart had breastworks erected at right angles to the Columbia Pike and only then allowed his men to light fires and prepare dinner. All division commanders were ordered to send out strong outpost chains and to notify immediately of any enemy movement along the road. The men were relaxed and in good spirits. Even without knowing the big picture, the importance of the fact that their entrenchments were facing south and not north was not lost on them. Exciting events were in the offing.​

 

[Tomboric]

"It is with the greatest sense of duty that I now comply with your request for a statement regarding my perspective on the events of the late evening of 29 November 1864. Having repelled several determined attacks by two rebel divisions, my men had moved into position as follows: Wagner's division formed the spearhead of the army with Opdycke's and Lane's brigades in line of battle north-east of Spring Hill and Conrad in reserve. Kimball's and Wood's divisions came up the Columbia Pike in column formation, followed by XXIII Corps. The situation was extremely precarious. On our right, east of Columbia Pike and only a few hundred yards away, the rebels were present with four divisions. The nature of the terrain and especially of the road did not permit more than one skirmish line to be posted at right angles along the road. Rumours that the road to Franklin was blocked by Confederates in corps strength proved true after a short scouting. It also became known that Forrest was supposed to be in the northwest with two divisions. To cut to the chase: We had been trapped by superior enemy forces on three sides. After General Schofield arrived, we went through the army's remaining options together and came to the joint decision that a night attack, although risky, seemed the only realistic possibility under the prevailing circumstances to break through successfully and still achieve a union with General Thomas at Nashville. The plan was quickly formulated: Opdycke and Lane would advance to the left and right of the Columbia Pike and make contact with the enemy. As soon as this was done, Conrad would charge up the road in three lines of two regiments, clearing the way with the use of the bayonet and holding the breach in the aftermath. This would have enabled a large part of the army to get out of the misery via a levelled path (...)."

-Excerpt of the statement of Major General David S. Stanley to the Military Tribunal against the accused Major General John M. Schofield​

 

[marktaha]

Does Hood actually get something right?

 

[TheRockofChickamauga]

It seems that, to slightly change the words of Sam Watkins, "the bird has not flown the coop." Based on the fact that a court martial has been drawn up against an army commander (and one of Grant's favorites no less), then something really bad most have happened. The only bright light I see is that Thomas will be nearby to salvage the situation, and that IOTL very little of the outcome of Nashville was dependent of the use of Schofield and his men. I hope that Thomas still earns the moniker "The Sledge of Nashville" ITTL. Based on the TL's title, however, it seems Hood is going to take a more raiding approach to wear down Federals in the region.

 

[Tomboric]

Does Hood actually get something right?

To be honest, he did not change anything yet, it was just Stewart not confusing the roads and sticking to his original orders.

It seems that, to slightly change the words of Sam Watkins, "the bird has not flown the coop." Based on the fact that a court martial has been drawn up against an army commander (and one of Grant's favorites no less), then something really bad most have happened. The only bright light I see is that Thomas will be nearby to salvage the situation, and that IOTL very little of the outcome of Nashville was dependent of the use of Schofield and his men. I hope that Thomas still earns the moniker "The Sledge of Nashville" ITTL. Based on the TL's title, however, it seems Hood is going to take a more raiding approach to wear down Federals in the region.

Thomas OTL remained inactive for a longer period, gathering his strength. Although Schofield was not actually key to defeating Hood at Nashville, his forces being at hand however played a big part in Thomas's decision to attack in the first place.

 

[Tomboric]

November 29

Moved at daylight and crossed the river three miles above town and moved so as to strike the pike at Spring Hill. A long and tiresome march as the roads were in wretched condition. Stopped about one and a half mile from Spring Hill in rear of Cheatham’s line. Cheatham and Forrest had a little fight during the afternoon. The corps [Stewart’s] was thrown across the pike early in the evening with our division [Walthall’s] in the center. The enemy tried to retreat toward Franklin during the night, which put my brigade directly in their way. Before I knew they were so near to us, my skirmishers became engaged. The enemy push was determinated and the fight was a savage contest. The 9th and 25th [Arkansas] regiments were nearly overwhelmed, but I was able to shore up the line by sending in the 4th [Arkansas] regiment from its reserve position. Heavy fighting to my right with Quarles in dire straits. The enemy assault finally faltered when General Stewart ordered Truehart’s and Storr’s battalions to the front, firing double-canister at nearly point-blanc range. My loss was 10 killed and 60 wounded. During the course of the night, my advanced line brought in around 400 prisoners, many of them wounded and every single one mightly demoralized. After the fighting ended, I had my men rest in line of battle, awaiting next morning.​

-The Civil War Diary of Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Reynolds

 

[Tomboric]

During the night of November 28, 1864, Lieutenant General John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee marched toward Spring Hill to get astride Major General John M. Schofield’s Union army’s supply line. Hood was pursuing Schofield as the Northerners withdrew north from Columbia towards Nashville. Cavalry skirmishing between Brigadier General James H. Wilson’s Union cavalry and Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s Confederate troopers continued throughout the day as the Confederates advanced. On November 29th, Hood’s infantry crossed the Duck River and converged on Spring Hill. In the meantime, Schofield reinforced two brigades under Colonel John Q. Lane and Colonel Emerson Opdycke holding the crossroads in town there guarding the Union supply trains. In the late afternoon, the Federals repulsed several piecemeal Confederate attacks from Cleburne's and Bate's divisions. The Rebel infantry and cavalry attacks from east to west attempted to dislodge Schofield's army from the Columbia Pike, their route north to Nashville. During the evening, the rest of Schofield’s command tried from Columbia through Spring Hill to Franklin but had to discover, that Stewart's Confederate corps had been thrown across the pike to block them. Under the cover of night, elements of Major General David S. Stanley attempted to break through Stewart's lines, but failed, particularly due to the fierce resistance of Walthall's Division in the centre of the formation. In the early morning of 30 November, Schofield continued to search desperately for a way out. When elements of Wilson's cavalry checked the passability of the parallel road, Carter's Creek Pike, they met Buford's division of Forrest's cavalry there and were pushed back. Blocked head-on, with enemy troopers on his left and two infantry corps on his right, Schofield finally had no choice but to send an emissary with a flag of truce to Hood. At noon on 30 November, the IVth and XXIIIrd infantry corps and Wilson's cavalry surrendered unconditionally. While the men were paroled, all arms, regimental flags and supply wagons passed into Confederate possession. In the end, only a few strokes of the pen were enough to more than halve the armed Union presence in Tennessee. Compared to the tens of thousands of prisoners of war, the casualties of the two-day confrontation were almost insignificant. During the fighting in and around Spring Hill, the Northerners suffered 3,000 dead and wounded, while the Confederates lost about 1,000 men.​

 

[Tomboric]

1 December, 1864, 10:30 a.m.
Franklin, Tennessee

Captain James W. Brown of the 7th Texas Infantry, Granbury's Brigade, Cleburne's Division led his company into the small town of Franklin with his head held high at the forefront of the regiment. The shiny new boots had taken only a few miles to break in, a sign of their quality. Unlike most of the year that was drawing to a close, he had not woken up hungry, nor had he gone to bed with an empty stomach the previous evening. Well-hung, smoked beef and a full mug of real coffee had awakened his spirits and made the march almost a Sunday outing. This impression had spread to the rest of his unit and, he assumed, to the entire army. From a bunch of embittered and resigned soldiers, the treasures from the Yankee supply wagons had reborn the Confederate Army of Tennessee to new strength. Along the road, the people of Franklin, old and young, had gathered. People waved the Stars and Bars and cheered the incoming soldiers. The scene was more reminiscent of a folk festival than a war zone. Captain Brown knew that he and his men still had hard work and a bloody grind ahead of them in the days and weeks to come. But the overall impression had changed decisively.

 

[Tomboric]

On the same day that Hood's 39,000-man army marched triumphantly into Franklin, the bad news of Schofield's surrender reached Major General George H. Thomas in Nashville. At that time, he himself had barely 30,000 soldiers. However, only 15,000 of them were veterans, including three divisions of the 16th Corps under Major General Andrew J. Smith, one division of the 20th Corps under Brigadier General Charles Cruft and two cavalry brigades under Brigadier General Joseph F. Knipe. The remainder was provided by Nashville's garrison troops with a very doubtful fighting value. Thomas was not a man who would have been inclined to hesitate culpably in such a situation. He immediately telegraphed to the troops of the District of the Etowah, who were at Chattanooga, and ordered them to join him by the railroad via Murfreesboro. This transfer of troops would provide him with about 7,000 more men. From the District of West Tennessee, two brigades of the USTC, together about 3,000 muskets, had already set out. Thomas now requested the additional transfer of Grierson's 4,500-man division to make up for his obvious lack of cavalry. Already western Tennessee was almost completely denuded and now held only by several thousand militia in and around Memphis. Thomas could only hope that in the days and weeks to come the Confederate cavalry from north Alabama would not make any effort to interfere in the Tennessee conflict as well. The Yankee from Virginia was now faced with the task of forging an army out of the ragtag band of troops in the shortest possible time that was capable of standing up to Hood's veterans.​

 

[Tomboric]

Schofield's capture had hit Washington's political circles like a bomb. When Sherman proposed his March to the Sea, Ulysses S. Grant and Henry Halleck had objected to it on the grounds that Hood would use the opportunity to invade Tennessee. In response, Sherman airily indicated that this was exactly what he wanted and that if Hood "continues to march North, all the way to Ohio, I will supply him with rations." However, when the ever-confident Sherman disappeared into the heart of Georgia, Grant once again became concerned about an invasion of Kentucky or Ohio. Grant later said of the situation, "If I had been Hood, I would have gone to Louisville and on north until I came to Chicago." His concern doubtless reflected Abraham Lincoln's concern. Lincoln had little patience for slow generals and remarked of the situation, "This seems like the McClellan and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing and let the rebels raid the country."

All these fears had now been channelled. Sherman could only be reached periodically, if at all, by telegraph, and with delays of days each time. Even if Grant and Lincoln had wanted this, intervention by him in the fighting in Tennessee would have been virtually impossible. At the same time, the political situation was more fragile than it might have appeared. Although Lincoln had been re-elected president, war fatigue had been only slightly alleviated by the capture of Atlanta. Many families wanted their husbands and sons back. Against the unwillingness of broad sections of the population, a war would be difficult to arrange for another four years. The psychological effect of a recapture of Tennessee, or even an established Confederate presence in the state, could well undo the political successes of the preceding weeks with a few drumbeats. Grant knew that consistent action was now urgently needed. George Thomas was therefore ordered to gather his forces as quickly as possible and regain the initiative against Hood. He took the understandable view that Nashville's fortifications could, in case of doubt, be held by the garrison alone or a capture would turn into a Pyrrhic victory. Thomas therefore had a real chance of taking the fight to Hood offensively, drawing on reserves even from Kentucky if necessary.

A second order was issued to William T. Sherman. This was as simple as it was momentous. Savannah had to be taken as quickly as possible, without any hesitation. This was to provide reassurance so that, if necessary, troops could be moved from there by sea to other threatened sections of the front. So far, Sherman's advance through Georgia had met no serious resistance, but Savannah's fortifications appeared on paper to be at least as impressive as the redoubts of Nashville.​