plausible ways of getting Great britian out of WW2?

Is it plausible for the Axis to adopt a "Britain First" strategy?
Yes but that would send signs that the UK couldn't help but see like extra U-boats, proper landing craft, aircraft carriers etc.



Is it plausible that once they pick a course of action, they would understand its requirements set out to fulfill them (like expanding the logistics network in North Africa, building docks, railroads, etc.)?

They knew what was needed but didn't show any sign of being patient enough to do it and commit the economy in the scale that the UK did.

Is it plausible that they would be given the time to do it before other great powers intervene?

In wartime, no they wont be given the time, before war is declared, the other powers don't have to intervene, they just build up their forces in the area.
 
The Germans won at Crete because the Allies misjudged the where and the how they would land. They didn't realize until too late that there was no amphibious landing, it was *all* airborne. If they had realized that 24 hours sooner Germany would have had its first major defeat just in time for Barbarossa.
In the absense of king Gyges ring,surprise is the most potent weapon of war,that is what you are saying in fact,what is the surprise that Germans used it?
 
A sentiment that doesn't bear up much to reality. The Allies were already retreating when the Italians landed, and the only troops that were bombed before then were those in Heraklion.

And much larger, which allowed the Germans to get their forces into some sort of order, a luxury they won't have on Malta (one paratrooper at Crete was beaten to death by an old man before he'd managed to disentangle himself from his parachute). I'm not suggesting that Malta can't be taken, just that it's not going to be as easy as mere statistics would suggest.

Malta was virtually worthless as a strike base between January and April 1941 anyway (94% of the Axis supplies got through), so excuse me for being critical of this.[/QUOTE
As far as I can remember the German 8th Fliegercorps(Volfram von Richthoffen) was operating in the Balcans with absolute superiority does that represent a sentiment to you? I call it a fact;over Crete?even worse:
the distance of mainland airports vary from 144 klm to 100 klm from the mainland,the losses of RN around Crete very heavy;do you call it a sentiment? I call it a fact.The softening of the island's defences was effective and kept the allies guessing about the areas of drops;not a sentiment but a fact.
Crete is mainly longer than Malta,consequently with fewer convenient air-landing aereas,so what was the German forces "sort of order" that was a "luxury" and in malta wasn't?
Maltra was extremely valuable as an allied strike base agaist axis shipping,something which was the main factor for the allied victory in the Mediterranean;its capture would greatly enhence German/Italian operations and and would force the English fleet to leave the Med.
 
A sentiment that doesn't bear up much to reality. The Allies were already retreating when the Italians landed, and the only troops that were bombed before then were those in Heraklion.

And much larger, which allowed the Germans to get their forces into some sort of order, a luxury they won't have on Malta (one paratrooper at Crete was beaten to death by an old man before he'd managed to disentangle himself from his parachute). I'm not suggesting that Malta can't be taken, just that it's not going to be as easy as mere statistics would suggest.

Malta was virtually worthless as a strike base between January and April 1941 anyway (94% of the Axis supplies got through), so excuse me for being critical of this.
The light losses of the Axis supplies were due to general Geisler's 10th Fliegercorps which was pounding Malta in view of the invasion of the island and anyway its presence in Sicily was limited since it was due to depart for Russia.
That proves the need for the complete nutrualisation of the island.
 
The Germans won at Crete because the Allies misjudged the where and the how they would land. They didn't realize until too late that there was no amphibious landing, it was *all* airborne. If they had realized that 24 hours sooner Germany would have had its first major defeat just in time for Barbarossa.
Not really,the 22 airtransported division was ready to land if anything untoward happened.
 
Given the logistic infustructure in place in Italian North Africa was pressed to support the forces deployed in OTL you'll either need to spend 6 to 12 months improving it (and in doing so, let the British build up their own forces in Egypt) or develop a Panzer capable of running on sand instead of petrol.
:rolleyes:
Quite an overstatement!what you claim,didn't stop the Italians from landing the divisions destined originally for the landing in Malta in north Africa instead and the Germans a few months later to land the 5th Panzerarmee in North Africa in a very short time.
 
In the absense of king Gyges ring,surprise is the most potent weapon of war,that is what you are saying in fact,what is the surprise that Germans used it?

The Allies expected an amphibious operation and viewed the German airborne landing as a prelude to the landing. In a sense it was akin to Operation Fortitude, the belief that the real deal was just a prelude, by the time they realized there was no prelude it was too late.
 
As far as I can remember the German 8th Fliegercorps(Volfram von Richthoffen) was operating in the Balcans with absolute superiority does that represent a sentiment to you? I call it a fact;over Crete?even worse:
Actually, that kind of my point, in Crete the Germans got the allies on the defensive with the paratroopers alone.

the distance of mainland airports vary from 144 klm to 100 klm from the mainland,the losses of RN around Crete very heavy;do you call it a sentiment? I call it a fact.The softening of the island's defences was effective and kept the allies guessing about the areas of drops;not a sentiment but a fact.
Oh hey, what did I say, Crete was large enough that the Germans were able to get organised without getting pounced.

Crete is mainly longer than Malta,consequently with fewer convenient air-landing aereas,so what was the German forces "sort of order" that was a "luxury" and in malta wasn't?
Uh Crete at its narrowest (about 12 km), is about as wide as Malta at its widest (about 60 km), at its widest Crete is wider than the whole Malta group is long.

...its capture would greatly enhence German/Italian operations and and would force the English fleet to leave the Med.
Bull. Crap. The Italian ports in Libya were the downfall of the Axis power in the Med, not any action by the Allies, as Rommel proved when, even with four months virtually untouched buildup, he couldn't take Tobruk. It doesn't matter how good your general is, if he doesn't have the supply network in place, he's never going to be able to do anything.

Quite an overstatement!what you claim,didn't stop the Italians from landing the divisions destined originally for the landing in Malta in north Africa instead and the Germans a few months later to land the 5th Panzerarmee in North Africa in a very short time.
It's easy to march troops down a ramp, and thus 'land' them, it's much harder than to unload a cargo ship because you can only do it a bit at a time.
 
Actually, that kind of my point, in Crete the Germans got the allies on the defensive with the paratroopers alone.

Oh hey, what did I say, Crete was large enough that the Germans were able to get organised without getting pounced.

Uh Crete at its narrowest (about 12 km), is about as wide as Malta at its widest (about 60 km), at its widest Crete is wider than the whole Malta group is long.

Bull. Crap. The Italian ports in Libya were the downfall of the Axis power in the Med, not any action by the Allies, as Rommel proved when, even with four months virtually untouched buildup, he couldn't take Tobruk. It doesn't matter how good your general is, if he doesn't have the supply network in place, he's never going to be able to do anything.

It's easy to march troops down a ramp, and thus 'land' them, it's much harder than to unload a cargo ship because you can only do it a bit at a time.
Magnificent,you haven't understood anything(how did you answer...)
I am sure 'Bull' and 'Crap' are not very persuasive arguments...
Anyway what I was saying there is that the capture of Malta would strengthen the Axis since the bases of planes and submarines that caused so many losses to Axis suplly ships for north Africa would be eradicated
(In his book "Des Deutsches Africa Corps unter Rommel" Hans Gert von Esebeck writes:'The greatest antitank weapon of the allies was the torpedo')-the rest tomorrow.
Hmm!do you know the distance El Agheila Tobruk? In African operations that distance in more than justifiable to stop for replenishment before the next jump;had Malta being eliminated Tobruk would have fallen in the first attempt.
You didn't seem to understand "Crete is larger than Malta;the Germans only had obvious places to drop paratroopers since they should be within Luftwaffe umbrella,I don't believe the allies were suprised with the paratroopers so much since the Italian navy didn't have control of the Aegean and
 
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Magnificent,you haven't understood anything(how did you answer...)
I am sure 'Bull' and 'Crap' are not very persuasive arguments...
Anyway what I was saying there is that the capture of Malta would strengthen the Axis since the bases of planes and submarines that caused so many losses to Axis suplly ships for north Africa would be eradicated
(In his book "Des Deutsches Africa Corps unter Rommel" Hans Gert von Esebeck writes:'The greatest antitank weapon of the allies was the torpedo')-the rest tomorrow.

The losses inflicted by Malta based forces have been massively hyped, whenever Rommel was complaining about lack of fuel etc there was usually several thousand tonnes sitting in storage around North African ports due to lack of transport to shift it.
 
Anyway what I was saying there is that the capture of Malta would strengthen the Axis since the bases of planes and submarines that caused so many losses to Axis suplly ships for north Africa would be eradicated
Malta was out of action for four months, and it did Rommel little good because the Italian infrastructure investments in Libya were virtually non-existent. It's you who hasn't understood a thing.
 
Except it wasn't good enough to roll from East to West until new railway lines had been built...something the Italians and Germans in North Africa were not prepared to take the time to do.
Not good enough but adequate.The Germans retreated the first time due to lack of adequate supplies and reinforcements;ditto the English at the end of 41 could not bring more units foreward to El Agheila due to lack of supplies.
Generally,as H.G.von Esebeck writes,"since operations in the desert resemble operations at sea,advances were rapid causing certain disorganisation to the armies and disruption to the supply due to distances."(Des Deutsches Africa Corps unter Rommel).
It shows that advance was difficult but feasable.Witout an other front the Germans could bring adittional weight on North Africa utilising the ports and improving facilites.Fall of Malta would remove the threat of its submarine bases and fast attack boats and planes against the German supply lines and the capture of Alexandria was feasable in 42'.
 
Eliminating Malta as an airbase and submarine base removes forces that preyed on the Tripoli and Bengahzi supply lines;

such an initiative would obviously have to come at the expense of postponing barbarossa

the op is defeat Britain, and this is how their forces in the field at that time could be beaten

it falls into the category of certainly physically possible but politically difficult versus hitlers desire to go after russia
Barbarossa was postponed not because of Malta where the X Fliegercorps of general Geisler was sceduled to leave Sisily at the beginning of April as at that time was chosen for the invasion of Malta.The postponement came because of the unexpected resistance in Greece(from 6th April to end of May/operation Mercury started 20th May) that kept considerable forces that were needed for the Russian campaign tight down in the mainland of Greece and the Balcans as well as in Crete(8th Fliegercorps-Richthoffen,armour formations from Kiustenil to Peloponnese) and barbarossa was postponed for 22nd June
 
Witout an other front the Germans could bring adittional weight on North Africa utilising the ports and improving facilites.Fall of Malta would remove the threat of its submarine bases and fast attack boats and planes against the German supply lines and the capture of Alexandria was feasable in 42'.
Except that the British won't be stupid enough to take the down-time they did in '42 because they know the Germans will have a steady stream of supplies, and thus they'll keep Tobruk reinforced, and that will cripple any advance.
 
Maybe, but doing so ignores prevalent thinking of the day. It is easy to look back and say Germans should have done this or that.

In July 1940, Germany defeated France in heartbeat. Campaign in France left bulk of German army exhausted and in dire need to recuperate and absorb replacements. Britain has shown no intention to abandon war, but it looked like they needed one last hard nudge and they would roll over and die too. Any plan of campaign in the Med involves time period longer than (at best and most optimistic estimate) a year. And Luftwaffe, commanded by second most prominent individual in Germany at that moment, claims that they will be able to knock Britain out in fortnight.

By that point, Luftwaffe record was of unmitigated success unless we count Dunkirk, but it was perceived as an insignificant blot, easily attributed not to any flows within the force, but objective circumstances and tactical situation. After all, British did escape only with their naked lives.

Besides, bombing Britain nets better result than attacking widely dispersed British colonial interests, of which those easy to reach are of little or no significance to British war effort (manpower, production or resources wise). Bombing Britain and destroying or neutralizing it as an enemy base of operation virtually guarantees safety of Western Europe, while conquering Egypt is at best a blow to enemy moral and nothing more.
Shaby,why exhausted?only a small part of the German army took part in the actual fighting and the losses were minimal:45000 losses approximately doesn't make an army the size of the German one to need recuperation;and only a fraction of that army would be involved in operations in the Balcans,malta and North Africa.
In fact the army was fully capable of proceeding in further operations as the demand might have been.
 
Except it wasn't good enough to roll from East to West until new railway lines had been built...something the Italians and Germans in North Africa were not prepared to take the time to do.
Well,it actually was.The Brits rolled east all the way to El Agheila on their trucks not on railways,ditto for the Germans and both had the same supply problems.
 
^Yup.



How does capturing Malta remove that threat? How does the Axis *find* four divisions while preparing Barbarossa? Why does Hitler decide not to do what he wants to do all along to go traipsing around the desert in a fashion that even at its most successful can never actually win him the war? If the goal is to get the UK out of the war altogether, North Africa's not where to go about doing that.
I believe,barbarossa was not on,or postoned or whatever,since the question is how to get England out of the war,but even with Barbarossa ready to execute,there were 27 battle ready divisions and 4 panzers in France which left for the Eastern front next year,so they were available for Africa(some of them) for Africa...
Malta was the basis of Submarines and planes that caused the greatest losses to Axis shipping and that was reason enough for the island's elimination as a threat.
 
It is not all about losses. German tanks needed maintenance, infantry needed the rest. More than a month of continued operations in France left their toll. Ammo stocks for one needed to be replenished, captured equipment taken stock of, units reorganized. It took some time.

Why Balkans in 1940? IIRC, Germany (well, Hitler) decided on Balkans operations only in 1941. In 1940 they still hoped to frag the Balkan country into German sphere of influence.
 
Well,it actually was.The Brits rolled east all the way to El Agheila on their trucks not on railways,ditto for the Germans and both had the same supply problems.

And repeatedly reached the limit of what truck-bourne logistic could support before being knocked back.
 
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