Plausible CSA victories?

TFSmith121

Banned
No, I just found it odd you

No one. I made an offhand reply to Anaxagoras which seems to have been misinterpreted (which is understandable from how I posted it) and I put down my responses and made my position clearer.

Unless someone is about to tell me they believe there was a silent white Unionist majority I'm really not arguing with anybody about that point. You seem to wish to start an argument about it, but that's about it.

No, I just found it odd you would categorize anything on this thread, or anywhere else on the site, as such.

If anything, the usual default in Civil War era AHs are the untapped legions of rebel sympathizers in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois who will form the butternut legions of the Knights of the Golden Circle given enough encouragement by the noble chivalry ... even though, of course, historically, they didn't...;)

Not even in Kentucky, when Bragg et al showed up; nor in Maryland, when Lee et al showed ... interesting, that.

Bottom line is there were "white" US regiments recruited in every slave state but South Carolina, to a total (from Current) of ~100,000 men.

There were no rebel units from any free state.

Puts the issue into perspective, one would think.

Best,
 
Though interesting and informative, this is getting rather afield of my original question: could a group of states with similar borders to those of the OTL CSA have had both the desire and the ability to secede from the USA, and if so, what POD(s) would have been needed for such a thing to happen?
 
Though interesting and informative, this is getting rather afield of my original question: could a group of states with similar borders to those of the OTL CSA have had both the desire and the ability to secede from the USA, and if so, what POD(s) would have been needed for such a thing to happen?

With a POD of 1840 it's more than plausible. You could start the war 10 years earlier which dramatically increases the *CSA's chances.
 
Though interesting and informative, this is getting rather afield of my original question: could a group of states with similar borders to those of the OTL CSA have had both the desire and the ability to secede from the USA, and if so, what POD(s) would have been needed for such a thing to happen?

You'd need the war to kick off earlier, say in the mid-1850's at the latest, and be (for lack of a better word) "messier". OTL's Civil War was basically the South picking up it's toys and going home once it became clear the political power of the planter class was done in the North and that slavery was done. For the *Confederacy to have a chance, you'd need the battle lines to be a lot less clear cut. Maybe Harrison doesn't die and the Whig's manage to get off the ground as a political party, maybe John C. Fremont wins the '56 election a fucks up spectacularly, something that muddies the waters a bit, such that someone could say that "actually it's about states rights" with a straight face.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Again, the question is why?

Though interesting and informative, this is getting rather afield of my original question: could a group of states with similar borders to those of the OTL CSA have had both the desire and the ability to secede from the USA, and if so, what POD(s) would have been needed for such a thing to happen?

Again, e question is why? Until 1860, southerners or dough faces had won every presidential election (essentially) since that of JQ Adams, and they got almost everything they wanted in terms of slavery...

What are they going to secede over? They run the country anyway...

Best,
 
I appreciate that the foreign intervention theme has been deemed slightly off topic, but I really need to correct some misconceptions that seem to be present. Misconception one is what was actually being discussed in 1862:
In the fall of 1862, both Prime Minister Lord Palmerston and Foreign Secretary Earl Russell were ready to propose recognition of the Confederacy to the full Cabinet.
It's not recognition but mediation which was to be proposed (“It seems to Russell and me that the Time is fast approaching where some joint offer of Mediation… might be made with some Prospect of Success,” Palmerston to Gladstone 24th September 1862). Recognition was suggested as the natural result of mediation being accepted by the South and rejected by the North, but the proposal to be made to Cabinet was not recognition as is commonly implied.

Only if the Confederacy appeared to be losing. If they appeared to be winning they probably accept the proposal and offer to fill the role as mediators alongside France (and potentially Russia as a counterweight).
It's not "potentially Russia"- Russia's involvement is seen as integral to the project. As Gladstone wrote:

"The interference which the case requires is an expression of opinion, or a course of action, on the part of such combination of the Powers as may virtually and constructively convey the prevailing judgement of the civilised world. The union of England and France would not sufficiently answer to this definition, for France, by her Mexican policy, has in some degree compromised her impartial, above all her unsuspected, position in American affairs. The union of England, France, and Russia would probably fulfil the definition... Russia supplies in the largest measure the one vital element, otherwise deficient, of traditional and unquestioned friendliness to America" (Gladstone memorandum, 25 October 1862)

Misconception two is that if it came up, it was going to happen.
If Palmerston, Russell, AND Gladstone had decided it was the thing to do, it's obviously going to be done.
This ignores the anti-intervention majority in cabinet, which I've highlighted on here before:

Those are the only three people who matter in terms of whether mediation makes it to cabinet, but they don't have the power to push it through. Let's look at the historical balance of opinion on mediation:

Supporters: Russell (Foreign secretary), Gladstone (Chancellor), Lord Westbury (Lord Chancellor).
Opponents: Sir George Cornewall Lewis (secretary of war), the Duke of Argyll (Lord Privy Seal), Sir George Grey (home secretary), Thomas Milner-Gibson (President of the Board of Trade), Charles Pelham Villiers (President of the Poor Law Board), the Duke of Newcastle (secretary for the colonies), Lord Grenville (leader of the House of Lords).

I don't see a victory at Antietam shifting opinion enough to overcome that balance. Most of those opposed stipulated that the North should show themselves to be tired of the war before mediation should be offered. If the only change is the Confederates winning at Antietam, that doesn't meet the criterion.

The only really powerful neutral is Palmerston, to be honest. The people I listed were the ones which historians have put on one side or the other: I would add Sir Charles Wood (secretary of state for India) to those opposed on the grounds that he later explicitly comes out and says they shouldn't offer mediation until it's asked for. That leaves the Duke of Somerset, Cardwell, and Lord Elgin, and- worthy though those gentlemen were- even if all three had supported mediation I don't see them swinging the balance.

The third misconception is the conflation of recognition and intervention. In fact, the main actors were careful to avoid such a conflation at the time:

"Many people who talk of acknowledgment seem to imply that that acknowledgment, if made, would establish some different relations between this country and the Southern States. But that is not the case. Acknowledgment would not establish a nation unless it were followed by some direct active interference. Neutrality, as was well observed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, is perfectly compatible with acknowledgment. You may be neutral in a war between two countries whose independence you never called in question. Two long-established countries go to war; you acknowledge the independence of both, but you are not on that account bound to take part in the contest." (Viscount Palmerston, HC Deb 18 July 1862 vol 168 c571)
"The proposal would naturally be made to both North and South, if both accepted we should recommend an Armistice and Cessation of Blockades with a View to Negotiation on the Basis of Separation. If both declined we must of Course leave them to go on; If the South accepted and the North declined we should then I conceive acknowledge the Independence of the South, but we ought, Russell and I imagine, to declare the maintenance of our Neutrality even in the Case of our acknowledging the Independence of the South." (Palmerston to Gladstone, 24 September 1862).
"The choice, I presume, lies between inaction on the one hand, and an interference limited to moral means on the other... Recognition,... wisely accompanied with a declaration of continued neutrality" (Gladstone memorandum, 25 October 1862)

Naturally, this doesn't mean the US wouldn't declare war in the event of the UK, France and Russia recognising the Confederacy. However, I find it hard to see the US making such a quixotic gesture, and even harder to see any of the three powers entering into such a war with particular gusto- certainly not enough to prevent the US bringing its economic preponderance over the Confederacy to bear if they can find a few half-decent generals.

Indeed. I think it's hard for many modern readers to understand how the aristocrats back in the day thought about the issue, or at least in terms of nationalist pride and self-interest.
Perhaps it's difficult to understand because nationalist pride and self-interest almost never form part of these calculations? The discussion over mediation is generally what might be best for America, the slave and the world. In fact, the rationale for the timing of the intervention is to avoid even the perception of self-interest:
"if in any one of the great towns... an outbreak should occur... we might then seem to be interfering... rather in the attitude of parties then as representing the general interests of humanity and peace" (Gladstone to Palmerston, 25 September 1862)

Given that I've got Gladstone out, I may as well end with a relevant quote:
Hell even OTL people were willing to overlook the slavery issue based on a set of prejudices and wildly inaccurate assumptions on the matter. The Confederacy enjoyed a baffling amount of support amongst influential portions of the population well into 1863.
"It is one thing to anticipate an issue of the war favourable in the main to the Southern view: it is quite another to sympathise with men whose cause is, as I think, seriously tainted by its connection with slavery" (Gladstone memorandum, 25 October 1862)
 
If the UK and France intervene actively on the part of the CSA then victory is possible though not a guarantee. Recognition and loans don't do it, and simply recognizing the CSA will not cause the RN to break the blockade, and doing things like building warships openly for the CSA is prohibited by UK law. recognition and loans help, but they don't provide manpower and don't provide anough extra 'stuff", the CSA is so deficient in everything they need from rails to guns to medical supplies that they need to fight the war that as long as the blockade is as effective as OTL they will always be very short.

The only CSA strategy that works without foreign intervention is for them to win enough, and to keep the Union forces mostly out of the south for long enough the north becomes tired of the war and lets the CSA leave...probably with Kentucky and W. Virginia staying with the Union.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
recognition and loans help, but they don't provide manpower

Actually, they do provide manpower, at least indirectly. Recognition and foreign loans would contribute to a more stable Confederate currency, thereby reducing inflation and making life easier on the home front than it was IOTL, which in turn means that not as many men will desert from the Confederate army as was the case IOTL. This is a big deal, because inflation was one of the major causes of Confederate defeat. As I have always said, the Civil War was won and lost on the bond market as surely as it was won and lost on the battlefield.
 
It's not recognition but mediation which was to be proposed (“It seems to Russell and me that the Time is fast approaching where some joint offer of Mediation… might be made with some Prospect of Success,” Palmerston to Gladstone 24th September 1862). Recognition was suggested as the natural result of mediation being accepted by the South and rejected by the North, but the proposal to be made to Cabinet was not recognition as is commonly implied.

Agreed, this is often misinterpreted.

It's not "potentially Russia"- Russia's involvement is seen as integral to the project. As Gladstone wrote:

"The interference which the case requires is an expression of opinion, or a course of action, on the part of such combination of the Powers as may virtually and constructively convey the prevailing judgement of the civilised world. The union of England and France would not sufficiently answer to this definition, for France, by her Mexican policy, has in some degree compromised her impartial, above all her unsuspected, position in American affairs. The union of England, France, and Russia would probably fulfil the definition... Russia supplies in the largest measure the one vital element, otherwise deficient, of traditional and unquestioned friendliness to America" (Gladstone memorandum, 25 October 1862)

Hmm my own reading is that if both France and Britain found the situation favorable to offer mediation they might continue to make the offer without Russia. If I'm completely wrong on that though I can retract that.

Misconception two is that if it came up, it was going to happen.

This ignores the anti-intervention majority in cabinet, which I've highlighted on here before:

This definitely prevents direct intervention short of a war with the Union caused by other means.

The third misconception is the conflation of recognition and intervention. In fact, the main actors were careful to avoid such a conflation at the time:

"Many people who talk of acknowledgment seem to imply that that acknowledgment, if made, would establish some different relations between this country and the Southern States. But that is not the case. Acknowledgment would not establish a nation unless it were followed by some direct active interference. Neutrality, as was well observed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, is perfectly compatible with acknowledgment. You may be neutral in a war between two countries whose independence you never called in question. Two long-established countries go to war; you acknowledge the independence of both, but you are not on that account bound to take part in the contest." (Viscount Palmerston, HC Deb 18 July 1862 vol 168 c571)
"The proposal would naturally be made to both North and South, if both accepted we should recommend an Armistice and Cessation of Blockades with a View to Negotiation on the Basis of Separation. If both declined we must of Course leave them to go on; If the South accepted and the North declined we should then I conceive acknowledge the Independence of the South, but we ought, Russell and I imagine, to declare the maintenance of our Neutrality even in the Case of our acknowledging the Independence of the South." (Palmerston to Gladstone, 24 September 1862).
"The choice, I presume, lies between inaction on the one hand, and an interference limited to moral means on the other... Recognition,... wisely accompanied with a declaration of continued neutrality" (Gladstone memorandum, 25 October 1862)

Naturally, this doesn't mean the US wouldn't declare war in the event of the UK, France and Russia recognising the Confederacy. However, I find it hard to see the US making such a quixotic gesture, and even harder to see any of the three powers entering into such a war with particular gusto- certainly not enough to prevent the US bringing its economic preponderance over the Confederacy to bear if they can find a few half-decent generals.

Agreed. I think that even if the offer of mediation was put forward somehow then it would simply be forcefully declined by the Union (but Seward's war bluster would prove nothing but that) and the whole issue would become nothing but an overt humanitarian gesture soon forgotten in Europe at wars conclusion, but one which would severely strain Anglo-American relations to a worse degree post war.

The Alabama claims x20 I would say.

Perhaps it's difficult to understand because nationalist pride and self-interest almost never form part of these calculations? The discussion over mediation is generally what might be best for America, the slave and the world. In fact, the rationale for the timing of the intervention is to avoid even the perception of self-interest:
"if in any one of the great towns... an outbreak should occur... we might then seem to be interfering... rather in the attitude of parties then as representing the general interests of humanity and peace" (Gladstone to Palmerston, 25 September 1862)

Here I'm speaking more with a broad brush on why and how the Confederates could enjoy the support of members of the upper and middle classes in Great Britain. I do realize that doesn't necessarily make the government willing to support the CSA outright.

Thanks for this information though and for clarifying so many things.
 
Hmm my own reading is that if both France and Britain found the situation favorable to offer mediation they might continue to make the offer without Russia. If I'm completely wrong on that though I can retract that.
I can't see how the Gladstone memorandum supports this interpretation: on its own, the quote I gave argues that "the union of England and France would not sufficiently answer... Russia supplies... the one vital element, otherwise deficient". The section I chose to redact from the original quotation elaborates on this:
"... would probably fulfil the definition. These are the three greatest powers of Europe. These are three powers which also represent the great rivalries of the Old World: and it is scarcely in the nature of things that the three should agree and co-operate, except for a good end. And not only by reason of their greatness may they fairly claim to represent Europe, especially in the absence of any contrary indication, but, in the particular case, Russia supplies in the largest measure the one vital element, otherwise deficient, of traditional and unquestioned friendliness to America. Besides, it may be assumed that if England, France, and Russia led, other Powers would be prepared to follow, if needful."

This definitely prevents direct intervention short of a war with the Union caused by other means.
It also prevents mediation: in the context I used it there, 'intervention' means anything other than strict neutrality between the two sides.

Here I'm speaking more with a broad brush on why and how the Confederates could enjoy the support of members of the upper and middle classes in Great Britain.
But the majority of Confederate supporters were driven neither by nationalism (assuming that by this you mean British nationalism) nor self-interest. When you actually look at their beliefs, they're a complex mix of disappointment at the weakness of the Northern anti-slavery cause, support for the principle of self-determination (generally phrased in libertarian as well as national/racial terms), and a vague anti-American/democratic sentiment. Self-interest is a barely-present feature of their arguments, and Confederate activists arguing that a divided America will make Britain's geopolitical position safer are overwhelmingly outnumbered by those arguing that it'll speed the end of slavery. If I can quote the original statement to make a neat point:

Hell even OTL people were willing to overlook the slavery issue based on a set of prejudices and wildly inaccurate assumptions on the matter.
Dig into the primary sources and you quickly find that it's not the Victorians overlooking slavery- it's us.
 
I can't see how the Gladstone memorandum supports this interpretation: on its own, the quote I gave argues that "the union of England and France would not sufficiently answer... Russia supplies... the one vital element, otherwise deficient". The section I chose to redact from the original quotation elaborates on this:
"... would probably fulfil the definition. These are the three greatest powers of Europe. These are three powers which also represent the great rivalries of the Old World: and it is scarcely in the nature of things that the three should agree and co-operate, except for a good end. And not only by reason of their greatness may they fairly claim to represent Europe, especially in the absence of any contrary indication, but, in the particular case, Russia supplies in the largest measure the one vital element, otherwise deficient, of traditional and unquestioned friendliness to America. Besides, it may be assumed that if England, France, and Russia led, other Powers would be prepared to follow, if needful."

Ah, my understanding of this position is in error then.

It also prevents mediation: in the context I used it there, 'intervention' means anything other than strict neutrality between the two sides.

Oh I see what you mean then. It neglects even a mediation position on humanitarian grounds then?

But the majority of Confederate supporters were driven neither by nationalism (assuming that by this you mean British nationalism) nor self-interest. When you actually look at their beliefs, they're a complex mix of disappointment at the weakness of the Northern anti-slavery cause, support for the principle of self-determination (generally phrased in libertarian as well as national/racial terms), and a vague anti-American/democratic sentiment. Self-interest is a barely-present feature of their arguments, and Confederate activists arguing that a divided America will make Britain's geopolitical position safer are overwhelmingly outnumbered by those arguing that it'll speed the end of slavery. If I can quote the original statement to make a neat point:


Dig into the primary sources and you quickly find that it's not the Victorians overlooking slavery- it's us.

I've found that amongst many of the British Confederate supporters that the slavery issue was overlooked, or at least handwaved away on the assumption of liberalism marching on (based on the recent emancipation of the serfs in Russia). Francis Lawley immediately springs to mind, and the many military observers too who supported the Confederacy such as Wolseley and Freemantle (the issue is as you say, more complex, but did not prevent favorable impressions of the South despite this slave state status).

This has been a position I've also found in Canadian observers of the war (granted again mostly amongst the upper class, with the more liberal supporters again seeing it as a Confederate fight for independence and the lackluster support of the Union for the anti-slavery agenda) which has matched my reading of the opinion of even some moderates in Britain.

That of course doesn't mean Britain is willing to endorse slavery, it simply means that the issue is one which people are willing to overlook in their support of the Confederate cause.

My position on self-interest stems from my reading of the concern over the effect of the loss of cheap cotton and the concerns over the loss of jobs and disruption of trade that seemed to be on the Cabinets mind in 1861-62 when mediation was considered.
 
Virginia has claim to peninsular Delmarva, that would bring about some concessions in a peace treaty. They also have claim to "West" Virginia, so that would give them some negotiating power. Getting New Orleans back nullifies some of that, depending on when the treaty is signed. Indian Territory is also likely to go Confederate if only because the US would not want them back if at all possible.
 
It neglects even a mediation position on humanitarian grounds then?
Some recognise a humanitarian justification of mediation but still oppose it. Argyll argues that the Union needs to be convinced of the hopelessness of subjugating the South; Granville argues that mediation is impractical because Britain doesn't understand the postion of the two combatants well enough.
I've found that amongst many of the British Confederate supporters that the slavery issue was overlooked, or at least handwaved away on the assumption of liberalism marching on
I'm not sure you can accuse Confederate supporters of overlooking or handwaving slavery without doing the same for Union supporters. The former tend to play down or split hairs about Union anti-slavery, the latter to overstate it or elide opposition to slavery with opposition to its extension. The tactic used by Confederate supporters at Emancipation Proclamation meetings of proposing resolutions calling on the North to emancipate its own slaves is a perfect demonstration of this phenomenon. More accurate would be to say that slavery, and particularly the sufficiency of the Union anti-slavery effort, is the primary determinant of British affiliations.

To say they overlook or handwave slavery implies a lack of attention to the topic, which doesn't seem to be borne out by the evidence. Slavery is discussed in chapter 4 of Spence's American Union (though territorial slavery also features in chapter 3), before tariffs (chapter 5) and the right of secession (chapter 6); the Confederate Secession, by the Marquess of Lothian, discusses slavery in chapters 4 and 5. The mere fact that the Confederacy sacks Spence for talking too much about slavery should be enough to dispel the idea that it's overlooked.

My position on self-interest stems from my reading of the concern over the effect of the loss of cheap cotton and the concerns over the loss of jobs and disruption of trade that seemed to be on the Cabinets mind in 1861-62 when mediation was considered.
Again, this doesn't really seem to match what was being said at the time: the discussions taking place at Cabinet level relate almost exclusively to the moral and practical justifications for mediation and not the likelihood of obtaining cotton as a result of the move. I've seen assumptions and surmises by both contemporary actors and historians that hardship was correlated with intervention, but I haven't seen evidence from the Cabinet that bears this out. In fact, though I recognise the potential for double-dealing, it should be noted that the government has publicly expressed its view that hardship is not a sufficient motivation for British involvement:
How would it have been, if, for the sake of any selfish objects, for any mercenary or interested motives—if to provide ourselves with cotton and to meet our own difficulties arising incidentally out of their misfortunes—how would it have been if, for the purpose of consulting and considering our own interests, we had been the first to break the recognised usages of established law—the first to say that the United States as a belligerent Power should not exercise all belligerent rights in the ordinary manner, because we wanted cotton? If we had taken such a course, we should not have been able to look in the face Europe or the world; we should not have been able to appeal to the verdict of our own age and of posterity. Would any Government presiding over the destinies of this country be capable of entertaining such a policy? If there were any such Government, a power even stronger than the Government would prevent it. (Sir Roundell Palmer, solicitor-general, HC Deb 07 March 1862 vol 165 cc1224-5)

However, I think we should probably agree to disagree on this front. We seem to be square on the fundamental aspect relevant to this thread, that foreign intervention is highly unlikely and that the question is whether the Confederacy is capable of winning the war by itself.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
I think you've answered the question

That's why I asked "ability and desire." I can't see a reason why a *CSA with the means to secede would also want to do so, which proves only that I can't see one.

I think you've answered the question.;)

The one time before 1860-61 there was any serious threat of a slave state considering secession was 1832, with South Carolina ("too small for a republic, too large for an insane asylum") regarding the Nullification Crisis. Jackson, of course, was president, so that threat ended in about a month.

One point worth raising in terms of 1832, of course, is that some 8,000 loyal militia were mobilized within South Carolina to guard against any attempt at nullification.

So there really isn't anything ONE slave state would secede over before November, 1860.

At least not historically.

Best,
 
I think one of the most plausible scenarios for a Confederate victory is Fremont winning the Presidency in 1856. With a probable war 4 years early, it's hard to picture a worse choice for President to prosecute the civil war (at least, if his OTL record is anything to go by).
 
I think one of the most plausible scenarios for a Confederate victory is Fremont winning the Presidency in 1856. With a probable war 4 years early, it's hard to picture a worse choice for President to prosecute the civil war (at least, if his OTL record is anything to go by).

The trick is getting Fremont to win, when OTL he got pretty thoroughly defeated by Buchanan. The only way I think you can get Fremont into the White House is either the Democrats split their votes (for some reason) with a third party run, or Fremont is convinced to moderate his views on Slavery going into the election.
 
Though interesting and informative, this is getting rather afield of my original question: could a group of states with similar borders to those of the OTL CSA have had both the desire and the ability to secede from the USA, and if so, what POD(s) would have been needed for such a thing to happen?

It's a lot harder than people think. First, the South as to feel they need to secede. Abolitionist sentiment has not risen to the level where the South feels threatened until the late 1850s. Heck, abolitionist sentiment doesn't really go mainstream until the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. Contrary to the Paul-ite rhetoric one sees deployed around secession now, historically, the South pioneered the over-reach of Federal power on the North, not vice versa. With no existential threat to slavery, there's no reason for a Southern secession. (I've already provided the "reality" link up the thread as far as why the South went out.)

If the South waits, it's a decade more of industry and rail-lines up North, and with no-where near the equivalent in the South. The window between when the South felt threatened and when it was obvious that they had not chance is narrow. Heck, you can even say that this was a mirage - TF will go in that direction, and I will outside of some narrow circumstances in 1862 and exceedingly narrow ones in 1864.

I think any independent CSA is much smaller than the borders of the states that seceded. I think in any 1862, early 1863 settlement, well, this ain't a fucking Paradox game. I think that the US keeps a lot of the Mississippi valley and New Orleans. I think as much of Tennessee that wants to leave probably gets to. Heck, I'm not sure Western North Carolina stays Confederate. I think the US gets to control the river. There is not a glorious CSA Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, New Mexico, and Southern California just because they tried hard.
 
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