Plausibility of US recapture of Wake Island in 1943

In 1941 Wake Island had strategic value for two basic reasons:

1. Wake Island would act as a picket for Pearl Harbor. In case of war patrol craft could operate from the island and either detect the Japanese fleet or recon the Marshall Islands. If the Japanese attacked Wake Island it would act as a warning bell to Hawaii.
2. Wake Island was a refueling stop for bombers flying to the Philippines.

Once the real war began Wake Island became unimportant. The Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor anyway. The Philippines were expected to fall anyway. The war shifted to the Southern Pacific. The purpose of the Guadalcanal campaign was to keep Australia from being cut off. Wake Island had no more strategic value to the US.

Maybe the 2nd Raider Battalion could have made a raid on Wake instead of Makin?
 
In 1941 Wake Island had strategic value for two basic reasons:

1. Wake Island would act as a picket for Pearl Harbor. In case of war patrol craft could operate from the island and either detect the Japanese fleet or recon the Marshall Islands. If the Japanese attacked Wake Island it would act as a warning bell to Hawaii.
2. Wake Island was a refueling stop for bombers flying to the Philippines.

Once the real war began Wake Island became unimportant. The Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor anyway. The Philippines were expected to fall anyway. The war shifted to the Southern Pacific. The purpose of the Guadalcanal campaign was to keep Australia from being cut off. Wake Island had no more strategic value to the US.

Maybe the 2nd Raider Battalion could have made a raid on Wake instead of Makin?

This, if the US had wanted to retake Wake, it could have done so at some point from late 1943 on. The fact that the US expended considerable effort to retake Attu and Kiska despite their lack of strategic value shows just how far down on the priority list Wake was.
 
This, if the US had wanted to retake Wake, it could have done so at some point from late 1943 on. The fact that the US expended considerable effort to retake Attu and Kiska despite their lack of strategic value shows just how far down on the priority list Wake was.

True. I think Attu and Kiska would also have had a greater morale and political value than Wake, and I guess presumed to pose a greater threat than Wake. (Greater in relative terms.)
 

McPherson

Banned
This, if the US had wanted to retake Wake, it could have done so at some point from late 1943 on. The fact that the US expended considerable effort to retake Attu and Kiska despite their lack of strategic value shows just how far down on the priority list Wake was.

True. I think Attu and Kiska would also have had a greater morale and political value than Wake, and I guess presumed to pose a greater threat than Wake. (Greater in relative terms.)

Politics. Attu and Kiska were American soil (Alaska) in a way that Wake was not.
 
Politics. Attu and Kiska were American soil (Alaska) in a way that Wake was not.

Concur, although given the valiant stand of Wake's defenders I do not think it is too hard to create a POD where there is some sort of demand in high places to recapture Wake. Maybe as part of the carrier raids that took place against the island in the early fall of 1943 or something like that.

Also, while I agree that politics was the primary driver of the operations to recapture the outer Aleutians, there was a strategic component (however misguided) for both sides in the North Pacific because both sides grossly overestimated the viability of the route for the other side and thus the necessity of defending it. I call this strategy by map or strategy by game board. It's the sort of thing that looks great when looking at a map or the Axis and Allies gameboard because Attu is only 1500 miles from Hokkaido and only 2000 from Tokyo but it quickly goes to pieces when accounting for things like weather, 24 hour darkness part of the year, the complete lack of infrastructure, and the sheer nightmare of sustaining even limited forces up there, etc.
 
Along with all the reasons given so far, another reason was it (Wake) made a excellent impact area to train navy pilots on their route to the front lines.
 
Any morale value from recapture would be strongest in late 1942/early 1943. Victories elsewhere would overshadow it after that.
If things are the same as OTL the problem is where do you get the troops to carry out a Wake Island Invasion in 1943? The Marines are tasked out with fighting in the Solomon Islands. or getting ready to invade Tarawa. The Army's 7th Infantry Division was invading Attu Island in the summer of 1943.
If the Japanese do not build an airfield at Guadalcanal in 1942 or do not land in the Aleutians then I could see a recapture Wake Island operation being brought up as America's first counteroffensive. What if in the aftermath of the Battle of Midway US carriers made a raid on Wake Island and USAAF bombers began making regular raids on the island. (The Island was attacked in Feb. 1942 by US carriers and USAAF B-24s bombed it Christmas Eve 1942.)

Could the USA retake Wake, certainly. Was it worth it, nope.

I wonder what the assault on Wake Island would have looked like. Let's say the 2nd Marine Division made the assault. Would the battle be over in a day? I don't think the Japanese made much improvements over where US contractors left off in 1941.
 
If things are the same as OTL the problem is where do you get the troops to carry out a Wake Island Invasion in 1943? The Marines are tasked out with fighting in the Solomon Islands. or getting ready to invade Tarawa. The Army's 7th Infantry Division was invading Attu Island in the summer of 1943. ...

There were others available. More important was where the amphib lift would come from. Between the SPac & the MTO there was a high demand.
 
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