Plausibility Exercise: Warsaw Pact Attacks NATO Nukes in Europe Conventionally?

Well, it's a long title, but I was wondering what some of our more learned members have to think about this.

With the advent of the US Tomahawks in the 1980's, people started talking about how NATO could seriously degrade the Warsaw Pacts theater and strategic nuclear capabilities using conventional weapons; the Soviets would probably have started getting antsy if Backfire bases and SS-20's (I think?) started getting plowed over by NATO conventional weapons.

The mid- to late-1970's are considered by many to be the nadir for NATO in terms of its ability to hold off a conventional assault by the Warsaw Pact. It seemed likely that NATO would have to resort to a nuclear shot across the Army Group if/when things got out of hand, with resulting nastiness.

Would it have been possible for the Soviets and their Allies to obliterate NATO's European theater nuclear systems by conventional means quickly at the opening of a war in the mid- late-1970's? If such a thing did occur, would a Ford- or Carter-led West opt for Armageddon, or...what?

I have a sneaky suspicion that the answer is going to be something along the lines of, "There's no way the Warsaw pact is going to smash every Pershing, Western European airfield, and carrier group, and if it looks like they might, the gloves will come off," but I'm curious all the same.
 
In my view the invariably result of large-scale war in Europe would be at the very least a limited nuclear war, and most likely a full scale exchange.
 
If the Pact can get through and attack said bases with airstrikes/cruise missiles/Spetznaz teams*, they could render a limited nuclear exchange less likely. However, this could result in it going nuclear earlier...and heavier...

* Interestingly, the first Pershing missile "deployed" was a replica at a Spetznaz training facility, designed to be used for sabotage.
 
Given the fact the Warsaw Pact operational plans consistently relied on the use of nukes on the opening minutes of the war to desagregate NATO troop concentrations and frontlines, I think the plausibility requires a very different Warsaw Pact, meaning a very different Russia.

Perhaps a Russia making quite clear it's only waging a very limited war with NATO nations, with something else than zero-sum war objectives in mind ?

Given the vast nuclear arsenals on both sides, the rationale behind the decision to go conventional all the way has to be the key plausibility factor here.
 
It's a wild risky gamble for the Warsaw Pact to attack, what with the threat of nuclear annhilation and everything - they'd have to be desperate to do it. If they are desperate, they are probably in no fit state to attack. Same applies to a NATO attack on the Pact too.

The only scenario I can see either launching a deliberate war involve ASBs. Accidental war is a different matter though.
 
Erm...let me rephrase, since it isn't obvious enough that I'm NOT asking "WI Warsaw Pact/NATO War?"

Assuming a conventional confrontation featuring a Warsaw Pact attack, do they have the firepower in the mid- to late-1970's to quickly neutralize, say, 75-90% of NATO theater nuclear assets in Western Europe?

Furthermore I am aware that most information on Warsaw Pact plans involve early use of nuclear weapons, but that is not the case in this exercise and I would prefer people to answer the question if possible, and not tell me what I already know.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
Erm...let me rephrase, since it isn't obvious enough that I'm NOT asking "WI Warsaw Pact/NATO War?"

Assuming a conventional confrontation featuring a Warsaw Pact attack, do they have the firepower in the mid- to late-1970's to quickly neutralize, say, 75-90% of NATO theater nuclear assets in Western Europe?

Furthermore I am aware that most information on Warsaw Pact plans involve early use of nuclear weapons, but that is not the case in this exercise and I would prefer people to answer the question if possible, and not tell me what I already know.

I'm going to have to say...Yes, with a but.

NATO didn't have SAM systems like the Soviets did, mostly because the Soviets knew they'd probably not get air-superiority and they'd have to fight the western aircraft from the ground.
What the Soviets had was an enormous amount of aircraft (though whether they could get them all operational for that large a strike and without the western intelligence knowing is probably not likely) that could probably hit the silos in France, and the British, American, French, and American-armed Canadian tactical nuclear weapons in Germany.
It'd take a terrible toll on their airpower. Especially the Backfires or what-have-you that are going into France to hit their silos. They'd be writeoffs.
I suppose they could do it, yes. But they would barely have anything left as far as fixed wing airpower goes. And NATO would be coming.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
So they hit the Pershing IIs, maybe even the nuke stores in Germany. The difficulty is that the bunkers where the warheads were stored were designed to survive a near miss (300 meters) by a one MT ground burst. What are going to hit the bunkers with that will do that sort of damage?

The Pershings were also not the only (or even main) tactical nukes in theater. Pershings were more of a strategic assest, at least the way they were deployed than a tactical weapon.

You have the Sergeant (MGM-29) in service until 1977 and the Lance (MGM-52) after that as U.S. Army tactical battlefield missiles. Both are fully mobile and difficult as all hell to find and kill (imagine solid fueled Scuds and you have a decent idea). The USAF has the Bullpup & Hounddog stand-off missile in service; while the Navy has both the Bullpup and the Walleye.

You MIGHT get some SF teams in, assuming it is a true bolt out of the blue, but not to all the sites. You will certainly not get all the sites in the UK, you will not get the carriers in the Med (and if, by some god-awful accident you DO get a carrier and it's east of Cyrpus you have now hit a U.S. strategic asset). Even if you do get ALL the bunkers (almost ASB, but WTH), what are you going to do about the almost casual ability of the U.S. to replace the dual use aircraft and aircraft nukes in a few hours? Especially after you have kicked the U.S. up to DEFCON2 and the POTUS into the air on Looking Glass?

Almost impossible to get all the nukes stored around Europe, it IS impossible to get the nukes in the U.S., the Brits have Resolution Class SSBN in service and the French have the Redoutable boats in service (and one would imagine that both France and Britain would be a bit peeved) so they have an independent nuclear option even if the U.S. somehow quailed in the face of such an attack (Not that it would be very likely. Try to picture Nixon backing down; and Jimmy Carter was an Academy grad), and the U.S. has sufficient weapons to get back into the tac nuke business in hours.

Very, VERY big gamble with very little potential ROI.
 
NATO didn't have SAM systems like the Soviets did, mostly because the Soviets knew they'd probably not get air-superiority and they'd have to fight the western aircraft from the ground.

NATO had extensive SAM systems deployed, although they did not get as much press coverage as WP systems. There were numerous interlapping Nike and Hawk units in permamenent readiness while the airbases were covered with shorter range systems (ie. for the time period Redeye and Bofors 40 L/70 and 75mm Skysweeper systems).
 
I'm going to have to say...Yes, with a but.

Actually its a resounding "not a snowballs in hell".

The Russians did not have any air-dropped conventional weapons capable of doing anything to a nuke cilo. Not a single thing. No bunker busters, penetrators, LGB's, nothing.

The ONLY way the Russians were going to take out nuke cilos is with nukes.

In a conventional war in the 80's, Nato gets its nose broken badly in the opening round, then gets back up and doesn't stop till it gets to the bearing straights. The Russians would have gone nuclear at the start.
 
You can also add the french air force and navy tactical nukes and army tank-born Pluton missiles to the list of tactical nukes in the west in the 70s.

Pluton were based on an AMX-30 MBT chassis.

ALso, for strategic weapons, in addition to SLBM, and Mirage IV bombers, France had land based ICBM then.

Quite a lot of targets, some of them quite hard
 
You can also add the french air force and navy tactical nukes and army tank-born Pluton missiles to the list of tactical nukes in the west in the 70s.

Pluton were based on an AMX-30 MBT chassis.

ALso, for strategic weapons, in addition to SLBM, and Mirage IV bombers, France had land based ICBM then.

Quite a lot of targets, some of them quite hard
Which raises the question of whether the russians try to take out the french arsenal (which I think is part of the scenario) and whether the french launch as soon as somebody goes for their deterrent (IMO quite possible).
 

MacCaulay

Banned
The Russians did not have any air-dropped conventional weapons capable of doing anything to a nuke cilo. Not a single thing. No bunker busters, penetrators, LGB's, nothing.

The ONLY way the Russians were going to take out nuke cilos is with nukes.

Something I kind of changed my mind on when Cal made a very well reasoned argument.

In a conventional war in the 80's, Nato gets its nose broken badly in the opening round, then gets back up and doesn't stop till it gets to the bearing straights. The Russians would have gone nuclear at the start.

I'd probably disagree with you on the Bering Straits part. But I assume you're saying that for dramatic effect. Like the "snowball's chance in hell."
 
Actually its a resounding "not a snowballs in hell".

The Russians did not have any air-dropped conventional weapons capable of doing anything to a nuke cilo. Not a single thing. No bunker busters, penetrators, LGB's, nothing.

The ONLY way the Russians were going to take out nuke cilos is with nukes.

In a conventional war in the 80's, Nato gets its nose broken badly in the opening round, then gets back up and doesn't stop till it gets to the bearing straights. The Russians would have gone nuclear at the start.

Well, I would hardly consider France's deterrent to be "theater" weapons. In fact, it might make more sense for a Soviet offensive in 1975 to leave France's nuclear devices alone.

I guess I should clarify what sort of scenario I had in mind:

For some reason, the USSR decides to invade Western Europe with limited aims in mind, I don't know why...but it's mostly a feasibility exercise anyway. It seems to me, and to experts like CalBear, that the USSR has a conventional advantage in Western Europe at this time. If the war is kept conventional, the Soviet Union has a possible opportunity of defeating the NATO ground forces and ending any significant conventional threat to its domination of Europe. I want to clarify here that NATO knows that the attack is coming, but that its caught off-guard a little bit.

The problem with this is that it is pretty well-known that NATO would resort to tactical nuclear weapons if faced with conventional defeat by Warsaw Pact forces. The goal, then, is to eliminate NATO's ability to respond with 90% of their tactical/low-level theater weapons, so as to make a NATO "shot across the Army Group" highly dangerous in terms of escalation opportunities, while allowing Warsaw Pact forces to continue to advance even in the face of tactical nuclear weapons.

Attacking strategic weapons is a no-no. I guess I didn't state that quite clearly, but going after hardened silos such as those containing France's ultimate deterrent is right-out, since while they may be located "in-theater", they are also never going to be used against Warsaw Pact conventional forces. For that same reason, massive conventional attacks against SSBN bases are also ruled-out, since the weapons on the French and UK SSBN's are, again, not likely to be used on Warsaw Pact conventional forces, and would rightly be considered attacks on strategic nuclear delivery systems. Attacking V-bomber bases and Mirage IV bases is probably also not going to happen, for similar reasons.

It doesn't really fit here, but I would say that it might be worth considering whether or not France is even involved. Possibly France tension with the rest of NATO could be exploited to leave them out of the struggle in the first place? It would certainly make the task easier...even if it is unlikely.

So where does that leave us?

1. Ground-based missiles/artillery. Going with a date of 1975, the following theater/tactical-level weapons are in Western Europe:

  • Honest John
  • Lance
  • Sergeant
  • Pershing Ia
  • Artillery (SP Howitzers, Field Guns, etc)
  • (Possibly: Pluton, French missiles)

I haven't been able to come across numbers for most of these, but they seem to be quite numerous. The Pershings are almost theater/strategic-level, but since they were targeted at Warsaw Pact locations where a "second echelon" of conventional troops would be mustered, I think they can be targeted as well.

There are 180 Pershings spread out in Germany. Assuming that these are "mostly" prepared for action, I think it's safe to say that these are extremely important to target, especially since the delivery systems and warheads are not divorced as in several other systems.

The short-range NATO rockets such as Honest John (being phased out in 1975), Lance (being phased in at the 1975 date), and Sergeant (practically gone, final phase-out 1977) are next on the list, since they are mostly intended (if not entirely so) for delivering tactical nuclear weapons. I wonder whether these delivery systems had their nuclear devices with them. I would imagine that in a crisis devices would be rushed to the weapons...if the Soviets' Spetsnaz units can hinder these warheads' movement from storage locations, that could really minimize these systems' utility. Hitting France's Pluton's would be really hard, but perhaps France isn't in the equation anyway. If anyone could give me deployment numbers on these systems, I would be very happy!

As for artillery, its going to be impossible to destroy all nuclear-capable artillery. The "good" news is that any disruption in getting warheads out to the devices will limit the number that can be used, and that the conventional onslaught will probably see many of these delivery systems destroyed in conventional combat during the first few days of war.

2. Land/sea-based aircraft.

Basically, an ass-load of NATO conventional aircraft are dual-use, and these dual-use aircraft are not going to be really easy to destroy, especially using conventional weapons only (i.e., the point of this exercise).

I've run out of steam here, but does this shed any more light on the situation I'm thinking of here? Any contribution is appreciated. :)
 
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